

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN, SUN YAT-SEN, AND THE CANTON CUSTOMS CRISIS

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In December of 1923 an international flotilla lay at anchor in Canton harbor, their guns trained on the city, their crews alert. The immediate source of this confrontation was the threat of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Southern Government" to seize the Maritime Customs House and expropriate the revenue for his impoverished administration.

The Canton Customs Crisis produced an important meeting between Sun Yat-sen and Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, American Minister to China, which partially resolved the Customs impasse and brought to an end the threat of western military aggression against the Canton Government. The meeting had a greater historic significance; it marked Sun's last appeal for American assistance to his Republic before he finalized an alliance with Soviet Russian advisors at the First Kuomintang Congress of January 1924. For Schurman, who was pressing his government to take the lead in restoring to China her rights and dignity, it was also a turning point; thereafter he became increasingly critical of the western nations' refusal to recognize the realities of Chinese nationalism and adjust their diplomatic policies.

The paths of Sun and Schurman had already crossed before their meeting at Canton. In some ways the two men were alike and under different circumstances may have become effective collaborators. Schurman, who once noted that his years in China were a "golden opportunity for America," could neither understand nor accept Sun's association with the Soviets. Nor could he immediately change the course of American policy -- a policy later modified along lines he had recommended. Had Schurman been able to do so, the course of Chinese history and Sino-American relations may have been greatly altered. This essay attempts to interpret the significance of the Sun-Schurman meeting against the background of Schurman's career and personality and his perception of the Chinese Revolution.

THE EARLY CAREER OF JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN

Born of a poor farming family on Prince Edward Island in Canada, Jacob Schurman displayed exceptional talent as a youth which enabled him to win scholarships and complete his formal education at Canadian and European universities. Schurman rose to become a leading philosopher of his era and, after serving as Dean of the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University, was appointed President of Cornell in 1892 at the age of thirty-eight.

Imbued with nineteenth century liberalism, Schurman's philosophy expressed faith in individualism and the merits of free enterprise. President Schurman's Inaugural Address at Cornell centered around his concept of a 'People's University' and stressed his belief in equal opportunity to give all a chance to develop their full potential. Schurman broadened Cornell's curricula, advocated co-education and defended the rights of negro students to live in Cornell's residence halls. of Schurman's twenty-eight years as Cornell's President, Morris Bishop, the Cornell historian wrote:

Schurman's success was the success of Cornell. During his regime the enrollment increased from 1,538 to 5,765, the physical domain from 200 to 1,465 acres. He boasted at the Semi-Centennial Celebration that of the 20,000 Cornell degrees he had conferred more than 17,500. The Veterinary College, the College of Agriculture, the Medical College, the College of Forestry were his creations. In this time Cornell became one of the great universities of America, indeed, of the world. ⁽¹⁾

Schurman believed that it was the duty of an educated man to apply himself to all the concerns of man where he might render a service and involved himself in politics and public affairs. The Spanish-American war of 1898 brought Schurman into the arena of world affairs. He served as President of the First Philippine Commission in 1899, a position that enabled him to visit China in the same year and to have a hand in shaping the 'Open Door' policy of Secretary of State John Hay. ²

(1) Morris Bishop, *A History of Cornell* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 442.

(2) *The New York Times*, August 16, 1899; A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 69.

As President of the Philippine Commission Schurman, who accepted the appointment because he believed he could serve to check the 'imperialists,' found himself in conflict with the McKinley administration's policy concerning the islands. Sympathetic to the Filipino insurgents claim that they had expected independence, not merely the Substitution of American sovereignty for Spanish rule, Schurman began seeking a basis for peace. Apparently interpreting his own mission more broadly than President McKinley's instructions suggest, Schurman alienated the other members of the Commission by conducting interviews in Spanish with Filipino nationalists. Major General Elwel S. Otis, Commander of the United States Eighth Army Corps in Manila, seeking a military victory, refused rebel truce offers. Schurman urged peace. He cabled President McKinley summarizing the situation and making recommendations for a clearer statement of United States policy including a plan of government that allowed for Filipino participation. As one historian wrote:

The breakdown of negotiations had been a severe disappointment to the President. The authorities had been utterly misled by the elated assertions of Otis and Schurman. United in expected rebel submission, these two were at cross purposes on all else. The soldier advised that the war must be fought to a finish. The college president spoke for a policy of 'magnanimity,' the end of the fighting, more concessions. Neither Worcester nor Denby agreed. Secretary Hay submitted Schurman's 'long disquisition' to the President with a Satirical sniff at the expense of the cable. McKinley accepted the advice of the soldier. ⁽³⁾

Hay cabled Schurman suggesting that he seek broader support from the Commission and implied that he had exceeded his authority. Schurman replied that his limited usefulness on the Commission might warrant his resignation. ⁽⁴⁾

The college president then undertook an inspection tour, alone, of the islands, apparently to gather information to confirm his views. He met with great "enthusiasm" wherever he went and arranged a preliminary treaty recognizing United States sovereignty with the Sultan of Sulu and discussed similar

(3) Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 264.

(4) Schurman to Hay, June 10, 1899, *State Department File Record Group 59*, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited as S. D. F.

proposals with other local chieftans. ⁽⁵⁾

Schurman left the Philippines in July and returned to America; he made his way across the country giving occasional interviews to the press. He stated his position clearly: he did not want the Philippines but circumstances made it necessary for us to take them. For the United States to leave the islands would be to invite a struggle over them among various European and Pacific powers. But the United States must not exploit the islands or their inhabitants. ⁽⁶⁾ Schurman urged McKinley to press for definitive action on the form of government for the Philippines before a special session of Congress.

⁽⁷⁾ In an interview given in Ithaca, the college president declared that:

..... the only justifiable object of the extension of sovereignty over remote countries and alien peoples is the establishment of good government in the territory annexed, the elevation of its people in civilization, and the training of them in progressive self-government with a view to ultimate independence. ⁽⁸⁾

The Philippines became an issue in the election campaign of 1900 and Schurman received bitter criticism from the antiimperialists. He wrote to a friend:

The most that can be said of me is that I am reluctant expansionist. But even then it must be asserted that I am in favor of giving the Filipinos complete self-government whenever they should become into unified one nationality Capable of exercising the rights and duties of sovereignty. ⁽⁹⁾

The Philippine policy of Theodore Roosevelt, successor to the assassinated President McKinley, proved to be a disappointment to Schurman. He continued to write and lecture on the "Philippines problem" and denounced those who

(5) J. G. Schurman, *Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1920), p. 17.

(6) See various newspaper clippings in the Schurman Papers, Hamilton (Ohio) *Republican News*, August 28, 1899; *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, August 21, 1899. Schurman Papers, Collection of Regional History and University Archives, Cornell, University, Ithaca, New York.

(7) *New York Tribune*, September 3, 1899. Schurman Papers.

(8) *New York Evening Post*, September 28, 1899. Schurman Papers.

(9) Schurman to Reverend Francis Clark, November 20, 1900. Schurman Papers. Some of Schurman's closest academic friends became strong critics of his association with American Philippine policy.

sought to exploit the Islands. His emotion was evident in these words:

no prospect of profit however assured, no wealth or advantage however colossal, could ever atone for the precious American life-blood swallowed up by the hungry soil of Luzon ay, and all the blood in that case innocent, of the Filipinos we have fought, the misery we have caused their families, and the devastation we have wrought in their homes. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Urging Congress to establish a Filipino central government, Dr. Schurman declared, "any decent kind of government by Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans." ⁽¹¹⁾

Schurman continued to work for Philippine independence throughout his career. He was associated with the Philippine Independence Committee founded in January 1904. He was a cofounder, in February 1905, of the Filipino Progress League and became its president; the League was to serve as a watch-dog committee on United States Philippines policy. ⁽¹²⁾ Upon his resignation from Cornell, Schurman declined the offer of Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, to become the President of the University of the Philippines. ⁽¹³⁾

President William Howard Taft appointed Jacob Gould Schurman United States Minister to Greece and Montenegro in the summer of 1912. Schurman spent a year in Greece during the turmoil of the Balkan Wars and returned to the United States upon the election of President Woodrow Wilson. Active in Republican Party affairs, Schurman campaigned for the nomination and election of Charles Evans Hughes for President in 1916. Disappointed by Hughes' defeat, Schurman supported President Woodrow Wilson during the crisis of World War One in the best non-partisan tradition.

(10) "Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook," speech given before the Reform Club of Boston on the evening of January 20, 1902. This speech was later published in book form, see footnote number five above.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Schurman to Carl Shurz, May 3, 1902; Schurman to Irving Winslow, September 5, 1903; Schurman to Josephine S. Lowell, December 10, 1903; Schurman to the editor of the *New York Tribune*, January 19, 1904; Schurman to Edward W. Ordway, February (n. d.), 1905. Schurman Papers.

(13) Jamie C. DeVeyra (Resident Commissioner of the Philippines) to Schurman, April 26, 1920, and June 16, 1920; Schurman to the Honorable Jamie C. DeVeyra, June 19, 1920. Schurman Papers. The offer was made for any salary Dr. Schurman named.

Shortly after the armistice agreement in 1919, Schurman joined in what was to become a major political crisis -- the dispute over the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations Covenant. The idea of a League suited Schurman's idealism and he favored the organization because it offered the world an instrument for the pacific solution of international problems and a vehicle through which to rectify what he considered the errors of the Versailles settlement. Schurman felt strongly that China should have had Shantung restored to her and wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge protesting "the cynical violation of the rights of China" as a glaring defect in the Treaty. ⁽¹⁴⁾

After retiring from Cornell University in the summer of 1920, Schurman supported Senator Warren G. Harding, the Republican candidate for President, by giving his "entire time and energy" to the campaign. Following his election, President Harding appointed Charles Evans Hughes as his Secretary of State and allowed him virtual autonomy in the Department's affairs. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Hughes' choice of Jacob Gould Schurman as American Minister to China, although a political appointment, has been acknowledged by historians to have been a good one. ⁽¹⁶⁾

The earliest reference to Schurman's nomination for the post is a letter from Alfred Sao-ke Sze, the Chinese Minister to America, in which he stated that he was "very much gratified to learn of the decision of President Harding to send you to Peking," and informed Schurman that he had cabled his government requesting authorization to inform Hughes that Schurman would be "persona gratissima." ⁽¹⁷⁾ Following the newspaper reports that Schurman had been named as possible Minister to China, he received many telegrams from well-wishers and supporters. ⁽¹⁸⁾

A few days after the announcement that Schurman was a candidate for the China post, the newspapers reported "considerable opposition" to Schurman's

(14) Schurman to Lodge, July 16, 1919. Schurman Papers.

(15) Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and his Administration* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 132.

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 135.

(17) Sze to Schurman, May 4, 1921. Schurman Papers. Minister Sze was the first Chinese to graduate from Cornell University (B. A., 1901, M. A., 1902). An outstanding student (Phi Beta Kappa) and editor of his class yearbook, Sze came to be known by Schurman who took a personal interest in the foreign students. His letters to Schurman suggest their relationship was informal and friendly.

(18) See Schurman Papers.

selection from "Western Sentors" who alleged that his views were "pro-Jap."⁽¹⁹⁾ These charges were made in relation to a trip to Japan which Schurman made in April-May of 1920 as a member of the Frank A. Vanderlip mission, a cultural exchange group invited to that country by the Japanese Welcome Association, a Japanese business group. Schurman expressed ignorance of the man or the motive of one Guy M. Walker who was leading a "campaign in the newspapers" against Schurman's appointment.⁽²⁰⁾ Mr. Walker objected to speeches Dr. Schurman made upon his return from Japan, particularly one on the Pacific coast and one at a luncheon of the Banker's Club of New York City on July 14, 1920.

Walker obtained a summary report of Schurman's speech to the Banker's Club and sent copies of this report to several Chinese and Americans. He also wrote articles for various newspapers in which he declared that the appointment of Schurman was a "flagrant insult" to China and charged that Schurman was "pro-Japanese." Walker's activity resulted in protests to the Secretary of State from several Chinese and American organizations in America and abroad.⁽²¹⁾

Walker sent a copy of one article to Ma Soo, the personal representative of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the United States, who paraphrased it and sent the result to the Asiatic News Agency in Peking.⁽²²⁾ Walker then sent the Secretary of State a copy of a note from the Asiatic News Agency which stated in part:

.....thanks for your various clippings.....concerning the unsuitability of Dr. Schurman's appointment to Peking. We have translated this excellent article of yours into the Chinese language and circulated it throughout the Chinese Republic.⁽²³⁾

(19) *The New York Times*, May 11, 1921

(20) See the Sze-Schurman correspondence of May 12, 14, 15, 1921. Schurman Papers. Sze called in reporters and denied the charges against Schurman; he also spoke to various Cornell alumni groups on Schurman's behalf.

(21) George Lockwood (editor of the *National Republican Weekly*) to George B. Christian (Secretary to the President), May 16, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/2; Chinese Community of Baltimore to Hughes, June 12, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/7; Consul General Fuller to Hughes, June 23, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/13.

(22) *Ibid.*, enclosed news clipping from *The North China Star*, June 21, 1921; *The China Advertiser*, June 22, 1921. These papers made editorial comment that Ma Soo's article was almost verbatim to that of Walker's printed in *The New York World*, May 10, 1921, and questioned whether Ma's article was an expression of "Chinese opinion."

(23) Walker to Hughes, July 25, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/15.

In a later communication to the Secretary, Walker enclosed a response from a letter written to Sun Yat-sen on June 4, 1921. This reply read:

Doctor Sun is basing an appeal for support for his government on the fact that the Peking Government has accepted without protest as a Minister from the United States, Doctor Jacob G. Schurman, who is notoriously anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese, and he is asking the Chinese people to repudiate the Peking Government because, as he says, it has accepted one who is a Japanese Agent as a Minister to represent the United States. ⁽²⁴⁾

On August 18, 1921, Walker relayed another letter from the Asiatic News Agency to Hughes; it stated that:

Regarding Mr. J. Schurman's appointment to Peking, protests have been received by Mr. Yen, Foreign Minister, from the Chinese National Farewell Society in the United States and other places, but in view of the international situation, the government prefers to receive the new American Minister first and then judge his actions in conducting Sino-Japanese-American diplomatic question. ⁽²⁵⁾

Meanwhile, to refute the charge, Schurman wrote to Senator James W. Wadsworth, the senior Senator from New York. He stated that his only speech on the west coast was to the Seattle Board of Trade and dealt "entirely with domestic matters." He explained that his speeches in Japan were critical of Japanese policy toward China:

I remember myself pointing out to our hosts that there would be great difficulty in re-establishing the old relations of cordiality between Japan and the United States 'till Japan restored Shantung to China. When they replied that Japan intended to restore it and was only awaiting the arrangement of some details, I added that in my opinion the way to restore it was to restore it and the sooner this was done, the better would be the effect on public sentiment in the United

(24) Walker to Hughes, August 11, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/17, with enclosed copy of letter from Canton dated July 11, 1921, and signed by "Que Tai-chi, Councillor." [Kuo Tai-chi]

(25) Walker to Hughes, September 16, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/26, with enclosed letter. We have already noted the role that Dr. Sze played in having Schurman's appointment accepted in Peking.

States. ⁽²⁶⁾

As testimony to this assertion, Schurman sent the Senator a copy of a booklet containing abstracts of some of his speeches published by the Japan Society of New York City. His address to the Banker's Club, Schurman said, presented the views of the Japanese as they were conveyed to him; he made no defense for these views, but presented them in the spirit of exchange. ⁽²⁷⁾ He requested Wadsworth to seek out the west coast Senators and inform them "as to my real views on Oriental questions" through the printed material supplied. ⁽²⁸⁾

Senator Wadsworth showed Schurman's letters to Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the west coast Senators and wrote Schurman that his name would be confirmed. ⁽²⁹⁾ On June 2, 1921, Jacob Gould Schurman was confirmed Minister to China by the United States Senate. ⁽³⁰⁾

The allegations concerning Schurman caused the Senate to delay his appointment for nearly a month and undoubtedly annoyed both Hughes and Schurman. At Hughes' request, Schurman met with him for a brief conference on July 22, 1921. There is no record of this conversation, but it is probable that the two men talked of the implications of this protest upon Schurman's work in China. ⁽³¹⁾

After a brief stay in Washington, Dr. Schurman and his family traveled to the west coast and sailed for China on the SS *Nanking*. The party arrived at Shanghai on August 24, 1921. ⁽³²⁾

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN IN CHINA

Two days after he arrived in China, Minister Schurman delivered his first major address there. At a dinner given in his honor by the Shanghai

(26) Schurman to the Honorable James W. Wadsworth, May 16, 1921. Schurman Papers.

(27) Schurman to Wadsworth, May 16, 1921. Schurman Papers.

(28) Schurman to Wadsworth, May 21, 1921. Schurman Papers.

(29) Wadsworth to Schurman, May 25, 1921. Schurman Papers.

(30) The *New York Times*, June 3, 1921.

(31) Hughes to Schurman, July 18, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/10a; Schurman to Hughes, July 18, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/11; Hughes to Schurman, July 19, 1921, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/11; see attached letter.

(32) The *New York Times*, August 26, 1921; The *Weekly Review of the Far East* XVII, August 27, 1921.

American Chamber of Commerce he told his audience that:

Fundamentally no change has taken place in the relations of China and the United States. These are today, as formerly, relations of peace and friendship What is the policy of the United States toward China? We stand for the integrity of China and the open door. We want China to remain in possession and control of her territory, to be mistress in her own house; and we want in China an open door to trade and commerce for all nations on equal terms.

His focus turned to the forthcoming Washington Conference called to consider disarmament and problems of the Pacific and Far East. He declared that the Conference promised to usher in a "new era" in Chinese history.

In that new era China will have an opportunity to unify and strengthen the foundations of her nascent republic, to frame and establish a constitution, to organize democratic institutions, reorganize her economic life and generally to prepare herself for a place in the modern, civilized world worthy of the place she once held as the creator or exponent of the oldest civilization known to mankind. (33)

Schurman called on Foreign Minister W. W. Yen on September 5 to convey Secretary Hughes' assurances of friendship toward China and said that it was his "personal observation" that American Public opinion was sympathetic to China and the invitation of China to the Washington Conference demonstrated American goodwill toward China. (34) On September 12, Schurman presented his credentials to President Hsu Shih-ch'ang and spoke briefly at a reception given by the President. The next day Schurman wrote a long personal letter to his friend Charles E. Hughes. He declared that the "two supreme problems" facing China were the demobilization of the costly warlord armies and the reorganization of China's national finances then on the edge of bankruptcy. "The solution of each of these problems is dependent on the

(33) The New York *Evening Post*, August 27, 1921, See News Clipping in the Schurman Papers.

(34) Wai-chiao-pu file, Septemaer 5, 1921, U. S. Legation Dialogue No. 37, quoted in Wang Yü-chun, *Ssu-er-man Tsai-hua Wai-chiao Huo-tung Ch'u-t'an i-chiu-er-i -- i chiu-er-wu* ["Jacob Gould Schurman's Diplomatic Activities in China, 1921-1925"] [*Journal of the Institute of Modern Hsitory*, Academia Sinica] I (August 31, 1969), pp. 240-241, hereafter cited as *Schurman in China*.

other," wrote Schurman, who could "see no way in which China can solve them without the aid of foreign nations." Schurman suggested that Senator Lodge's proposed bill which would have the United States relinquish its share of the Boxer Indemnity might yield a solution

If other nations also adopted that policy the conditions might be attached that from the Chinese Customs Revenue, which is the security for the Boxer Indemnity payments, there should be transferred amounts corresponding to the released sums pledged for Indemnity payments, to be used for the creation of a fund, or security for a loan, to enable the Chinese Government to pay off and disband its soldiers under the supervision of the Powers, who would also, of course, see to it that their arms were destroyed. China might in that way escape from the web of difficulties in which she is now hopelessly enmeshed, without additional financial cost to herself and with only such sacrifice on the part of the nations as some of them at any rate would have voluntarily made

Anticipating some objection to the plan, the Minister asked, " what substitute constructive policy can be supported as an alternative?" (35)

In an address before the American Chamber of Commerce at Tientsin on October 13, Schurman reiterated his statement that America stood for the Open Door and the political and territorial integrity of China. He told his audience that what China needed most was a united and efficient government and idealistically stated that "if the Chinese people want help in establishing it the Powers should lend them the needed assistance." (36)

Thus, in his first few weeks in China, Schurman reaffirmed the dual principles of American policy, the Open Door and the political and territorial integrity of China, espoused his belief that the Washington Conference would usher in a "new era" in which the conflict of the past would be succeeded by a spirit of cooperation with China, and suggested that the United States provide the leadership for reshaping the relations between China and the other powers. These first weeks in China were demanding ones for Schurman.

(35) Personal letter from Schurman to Hughes, September 13, 1921, with enclosed news clippings. Schurman Papers.

(36) News clippings from the *North China Star*, October 14, 1921, and *The China Advertiser*, October 15, 1921. Schurman Papers.

He was immediately engrossed in familiarizing himself with conditions in China in preparation for the Washington Conference. We may reasonably assume that the scholar-diplomat reviewed the Legation files and studied the consular and political reports carefully. During the initial weeks of the Conference Schurman was busy compiling a detailed report which he apparently believed would enlighten and shape the work of the Conference regarding China.

The Minister called attention to three specific points: 1) the Chinese had undergone a "marked development" of national and patriotic spirit and were capable of "greatest achievements;" 2) the Peking Government lacked the approval of the people and rested on the power of the military bosses, "having nothing, doing nothing, the Peking Government is liable to pass away;" and, 3) official and unofficial observers generally viewed the Canton Government with sympathy and spoke well of it; that Government, however, was threatened by an impending rupture between Sun Yat-sen and General Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the possibility of the north sending an army to destroy it. Citing a "hopeful feature in the situation," Schurman noted that commercial and banking groups were now joining with the students and educated classes in making demands for peace and stability.

Schurman's report called for patience and an active benevolence toward China:

One thing Disarmament Conference could do to help China would be to formulate policy of disbanding troops which now number a million quarter men. These troops useless for national defense or maintenance internal order No offense could be taken by Chinese as it would be merely application of disarmament to China.

Second assistance Conference might render China would be an appeal to Chinese to unite their country politically. Conference might demand as condition of continuance of recognition some form of constitution even if temporary, and representative legislative council and chief executive legally elected. Possible Conference might also specify provincial autonomy International governmental control if attempted would be paralyzed by passive resistance of Chinese to say nothing of cost, jealousy of powers..... International financial control should be limited to protection of foreign debt and supervision of expenditure new loans

China is entitled to demand thorough revision of the tariff with differentiation between luxuries and necessities. Present rate 5 percent or even 12½ percent unscientific and deprives China of large amount revenue. But abolition of likin should go with revision of tariff and Government cannot force abolition of likin.....till troops are disbanded and political unification of country

.....Foreign post offices unnecessary should be abolished

As regards abolition of extraterritoriality, proposal premature with Chinese government what it is today should not be abolished till China has developed sound habits of judicial administration and practice which would prevent corruption all but universal today.

China greatly needs more railways suggest that Department urge American group consortium to take more active interest in Chinese railway projects These first years after war are America's golden opportunity here

Our fundamental policy of Open Door in China should be maintained and applied to new conditions our unselfish defense of independence and territorial integrity of China has won good will of Chinese people We are universally regarded by Chinese people as their special friend If we can aid in strengthening Chinese Republic through Conference or otherwise America's position in China will be rendered still more favorable. (37)

On the whole, the results of the American initiative taken at the Washington Conference fell short of the promise. China did have Shantung restored to her and progress was made toward China's attainment of tariff autonomy. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated and the tension of American-Japanese relations was enabled to wane. The Washington powers pledged not to take advantage of China's internal troubles for their own selfish ends and spoke of serving China's best interests through a policy of "international cooperation." However, the record of the Conference reveals that the powers did not share a like degree of concern for justice in China.

(37) Schurman to Hughes, December 3, 1921, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1921 I (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 315-321. Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.

Jealously protecting their own rights, they agreed to leave China only that portion of her sovereignty that had not been earlier usurped by the "unequal treaties." (38)

Secretary Hughes was sympathetic to China's struggle for modernization and earnestly desired the return of Shantung to China. Yet he made it clear that he had no desire to champion China's nationalistic aspirations, nor did he intend to use force or alienate the new relationship with Japan. Hughes instructed Schurman to "impress" upon Foreign Minister Yen his desire to have China and Japan negotiate the Shantung issue independent of the Conference.⁽³⁹⁾ Again, when the Chinese delegation resigned over the powers' refusal to accept fully China's Ten Point Proclamation, Hughes cabled Schurman to make it clear to Peking that if it

..... should withdraw support from these delegates and force them
..... to abandon an attitude of helpfulness and conciliation for one
of uncompromising obstruction, the result would be to dissipate the
sympathy and confidence they have thus far commanded, and
react very unfavorably on the work of the Conference in general and
more particularly upon China's position.⁴⁰

By contrast, Schurman's early speeches in China, and his report of December 3, 1921, reveal a more liberal view. Schurman held a more idealistic, broader idea of what the Washington Conference could do for China. Impressed with the spirit of nationalism, the Minister sensed a new China was emerging. His recommendations for tariff relief, his stress on troop disbandment, and his expressed hope for capital investment to cooperate in China's interest, portray a genuine sympathy for China's plight and aspirations.

(38) Several fine studies of the Washington Conference are available, see Westel W. Willoughby *China at the Conference: A Report* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922); Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933); Daniel T. J. Liu, "A Study of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations: Washington Conference and After, 1921-1924," *Chinese Culture: A Quarterly Review* XV (March 1974), pp. 37-64.

(39) Hughes to Schurman, November 25, 1921, *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 934-935; Wang, *Schurman in China*, does not report this meeting between Schurman and Yen from the Wai-chiao-pu files.

(40) Hughes to Schurman, December 7, 1921, *FRUS*, 1921 I, p. 275,

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN AND SUN YAT-SEN

Beginning with Sun Yat-sen's note of congratulations to President Woodrow Wilson upon the latter's election in 1912, the United States Department of State rebuffed Sun's appeals. Official views of Sun ranged from that of a well-meaning but "impractical" idealist, to the allegation that he was a "disreputable character" dominated by ambition to rule China.⁽⁴¹⁾ Not all Americans shared this view of Sun. When a United States Congressional delegation visited China in the Summer of 1920, the American Minister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, introduced Sun and T'ang Shao-yi as "representatives of the Chinese ideal, true to her inner traditions, and the ideals Americans believed in."⁽⁴²⁾

Shortly after Sun, T'ang, and Wu T'ing-fang restored the Kuomintang government at Canton in November 1920, Ernest B. Price, Vice Consul at Canton, wrote the Secretary of State:

.....these leaders of the Southern Government are enlightened men, acquainted with foreign ideas and methods and, for the present at least, are making a praiseworthyattempt to govern the peopleto the satisfaction of the people themselves.⁽⁴³⁾

Consul Price's sanguine view was not fully shared by Minister Charles R. Crane in Peking. Crane's report stated:

The Legation is informed.....that the associates of Sun Yat-sen, ever since the Revolution of 1911, have been greatly embarrassed by his impractical and grandiose schemes. He is reported to be a man of great personal vanity, although sincere in his motives,in the North he is regarded as, at the best, an impractical idealist.⁽⁴⁴⁾

In April 1921, Price challenged the Legation's reports which he said did

(41) For American images of and policy toward Sun Yat-sen, see Nemai S. Bose, *American Attitudes and Policy to the Nationalist Movement in China, 1911-1921* (Calcutta: Oriental Longmans, 1970); Roy W. Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921* (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968); and Li T'ien-yi, *Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1952).

(42) *The New York Times*, August 15, 1920.

(43) Consul Price to Acting Secretary of State, January 11, 1921, *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 323-325.

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 325.

not reflect information forwarded by him, but were composed of facts and analysis which were false. He denied that Sun and others were radical and warlike as the Legation reports inferred. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

On May 7, 1921, Price reported the inauguration of Sun as "President of the Republic of China," on May 5.

I am convinced that the present group of leaders will hold togetherprovided they do not have to carry on a military enterprise. I am also convinced that in this group of men, not merely Dr. Sun but the really large and loyal group of men who are supporting the principle and cause of democracy in South China, lies the only hope for China. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

Enclosed in this report were two documents: a "Manifesto" which denounced the corruption of the Peking government and a sealed letter. The letter was a personal appeal from Dr. Sun to President Harding for recognition of his newly established government. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

The State Department returned the material to Consul General Leo Bergholz at Canton and instructed him to return them. The message concluded with a rebuke.

It is also desirable that you caution Vice Consul Price against the irregularity of permitting the Consulate General to make itself a vehicle of official communication for an organization in revolt against the Government with which the United States is in friendly relations. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

Bergholz declared his chagrin at having to return the documents to Sun since they had been opened and urged the Department to "spare Dr. Sun, the one honest and patriotic administrator in China, the mortification of having his letter returned to him." ⁽⁴⁹⁾

(45) Price to Hughes, April 6, 20, 1921. *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 326-330; Price to Crane, April 26, 1921, *S.D.F.* 893.00/3896.

(46) Price to Hughes, May 7, 1921, *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 332-335.

(47) Copies of these materials remain in the State Department Decimal Files, see "Ma Soo to the President of the United States," *S.D.F.* 893.00/3913. For the Manifesto, see *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 336-337.

(48) Hughes to Bergholz, June 25, 1921, *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 339-340.

(49) Bergholz to Hughes, August 17, 1921, *S.D.F.* 893.00/4039. Hughes ordered Bergholz to return the material and to explain to Sun that the "Consulate [is] unable to account for the communication being unsealed." Hughes to Bergholz, October 15, 1921, *S. D. F.* 893.00/4131.

The first political report from Schurman reflected the views of the junior diplomatic officers. The report stated:

The Government of Canton has created in that city a modern municipal government of great efficiency and is endeavoring to conscientiously introduce self-government throughout the province.....Kwangtung has undoubtedly the most enlightened, democratic, and perhaps one of the most efficient, provincial governments in China.....

.....Sun and Ch'en appear to be highly popular, not only in Kwangtung but also among modern educated classes farther north. Sun is understood to be a militarist in his ambition to extend the sway of his "government," while Ch'en and his associates are averse to further impoverishing the province and causing loss of life by armed extension of power. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

That Schurman carefully observed the reports from Canton is evident in his report to Hughes of December 3, 1921. Schurman was well aware of the American position regarding the southern governments since 1917, but when read with a mirror his report suggests that the only semblance of popular and progressive ideas were emanating from Canton and the Department would do well to keep the door open.

When he received his appointment to China, Schurman stated that he regarded himself "as Minister not only to the Chinese Government but to the Chinese people," and declared a desire to establish close contacts with Chinese organizations and leaders throughout China. ⁽⁵¹⁾ As the Washington Conference drew toward conclusion, Hughes endorsed Schurman's request to visit American consular offices in China. Accordingly, Schurman undertook a series of visitations to all consular offices during the first two years of his mission there; his procedure was to hold interviews and give addresses in as many cities enroute as possible. Schurman particularly sought out Chinese civic groups; Chambers of Commerce, student and teacher organizations, members of the Chinese press, and Chinese political and military officials. Naturally, he spoke to the American and foreign counterparts of these groups.

On February 24, 1922, Dr. and Mrs. Schurman sailed from Taku aboard the USS *Albany*. After a fine day visit to the Philippines where the Schurmans

(50) Schurman to Hughes, September 16, 1921, S.D.F. 893.00/4114

(51) Personal letter of Schurman to Hughes, December 21, 1921. Schurman Papers.

were the guests of Manuel Quezon, the *Albany* proceeded to Canton on March 12, where the party spent five days. Schurman followed his practice of speaking before various Chinese and American groups. Schurman was the guest of Wu T'ing-fang, a former Chinese Minister to the United States, at a noon tiffin on March 16.⁽⁵²⁾ Because he was accredited to Peking, Schurman was very cautious about his contacts with Canton officials. Before leaving Peking, Schurman assured Foreign Minister Yen that, although meeting some of the Canton leaders might be unavoidable, he had no intentions of developing relations with southern officials.⁽⁵³⁾

Schurman later wrote Secretary Hughes that

.....Just as we were ready to sail I learned that.....they intended to fire a salute of twenty-one guns on our passing as a regard for me and expected our gunboat to return the salute. I immediately declared that this was impossible. Delayed our departure while I sent officers ashore to inform parties concerned through our consul that I did not desire the salute and that in any case no return salute would be fired by our gunboat, and no salute was fired.⁽⁵⁴⁾

At the end of March, in an address entitled "Foreign Help and Self-Help for China", Schurman told the assembled Chinese and American Chambers of Commerce of Shanghai that the educated Chinese and the leaders of China must work together for a unified republican government. He closed with these words: "If in any way I might contribute to so fortunate a result I would regard it as one of the greatest opportunities and satisfactions of my life."⁽⁵⁵⁾ The *Shanghai Times* commented on this speech in an editorial: "In other words, he [Schurman] is willing and eager to mediate. We hope that rival

(52) For the Canton itinerary see Huston to Schurman, March 14, 1922. Schurman Papers.

(53) Wai-chiao-pu file, February 15, 1922, U.S. Legation Dialogue No. 6, Wang, *Schurman in China*, pp. 252-253. Wang states that Schurman may have met with General Ch'en Chiung-ming but neither the Schurman papers nor Schurman's personnel file (123 Sch 87/---) make reference to any such meeting and it is not on Huston's itinerary. The meeting with Wu was acceptable since he was a former Minister to the United States. Sun was at Kweilin at the time.

(54) Schurman to Hughes, March 26, 1922. *S.D.F.* 123 Sch 87/41. Schurman displayed courtesy in informing the Canton authorities of his desire not to accept and return the salute. To do less would have been a humiliation for them.

(55) "Foreign Help and Self-Help in China," MSS. Schurman Papers.

factions in China will avail themselves of this offer at an early date."⁽⁵⁶⁾

While touring the consulates in Manchuria, Schurman spoke at a dinner given in his honor by Governor Chang Tso-lin. He stated that American concern for China revolved around the "fundamental question" of unification of the country. On the danger of political division in China he said; "It is a great temptation to other nations if China does not have a united government,you must save yourselves by unifying your country."⁽⁵⁷⁾

While Schurman was imploring the leaders of Manchuria to seek unity for China, the Chihli-Fengtien war was resumed. The Minister relayed a circular on American policy to all the consulates:

The Department.....desires that officials of the United States in China adhere to strict impartiality as between local leaders of political factions in China and that they avoid intervention of any kind between factions or in the plans for the settlement of dissention.⁽⁵⁸⁾

In the spring of 1923 Schurman resumed his visits to American consulates. On April 12 he spoke to the Rotary Club of Tientsin on "Socialism vs. Capitalism," a topic the Minister said was "one of the most vital questions of the present day." Several passages of this speech are worth noting. Disclaiming class consciousness as an "ugly doctrine," Schurman said it

.....is a denial of the psychological fact of the fundamental solidarity of the community; class hatred is a repudiation of the fundamental moral principle by which the community lives. the demand for the rule of the proletariat is merely the rejection of democracy; it substitutes for the government of the people, for the people, by the people, the very different programme of government of the people by a class and for a class.....

No system of social and political life that denies the fundamental impulses and elements of human nature can permanently prevail or prevail even temporarily except by the use of force There is no deeper or more powerful spring of human conduct than the desire

(56) Ruddock to Hughes, April 10, 1922. *S.D.F.* 123 Sch 87/49, attached news clipping from *The Shanghai Times*, March 30, 1922.

(57) Consul Pontius to Hughes, April 11, 1922, *S.D.F.* 123 Sch-87/47.

(58) "The Minister in China to the American Consular Officers China," June 26, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922 I, p. 722.

of possession.....a Socialistic society [is] bound to become impoverished society and that if equality prevailed in the distribution it would be an equality of poverty and not of prosperity.....

From the Russian spectacle we turn away in despair. But if we reject Socialism we do not on that account glorify the present system of capitalistic production. On the contrary, it leaves much -- very much -- to be desired.....it has in the ever-growing province of big industries, exorbitantly and needlessly, enriched many owners of capital while it exploited the manual laborers as mere agencies for the production of marketable commodities. ⁽⁵⁹⁾

During a six day tour of Shanghai Schurman spoke at several luncheon and dinner meetings and delivered major address at area colleges and universities. His theme was the obligation of the educated classes to participate in political life. He called upon the students, as the generation of Chinese who would have to shoulder the task of modernizing China, "to give China a more abundant life." ⁽⁶⁰⁾ While at Shanghai, Schurman accepted an invitation from C. C. Wu to meet "some men representative of the thought of the 'South'." Consul Cunningham's itinerary shows that the Minister had a two hour conference on Sunday, May 13, with Dr. Wu and Sun Hung-yi. On May 15 Schurman met with T'ang Shao-yi. There is nothing in the records to indicate the content of these conversations. ⁽⁶¹⁾ We may assume that Wu and Sun appealed to Schurman to consider further the matter of the Southern Government's opposition to Peking and to familiarize the Minister with the programs and aspirations of the Canton Government.

Minister Schurman cabled Hughes on November 11, 1923:

Having already visited all the Consulates except Yunanfu, and having some time ago accepted General T'ang Ch'i-yao's invitation to visit the province of Yunan, I now propose to fulfill this two-fold obligation and plan to sail on the 23rd. On the return journey I expect to visit the Governors of the politically and militarily critical provinces of Kwangtung, Chekiang, and Kiangsu.

Dr. and Mrs. Schurman sailed from Shanghai on November 23, and

(59) Consul Huston to Hughes, April 16, 1923. *S.D.F.* 123 Sch-87/75.

(60) Consul Cunningham to Hughes, May 18, 1923, *S.D.F.* 123-Sch 87/78.

(61) *Ibid.*

(62) Schurman to Hughes, November 11, 1923, *S.D.F.* 123 Sch 87/96.

arrived at Yunnan on December 22, via Hong Kong to Haiphong and from Hanoi by train to Yunnan-fu.⁽⁶³⁾ At a dinner given by Governor T'ang on Christmas Eve, Schurman somberly noted that political events were not going well for "the youngest great republic in the world." Declaring that "democracy and home-rule are native to Chinese soil" as they are to America, he cited the long tradition of China's "essentially self-governing" provinces. Then he delivered his message:

I do not say that what is good for America must always be good for China. But I am convinced that in a vast country like China or America, with many local differences of sentiment and usage, the federal form of government will be found the only workable form, and that the strength and stability of the central government can be assured only as the people enjoy unrestricted control over their own local affairs through state or provincial administrations which they are conscious of controlling directly and continuously.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The Schurmans returned to Hanoi and the French Governor General of Indo-China kindly arranged to have the French gunboat *Moquese* ferry the Minister's party to Hong Kong where they transferred to an American ship for the remainder of the tour through south China. This visit to south China resulted in the meeting between Schurman and Sun Yat-sen; before taking up a discussion of this meeting, we ought to briefly examine developments in Canton since Sun's return there in the spring of 1923.

The revolt of General Ch'en Chiung-ming in June 1922 forced Sun Yat-sen to temporarily abandon his government at Canton and travel to Shanghai. In an interview with China's new Foreign Minister, V. K. Wellington Koo, Schurman learned that President Li Yuan-hung sent representatives to meet with Sun. Schurman commented that it would be very significant if Sun were elected President.⁽⁶⁵⁾

In Shanghai, Sun was approached by Russian representatives of the Communist International with a proposal to join with the incipient Chinese

(63) Consul Meyers to Hughes, January 30, 1924, *S.D.F.* 123 Sch 87/99.

(64) *Ibid.*

(65) Wai-chiao-pu file, August 23, 1922, U.S. Legation Dialogue No. 27, quoted in Wang, *Schurman in China*, pp. 259-260; see also the Peking newspaper *Shun T'ien Shih-Pao*, January 18, 1923.

Communist Party. Sun rejected a two-party alliance but agreed to allow Communists to join the Kuomintang as individuals. Adolphe Joffe, who had just failed to reach an agreement with Peking concerning Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway, went to Shanghai in December 1922, to discuss the prospects of an alliance with Sun. These talks resulted in the Sun-Joffe Manifesto of January 26, 1923. The Manifesto proclaimed Soviet willingness to aid the Kuomintang in China's struggle to attain national unification and independence, but declared that neither Communism nor the Soviet system were proper for China at the time.

The Sun-Joffe Manifesto was promulgated within two weeks after the recapture of Canton by Kuomintang forces, on January 15, 1923. Sun sailed for Canton, where he arrived on February 21, and assumed the position of Generalissimo in a new government on March 2, 1923. By coincidence, Nelson Johnson of the State Department sailed aboard the same ship to Canton. Johnson reported a long conversation with Eugene Ch'en, Sun's secretary, who said that "time had made Sun more conservative." Ch'en declared the powers' support of Peking tantamount to intervention and said it was Sun's plan to ask America to "step in and send to China a strong man, Mr. Hughes for example, who as a neutral person would be able to unite the rival leaders of China."⁽⁶⁶⁾

Several days after arriving in Canton, Johnson reported his observations of the situation. He met with Robert S. Norman, a personal advisor to Sun, who said that Sun would consolidate the situation at Canton but would not organize another government like the last one. Norman said Sun had aged much, was suffering from throat trouble, and had lost his sense of humor, which, he believed resulted from Sun's disappointment arising from differences with old friends such as Hu Han-min and others.⁽⁶⁷⁾ After the new government at Canton was established, Schurman wrote to Hughes stating that the British authorities, concerned over the influence which Sun exerted over the Hong Kong laborers, had adopted a friendlier policy toward Sun. "In Peking Sun is still recognized as a potent force in China," he added.⁽⁶⁸⁾

C. C. Wu, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the new Canton government,

(66) Nelson T. Johnson to John V. A. MacMurray, February 16, 1923. Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Vol. 3, Library of Congress.

(67) Johnson to MacMurray, February 20, 1923. Ibid.

(68) Schurman to Hughes, March 20, 1923, S.D.F. 893.00/4942.

sent a copy of a Manifesto signed by Sun to the American Consulate at Canton with a request that it be forwarded to Minister Schurman. This Manifesto of June 29, 1923, represents one of the earliest of Sun's anti-imperialist statements. The document scored the effects of continued western recognition of the Peking Government:

Unconsciously perhaps, they have done something which they have professed they would not do, that is intervened in China's internal affairs by practically imposing on the country a government repudiated by it. They have, by supporting a government which cannot exist for a single day without such support, hindered China from establishing an effective and stable government which the Washington Conference agreed 'to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself.' ...On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that non-recognition of the Peking Government, involving as it does the loss of prestige and important sources of revenues, will compel the Militarists to agree to disbandment and unification.⁽⁶⁹⁾

The leftist propaganda emanating from the more radical elements at Canton in the summer of 1923, and the changing tone of Sun Yat-sen must have caused Schurman to regard with alarm Sun's new relationship with the Russians. Schurman's speech on "Socialism vs. Capitalism" may be viewed as an expression of concern over developments at Canton.

In September 1923, C. C. Wu presented to the foreign consuls at Canton a demand for the release of the Kwangtung share of the Maritime Customs surplus revenue to the Canton Government. In his report of this appeal to the Secretary of State, Schurman discussed the needs of the Canton government and the use to which the funds would be put. He stated a serious concern that the southern government might carry out its threat to either declare Canton a free port and collect no duties, or forcibly seize the

(69) Consul Tenney to Hughes, July 2, 1923, S.D.F. 893.00/5111. For Sun's criticism of the western nations' support for Peking made after the Manifesto was issued, see Fletcher S. Brockman, "Foreign Control at Peking Means War, says Sun Yat-sen," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1923. In an interview with Brockman, Sun declared: "We have lost hope of help from America, England, France, or any of the great powers. The only country that shows any signs of helping us in the South is the Soviet Government of Russia." When Brockman asked, "Do you call the Soviets democratic?" Dr. Sun replied, "I do not care what they are if they are willing to back us against Peking."

customs houses and retain the surplus revenues. Either of these would destroy the integrity of the customs service and, if allowed, might encourage other tuchuns to follow the example.⁽⁷⁰⁾

In October the Legation received reports of a serious financial crisis at Canton and conflicts arising from the imposition of new taxes on the foreign buildings erected on leased land, and of the confiscation of property formerly designated as public land to be sold for revenue.⁽⁷¹⁾ Schurman met with Koo and told him of Canton's appeal for a share of the customs revenue and stated that Washington had instructed the legation that it still regarded the powers as only the trustees of the customs revenues and viewed their disposition as a solely Chinese matter.⁽⁷²⁾

Before Schurman left Peking for Yunnan, he informed the Department of the fighting between the forces of Sun and Ch'en which had renewed in October, and that the USS *Ashville* at Canton had landed nine marines to protect the American mission at Tungshan -- the latter with the approval of Sun who was "still in [the] city well and optimistic."⁽⁷³⁾ In early December it was reported that Sun might seize the Canton Customs house. The Amer-

(70) Schurman to Hughes, September 22, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923 I, pp. 552-555. The declaration was dated September 5, 1923; for the text, see *The China Year Book*, 1924, p. 850. The customs revenues collected by the Chinese Maritimes Customs Administration were held by the Inspector General and disbursed for the payment of debts secured on these revenues. The 'surplus' or remaining portion, was remitted to the Chinese government for its own administrative uses. When the Republic fragmented after 1917, the southern governments petitioned for their share of the funds and a Canton Conservancy Board was created by the Inspector General to supervise the allocation of revenues to necessary projects and government expenses in Kwangtung. From September 1919 to March 1921, 13.7% of the surplus was paid to the Canton government in periodic installments. In December 1920, the Peking government declared its intention to stop allocations to the reconstituted Military Government under Sun Yat-sen. Sun sent Kuo Tai-chi to Peking to appeal to the legations for the funds. The various foreign diplomats were sympathetic and considered the Canton request reasonable. Minister Crane cabled the State Department and was informed that it was the view of the Department that it could not interfere with or impose conditions upon the release of the customs surplus to the recognized and legal government in Peking; the allocation of the surplus was solely a Chinese problem. The Peking government refused to continue the allocation beyond March 1921, and periodically the Canton government threatened to take some action. See *FRUS*, 1921 I, pp. 491-505; Schurman to Hughes, December 28, 1922, *S.D.F.* 893.51/4507.

(71) Schurman to Hughes, October 4, 11, 1923, *S.D.F.* 893.52/96, 97; *The North China Herald* CXLIX, December 1, 1923.

(72) Wai-chiao-pu file, October 24, 1923, U.S. Legation Dialogue No. 29, quoted in Wang, *Schurman in China*, p. 293.

(73) Schurman to Hughes, November 14, 16, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923 I, pp. 555-557.

ican Chargé informed the Department that the Diplomatic Corps in Peking had agreed upon a joint naval demonstration, and stated that the naval attaché recommended seven ships be sent to Canton.⁽⁷⁴⁾ The powers replied to Canton's declaration of September 5 on December 11, with the statement "that the granting or refusal of such a claim does not lie within the province of the diplomatic body."⁽⁷⁵⁾

In mid-December Consul Jenkins reported that C.C. Wu was discussing the crisis with British diplomats and that Sun held a mass rally on December 16, and issued a Manifesto "To My Friends, The American People." The Manifesto expressed disappointment with American lack of sympathy for the Canton Government. Jenkins informed Schurman that

A few days ago, Mr. Norman told me that Sun flew into a rage when he was informed that the United States would join with the other powers to protect the customs and that American destroyers had been ordered to Canton.....Dr. Sun is under the impression that the Americans [are] susceptible to appeals on behalf of the Canton Government.⁽⁷⁶⁾

At the rally, Sun stated that he would inform the Commissioner of the Maritimes Customs that he was taking over the customs house within three days and give the Commissioner seven days to comply; after ten days he would take whatever steps necessary to take control of the customs receipts and appeal to world opinion. Sun declared that the customs issue was a Chinese internal matter and the foreign powers had no treaty rights to interfere with the customs as long as debts secured by it were met.

I have to add that my Government is willing to undertake that, in the event of the Customs revenues from the rest of China being insufficient to meet foreign obligations, it will make good any deficit to the extent of the Customs revenues received by it from time to time.⁽⁷⁷⁾

(74) Charge Bell to Hughes December 1, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923 I, pp. 557-559.

(75) Bell to Hughes, December 11, 1923, *FRUS*, 1923 I, p. 568.

(76) Jenkins to Schurman, December 18, 1923, *S.D.F.* 893.51/4502, see enclosed copy of the Manifesto.

(77) Jenkins to Schurman, December 16, 1923, *S.D.F.* 893.51/4516, see attached copy of news release authorized by Sun Yat-sen and dated December 16, 1923.

Consul Jenkins observed:

Dr. Sun is by no means an ordinary Chinese, nor is he an ordinary man from our point of view. He is resourceful and courageous and both he and Dr. Wu understand Europeans and Americans and their methods. They cannot, in my opinion, be frightened by a mere naval demonstration. ⁽⁷⁸⁾

With the arrival of four American destroyers from Manila, to complement the *Ashville* and *Pampanga* at Canton, anti-American criticism rose sharply. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ When the ten day grace period allowed by Sun had expired on December 19, he notified the consular corps at Canton that he intended to have the customs revenues but stated that he would not use force if resisted. ⁽⁸⁰⁾ At this juncture, encouraged by events at Canton, Chang Tso-lin declared his intention to seize the customs offices in Manchuria. ⁽⁸¹⁾

Minister Schurman received a message from Bell through the Yunnan consulate informing him that

In view of the present situation you may decide it preferable to omit Canton from your schedule and in any case I venture to advise of your consulting. Jenkins from Hong Kong before you go and ascertaining the exact situation. ⁽⁸²⁾

Schurman replied:

I gather you consider it might be dangerous, in view of Sun Yat-sen's hostile act to foreign nations and especially U.S. of A., for me to visit Canton. I feel, however, that American interests in present situation calls for such visit which might safely be made on gunboat..... I arrive approximately January second?.....⁽⁸³⁾

(78) Jenkins to Schurman, December 18, 1923, S.D.F. 893.51/4502, see attached news clipping from *Hsien Hsiang-pao*, December 17, 1923.

(79) Jenkins to Schurman, December 22, 1923, S.D.F. 123 Sch 87/96; the *Hsien Hsiang-Pao*, December 21, 1923, demanded the recall of Jenkins and Schurman, *ibid.*, see attached news clipping.

(80) *North China Herald* CXLIX, December 22, 1923.

(81) Consul Hanson (Harbin) to Schurman, December 22, 1923, S.D.F. 893.51/4514.

(82) Bell to Schurman, December 21, 1923, S.D.F. 123 Sch 87/90; Bell to Hughes, December 27, 1923, S.D.F. 893.51/4487.

(83) Schurman to Bell, December 26, 1923, S.D.F. 123 Sch 87/90a.

On December 30, Jenkins cabled Schurman in care of the American consulate, Hong Kong:

.....concerning the possibility of your coming to Canton. On the day this message was received, Dec. 28, I had just been informed that Sir Francis Aglen had replied.....to Dr. C. C. Wu to the effect that it was impossible to comply with the Canton Government's demand.....It appeared to me that.....Aglen's reply was final and that the situation here would reach a crisis in a day or two. Under such conditions I did not think it would be advisable for you to come to Canton.....

Yesterday, however, I was reliably informed that the Canton Government would not regard..... Aglen's reply as final.....Wu..... will now ask.....Aglen to state specifically whether or not, in principle, the Canton Government is entitled to any share in the surplus.....

Dr. Sun and his more radical advisers are in a desperate position and seem to be prepared to go to almost any extreme.You may find it impossible to reason with him at all and I am not sure that it would be advisable for you to meet him under any circumstances. I may add that not a few people here think that he is mentally unbalanced. It will, however, be possible and proper, I think, for you to have an interview with Dr. C. C. Wu and perhaps one or two other more conservative members of the Canton regime. ⁽⁸⁴⁾

The Minister reached Hong Kong on January 3, 1924. The next day he conferred with consular officers, naval officers, and leading American residents. He held a four hour conference with C. C. Wu on the afternoon of January 5, at which time Wu invited Schurman to meet with Sun Yat-sen. Jenkins noted:

(84) Jenkins to Schurman, December 30, 1923 S.D.F. despatch no. 46 (no decimal file number). After the arrival of the four American destroyers from Manila, there were a total of six American warships anchored at Canton Harbor. When the Canton press singled out the presence of the American ships for special attention the other powers began to withdraw some of their ships. On December 26, 1923, there were six American ships, four British, two French, and two Japanese. After consultation with the United States Naval attache, Consul Jenkins ordered two destroyers back to Hong Kong on December 31. Ibid.

At the outset I felt somewhat dubious as to the advisability of Dr. Schurman's accepting Dr. Sun's invitation to visit the latter at his headquarters and told Dr. Schurman of my misgivings. Dr. Schurman insisted, however, that he had visited many prominent leaders in various parts of China and since he felt it extremely important that he should meet Dr. Sun at this time he could not see his way to decline the invitation. ⁽⁸⁵⁾

That evening Wu gave a dinner for Schurman; many prominent members of the Canton government, including Mayor Sun Fo, were present. Schurman spoke briefly, comparing the original thirteen colonies of America to the conditions in China. He said the American colonies established their sovereignty through a constitution which divided political authority between the central government and the states, and urged China to pursue a like arrangement. A Canton paper noted: "We have nothing very serious to state with respect to such remarks. Like many good things of America they cannot be transplanted into China." ⁽⁸⁶⁾

On Sunday, January 6, Schurman and Jenkins met Wu and proceeded to a meeting with Sun. Also present were Madame Sun, Eugene Ch'en, and Robert Norman. Sun and Schurman discussed the customs issue; Sun asserted his intent to have the customs revenue while Schurman agreed that Canton was entitled to a share of the surplus for public projects, but that it was not within his authority to grant it. However, as a friend of China he would take the matter up with Peking. ⁽⁸⁷⁾

Sun angrily denounced the American ships anchored at Canton and declared that if the United States really wanted to show friendship for China she would demonstrate it by bringing about the return of the foreign concessions at Shanghai and Hankow and halt the acts of imperialism committed in China. Sun said he was about to undertake action to bring other provinces in south China under his control and urged the United States to call the powers to a roundtable conference to deal with troop disbandment and the reunifi-

(85) Jenkins to Schurman, January 8, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4538.

(86) Ibid., attached news clipping from the *Canton Gazette* (English language), January 8, 1924.

(87) Ibid., attached news clipping from the *Hsien Hsiang-Pao*, January 9, 1924.

(88) Paul M. W. Linebarger, *Sun I-hsien Ch'uan-chi* [The Life of Sun Yat-sen], (2nd ed. n. p., Chinese Cultural Association, 1944), p. 81.

cation of China. Schurman responded that American policy precluded such intervention in China's domestic affairs, to which Sun, Wu, and Ch'en replied that the Chinese people desired it.⁽⁸⁹⁾ After two hours of discussion the meeting adjourned and Schurman returned to Hong Kong aboard the destroyer *Sicard*, accompanied by the USS *Pope*. Schurman sent the *Helena* to rejoin the *Ashville* and *Pampanga* at Canton in support of the naval demonstration.⁽⁹⁰⁾

Schurman's own report of the meeting is worth noting:

I conferred for two hours this morning with Dr. Sun. With fierce emphasis during the first quarter hour of our conversation, Dr. Sun declared he would seize customs house. I said I was desirous to avoid collision. That Aglen should consent to appropriations from customs fund for reclamation work along West River where previous costly work if not completed will be ruined was my suggestion.

This money was wanted granted to Canton authorities but, if conditions were made, it would, I replied, be impossible in my opinion to reach adjustment in Peking. When they said they wanted diplomatic body to intervene, I said diplomatic body had nothing to do with the expenditures of the surplus and would take no action on it. My suggestion was accepted without condition by Sun and on two different occasions, replying to my specific inquiries, if Aglen acted on the suggestion, he would not seize customs. I clearly explained that neither diplomatic body or my Government knew I was making suggestions and matter concerned only Canton and Peking authorities. Sun criticized foreign interference and presence of men-of-war and stated that it was none of their concern. I stated that it was a case in which one thing involved another and that the forceful taking of customs menaced the integrity of customs service, and if Kwangtung is permitted, it would probably result in other independent provinces following her example, thus resulting in the destruction of the customs service.

...Hope that a collision may be averted is given me by my contact with the situation for the last three days. However, it must be

(89) Schurman to Hughes, January 29, 1924 S. D. F. 893. 51/4519.

(90) Bell to Hughes, January 8, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4505.

stated that Sun is prepared to face all nations and be defeated as a martyr. His opposition in Canton is strengthened by this attitude. Endeavored to conciliate him and find predominance his face and honor as well as our own (this last sentence as received). Since the interview, from an inside source I have learned that he was gratified, feeling in all, distinctly hopeful when I left Canton. [sic]⁽⁹¹⁾

Schurman sailed from Hong Kong on January 7, and visited Shanghai enroute to Peking. At Shanghai Schurman spoke to reporters; he told them the substance of the meeting and of Sun's request for a conference to unify China. Schurman stressed that the meeting was unofficial and noted that American opinion in Canton was sympathetic to the conference proposal. The Minister said Dr. Sun "emphasized that America was the only nation regarded without suspicion by the Chinese, and therefore the only nation able to mediate in the way requested."⁽⁹²⁾ Upon his return to the Legation in Peking, Schurman received a report from Jenkins who earnestly denied the charges of the British Consul General that he (Jenkins) had accused Great Britain of failing to cooperate in the naval demonstration by removing their ships without consultation with result that the American contingent was the largest at Canton.⁽⁹³⁾

This report, and perhaps expressions of disapproval from members of the

(91) Chargé Bell to Hughes (Relayed for the Minister aboard the USS *Sicard*, January 6, 1924, Naval Code Green), January 8, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/5405. C. C. Wu stated that the meeting of Sun and Schurman was at first "unpleasant," *Shun-T'ien Shih-Pao*, February 25, 1924. The Sun-Schurman meeting has been incorrectly reported in several sources. Lyon Sharmon, the biographer of Sun, states that the meeting took place "late in the spring of 1923," Lyon Sharmon, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Meaning* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 250 O. E. Clubb, *20th Century China* (2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), cites the Sharmon account. Hallet Abend, a journalist who spent many years in China gives an exaggerated account of meeting, see Hallet Abend, *My Life in China, 1926-1941* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), pp. 23-25.

(92) *The New York Times*, January 12, 1924; *Peking and Tientsin Times*, January 16, 1924.

(93) Jenkins to Schurman, January 9, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4535. The Canton press dropped its anti-American stance and expressed optimism following the Sun-Schurman meeting. Reports asserted that America had now adopted a policy of independent action toward Canton and was no longer heeding the "cooperative" policy of the major powers. Apparently, the British made a charge against Jenkins as a response to these rumors, see Jenkins to Schurman, January 8, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4542, attached news clipping from the *Canton Press* with translation; Jenkins to Schurman, January 10, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4548, attached news clipping from the *Canton Gazette* (English language), January 10, 1924.

Diplomatic Corps at Peking, seemed to affect a change in Schurman's comments on his meeting with Sun. On January 18, 1924, Schurman addressed the American Association of North China. In an apparent attempt to assure the other powers, and Peking, that America had not acted independently, he said the United States would continue to protect her treaty rights in China. He expressed satisfaction that a collision had been averted at Canton but the matter remained unsettled and "a collision may occur at any time." Should this happen, the United States would join with the powers to present a "united front" to any trespass of the Chinese customs. Schurman cited illegal taxes in Chekiang province and warned that "foreigners may have to protect their rights in Chekiang as they are now doing in Canton."⁽⁹⁴⁾

This speech drew a protest from Canton to Consul Jenkins. C. C. Wu quoted the report of the *South China Morning Post* that Schurman's speech implied that Canton should serve as a "lesson" to other provinces and asked for verification of the Minister's comments. Jenkins forwarded Wu's letter to Schurman who instructed the Consul to make no reply.⁽⁹⁵⁾

Sun Yat-sen was also troubled by Schurman's remarks to the press. On January 23, 1924, Sun called in Alexander I. Cherepanov, a Soviet military adviser attached to the Borodin mission, and explained the substance of his talk with Schurman. Sun stated that Schurman failed to mention his strong protests concerning imperialism but only reported that portion of their conversation which dealt with Sun's proposal for a roundtable conference. The net effect was to create the impression that he, Sun, was in favor of foreign intervention in China. Sun asked, "what kind of an impression can such a statement make, made in my name?" Cherepanov took the opportunity to prod Sun, then hedging on accepting the radical reforms being pressed by the Soviets, to take the matter before the Kuomintang Party Congress, then in session, and expose the imperialists and their policies in China.⁽⁹⁶⁾

Although Schurman told the press of Sun's roundtable conference pro-

(94) Schurman to Hughes, January 21, 1924, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/97, see attached news clipping from the *Peking Leader*, January 19, 1924.

(95) Jenkins to Schurman, January 22, 1924, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/100, see enclosed letter from Wu dated January 21, 1924, and Schurman's response to Jenkins dated February 7, 1924.

(96) Alexander I. Cherepanov, *Zapiski Voennogo Sovietniki v Kitae* [Memoirs of a Military Advisor in China] (2nd ed., Moscow: Nauko, 1971), pp. 80-82.

posal, he did not formally report it to the Secretary of State or Foreign Minister Koo until late in January.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Upon returning to Peking, Schurman saw Koo on January 16 and 23, and discussed the matter of allocating customs revenue to conservation work, but did not mention Sun's conference proposal. Koo stated that he would look into the matter but doubted that certain factions in the government would release the money.⁽⁹⁸⁾

It was not until January 29, 1924, that Schurman cabled Hughes the full substance of his conference with Sun:

In my conversation with Sun Yat-sen on January 6th, ...he outlined with much enthusiasm a plan for a conference of Chinese leaders on unification and disbandment of troops which he desired the American Government, after consulting with the powers, to call. I replied that the American people and Government were strongly opposed to intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations and my Government would therefore probably not favor his suggestion. He and C. C. Wu and Eugene Ch'en asserted that in this case Chinese people desired it.

In a conversation with premier January 24th I informed him informally of Sun's suggestion and said I had not even reported it to my Government. To my surprise he expressed himself in favor of the plan and urged me to inform my Government. I inquired if he desired me to telegraph the Secretary of State that the Prime Minister and Government of China made such a request of the American Government. He was somewhat taken back at this practical question to which I stated that I had asked only because I desired that my Government might know exactly what was proposed. He then remarked that he would on the 25th consult the President, on the 26th the Cabinet, and communicate with me the day

(97) Dr. Koo stated that he was surprised at the first reports of Schurman's mediations with Sun at Canton but thought Schurman acted on confidential instructions from Washington. Interview with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, May 12, 1971. When questioned about the reports of Sun's proposal Secretary Hughes had "no comment," see *The New York Times*, January 14, 1924.

(98) Schurman to Hughes, January 26, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4518. At the time of this report Schurman had still not informed the Secretary of State of Sun's conference proposal. No report of Schurman's January 16 and 23 meetings with Koo is contained in Wang, *Schurman in China*.

after.

Monday, January 29th, Secretary from the Foreign Office came to me by appointment. He stated that Koo had directed him to report to me that the matter had been referred to a committee

I conjecture this is a method of dropping the matter. Probably the President recognized an insuperable obstacle in Wu Pei Fu who has embarked on a program of unifying China by force. January 29, Noon. [sic]⁽⁹⁹⁾

Schurman continued to press for allocation of funds to the Canton authorities for conservation work, and on January 31, the Chinese cabinet agreed to take steps to implement the release of funds to Canton.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

At the request of President Calvin Coolidge, Schurman prepared a long report on conditions in China. Of Sun Yat-sen he wrote:

Whether in defeat or in victory Sun Yat Sen is a power to reckon with. He exerts a large influence, especially among the workingmen and the younger students. An American might describe him as a compound of William Jennings Bryan and a red-hot Eastside socialist in New York City.

Doubtful that the particularistic tendencies of clan, family, and village were adaptable to modern western republican institutions, the report concluded:

The state organization which China may ultimately evolve may be as different from our western type as China herself is from the Occident. The Soviet feature of the Russian Government might fit into the village communities of China, but Communism is wholly alien to Chinese life and democracy of the self-governing pat-

(99) Schurman to Hughes, January 29, 1924, S. D. F. 893. 51/4519. Koo informed the author that there was strong feeling against the conference proposal expressed in the cabinet. Interview with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, May 12, 1971.

(100) Wang, *Schurman in China*, p. 298. On June 19, 1924, an appropriation from the customs surplus was paid to a special Commission of Water Conservation for Kwangtung as arranged between C. C. Wu and Schurman, who was reluctant to grant payment directly to a government not recognized by the powers. See statement by Wu in *Shun-T'ien Shih-Pao*, February 25, 1925. The roundtable conference proposal received no further mention in the official State Department records.

riarchal family communities.....(101)

In August 1924, Schurman received permission to take his first home leave from China. Before he left Peking, Schurman reported that the attempted assassination of the Governor General of Indo-China who was visiting Shameen had brought a strong response from the British, who had established a 9:00 p.m. curfew and required all Chinese to carry passes. Schurman denounced the measures as "high-handed," and said they would only provide a "rallying ground for the Bolshevik-minded Chinese and turbulent elements generally under the unstable Sun Yat-sen Government." He repeated his orders that American Consuls should "avoid all conflicts with the local authorities." (102)

Enroute to America, Schurman spoke to reporters at Kobe, Japan, and, noting that European affairs were more stable, said, "one may hope that the powers concerned will be able to turn their attention more actively to Chinese affairs," and expressed hope that steps would be taken to fulfill the pledges of the Washington Conference. Chargé Bell forwarded to Hughes a clipping from a British newspaper in Peking which described Schurman's interview as "amazing," and reported the story with headlines titled, "U. S. Minister's Change of Front." (103)

On September 16, Schurman met with Hughes at 10:00 a. m.; the official papers contain no memorandum of this meeting. The essence of their conversation, however, is suggested by the Secretary's later despatch to Ambassador Frank Kellogg in Great Britain:

When Minister Schurman was here recently for consultation he confirmed the apprehension that in the relatively near future the Chinese will demand what they call the 'unequal treaties' shall be revised, insisting upon control of their tariff, freedom to tax foreigners, and the abolition of extraterritoriality. If such a policy were enunciated it would bring forth a degree of enthusiasm

(101) President Coolidge to Schurman, February 25, 1924. Coolidge Papers, Box 364, Index 1381, Library of Congress; "Confidential Report on China Written for President Coolidge at His Request, April 8, 1924." Schurman Papers.

(102) Schurman to Hughes, July 25, 1924. S. D. F. 893. 00/5528.

(103) Bell to Hughes, September 9, 1924, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/122; See attached news clipping from *The North China Daily News*, August 29, 1924.

and popular approval such as no recent Chinese regime has been able to win. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Following the meeting with Hughes, Schurman told reporters; "There is no feeling in China against the foreigners." ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Schurman discussed Sino-American relations at a luncheon meeting of the China Society of New York on October 1. The discussion was "of intimate character and closed to the press." ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Schurman returned to Washington and we have this record of one evening he spent there:

Night before last [October 27, 1924] I dined with Jacob Gould Schurman at my sister's. He was full of problems of China. He talked steadily about them all through the evening he said that in a negative way a national spirit was growing up in China quite rapidly in these later years. This manifested itself mainly in a dislike and contempt for the foreigner. ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The China that Schurman returned to in December 1924 was very different from the one he left four months earlier. General Wu P'ei-fu had embarked on a campaign to unify China and the result was civil war. In the melee President Ts'ao K'un's government fell and Wu was defeated by a new coalition. The victors invited General Tuan Ch'i-jui to accept the position of Provisional Chief Executive pending the drafting of a new constitution. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, who had launched a "northern expedition" to unseat Ts'ao K'un, declared his intention to go north and convince the warlords to abolish the unequal treaties. ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Sun arrived in Shanghai on November 17, stayed only briefly, and sailed for Japan. At Kobe, Sun spoke of developments in China; he declared that China wanted unity and peace, but to accomplish this the militarists and the imperialists who supported them had to be eliminated, and Sun declared his

(104) "National Diary, 1924," Hughes Papers, Library of Congress; Hughes to Kellogg, November 24, 1924, *FRUS*, 1924 I, p. 424.

(105) *The New York Times*, September 16, 1924.

(106) *Ibid.*, October 2, 1924.

(107) Henry Lewis Stimson "Diaries," Vol. 6, entry for October 29, 1924, p. 87. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

(108) For a synopsis of developments in China during this period, see Clubb, *20th Century China*, pp. 125-129.

intent to abolish the unequal treaties and end imperialism in China. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

These events in the fall of 1924 brought a characteristic response from the powers -- talk of intervention. Hughes cabled Chargé Bell that America was not "indifferent" to events in China, but her policy remained one of "aloofness." ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Hughes was resisting suggestions from several quarters that intervention might be necessary. ⁽¹¹¹⁾

Upon his return to China, Schurman gave an address on American policy before the Union Club of Shanghai on December 17, 1924. Restating earlier positions, he stressed that foreign nations must recognize that their privileges under extraterritoriality must be surrendered. In reporting this speech to Hughes, Schurman noted that the English language press in China generally considered it "weak" and "yielding," but he declared that "the pursuit of mistaken policies" in China may only retard that nation's development. ⁽¹¹²⁾

Sun Yat-sen arrived in Peking on December 31, 1924, only to learn that the warlords had reneged on their earlier pledges to incorporate Sun's suggestions into the "reconstruction conference." Sun's plan called for representation for industry, merchants, students, farmers, and all political parties at the conference. Schurman noted that should the Tuan regime fall, the next government would be headed by Sun Yat-sen, supported by General Feng Yu-hsiang, and committed to abolishing the unequal treaties. ⁽¹¹³⁾ In a later despatch, after observing the reaction to Sun's presence in Peking, Schurman stated that neither Sun nor Feng were Bolsheviks; they were but the stronger exponents of radical nationalism who were using the Bolsheviks in their search for political power and national unity. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾

On January 14, Schurman met with "one of the ablest intellectual leaders of the Kuomintang Party and a close friend of Dr. Sun who talked with me for an hour and a half with great frankness and apparent

(109) Bancroft (Japan) to Hughes, November 25, 1924, S. D. F. 983.00/5781. For the Chinese text of Sun's speech at Kobe, see Hu Han-min, *Tsung-li Chuan-chi* II, [Collected Works of the National Leader] (Shanghai: People's Wisdom Book Store, 1930), pp. 557-557.

(110) Hughes to Chargé Bell, September 30, 1924, S. D. F. 893.00/-5575.

(111) "Memorandum of an Interview with the Chinese Minister" (Sze), October 9, 1924, Hughes Papers, Container 174, folder 62.

(112) Schurman to Hughes, January 5, 1925, S. D. F. 123 Sch 87/128, see attached news clippings from eleven newspapers reporting and commenting on the speech.

(113) Schurman to Hughes, January 2, 1925, S. D. F. 893.00/5901.

(114) Schurman to Hughes, January 12, 1925, S. D. F. 893.00/5945.

sincerity." Schurman learned that Sun was genuinely ill and that "if he were well enough would soon come to the Presidency but that no individual could do much for China" in her present chaos.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

During Schurman's remaining months in China the demand for American participation in foreign intervention increased. The British Minister in Peking approached Schurman in mid-January with a proposal that, due to the fighting around Shanghai, an international military force be despatched to protect foreign interests in that city. Schurman received a similar appeal from Consul Cunningham in Shanghai.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ These proposals were rejected by Schurman who wrote to Hughes that:

Among the British and some other foreign merchants in Shanghai there has always been a strong element in favor of military intervention in China and they may be utilizing the present situation to get foreign Governments committed to that programme.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

It may have been these probes for foreign action that inspired Schurman to use the occasion of his address before the annual Anglo-American Association banquet to deliver a speech entitled "Extraterritoriality and its Gradual Relinquishment." Schurman put before his audience three courses of action: to continue to gloss over the present situation and refuse to modify the system of extraterritorial privileges, or to choose between two other alternatives. The first of these was a policy of revolution "advocated by a very small-number of Chinese" who were "inspired and instructed by Mr. Karakhan." Moving from a rejection of these first two courses, the Minister proposed what he called "The Policy of Evolution and Cooperation." This program required western and Chinese cooperation in reforming China's law codes and a graduated restoration of Chinese sovereignty in areas of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Schurman called upon the leaders of China to establish a government that could make possible immediate revision of the treaties. He closed with an "ardent wish that the Chinese New Year..... may witness the establishment ofa Government bringing in its train the consummation of the best hopes and aspirations of the Chinese people."⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Schurman wrote President Coolidge that the speech was intended to reach

(115) Schurman to Hughes, January 15, 1925, *FRUS*, 1925 I, p. 591.

(116) Schurman to Hughes, January 18, 1925, *S. D. F.* 893.00/5952.

(117) Schurman to Hughes, February 11, 1925, *S. D. F.* 893.00/6096.

(118) Schurman to Hughes, January 28, 1925, *S.D.F.* 123 Sch 87/132.

the “stand pat…… do nothing” foreigners who “are in effect aiding the Bolshevik propaganda among the Chinese.”⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The reaction of westerners to the speech was volatile. Most of the English language press in China expressed shock at Schurman’s remarks; the New York Times called it a “bomb.”⁽¹²⁰⁾

Throughout February and March, Schurman continued to reject pleas from American citizens and the foreign representatives in China for intervention. These requests concerned the establishment of foreign military escorts on all trains and for additional protection in the treaty ports. Schurman advised that such action would engender more anti-foreign feeling among the Chinese.⁽¹²¹⁾

Sandwiched between the despatches from the American Legation was this brief telegram of March 12:

Sun Yat-sen died at 9:30 this morning.⁽¹²²⁾

Thus ended Schurman’s relationship with the Chinese leader whom he sometimes admired, but ultimately rejected as having little prospect for success.

Basically conservative and modest, Jacob Gould Schurman was a man outside of his own era. As a scholar, he stood opposed to the philosophers of his age; he rejected Darwin, Huxley, and the pragmatists, and advocated a spiritualism which embodied the wisdom of the ages. In his international outlook too, Schurman was opposed to the “imperialist impulse” of his age; he disliked power diplomacy and urged cooperation among nations in the spirit of justice and service to mankind. Schurman was a man of peace. In 1899, as a member of the Philippine Commission, he showed his strong disapproval of General Otis’ military solution to the Filipino insurgency. Schurman’s Philippine policy of conference and conciliation was repeated during his years in China.

Almost immediately upon his arrival in China, Jacob Schurman noted the growing nationalism of the Chinese people and expressed his optimism that the Washington Conference would redefine Sino-Western relations. On several occasions, Schurman showed disagreement with the policy originating in Washington. He repeatedly counseled moderation and often rejected Hughes’

(119) Schurman to Coolidge, January 28, 1925. Coolidge Papers, Box 364, Index 1183.

(120) *North China Daily News*, January 21, 1925; *The New York Time*, March 6, 1925.

(121) Schurman to Hughes, February 6, 11, 1925, S.D.F. 893.00/6099, 6096; Schurman to Hughes, March 23, 1925, S.D.F. 893.00/-6173.

(122) Schurman to Hughes, March 12, 1925, S.D.F. 893.00/6082.

considerations of military intervention. Schurman approached events in China from the experiences of a university president, long since acclimated to reconciling factions through compromise.

Jacob Schurman's attitude toward Sun Yat-sen is a difficult one to assess. His early reports on Canton broke from the close-mindedness of his predecessor, Minister Charles R. Crane. In his report of December 3, 1921, to Secretary Hughes, Schurman commented favorably on the Canton government. When Sun was expelled from Canton by Ch'en Chiung-ming, Schurman apparently regarded the event as the end of Sun's chances for establishing an effective government. Yet Schurman continued to remain open-minded toward the Canton government as perhaps representing a viable alternative to Peking. This is illustrated by his meeting with C. C. Wu in Shanghai in March 1923. When Sun Yat-sen went north in the winter of 1924-1925, Schurman observed his impact on Peking, and again met with a "close friend" of Sun's who had accompanied the Chinese leader. Thus, his early attitude suggests Schurman was not blinded by prejudice toward Sun arising from the latter's opposition to Schurman's appointment as Minister to China.

Perhaps more than anything else, it was Sun's alliance with the Soviets that turned Schurman away from him. After Sun's return to Canton, the harsh propaganda of the Communist Party members in Canton alarmed the foreign population and press in China. Sun himself, disappointed and frustrated with the failure of the western powers to support his government manifested a growing hostility toward the maintenance of foreign rights in China.

It may be prudently stated that the powers overreacted to the Canton customs dispute and Consul Jenkins was, as Schurman himself observed, unduly alarmed over the "danger" of the Minister's visit there. Schurman's decision to accept Sun's invitation for a meeting was characteristic; it was his style to go right to the heart of a problem. Although the meeting with Sun was tense, Schurman displayed a concern for the problems of the Canton authorities and was instrumental in obtaining Peking's release of funds to Canton.

Sun's proposal for a roundtable conference was not very different from Schurman's suggestion that the Washington Conference sponsor measures to effect troop disbandment in China. Had not Schurman himself offered his

services to bring rival factions in China together? The fact that Schurman did not immediately report Sun's proposal is understandable: the Minister was well aware of the State Department's often repeated position on official contacts with the principals of a faction in revolt against the recognized government in Peking. Schurman had no specific authority to meet with Sun Yat-sen, and he certainly knew that Washington would not look upon his discussion of such matters with enthusiasm. His loyalty to Charles Evans Hughes, his dearest friend, would not permit him to risk embarrassment of Hughes' administration.

It is unfortunate that upon his return to Peking Schurman changed his tone toward Canton. The evidence suggests this was due to criticism from other members of the diplomatic body that Schurman's action somehow weakened their united response to the Canton crisis. We have seen that both C. C. Wu and Sun Yat-sen felt disappointed in their hope that America would act independently of the powers in China.

The fact that Sun requested America to call a conference to end the civil war in China suggests that he never really abandoned his hope that America would aid his struggle to establish a republican government in China. Sun Yat-sen was faced with a very difficult decision. The Soviet advisers were pressuring him to accept a radical reform program as part of their assistance on the one hand, while loyal, but conservative supporters opposed to the Soviet influence threatened to defect from the Kuomintang on the other. There is evidence to believe that Sun was seriously disturbed by the activities of the Communists in Canton after the arrival of Borodin and his Soviet advisers. Dr. Sun himself had received letters and telegrams from overseas Chinese who urged him to break with the Communists. Sun's meeting with Schurman may be viewed as a final attempt to enlist American support which might have made possible a break with the Russians.

As a result of the developments of 1924 in China, Schurman became convinced that America should take the lead in fulfilling the Washington Conference promises and in relinquishing extraterritoriality. His speech at Kobe, Japan, was such an abrupt "change of front" that it evidently caused concern for other western diplomats. The Minister must have won Secretary Hughes to his views, because upon Schurman's return to China he spoke confidently and with authority of the need of the western powers to effect

some change in the extraterritorial system, and called for an "evolutionary" alternative to revolution.

A month after the death of Sun Yat-sen, Jacob Gould Schurman left Peking to become Ambassador to Germany. On May 30, 1925, British police in Shanghai fired in to a crowd of Chinese students and workers who were demonstrating in protest against an earlier killing of a Chinese laborer in a strike dispute. This "May Thirtieth Incident" inflamed Chinese passions and began a new phase of the Chinese revolution. A fitting tribute to Schurman's perception of the mood of China and his attempts to persuade the powers to adopt a more altruistic course is contained in a letter he received from John B. Powell, editor of the China press. Powell wrote of those who had criticized Schurman's "change of front" in 1925:

.....[they are] all looking back to your addresses with renewed interest and consider you a political philosopher for you told them what they should do and they objected most strenuously to your advice. Now, if they could follow out your suggestions they would be most happy, but from the way things have been going in China recently, I am afraid the transition from the old to the new system is going to be much quicker than any of them dreamed a few months ago. ⁽¹²³⁾

(123) Quoted in a letter from Schurman to Captain A. St. Clair Smith, March 25, 1926. Schurman Papers.