

RESISTING INTERVENTION: American Policy and the Lin Ch'eng Incident

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The decade following World War One was marked by the rise in China of hostility toward foreigners manifested in attacks on foreign residents and their enterprises. These xenophobic incidents stemmed from several factors: ascendant Chinese nationalism of the May Fourth era, the rise of banditry by renegade soldiers, and the growing influence of Bolshevik propaganda upon students and labor groups. Attacks on foreign residents resulted in demands upon foreign governments for greater protection of life and property from their nationals engaged in commercial, missionary or other legitimate pursuits.⁽¹⁾ Concerned for the safety of their nationals, western diplomats called for "strong concerted action" to secure the Chinese countryside. The possibility of foreign intervention loomed ominously as ineffective Peking governments were manipulated by warlord factions.⁽²⁾

It had been the hope of the American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, that the Washington Conference would aid China in establishing a stable and effective government which would restore order if "given a chance" and make intervention by the Powers unnecessary.⁽³⁾ Contrary to Hughes' hopes, conditions in China after the Conference worsened. The resumption of civil war in April, 1922, between the rival Chihli and Fengtien warlord cliques threatened the Peking-Tientsin area and prompted Jacob Gould Schurman, the

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- (1) By 1922 there were nine thousand Americans living in China. H. G. W. Woodhead, ed., *The China Year Book*, 1924 (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press), p. 30.
 - (2) The desire to protect one's nationals often resulted in military intervention, see Frederick B. Hoyt. "Protection Implies Intervention: The U. S. Catholic Mission at Kanchow," *The Historian* XXXVIII:4 (August 1976), pp. 709-727.
 - (3) Charles Evans Hughes, "Some Aspects of Our Foreign Policy", *American Historical Association Annual Report*, I (1922), p. 264. An address delivered before the Association conference for that year.

American Minister to China, to request an increase in the Legation Guard. Hughes rejected, however, Schurman's suggestion that additional forces be sent to protect Americans in Tientsin. (4)

Chinese warfare aggravated the problem of banditry as unemployed troops and deserters looted and ravaged the countryside. Conditions in Hunan became so unbearable in 1922 that many foreigners and missionaries left the province. (5) The murder of Dr. A. L. Shelton, an American missionary, by Chinese bandits in Szech'uan in March was followed by the looting of an American mission in Kaying, Kwangtung. In October 1922, several American missionaries were held hostage by Chinese soldiers who sought acceptance of their demands for recognition of their military rank and pay from their superior officers. Schurman remonstrated personally with Generals Wu P'ei-fu and Feng Yü-hsiang, the commanders of the military units involved. (6)

Secretary Hughes left the diplomacy of these incidents to Schurman who informed the Peking government that they would be held responsible for the protection of American residents. (7) Hughes' policy was in accord with the traditional American position on protection of life and property in China and with the nonintervention pledges of the Washington Conference. Hughes stated that it was not "part of this country's purpose to impress upon the Chinese Government or people the military power or prestige of this country. (8) This position was to be seriously tested by an incident that occurred in May, 1923.

In the early morning hours of May 6, 1923, China's crack "Blue Express", while travelling north on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad was wrecked by bandits at Lin-ch'eng, near Tsinan, in Shantung province. After looting the train and

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- (4) See exchange of correspondence between Hughes and Schurman, April 24-27, 1922, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1922, I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 692-696. Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.
- (5) U.S. Department of State, *China Since the Revolution of 1911*, Confidential Series D, No. 84, China No. 41 (Washington, D.C.: 1925), p. 125.
- (6) Schurman to Hughes, Oct. 17; Nov. 4, 16, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, I, pp. 864-867.
- (7) Schurman to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yen), June 17, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, I, p. 863.
- (8) Hughes to Secretary of War Weeks, Nov. 8, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, I, p. 873.

killing a British citizen who resisted; the bandits took about two-hundred passengers hostage. Among the twenty-six foreign passengers, there were fifteen Americans, including the sister-in-law of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Miss Lucy Aldrich, and her two female companions.⁽⁹⁾

Jacob Schurman went to Tsinan immediately upon hearing of the event that Sunday, May 6th. The Minister telegraphed Marshal Ts'ao K'un, Inspector General of Chihli, Shantung and Honan provinces, that he "counted on him to press matters unremittingly and effectively until captives are released," and made similar declarations to other civilian and military officials. Marshal Ts'ao responded by sending troops to deal with the bandits who had fled with their hostages to a mountain hideout at Pao-tu-ku, forty miles away.⁽¹⁰⁾

For unknown reasons, the bandits released Miss Aldrich, along with six other captives, the day after their capture.⁽¹¹⁾ Schurman had these people rushed to Shantung Christian University Hospital for medical care and visited them there. During the first few days of the kidnapping, the American Minister brought to bear his talent for organization. He assembled a staff of American military and consular personnel from Peking and nearby Nanking to observe conditions and report; he had medical supplies, bedding, and foodstuffs rushed in from U. S. military posts; he called upon the services of the Asia Development Company to send technicians to repair the train and the track, and he called in the Red Cross who began a steady flow of food and other supplies which were

(9) For an account by an American journalist in China who was among the captives see John B. Powell, *My Twenty-Five Years in China* (N. Y.: The MacMillan Company, 1945), Chapter XI, pp. 92-124. The other American captives were Miss Lucy Aldrich, Major and Mrs. R. A. Allen and one son, Leon Friedman, J. A. Henley, L. Lehrbas, Miss Minnie McFadden, Major and Mrs. R. W. Pinger and their two sons, Miss Schonberg, and L. C. Solomon. The initial news reports proved to be unreliable, see *The New York Times* which reported eighteen Americans captured and an American military officer killed. Later reports that Major Pinger was wounded were false. *The New York Times*, May 7, 8, 1923.

(10) Bell to Hughes, May 9, 1923. *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 632.

(11) Released were Miss Aldrich and her two companions, Miss McFadden and Miss Schonberg, Mrs. R. A. Allen, Mrs. R. W. Pinger and one son, and Mr. Lehrbas, *ibid.*, p. 631. The only plausible reason for the release of these prisoners was that most were women, yet Mr. Lehrbas was not injured and the Chinese took and kept a number of injured prisoners.

forwarded to the captives after contact with the bandits was established. Although Schurman called upon every military commander of any importance, he

... abstained and advised vice-consul to abstain from giving any suggestions to Shantung authorities as to the methods they should employ in bringing about the immediate release of the captives which is the one thing we insist upon in all official conversations as our right. ⁽¹²⁾

Between May 10 and 17, Schurman was in Shanghai to fulfill a tour arranged prior to the train wreck. ⁽¹³⁾ He inspected the American Consulate, visited American business and educational institutions, and spoke at several tiffins given in his honor. During this trip the Minister was kept informed of any new developments at Lin-ch'eng or Peking.

Upon his return to Peking on May 18, Jacob Schurman informed the State Department that he considered a proposal from the Diplomatic Corps for a joint naval demonstration at Taku "to remind the people of China that there is a point beyond which we cannot be flouted," was "unnecessary at the present time ... because all Chinese Government officials are doing their utmost to effect the release of the captives" and a naval demonstration might only serve to delay their release since the bandits might exaggerate the significance and delay in hopes for a greater settlement. ⁽¹⁴⁾

On May 19, the bandits released a French citizen, Marcel Berube, who reported the outlaws' demands to the President of China: (1) withdrawal of

(12) Ibid., p. 633.

(13) Schurman had originally planned to leave May 6 to visit the repair work along the Yellow River dikes at the Li-ch'ing district near Tsinan and then proceed to Shanghai. This trip was to coincide with the sailing of Mrs. Schurman, aboard the SS *President Taft*, for America on May 12. Mrs. Schurman was returning on holiday to visit Jacob Gould Schurman Jr., who was married to Miss Mary Cushman on April 10, 1923. Schurman to Hughes, May 6, 1923, Schurman Personnel File number 123 Sch 87/, U.S. Department of State, Decimal Files, Record Group 59, the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as *S.D.F.*

(14) Schurman to Hughes, May 18, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 641-643. It is apparent from the Minister's early despatches that he believed the captives would be released in a very few days.

all Chinese troops then encircling the bandits' base before negotiations would commence, (2) incorporation into the Chinese armies, (3) food supplies during negotiations, and (4) a guarantee for their security by the six foreign powers.⁽¹⁵⁾ The Chinese Government withdrew some of its troops and continued to negotiate with the bandits.

Schurman reported that the announcement of these terms had outraged foreign groups in China who were calling for intervention on a wide front including the disbandment of Chinese troops by means of foreign military forces, foreign control of Chinese railroads and their finances, the maintenance of foreign garrisons at strategic points in the interior of China, and the "sweeping away" of the Chinese Government and establishment of an "international re-gency." The mood, as the Minister saw it, was "to use the Lincheng outrage as a reason for reforming China generally as well as for the protection of foreigners."⁽¹⁶⁾ He declared that his own policy was "to keep hammering at the Chinese Government for the immediate and safe release of our nationals and to hold up to them their exclusive responsibility," and requested of the Secretary "confidential instructions for any private guidance at your earliest convenience."⁽¹⁷⁾ Until this time Secretary Hughes had left the diplomacy of the incident to Schurman who kept him informed. The delay in securing the prisoner's release and the pressure of appeals from various groups in China and at home may have prompted Hughes to action.

Hughes consulted with President Harding and on June 1, 1923, he cabled Schurman that "any attempt to bring comprehensive or general armed pressure upon China would be useless," and that such intervention

... might involve difficulties and compromises in the policies of this Government and might be the occasion for the entrenchment of other

(15) Schurman to Hughes, May 2-, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 643-644.

(16) Schurman to Hughes, May 23, 26, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 644-649; *The China Weekly Review*, XXIV (May 19, 1923), pp. 434-436; *The New York Times*, May 20, 1923, called upon American businessmen to demand action from Washington.

(17) Schurman to Hughes, May 26, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 649.

nations in a position which would facilitate, ultimately, their control over the economic and political development of China. The only condition under which serious consideration would be given to the subject of a general intervention in China would be such a degree of disorder and chaos as would be a definite threat to the whole system of foreign interests and residence in that country. (18)

While he opposed massive intervention, Hughes suggested that a limited display of force was “not incompatible” and would serve “to restore and increase foreign prestige in China by impressing upon the Chinese people and Government the necessity of respecting foreign nationals and property.” (19)

Schurman met with Acting Foreign Minister Shen Jui-lin on May 30; Shen assured him that the Chinese Government was taking strong action and that progress was being made in the negotiations with the bandits. (20) On June 6, Schurman telegraphed Hughes that:

... it would be a mistake for foreign forces to occupy the Tientsin-Pukow Railway unless such occupation becomes necessary in order to secure the release of the foreigners still held captive.... The occupation of the Railway would doubtless provoke Chinese resentment and might not only create antiforeign resentment but also lead to acts of hostility against unprotected foreigners.... All the provinces are cursed with banditry.... The Chinese themselves must therefore solve the problem. (21)

The Minister concluded with his belief that, in view of the situation, the Chinese might entertain suggestions for the use of foreign-trained police and foreign inspection, but that railway police should be under the “supreme control”

(18) Hughes to Schurman, June 1, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 650-651.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 651.

(20) Wai-chiao-pu file, May 30, 1923, U.S. Legation Dialogue No. (20), quoted in Wang Yü-chun, *Ssu-er-man Tsai-hua Wai-chiao Huo-tung Ch'u-t'an i-chiu-er-i--i-chiu-er-wu* [“Jacob Gould Schurman’s Diplomatic Activities in China, 1921-1925”], (*Journal of the Institute of Modern History*, Academia Sinica) I (August 31, 1969), p. 279, hereafter cited as *Schurman in China*.

(21) Schurman to Hughes, June 6, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 653.

of Peking. Secretary Hughes did not press his recommendation for the use of force.

After the remaining captives were released by the bandits on June 12, the Diplomatic Corps in Peking commenced discussions to formulate a statement of demands to be presented to the Peking authorities. On June 14, an "International Committee" was formed to draft a set of demands.⁽²²⁾ After agreement that the demands should include monetary compensation for the captives and punishment for the responsible officials, the Committee fell into disarray. Schurman wrote that he agreed that monetary compensation should be made for loss of earnings, loss of valuables, personal injury, disability, or death, but he stood alone in opposing an "indemnity" for the captives at the rate of \$500 a day for each of the first three days and \$100 a day for each day thereafter. He stated the reasons for his opposition:

1. Such an indemnity added to the exhaustive compensation for which provision is made would not, in my opinion, be allowed by a court of equity or justice.
2. It brings in a new principle for the assessment of damages against the Government of China.⁽²³⁾

At subsequent meetings the Committee agreed that China must give some future guarantee against acts of banditry; they proposed that this be done through reorganization of the railway police directly under the Chinese Foreign Office and through the employment of foreign managers and supervisors. Schurman opposed these suggestions and Japan also expressed dissent.⁽²⁴⁾ The Minister reported that the Committee proposed the settlement of three outstanding, but unrelated, issues be made part of the demands. These were the improvement

(22) Schurman to Hughes, June 14, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 658. The "International Committee" was composed of the Ministers of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United States, and the Charge d'affaires of Japan.

(23) *Ibid.*, pp. 658-659.

(24) Schurman to Hughes, June 15, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 659-660. It should be noted that Japan had no nationals held captive and had only recently restored the Shantung railroads to China as a result of the Shantung Settlement of 1922.

of the harbour at Shanghai, the extension of the Shanghai International Settlement, and, the settlement of the question of the Shanghai Mixed Court. ⁽²⁵⁾ Schurman made no specific comment on these demands but noted that the Committee itself believed the terms would not be acceptable to the Chinese Government. ⁽²⁶⁾

Secretary Hughes strongly opposed the inclusion of extraneous demands based on "ulterior motives" and stated that any program of demands to be presented to the Chinese Government should be grounded upon principles of elementary justice whose fairness "will instinctively appeal to the Chinese people."⁽²⁷⁾ The Minister viewed the demands with "a certain detachment" but expressed regret that the Secretary's position

... would seem to make impossible the imposition of any progressive sanctions whatever and thus cost diplomatic body loss of self-respect, prestige and face: such loss would affect disadvantageously the influence of the nations having representatives in the diplomatic body and especially those who had nationals in the Lincheng capture. ⁽²⁸⁾

Hughes replied to Schurman's concern for American prestige and bargaining leverage with the proposal that, while "not prepared to recommend any demonstration in force," a small international force of 100 men from each nation might be stationed at Tsinan as "a penalty for the outrage at Lincheng and also

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 660. The Shanghai Mixed Court was established in 1864 to handle cases which did not come clearly within the jurisdiction of the Chinese or foreign consular courts. The Powers took control of the Court during the Revolution of 1911 and refused to return it to the Chinese until certain administrative reforms had been complied with. China's appeals at Versailles in 1919, and at the Washington Conference failed to regain the Court to her control. The Powers refused to consider the Court separate from the issue of extraterritoriality and demanded that retrocession be contingent upon the extension of the International Settlement and the improvement of the harbor at Shanghai. Anatol Kotenev, *Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council* (Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd., 1925), pp. 273-275.

(26) Schurman to Hughes, June 15, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 660. Schurman apparently accepted the inclusion of these demands as part of a compromise. He noted: "In the opinion of the Commission, however, the terms are reasonable. The sanctions include no money indemnities and apart from the punishment of individuals they will be as beneficial to the Chinese people as to foreigners." *Idem.*

(27) Hughes to Schurman, June 21, 1923, *S. D. F.* 393.1123 Lincheng/159a.

(28) Schurman to Hughes, June 23, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 665-666.

serve as a warning to the officials of Shantung and of other provinces. ⁽²⁹⁾ Schurman advised against this plan and, as an alternative to "strengthen the note presented by the Diplomatic Corps," he suggested reinforcing international garrisons maintained in the treaty ports as authorized by treaty arrangement. ⁽³⁰⁾

The Peking Diplomatic Corps remained divided on the question of future guarantees for the protection of foreigners in China. The American and Japanese representatives continued to oppose the reorganization of railroad police under the control of foreign personnel. At their June 14, meeting, the Committee took up monetary compensation and discussed tentative figures. At subsequent meetings the amount of compensation became a serious issue.

The tenth session of the Committee on July 9 was marked by a prolonged debate on the amount of compensation to be granted the former captives. One report stated that "certain foreign diplomats" were demanding an indemnity of \$25,000 silver for each prisoner but this was opposed by another diplomat. ⁽³¹⁾ On July 16, the amount of compensation originally discussed was adjusted upward to the following scale: \$500 silver a day for the first three days of capture, \$100 a day for the next week of capture, \$150 a day for the next week, \$200 a day for the next, \$250 a day for the next and \$300 a day for the last week of capture. An indemnity of 20,000 silver dollars was to be paid to the family of the Englishman killed during the kidnapping. ⁽³²⁾

Upon completion of the deliberations of the Committee, the "Lincheng Note"

(29) Hughes to Schurman, June 23, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 666.

(30) Schurman to Hughes, June 25, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 669.

(31) *Shun-T'ien-Shih-Pao* 順天時報 July 10, 1923, p. 1. This Peking daily newspaper expressed grave concern over the meetings of the Diplomatic Corps concerning the Lin-ch'eng issue.

(32) *Ibid.*, July 20, 1923, p. 1. Schurman to Hughes, July 16, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, L, pp. 678-679. Schurman did not report the demands for large indemnities and the Diplomatic Corps subsequently denied rumors that they had reduced their demands as a result of disagreement in the Committee, see *Shun-T'ien-Shih-Pao*, July 20, 1923, p. 1. Yet in a long interview with Schurman on August 22, 1923, the Chinese Foreign Minister V.K. Wellington Koo thanked Schurman for his role in reducing the indemnity demands, see Wai-chiao-pu file, August 22, 1923, U.S. Legation Dialogue No. 23 as quoted in Wang, *Schurman in China*, pp. 283-285. Dr. Koo told the present author that Schurman opposed strong indemnity demands and sought for just compensation. Interview with Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo on May 12, 1971.

of the Powers was handed to Foreign Minister Koo on August 10, 1923. The note called for compensation for the victims according to the schedule agreed upon July 16th, a general reform of the railroad administration and police "under the supervision of foreign officers," and punishment and dismissal of the Military Governor of Shantung province and his subordinates.⁽³³⁾

Although the "Lincheng Note" carried the implied threat of strong foreign action in China, at the time it was presented there was no agreement as to what specific course the Powers would pursue. The Diplomatic Corps was, in fact, dealing with a Chinese Government in name only. In a dispute over the drafting of a new constitution, Ts'ao K'un intimidated the Peking administration and, on June 6, 1923, Premier Chang Shao-ts'eng resigned. The following day General Feng Yu-hsiang announced that he would not be responsible for the maintenance of order in the capital. Several days later the municipal police went on strike and demanded their back pay. On the thirteenth of June President Li Yuan-hung left the city and the next day the cabinet announced it was assuming the function of the Presidency. This "Regency Cabinet" served as provisional government until Ts'ao K'un was 'elected' President through bribery and intimidation on October 10, 1923.⁽³⁴⁾

In view of these developments the Committee met to discuss means of coercion. Schurman wrote Hughes that the Powers were considering withdrawal of recognition from the Peking Government as an alternative to the use of force, but stated that, while he believed the situation would continue to deteriorate, "if Legations were withdrawn [from Peking, relations with rehabilitated China would be embarrassed, peace between other nations with interests in China put in jeopardy and the lives and property of foreign nationals left in the meantime to grave and intolerable risks."⁽³⁵⁾

(33) The Diplomatic Corps at Peking to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wellington Koo), August 10, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, L, pp. 682-688.

(34) Chien-nung Li, *The Political History of China* (Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 432-435; Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York.: The MacMillan Company, 1933), pp. 258-259.

(35) Schurman to Hughes, June 10, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 513.

Hughes' earlier objection to a strong show of force has already been discussed. He seemed inclined, however, to some unorthodox form of partial withdrawal of recognition. He informed Schurman:

... it is not the Department's view that withdrawal of recognition from the Peking Government would involve withdrawing from Peking the Legations, which would continue to function for the maintenance of *de facto* relations with the Chinese authorities, for the transaction of business among themselves, for... Consular services, ... [and] protection of their national interests...⁽³⁶⁾

The threat of non-recognition was apparently designed to induce Peking to accept the "Lincheng Note" since withdrawal of recognition would enable the Powers to withhold the customs surplus revenue which they remitted to the Chinese Government, and without which no government could sustain itself in power.⁽³⁷⁾ Hughes did not specifically state that it was this feature which attracted him to non-recognition but we may surmise that he and his advisors must have considered it.

The Committee continued to draft a plan for railway reorganization to be presented to the Chinese Government. Hughes and Schurman, with the support of the Japanese Government, succeeded in effecting compromises in the original plan submitted by the British Minister. When presented to the Chinese Foreign Minister on August 28, the final plan called for the following essential reforms: (1) the establishment of a directorate of Chinese Railway Police, headed by a Chinese Director who would be assisted by a foreign Associate Director appointed by China with the approval of the Diplomatic Corps. The Directorate would be an agency of the Ministry of Commerce; (2) the employment of foreign

(36) Hughes to Schurman, July 24, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 680.

(37) The Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs Service, under the direction of a foreign Inspector-General, collected all customs revenue, withheld portions sufficient to meet payments on loans and/or indemnities secured on the customs receipts, and remitted the balance, or "customs surplus" to the Chinese Government. See Westel W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, II (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 768-772.

“instructors” and “inspectors” to assist in maintaining the secure operation of the railroads; (3) China was to draft a detailed scheme of railroad reorganization to be subject to recommendations but not approval of the Diplomatic Corps, and, (4) the reorganization to be applied first to the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and gradually extended to other railways. ⁽³⁸⁾

While waiting for the Chinese reply to the Lin-ch'eng demands Schurman continued to see Foreign Minister Koo. On August 29, and again on September 21, Schurman urged Koo to give a prompt reply to the Diplomatic Corps. ⁽³⁹⁾ At the later meeting Koo told Schurman a reply would be made on September 24, and added that the dismissal of the Military Governor of Shantung, General T'ien Chung-yu, was the greatest obstacle. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

The reply of the Chinese Government to the “Lincheng Note” of the Powers was a carefully worded statement. Koo refuted the basis for each item of the Diplomatic Corps' demands. The Chinese Government would agree to an equitable “reparation” for the foreign victims, but denied that the incident was anti-foreign in character, as charged, and stated that it represented nothing more than an unfortunate act of banditry. The Powers' demands for “guarantee” and “sanctions” were dismissed as matters already being dealt with or subject to the exclusive purview of Chinese law. ⁽⁴¹⁾ At another meeting the Diplomatic Corps decided not to engage in polemics but merely to inform the Chinese that the reply was unsatisfactory and reiterate the demands of August 10. ⁽⁴²⁾

In Washington, the Chinese Minister to the United States, Dr. Alfred Sao-Ke Sze met with Secretary Hughes on October 2 and conveyed an appeal from Koo who had “long appreciated the Secretary's friendship.” Hughes said

(38) For a discussion of how this plan was formulated, see Schurman to Hughes, August 21, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 689-690; Hughes to Schurman, August 25, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 690-692, and Schurman to Hughes, August 29, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 692-694.

(39) Wai-chiao-pu file, August 29, 1923, U. S. Legation Dialogue No. 25, quoted in Wang, *Schurman in China*, pp. 285-286; Schurman to Hughes, September 28, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 696-697.

(40) Schurman to Hughes, September 28, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 695.

(41) “The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister,” September 24, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 696-701.

(42) Schurman to Hughes, October 2, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 702.

that he "appreciated Koo's difficulties" but would not discuss the demands which he considered appropriate and warned Sze that "Koo should not be given the idea that... [Hughes' views] would be altered."⁽⁴³⁾ On the day of Sze's appeal the Diplomatic Corps decided to employ the threat of non-recognition. Two days later, on October 4, the foreign envoys responded to Koo's note of September 24; they reaffirmed the demands of the "Lincheng Note" and asked that they be satisfied immediately. A Chinese account states that when the note was delivered to the Foreign Ministry the Diplomatic Corps' representative demanded an answer no later than October 15, 1923.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Amidst this flurry of diplomatic maneuvering, the Chinese sought to reconstitute some form of executive government. Schurman reported the Chinese 'election' in a brief despatch on October 5:

Ts'ao K'un elected President this afternoon by 48 (480) votes, being 37 above number necessary to elect. No enthusiasm, no crowds, only police and rickshaw men in streets. I was the only foreign Minister present.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Several days later Minister Schurman informed Hughes that the Corps had "intimated" to the Chinese that they would not attend the post-inaugural reception for President Ts'ao K'un on October 10.⁽⁴⁶⁾ During the next week the Cabinet meetings showed division on the question of how to handle the Powers' demands. Koo stated that if Governor T'ien Chung-yu was not removed the Lin-ch'eng episode would not be resolved; he had done all he could in bearing the burden and refused to negotiate the matter further and declared his willingness to resign.

(43) Memorandum of Interview with the Minister of China (Dr. Sze), October 2, 1923. Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Container 171, folder 13j, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

(44) Schurman to Hughes, October 5, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 704-705; *Shun-T'ien-Shih-Pao*, 順天時報, October 5, 1923, p. 1.

(45) Schurman to Hughes, October 5, 1923, *S. D. F.* 893.00/5213. Schurman had earlier reported that "one of the foremost leaders of the Chihli Party" told him that Ts'ao K'un would be elected within a week by members of the Parliament who were paid \$5,000-6,000 each for their vote. See Schurman to Hughes, September 29, 1923, *S. D. F.* 893.00/5200.

(46) Schurman to Hughes, October 7, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 705-706; Hughes to Schurman, October 11, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 518.

On the thirteenth of October the Cabinet decided to recommend that T'ien "resign."⁽⁴⁷⁾

At the eleventh hour, on October 15, 1923, the Foreign Ministry sent a second reply to the Diplomatic Corps stating that it gave "further consideration" to the "Lincheng Note" of August 10. The reply then proceeded to list the steps which the Chinese Government was undertaking in accordance with the Powers' demands. Schurman cabled the Secretary that the Chinese response was "reasonably satisfactory" and acceptable to the Diplomatic Corps.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The foreign envoys attended the reception of President Ts'ao on October 15. After a brief address by the President, they were all received and exchanged amenities.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The Lin-ch'eng crisis came to an end, although it took more than a year before the compensation claims could be resolved and paid by the Chinese Government.⁽⁵⁰⁾ The Chinese pledged to study the problem of railroad security but there is no evidence in the official files for the period of this study that any plan was ever implemented.⁽⁵¹⁾

The settlement of the Lin-ch'eng incident restored the relationship between the Chinese Government and the Diplomatic Corps at Peking to one of mutual toleration. It did not, however, bring an end to banditry and anti-foreign incidents which increased in intensity during the remainder of 1923 and through 1924.⁽⁵²⁾

(47) *Shun-T'ien-Shih-Pao* 順天時報, October 15, 1923, p. 2. Dr. Koo recalled that the Ts'ao K'un supporters in the Cabinet were ignorant men who knew little of international diplomacy. Interview with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, May 12, 1971.

(48) "The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking," October 15, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, pp. 706-708. The Corps was verbally informed on October 14, that the note would be sent the next day, Schurman to Hughes, October 14, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 520-522.

(49) Schurman to Hughes, October 15, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 522.

(50) The Chinese Government made payment of \$351,567.92 in satisfaction of the Lin-ch'eng claims, Schurman to Hughes, February 23, 1925, *S. D. F.* 393.1123 Lincheng/294.

(51) Dr. Koo told the author that it was not until late 1925 or early 1926 that a plan to hire foreign instructors to train Chinese railroad police was implemented. As he recalled the foreign-trained police did bring some improvement in the security for the railroads. Interview with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, May 12, 1971.

(52) U. S. Department of State, *China Since the Revolution of 1911*, pp. 15-25.

Shortly after the "Blue Express" was derailed a Protestant mission in Fukien was looted, and later, bandits in Hupeh killed Bernard A. Hoff.⁽⁵³⁾ In another incident a group of American missionaries in Hunan and Szech'uan were attacked by bandits.⁽⁵⁴⁾ At another time several missionaries were carried off and one was killed.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Each incident brought greater demands from foreign nationals to their governments for protection. When a group of angry Americans petitioned Nelson T. Johnson in June, 1923, he told them that the United States would not send troops into the interior of China "to make the summer easier for a handful of residents."⁽⁵⁶⁾ In October, 1923, Hughes wrote that American protection was "necessarily limited" and stated his view that missionary groups should "refrain from sending further members of their organizations" to China.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Although commercial residents of the treaty ports fared better than the missionaries in the interior, it became increasingly difficult to protect American shipping and residents along the Yangtze valley. Schurman wrote to Hughes in June, 1923, that the American naval contingent was "inadequate" and resulted in "a general feeling of apprehension" among Americans in China.⁽⁵⁸⁾ In the fall of that year piracy and sniping attacks on American shipping rose sharply.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Additional American river patrols did not effectively achieve their purpose and, although for different reasons, both Chinese and Americans denounced the "gunboat diplomacy."⁽⁶⁰⁾

The diplomacy of the Lin-ch'eng incident is scarred by inconsistencies in

(53) *The New York Times*, May 16, 1923, p. 1.

(54) *Ibid.*, January 18, 1924, p. 1.

(55) *Ibid.*, May 30, 1924, p. 2.

(56) Nelson T. Johnson to John V. A. MacMurray, June 28, 1923, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Container 1, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. Johnson was on a special assignment for the State Department to study methods on consulate administration for a planned reorganization of the Department which Hughes had undertaken.

(57) Hughes to Charles Denby, October 16, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923, I, p. 750.

(58) Schurman to Hughes, June 13, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 745.

(59) *The China Weekly Review*, XXVII (January 26, 1924), p. 298.

(60) American river vessels in China were obsolete and poorly engineered for their application. Congress approved the construction of six specially constructed river gunboats for duty in China in 1924, but they were not ready for service until several years later. *The New York Times*, May 29, 1924, p. 3.

American policy toward China. Both Hughes and Schurman showed restraint; they also showed a willingness to compromise with the principles upon which such restraint was predicated. Hughes strongly disavowed any intent of intervention in China, yet he could argue that a "limited display" of force was "not incompatible." In November 1922, Hughes stated that this country had no desire to impress upon China its power or prestige; in his note of June 1, 1923, he suggested a military display "to restore and increase foreign prestige in China."

Jacob Gould Schurman, although more consistent in his opposition to military intervention, also wavered. He supplemented the Legation Guard and he would permit increasing the authorized garrisons in the treaty ports. His strong opposition to certain of the Lin-ch'eng demands gradually weakened and he came to accept several of the proposals. There is no doubt, however, that Schurman mitigated the impact of America's response to this incident. His relationship with Sze and Koo enabled him to effect compromises in the interests of Chinese-American relations.

Finally, the state of political affairs in China during those years did not contribute to moderate diplomacy. The ephemeral Peking governments had little control over the military satraps who, themselves, showed little regard for honest, effective government. In spite of these conditions both Hughes and Schurman displayed considerably more reluctance to intervene in Chinese affairs than the other foreign governments represented in China.