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The development of Tunxi, originally a small market town in the Xin’anjiang River valley in Huizhou, into a center of the tea industry began in the Hongzhi Reign (1488-1505) of the Ming Dynasty. The local tea industry took off with the development of Songluo tea from Xiuning. Tunxi, as a waterway hub, became the seat of Xunjiansi, a government agency operating chayin, or licensing of the tea trade. Tea produced downstream in Shexian generally did not pass through Tunxi, but with the channeling of the foreign tea trade through Guangzhou in the eighteenth century, all area teas were first gathered in Tunxi before transshipment to Guangzhou. Related industries boomed, such as tea tin, wooden box, bamboo basket and financial products, attracting a large number of immigrants from Anhui, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces. The centralization of related industries consolidated Tunxi’s geographical advantage. Even after Shanghai was opened as treaty port and tea produced in the lower reaches could have been directly shipped there, it was still shipped upstream to Tunxi for refinement. The successful development of Tunxi demonstrates path dependence in economic geographic distribution and institutional formation.
Under the reign of Emperor Xuantong, the Qing government determined to adopt the Western budget system. This shift depended on various factors, of which the attitude of provincial governors was of key importance. At first, the governors generally backed the new system, but later they resisted it, at least passively. This change in their attitude stemmed from the nature of the financial division between central and local governments. Governors sought to influence the drafting and auditing of the budget. They also advocated the establishment of a cabinet and parliament to overcome the fiscal crisis and generally influence national policy. Both the central parliament and local councils attempted to discuss budgets and supervise governmental finances, but were constrained by both central authorities and provincial governors. The governors tried to eliminate the conflicts of financial interests between the central and local governments, and so opposed the institutionalization of Western budgetary procedures. The Qing dynasty hoped to solve its financial problems by adopting the Western budget system, but instead this action intensified political and personnel conflicts.
Coming to power and forming a new national government in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek made many inspection tours by airplane all over China in the following ten years. From 1937 to 1945, during the Sino-Japanese War, Chiang stayed in Chongqing and seldom left Sichuan Province due to safety considerations. After Japan’s surrender and the beginning of the civil war, Chiang traveled more frequently, making use of the Nationalists’ control of the majority of cities with airports. The Communists’ embryonic Air Force could not threaten Chiang’s air travels. Chiang mostly traveled in the north, the site of the main battles, northeast China, and Shandong. On his northern tours, Chiang primarily stayed in Beiping, the traditional capital, an important city politically and strategically, and a convenient place for Chiang to conduct military and political strategy. In January 1948, the Nationalist government named Beiping as the second capital of the country. This article focuses on the background, causes, processes, features, and results of Chiang’s two northern inspection tours and stays in Beiping in 1947.
This article discusses the position taken by Taiwan and the principles behind Taiwan’s efforts to join the WHO from the “accession model” perspective. It reveals the value judgments and cultural implications behind Taiwan’s diplomacy. Constrained by this model, Taipei’s policy goals remain unrealized as it swings between a “China status” and a “Taiwan status.” In 2002, the Democratic Progressive Party government started to pursue “Taiwan status” instead of “China status,” which had formed the traditional thinking behind participation in the WHO. In 2007, despite objections from U.S., Taiwan applied to accession to WHO under the name of “Taiwan” to emphasize the status of Taiwan as a sovereign state and gain the results of such a declaration in international law. Then after the change of power to the Kuomintang, the Ma Ying-jeou administration publicly recognized the “1992 consensus.” The international status of Taipei’s participation in the WHO has returned to a “China status.” In short, Taipei’s international status must be “like China not China, like Taiwan not Taiwan” in order to be accepted by Beijing, the U.S., and international society.
This reply deals with three issues raised by critics in regard to my book: first, the charge of one-sidedness, or that I only discuss the power struggle among the Communist Party leaders trying to outwit each other and not the high degree of trust and openness among party leaders; second, that I should not be saying that the entire CCP completely lacked the values of democratic liberalism and humanism; and third, that there is a contradiction between my sympathy for the communist revolution and my rejection of it. My reply considers each of these issues, particularly in regard to the points of the “old Yanan hand” He Fang. I believe that contemporaries do not fully know what was happening at the time. He Fang was led to misread my book due to his pride in being an old Yanan hand, but his fixed views did not allow him to accept different opinions. Hong Taiyang was not allowed to be published in China, but pirated editions became very popular, showing that it could pass a certain kind of test; and indeed, newly discovered sources have supported its main arguments. The second edition of Hong Taiyang will correct obvious mistakes but maintain its basic framework. In particular, I emphasize the background of the Yanan “rectification movement” and how, after the victory 1949, “rectification” was made into a governing strategy. This led to disaster. Coming to power, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the need to keep pace with the times and abandoned rectification, but it was too late.
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