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Controlling the two north-south passes between Sichuan and Sizhang, and situated to the west of Sichuan, Zhandui was a strategic region where rebel1ions occurred from time to time during the Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns. Particular1y unsettling for the Sichuan border region and the Qing dynasty's control of it was the rise of Chief Gonbu Langjie in the Daoguang era, which led to decades of regional turbulence, brought instability to Tib 肘, and saw roads blocked for a long periods of time. As a resu1t, the Qing court, acting upon suggestions made by Sichuan govemor Luo Bingzhang and others, decided to give the whole of Zhandui to the Dala Lama as an imperial gift. However, the fact that Zhandui was controlled by Tibet not only failed to resolve local tensions but it threw the Sichuan border region into further turmoil. Shortly after he became Sichuan govemor in the twenty-first year of the Guangxu reign, Lu Chuan-lin had to resort to military action and began advocating the recovery of Zhandui. Vacillating between a hard-line approach and appeasement for fear that any action against Zhandui would affect Tibet, the Qing court did not accept Lu Chuan-lin's proposal.
The resu1t was what Lu Chuan-lin and others had redicted: that both local chiefs and the Tibetans became increasingly defiant and did .not take the Middle Kingdom seriously, which consequent1y led to Great Britain's military dventures in Tibet. This study of the history of Zhandui in relation to Tibet and Qing politics wi11 not only help us understand Lu Chuan-lin's motivations and actions taken on the matter of Zhandui, but wi11 also c1arify the evolution and exacerbation of the Zhandui problem in the late Qing period.
Since 1990, the terms “Greater China Economic Zone" and “Global Chinese network" have been frequently used in the mass media. This paper examines the underlyingconcept ofbuilding economic networks through cultural attachment by focusing on" the overseas trade experiences of Taiwanese merchants under Japanese rule. Materials used for this study are mostly Japanese consular reports, investigations of the Japanese Taiwan governor-general and of the Taiwan Bank, newspapers of Taiwan, Manchuria, Southeast Asian overseas Chinese communities obtained from Taiwan, Japan, the U.S.A., Singapore, and Chinese mainland. During the whole period, Southern China, which shares a Southern Fujianese subculture with Taiwan, drew the most interest from Taiwanese merchants for migration and investment; and Southeast Asia, whose overseas Chinese also shared this common culture, ranked next; Manchuria, which did not share this culture, ranked last. This suggests the influence of cultural attachment was six times that of Taiwan-Southern China trade and eight times of Taiwan-Southeast Asia trade as Taiwan had a better regional division of labor with Manchuria. This suggests that the more dominant influence of comparative advantage than cu1tural attachment for building trade networks. And, as Taiwanese merchants active in their cu1tural homeland, Southern China, provided war materials for the Japanese army with whom they shared the same political and conomic interests, it further suggests that even for migration and investment, cultural attachment could be overridden by politicoeconomic considerations. These Taiwanese merchants' experiences suggest the limited efficacy of the concept underlying the terms “ Greater China Economic Zone" and “ Global Chinese network."
Jingguo's student years in the Soviet Union by focusing on his intellectual, romantic and political life. It is also the first study to reveal his relationship with Feng Funeng (Feng Yuxiang's daughter) and the meeting minutes of his application for candidate membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In a word, this study tries to present Jiang Jingguo as a human being, rather than as a flawless leader or a saint.
Jiang Jingguo was a serious student. His progress in Russian might not have met his father's expectations, but his father was very happy with his intellectual progress. Also, he actively participated in various po1itical activities and even became a Trotskyist for a time. Considering his father's encouragement to devote himself to revolution as well as the influence of his Soviet education and his communist friends , I argue that his denouncement of his father after the purge in April 1927 very likely reflected his sentiments.
Compared with Jiang Jingguo's memoirs written after his return to China, the archives cannot sustain many of Jiang's statements. In this article 1 discuss the different versions of his memoirs and the possible reasons for the discrepancies.
The major thrust of Lei Pei-hung's ambitious educational programs lay in the area of primary education. The Kwangsi government, for which he was in charge of education, required each village and ward in the province to turn one of its temples into a primary school, or else to bui1d a new school bui1ding (which would also include offices for either a village or ward government and a miniheadquarters for a local militia unit). Under the leadership of Lei Pei-hung, the director of education of the Kwangsi Provincial Government, and the guidance of the Kwangsi KMT Clique, about two-thirds of Kwangsi's 24,000 vi1lages and wards had primary schools by 1934. The statistical sources indicate a rapid increase in the number of children attending primary schools.
Lei Pei-hung viewed adult education in Kwangsi as the education of the masses, which was taken to be even more important than the education of children. This education needed to be consistent with the political, economic, and social objectives of the masses, as determined by the Clique. The militia system provided the primary mechanism through which adult education was achieved. Viewed from all possible ~ngles , the Kwangsi militia and adult education were inextricably united.
This artic1e deals with Lei Pei-hung's thought on the universal, national and fundamental education reform ofa tutelary sort from 1933 to 1936, which had the aims first to salvage the country and, secondly to enlighten the citizens. The first aim proved to be so emergent and important that it matched educational reform with military purpose. Both reserve militia units and adult educational units were simultaneously constituted. Adult educational units became permanent parts of the provincial militia program, not merely temporary adjuncts to it. The adult educational program included formal and informal education. Formal c1asses were held in primary schools. The informal part of adult education and militia training inc1uded teaching peasants to improve planting methods, propagandizing the need for conscription, and so on. Lei Pei-hung served as the key designer and executor of the education reform of Kwangsi in accordance with the ideas of Dr. Sun Yatsen.
This paper is one of the author's serialized studies of the Japanese involvement in 可drug-trafficking in China prior to and during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. It focuses on Japanese activities in central China, stressing particularly the drug situation in the metropolitan areas of Shanghai, Nanking and Wuhan (Hankow). The article is divided chronologically into three parts covering the wartime period of 8 years.
Facts show that by the time Japan consolidated its occupation of Shanghai, the Japanese military authorities had already begun to transport opium and other dangerous drugs to Shanghai from Manchuria and North China, and, at the same time, massive amounts of raw opium were also imported from Iran. The primary intention was to make money through the drug-trafficking, with a view to supplementing limited military budgets as well as reimbursing the large expenses of instituting various puppet governments in the region. The drug-trafficking scheme was drawn up and put under the control of Hajime Satomi, a Japanese assuming the Chinese name of Li Ming,functions of facilitating and implementing the policy set by the Japanese. The puppet Nationalist government of Wang Ching-wei was compelled after March 1940, to play the same role of facilitating drug-trafficking, although after December 1943, it began to resist this notorious business under Japanese domination with some success.
Based on the information collected by the U. S. Treasury attachés in Shanghai before December 1941, the author estimates that the Japanese collected a total net profit of ¥ 2,175,000,000 during 1937-1945 (in 1939 ¥4.00= ca. US$ 1.00). It has to be noted for comparison that in 1940 the construction of a Japanese most modern 25,675-ton aircraft carrier required ¥80,000,000 only). From all the regions in Japanese-occupied China, it has been estimated that the Japanese and Chinese puppet authorities managed, through their massive drugtrafficking policy in 1937-1945, annually to extract from poor, helpless Chinese drug-addicts and society the large sum of ¥2,037,000,000 an enormous amount of money equivalent to an annual exaction of US$ 509,000,000.
This paper discusses the development of the problem of legal tender's (fapi) various rates of exchange between its own different denominations and China's inf1ation during the period of the War of Resistance against Japan. At that time, people referred to those bills with values of less than ten Chinese dollars as “ xiao-piao" (small bills), and those worth more than that figure as “ da-piao" (big bills). Because of the National Government's inability to supply enough “ xiao-piao”,there occurred the problem of unequal rates of exchange between the different denominations of fapi. The direct result of this was inconvenience in trading. Moreover, many local governments and puppet governments opportunistically issued their own notes, causing the National Government gradually to lose its hold over the currency. Therefore, this problem indirectly led to China's wartime inf1ation.