

CHANG PING-LIN AND THE RISING CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, 1900-1905

By
YOUNG-TSU WONG*

Introduction

This paper deals with one of the most significant phases of Chang Ping-lin [T'ai-yen]'s revolutionary career: His conversion to revolution and his contribution to the rising revolutionary movement from 1900 to 1905.

Chang's own reminiscences tend to suggest that his anti-Manchu revolutionary thought was inspired by the reading of late Ming loyalists during his boyhood. But this inspiration did not make him an instant revolutionary. In fact, from 1895 to 1899, he was a reformer *par excellence*. He did not become a revolutionist until after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. We shall consider the events and the course that prompted him to change his stance from reform to revolution.

As a revolutionist, thanks to his intellectual calibre, he soon became a mouthpiece of the rising revolutionary movement. He organized the first but abortive rally to observe the 242th anniversary of the downfall of Ming dynasty and issued the most forceful anti-Manchu declaration to date. Both actions he undertook in Japan. Back in Shanghai, thanks to the protection of the International Settlement, he was able to engage in anti-Manchu teaching and writing as well as to make friends with other revolutionaries in the area. We shall examine how did Chang and his comrades respond to the revolutionary scene and initiate their actions. The most important event at the time, of course, was the so-called the *Su-pao* Case [*Su-pao an*], and the key figures on trial were Chang Ping-lin and Tsou Jung. The Manchu government attempted to

* The Author is Professor of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

use this trial to punish its most wanted enemies so as to suppress the rising force of political opposition. But the rejection of repatriation by the foreign authorities in Shanghai made the government plan unsuccessful. On the other hand, the trial publicized the revolutionary cause, and the courage of Chang and Tsou won wide admiration. We shall account for the meaning of the *Su-pao* case in the onset of the rising revolution, detail Chang's role in the making of the event, analyze the effect of the case by placing it into historical context, and assess to what extent can the rapid rise of Chinese nationalism from 1900 to 1905 be attributed to Chang's revolutionary activities.

Chang's Road to Revolution

Chang Ping-lin had been a reformer since 1895, but his confidence in the Manchu regime was in gradual deterioration as the reform movement got nowhere. However, he did not totally abandon his reformist stance until the outbreak of the Boxer uprising in 1900 which shattered his remaining faith in the Manchus. It should be remembered that his initial support of reform had been rested on the hope that the Manchu government could still weather the storm of foreign aggression. Violent changes, like revolution, would not only weaken the government's ability to defend the country but also provide the foreign powers with the pretext for further aggression. A successful reform, on the other hand, would surely strengthen the government's hands in dealing with the foreign powers. Even after the failure of the reform he remained hopeful for a reformist solution, in part because of his sympathy and admiration for K'ang Yu-wei, who had emerged as a political hero among the progressive-minded Chinese in the wake of the coup. Nevertheless, the events taking place in 1900 proved that the Manchu regime was totally incapable of resisting foreign aggression and preventing internal turmoil. The justification for the existence of the Manchu regime was, hence, rapidly vanishing in Chang's mind. He doubted that the Kuang-hsü emperor, whom K'ang favored, would give any strength to the degenerated dynasty.

Just before the Boxer rising, Chang still worked for the reformers. In late 1899 he affiliated himself with the *Ya-tung shih-pao* [East Asian Times] as a frequent contributor. The newspaper was published by T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang, a disciple of K'ang Yu-wei, whom he met in Shanghai. (1) Originally, T'ang answered T'an Ssu-t'ung's call to go to Peking from Hunan for assisting the 1898 reform; however, the coup suddenly broke out when he was still on his way. Hence, he sought refuge instead in Hong Kong, then in Japan, Singapore, and finally returned to Shanghai in late 1899, where he administered the newspaper. T'ang's circle in Shanghai was clearly in favor of reform, even though he had reportedly made contacts with revolutionaries while being abroad. (2)

When the Boxer crisis was turning from bad to worse in 1900, the reformers took advantage of the circumstances and tried actively to undermine the existing conservative government in order to restore the disgraced Kuang-hsü emperor to power. On February 25, 1900, T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang found the Cheng-ch'i hui [The Righteous Society], soon to be renamed as Tzu-li hui [Self-reliance Society], and drafted a by-law in which loyalty to the Kuang-hsü emperor, among other things, was clearly stated. (3) Doubtless, both K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were behind T'ang's active move to "rescue the emperor" [*ch'in-wang*]. (4)

When the foreign intervention appeared imminent in early June, Chang sent his second letter to Li Hung-chang and urged the governor-general to

-
- (1) See Chang Ping-lin 章炳麟, *T'ai-yen hsien-sheng tzu-ting nien-p'u* 太炎先生自定年譜 [A Chronological Autobiography of Mr. Chang Ping-lin], in *Chang-shih ts'ung-shu san-pien* 章氏叢書三編 [The Third Series of Chang's Collected Works], (Chang-shih kuo-hsueh chiang-hsi hui 章氏國學講習會 n. d.), p. 7. Hereafter this work will be cited as *Tzu-ting nien-p'u* followed by page number(s).
 - (2) T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang 唐才常, *T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang chi* 唐才常集 [The Collected Works of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1980), p. 1.
 - (3) *Ibid.*, 198-200. See also Ch'ai Te-keng 柴德廣 et. al. comp., *Hsin-hai ko-ming* 辛亥革命 [The Revolution of 1911], (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957, 1931), Vol. 1, pp. 254-55. Hereafter this work will be cited as HHKM followed by numbers of volume and page(s).
 - (4) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao sought cooperation, in vain, from Sun Yat-sen under the banner of the disgraced emperor. See Ting Wen-chiang 丁文江 com., *Liang Jen-kung nien-p'u ch'ang-pien* 梁任公年譜長編 [A Draft Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao], (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1972), Vol. 1, pp. 139-41.

reject the conservative government so as to protect the southern half of the country from foreign invasion.⁽⁵⁾ He wrote:

At present, when the trouble is still [confined] to the north, where the European, American, and Japanese forces gathered at the Yellow Sea, you still have the time to keep the south from [probable] devastation. Should you let this chance go, Canton would be the Tientsin of tomorrow. Even though this would not happen, how could our people survive the ruthless war waged by the numerous foreign powers against our internal rebels?⁽⁶⁾

This letter to Governor-general Li shows that Chang's stance was obviously radicalized. He actually advised Li to break off with Manchu court. Although he had suggested in his first letter to Li dated 1898 that the regional governors-general be granted high degree of autonomy, he did not want, then, a regional independence as he now advised Li in 1900.⁽⁷⁾ Was Chang a revolutionist when he wrote this letter? It seems to be the case, but not quite so. For at this moment he was mainly concerned about the national crisis, and his advice to Li could be an act of expediency. Moreover, what Chang had in mind was that Li might be able to assume a progressive leadership by rallying the disgraced reformers, like K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang, to resume reform.⁽⁸⁾

Then, a sequence of events intensified the crisis: the allied forces of the eight powers landed at Ta-ku fort near Tientsin on June 2, 1900, the Manchu court declared war against the foreign powers on June 20, and Governors-general Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i signed a separate peace agreement with the foreign powers in the Yangtse region on June 26, known as "Tung-

(5) This letter can be found in T'ang Chih-chun 湯志鈞 ed., *Chang T'ai-yen cheng-lun hsuan-chi* 章太炎政論選集 [Political Essays of Chang Ping-lin], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1977), Vol. 1, p. 145.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 147.

(7) See Chang Ping-lin, "Fen-chen" 分鎮 [On Regional Power], in *Ch'iu-shu* 九書 [Book of Urgency] (1900), (Taipei: Kuang-wen reprint edition, 1978), pp. 66b-69a.

(8) See, T'ang, *Chang T'ai-yen cheng-lun hsuan-chi*, Vol. 1, pp. 146-47.

nan tzu-pao" [Self-protection in southeast China]. In view of what had happened, T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang convened a "national conference" [*kuo-hui*] in Shanghai on July 26. ⁽⁹⁾ Chang Ping-lin and some eighty persons took part, and they elected Yung Wing president, Yen Fu vice president, and T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang secretary general. ⁽¹⁰⁾ The declared purpose of the conference was to oppose the war policy of the Manchu government and to defend the Chinese sovereignty by promising a progressive new government. But there were considerable confusion and disagreements among the participants over the fundamental issues involved, particularly the question of whether to retain the dynasty. ⁽¹¹⁾ Chang described what he had seen at the conference in a letter to his close friend Hsia Tseng-yu:

[The attendants of the conference] have vastly different views, a contrast to Japan's *sonnō jōi* movement. Some wanted to invite the Kuang-hsü emperor [down to the south to assume leadership], while others wanted to [expel the Manchus]. These are, of course, contradictory stances. Those who supported the [disgraced] emperor intended to seek help from Japan and Western powers. [Many of them still had confidence in some prominent Manchu officials], like T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang in Weng T'ung-ho and Ch'en Pao-chen, Ti Pao-hsien in Li Hung-chang, and Yeh Han in Chang Chih-tung. There are few, if any, determined men, and disagreements are so immense. The [unsuccessful] consequences of [the conference] can be foretold. ⁽¹²⁾

(9) This conference was held at Yü-yuan rather than Chang-yuan as Feng Tzu-yu had suggested. See Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由, *Ko-ming i-shih* 革命逸史 [Untold Stories about the Revolution], (Peking: Chung-hua reprint edition, 1981), Vol. 2, p. 68.

(10) *Ibid.* p. 69. See also Sun Pao-hsuan 孫寶煊, "Jih-i-chai jih-chi" 日益齋日記 [The Diary of the Jih-i Studio], July 26, 1900 (Unpublished manuscript: collection of Shanghai Library).

(11) Cf. T'ang Chih-chun comp., *Chang T'ai-yen nien-p'u ch'ang-pien* 章太炎年譜長編 [A Draft Chronological Biography of Chang Ping-lin], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 109. Hereafter this work will be cited as *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien* followed by numbers of volume and page(s).

(12) This hitherto unpublished letter is now printed in Chu Wei-cheng 朱維鏗 and Chiang I-hua 姜義華 eds., *Chang T'ai-yen hsuan-chi* 章太炎選集 [The Selected Works of Chang Ping-lin], (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1981), p. 115.

Quite clearly, the conference, which was clouded by political ambivalence toward the Manchu regime, greatly disturbed Chang, and it brought home his own ambiguous allegiance. In a dramatic way he cut off his queue. Since queue was a sign of Chinese submission to the Manchu conquest, Chang's action was a clear act of defiance. Obviously, he did not contemplate such an act when he first attended the conference; nonetheless, he had his queue cut after the conference, thus clearing out his ideological confusion and reaching a point of no return. The depth of national humiliation and anxiety burned his nationalism to the boiling point and kindled revolutionary fire in his mind. He became convinced that China's salvation could no longer depend on the incompetent Manchu regime and therefore it had to be replaced at any cost. ⁽¹³⁾

The tragic ending of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's abortive mission to "rescue" the disgraced emperor in 1900 only strengthened Chang's determination to overthrow the Manchus. Though he did not participate in T'ang's uprising, he was implicated. But he became an anti-Manchu revolutionist in any case. While hiding from government persecution in Chekiang and then in Soochow, he started revising, quite extensively, his recently published book, *Ch'iu-shu* [Book of Urgency], transforming it from a reformist treatise into a revolutionary monograph. ⁽¹⁴⁾ He rebutted two of his own essays, "K'o-ti" and "Feng-chen"—the former tended to justify the Manchu rule while the latter lodged a hope in regional governors-general. The rebuttals indicate that he had totally rejected the Manchu dynasty by mid-1900. As he clearly stated in "K'o-ti k'uang-miu" [Rebutting the Guest Rule], the Manchu ruler was utterly incapable of inspiring patriotism during the recent crisis:

If we don't overthrow the Manchu regime, we cannot expect the people

(13) Cf. *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, p.8. See also Chang Ping-lin, "Chieh pien-fa" 解辮髮 [On Queue Cutting], in *Ch'iu-shu* (1904), (Taipei: KMT Archives reprint edition, 1968), pp. 216-17.

(14) See *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, p.9. The differences of the two editions have been tabulated in *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:144-47.

to ignite their patriotism for resisting [foreign] threats. Sooner or later, [we] will be gradually made slaves of the Europeans and the Americans. ⁽¹⁵⁾

The revision also deleted sixteen essays with clear reformist implications from the original edition, while adding twenty-seven new critical essays, together with some proposals for the more radical socio-political changes. Although the revision was completed in 1902, the new edition was not in print until 1904 in Japan, when Chang was in a Shanghai prison.

Chang's First Revolutionary Activities

By cutting off his queue Chang became an instant revolutionist in physical appearance—only foreigners and revolutionaries had no queue at that time. He had, however, not yet made any meaningful contacts with other revolutionaries, at home or abroad. Most of his friends were still reformers, like Sung Su, who mocked his unrealistic ambition to overthrow a dynasty single-handedly. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Understandably, his friends were abandoning him, either fearful of or disagreeing with his anti-Manchu stance. Yü Yueh, his erstwhile teacher, reproached him in anger when Chang called on him in Soochow in 1901. But his conversion to revolution was firm enough to disregard the breaking of relationships with a respected former teacher. ⁽¹⁷⁾ While in Soochow, he lectured regularly at Soochow University [Tung-wu ta-hsüeh], a missionary school; however, his overt anti-Manchu teachings cut short his stay. Under the threat of En-ming, the Manchu governor of Kiangsu, the missionaries, who were concerned about Chang's safety, asked him to leave. In February 1902, he again set sail for Japan as a refugee. ⁽¹⁸⁾

(15) Chang Ping-lin, "K'o-ti k'uang-miu" 客帝匡謬 [Rebutting the Guest Ruler], *Ch'iu-shu* (1904), pp. 2-7.

(16) See *Tzu-ting nien-pu*, p. 8.

(17) See Chang Ping-lin, "Hsieh pen-shih" 謝本師 [To Break Friendship with My Teacher] (1901), reprinted in Chu and Chiang, *Chang T'ai-yen hsuan-chi*, pp. 121-23.

(18) *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, pp. 8-9.

This time in Japan he made friends with many revolutionaries. Most notably, he visited Sun Yat-sen and Sun's headquarters—the Hsing-chung hui [China Restoration Society]—in Yokohama. He had pleasant long talks with Sun on various key issues.⁽¹⁹⁾ They exchanged views on such broad questions as the promising sites for the future national capital and potential solutions for the problem of land concentration. So far as the latter question is concerned, both saw the importance of equalizing the land, and agreed upon the suggestion that only tillers should own the land. Points of mutual agreement were recorded in two essays which Chang later included in his revised edition of the *Ch'iu-shu*.⁽²⁰⁾ This episode inaugurated their comradeship, which Chang cherished even after he was in antagonism with Sun some years later.⁽²¹⁾

For the time being, he tried hard to defuse the bitter tension between Sun and K'ang which he had observed upon arrival in Tokyo. His correspondence with Wu Chun-sui discloses that he was deeply worried about the "mutual slaughtering" between the revolutionaries and the reformers; it would only benefit their common enemy—the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi. He had placed his hope, in his writings, in the cooperation of Sun Yat-sen and K'ang's principal disciple Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, but only regretted that they were locked in a fierce ideological battle. He wished he could talk Sun into peace or even an alliance with the reformers, though he admitted that the chance of success was very slim.⁽²²⁾ Indeed, he failed to bring the two camps together. But while ideologically he was now closer to Sun, he maintained his personal friendship with Liang for a long time to come.

(19) *Ibid.*, 9. Cf. *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:130-34.

(20) See *Ch'iu-shu* (1904), 143-46; 174-76. Cf. *Sun Chung-shan ch'uan-chi* 孫中山全集 [The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), Vol. 1, pp. 213-15.

(21) See Chang Ping-lin, "Fu Sun Chung-shan shu" 覆孫中山書 [Reply to Sun Yat-sen], in *Ta Chung-hua* 大中華 (Jan., 1912), Vol. 2, No. 12, quoted in *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:334-86.

(22) See "Chang T'ai-yen chih Wu Chun-sui shu" 章太炎致吳君遂書 [A Letter from Chang Ping-lin to Wu Chun-sui], (Unpublished letters collection of Shanghai Library).

Chang's first revolutionary action was the organization of a rally to observe the 242th year of China's falling under the Manchu rule in Tokyo on April 26, 1902. This was Chang's own Initiative but he had given prior brief to both Sun and Liang. Reportedly both men endorsed his plan, though Liang requested him not to publicize his name.⁽²³⁾ When the news of the rally was quickly spreading, the worried Manchu consul pled for the Japanese intervention. Just a day before the rally the Tokyo police summoned Chang and required him to cancel his plan. Consequently, a private ceremony for the anniversary chaired by Chang was held at a restaurant in Yokohama. Chang read his announcement and a declaration. In the evening, Sun Yat-sen and his Hsing-chung hui followers honored him at a banquet, during which over sixty revolutionaries "proposed toasts to Chang." He was too intoxicated to return to Tokyo that night.⁽²⁴⁾

Although the planned public rally failed to materialize, the message nevertheless got across. The *Chung-kuo jih-pao* [China Daily] in Hong Kong published Chang's declaration and drew "enthusiasm and attention" from the Chinese in the Hong Kong—Macco—Canton region.⁽²⁵⁾ In the declaration Chang emphasized the racial issue; he reminded the Chinese people the downfall of the Ming dynasty which marked the "loss of the Chinese state" [*wang-kuo*] to the alien Manchu race. He called for rekindling the ambition and dedication of the late Ming loyalists, like Cheng Ch'eng-kung [Koxinga], Chang Huang-yen, and Li Ting-kuo, in order to fight for the restoration [*kuang-fu*] of a Chinese nation. He denounced the alien Manchu race, "not much less than the Europeans and the Americans."⁽²⁶⁾ And quite clearly he rejected the legitimacy of the Ch'ing rule. As he told a Japanese policeman, he was not a "subject" of the Ch'ing but a "survivor of the lost Chinese state"

(23) Feng, *Ko-ming i-shih*, Vol. 1, p. 59.

(24) Cf. *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:135.

(25) Feng, *Ko-ming i-shih*, Vol. 1, p. 60.

(26) This declaration can be found in *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 57-59.

[*i-min*].⁽²⁷⁾ In the final analysis, Chang drove home his key point that the Chinese was really a people "without a nation" and it had to ignite its national consciousness for the eventual restoration.

In July, Chang returned to Shanghai, where he took a job as editor for Kuang-chih Bookstore. It was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who arranged this job for Chang, who had corresponded continuously with Liang and sent articles to Liang's *Hsin-min ts'ung-pao* [the Journal of New People] for publication. Chang's work *She-hui hsüeh* [Sociology], the translation of a Japanese book, was also first introduced in Liang's journal.⁽²⁸⁾ Apparently, Chang's friendship with Liang was retained in spite of his clear-cut anti-Manchu stance. In fact, Liang, who himself had been struggling between reform and revolution, would surely respect his friend's new stance. However, whether Chang's close relationship with Liang had a bearing on his relationship with Sun Yat-sen is still uncertain. Sun and his fellow revolutionaries sang the praises of Chang's planned rally and the stimulating anti-Manchu declaration. To be sure, they became personal friends and ideological allies. But Chang did not join Sun's camp, nor was he invited to do so at this time.

Back in Shanghai Chang decided to draw his pen against the Manchu regime. In addition to giving a finishing touch to his revised *Ch'iu-shu*, he set forth an ambitious project to write a general history of China. History, he said repeatedly, was the ultimate source of patriotism. A new inspiring history of the fatherland, he hoped, would awaken the national soul so as to restore a Chinese nation. Although he never completed this ambitious project—the rising revolutionary tide was too excited to permit him to become a research historian, he revered the study of history throughout his life.⁽²⁹⁾

(27) *Ibid.*, 1:60.

(28) See *Hsin-min Ts'ung-pao* 新民叢報 [The Journal of New People], No. 222, November 15, 1902. Chang's translation was published by Kuang-chih Bookstore in two volumes in 1901.

(29) The idea was presented in his *Ch'iu-shu* (1904), pp. 181-89, 201-02.

Chang drew attention revolutionary works by his and began making friends with many revolutionaries in Shanghai, where the International Settlement provided a haven for radicals of all inspirations. In the spring of 1902, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, a *chin-shih* degree holder, founded China Education Society [Chung-kuo chiao-yu hui] in Shanghai's International Settlement.⁽³⁰⁾ Its announced purpose was to write new text books, rather than using translated Japanese ones, for Chinese students. But the Society was also an organization to serve as a corner for clandestine anti-government activities. Shortly after its founding, a campus upheaval took place at the noted Nanyang Academy in Shanghai, where students longing for new ideas had been discontent with the conservative policy and rigid discipline of the school.⁽³¹⁾ On November 14, 1902, a minor incident at last burst into a major clash between the students and the school administrators. When the principal insisted on dismissing some students and condemning them as revolutionaries, the incensed students resigned *en masse* on November 17 in protest.⁽³²⁾ Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, who also taught at Nanyang Academy, was sympathetic with the students. He helped them create a school of their own and called it Patriotism Academy [Ai-kuo hsüeh-she]. Under the auspice of Ts'ai's China Education Society, the new school found its accommodation and voluntary teaching staff. And before long, the Society was also able to sponsor a Patriotism Woman Academy [Ai-kuo nü-hsiao]. Chang was one of the voluntary teachers whom Ts'ai invited.⁽³³⁾

Chang started teaching upper class Chinese at Patriotism Academy in

(30) See Kao P'ing-shu 高平叔, *Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei nien-p'u* 蔡元培年譜 [A Chronological Biography of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei] (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1980), p. 14. See also T'ao Ying-hui 陶英惠 *Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei nien-p'u* (Nankang: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1976), Vol. 1, pp. 99-100.

(31) Note that Nanyang Academy was founded in 1898; it included elementary, middle, and college levels of education.

(32) Cf. Chou Chia-jung 周佳榮, *Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'ien ti Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei* 辛亥革命前的蔡元培 [Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei Before the 1911 Revolution] (Hongkong: Po-wen shu-chu, 1930), pp. 38-40. Some details of the campus unrest have been treated in Mary Backus Rankin, *Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902-1911*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 61-64.

(33) T'ao, *Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei nien-p'u*, Vol. 1, pp. 104-09.

March 1903. In fact, in classroom, he was preaching the anti-Manchu cause rather than lecturing on scholarship. ⁽³⁴⁾ The Society and its affiliated academy provided him with not only a platform but also a milieu in which he made regular contacts with the intellectual-revolutionaries from various places of the country. Many of them soon became his most affectionate comrades, including a radical teenager named Tsou Jung from Szechuan. ⁽³⁵⁾ Chang Ping-lin was no longer a lone fighter; he found his fellow revolutionaries and a base to respond to the developing events.

The increasing number of Chinese students studying in Japan since 1900 had been providing potential new blood for the emerging revolutionary movement. The Manchu court's ambivalent policy of sending students abroad and at the same time trying to control their behavior could not but end up on a collision course. The Ch'ing consul in Japan, for example, found it increasingly more difficult dealing with the unruly students. Notably, in August 1902, alarmed by Chang's anti-Manchu rally, the Ch'ing authorities ruled to prohibit Chinese students to study military science in Japan. The incensed students protested the new ruling at the consulate, and the consul Ts'ai Chun requested Japanese police to deport several student leaders. Ts'ai's high-handed handling of the matter only gave rise to wider upheaval. The China Education Society in Shanghai echoed the protesting students in Japan and brought the protest into a nation-wide attention. The Ch'ing court was compelled to reprimand Consul Ts'ai for his "mishandling of the situation" and to send a Manchu nobleman to Japan for consultation. ⁽³⁶⁾

By 1903, despite confrontation, the Chinese students in Japan were generally unsure whether the Ch'ing regime should be overthrown. A large number of them still preferred reform to revolution. And the Ch'ing court's resumption

(34) *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, pp. 9-10.

(35) Chang Ping-lin made Tsou Jung and Chang Shih-chao his "sworn brothers," see *ibid*, p. 10.

(36) Cf. Chang K'ai-yuan 章開沅, *Hsin-hai ko-ming shih* 辛亥革命史 [A History of the 1911 Revolution] (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 384.

of reform in the aftermath of the Boxer catastrophe also rekindled some hope for non-violent change. But the Manchu court's inability to understand and to handle the rising Chinese nationalism vis-à-vis foreign imperialism inevitably resulted in the court's getting fingers burned. A case in point was two anti-foreign incidents which took place almost simultaneously in 1903. The first was an agitation over the French incursion into Kwangsi province from Vietnam. People in Kwangsi had been restless and anti-foreign since 1902 because of Boxer indemnity which imposed on them unbearable financial burdens.⁽³⁷⁾ Fearful of the rebellious situation, Wang Chih-ch'un, the governor of the province, sought French assistance in exchange for special privileges in his region. The government's joining with a foreign power in pacifying internal rebellion at once angered Chinese students in Japan. They organized a big rally and sent telegrams to demonstrate their patriotism. Although the French and the governor were the main targets for the patriotic assaults, the incompetent and treacherous Manchu government had to assume the ultimate responsibility. The newest humiliation readily reminded a series of old ones and the ruling Manchu government had to take the blame.⁽³⁸⁾ The patriotic opinion pressed the Manchu court to dismiss the governor, but the anti-French movement almost immediately transformed into an anti-Russian movement with far greater passion of patriotism and lasting influence. The trouble also had its roots in the Boxer rebellion. The Russian thrust into Manchuria in 1900 had already alarmed the conscientious Chinese, and by now, in April 1903, the Russian envoy in Japan proclaimed without scruple that his government had the intention of annexing Manchuria.⁽³⁹⁾ This outright challenge prompted the outraged Chinese students in Japan to take a militant stance. At rally in

(37) See *Kuang-hsü ch'ao Tung-hua lu* 光緒朝東華錄 [The Tung-hua Record of the Kuang-hsü Reign], chuan 5, p. 5014.

(38) See "Chü-Fa shih-chien" 拒法事件 [Anti-French Affair], in *Che-chiang ch'ao* 浙江潮 (April, 1902), reprinted in Lo Chia-lun 羅家倫 comp., *Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien* 中華民國史料叢編 (Taipei: KMT Archives, 1963), Vol. 4, pp. 127-30.

(39) See "Chü-O shih-chien" 拒俄事件 [Anti-Russian Affair], *ibid.*, 130-38.

Tokyo, they demanded the Manchus to drive the Russian out by force and they vowed to fight the intruders in Manchuria with a volunteer student army. Then the students in China, including the army cadets in Nanking, were also aroused. When the Ch'ing government failed to stand up firm against the Russian threats while suppressing internal protests instead, the confrontation between the Manchu officials and the patriotic Chinese was inevitably intensified. It is only natural that more and more patriotic students became anti-Manchu revolutionaries.

Chang Challenged K'ang

Chang and his comrades at China Education Society never missed a chance to endorse the patriotism expressed by the Chinese intellectuals in Japan. They responded to the events by holding meetings at Chang-yüan, a garden mansion in Shanghai, where they often gave anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist speeches. In his speeches and writings, Chang laid blame squarely on the Manchu regime for national humiliation of all sorts and became ever more energetic in inciting people against the "barbaric Manchu race." He did convert some; for instance, two of his students at Patriotism Academy confessed that they had once followed K'ang Yu-wei. In fact, Chang himself, as he admitted, had once followed K'ang.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Nevertheless, there were still many patriotic Chinese, though dissatisfied with government policy, continued to follow K'ang's reformist steps. Despite his setback in 1898 K'ang still represented the influential force of reform, particularly among the overseas Chinese. His "Emperor Protection Party" [Pao-huang hui] enjoyed greater popularity than Sun Yat-sen's Hsing-chung hui. In 1902, in an effort to counter the rising radicalism, K'ang launched a propaganda campaign against revolution. He warned that revolution would shed too much blood and hence bring catastrophe to the fatherland. He cited the underside of the French Revolution as a lesson to discredit the current Chinese revolutionary movement. The cost of revolution, he

(40) See Liu Ya-tzu 柳亞子 comp., "T'ai-yen hsien-sheng i-cha" 太炎先生遺札 [Letters of Late Mr. Chang Ping-lin], in *Chih-yen* 制言 (Feb., 1940), Vol. 61, pp. 1-2.

said, would be too high a price for China to pay. Moreover, even with a high price, revolution guaranteed no democracy and freedom as the revolutionaries had claimed; rather, it often gave rise to dictatorship as the French Revolution had exemplified. The French Revolution produced one dictator—Napoleon, and yet, given China's size and variations, a Chinese revolution could well produce numerous Napoleons (Incidentally, the post revolutionary Chinese warlordism seems to have confirmed K'ang's prediction). On the other hand, what a revolution could not accomplish with blood and violence would be materialized once the Kuang-hsü emperor regained his power. Obviously, this is why he insisted on protecting the emperor—there was no reason to overthrow the dynasty just because a bunch of Manchu proscribers was temporarily in power. As for anti-Manchu racism, he found it groundless both biologically and historically. The Chinese people had long assimilated with other races, so much so that it would be neither possible nor necessary to pinpoint racial distinctions. And the Manchu dynasty had fully adopted the Chinese system and let the Chinese share its political power. If autocracy was to be blamed, the guilt should hardly be associated with the Manchus.⁽⁴¹⁾ Here K'ang presented a strong case for reform which would not risk internal violence and external intervention. No doubt in Chang's mind that K'ang had created the immediate intellectual obstacle to revolution. He decided to refute K'ang's arguments. He wrote a long letter of rebuttal, which was delivered by a Cantonese merchant to K'ang in Singapore. When K'ang ignored Chang's letter, the letter was made public.⁽⁴²⁾

Chang had been criticizing K'ang since his conversion to revolution in 1900. In the revised version of his *Ch'iu-shu*, for instance, he obviously had K'ang in mind when he was criticizing Confucianism, as K'ang rested his

(41) K'ang's long letter to overseas Chinese in America can be found in Chiang Kuei-lin 蔣貴麟 comp., *K'ang Nan-hai hsien-sheng i-chu hui-p'ien* 康南海先生遺著彙編 [Collected Works of Late Mr. K'ang Yu-wei] (Taipei: Hung-yeh shu-chü, 1976), Vol. 16, pp. 51-99.

(42) See "Hsu-hsun ko-ming-tang an" 續訊革命黨案 [The Trial of the Revolutionaries Continued], in *Shen-pao* 申報 [Shanghai Daily], December 5, 1903.

political ideology on the reinterpretation of Confucianism. Chang's point that Confucius was nothing but "a good historian" [*liang-shih*] clearly rejected K'ang's celebrated efforts to make the sage as a prophet who had long ago set a grand scheme for reform.⁽⁴³⁾ By denunciation of Wang Yang-ming, a great speculative Ming philosopher, he actually disapproved K'ang's highly subjective approach to Confucianism.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Blaming Ou-yang Hsiu and Su Shih, the twin orthodox Confucian scholars of the Sung period, for "honoring the prince" [*tsun-wang*], he disagreed with K'ang's single-minded protection of the Kuang-hsü emperor.⁽⁴⁵⁾ And he generally downgraded Confucianism because K'ang used it for political purposes. To be sure, Chang always disagreed with the mythical nature of K'ang's reinterpretation of Confucianism. But not until 1900 did he abandon K'ang completely—not merely the excessive reinterpretation of Confucianism in particular but also Confucianism itself and reform in general. Now, in 1903, he thought the proper time finally came for him to make a sweeping invective against K'ang and K'ang's thought in public so as to lift a major intellectual roadblock on the revolutionary path.

Chang's "Reply to K'ang on Revolution," erudite, elegant, and inflammatory, made it equal to K'ang's, if not better. Disagreeing with K'ang, he saw violence not necessarily synonymous to revolution. Reform could be violent as well. To support his argument, he cited the example of Japan's chaotic Bakumatsu period prior to the Meiji Restoration, not to mention the bloodshed in K'ang's own reform in 1898. As a matter of fact, revolution, which depended primarily on people's determination, seemed much easier to accomplish than reform, which required a combined effort of the ruler and the people. K'ang's worry that revolution might wreck the country was

(43) See Chang Ping-lin, "Ting-Kung" 訂孔 [A Critique of Confucius], in *Ch'iu-shu* (1904), pp. 2-3.

(44) See Chang Ping-lin, "Wang-hsüeh" 王學 [The Thought of Wang Yang-ming], in *ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

(45) See Chang Ping-lin, "Hsüeh-pien" 學變 [On Intellectual Change], *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

baseless, as people had already shown their national consciousness and patriotism. If the people were not nationally conscious, they would not make reform a success either. Revolution might not produce a Napoleon, it could also produce a Washington. He found it totally senseless for K'ang to entrust the disgraced emperor with the future of the country. The emperor, whom he satirized as an "ignorant clown," had already demonstrated himself as a feeble monarch, so that he had not only lost power easily to his conservative opponents in 1898 but also failed to regain his power in the wake of the Boxer uprising in 1900. In his opinion, the entire "Manchu gang" rather than a handful Manchu diehards was the source of China's trouble. Hence the regime as a whole had to go. With regard to the racial issue, he refused to yield to K'ang, whom he reproached as a traitor for supporting the alien race. If the Manchus wanted to be assimilated, he declared, they should join the Chinese nation as naturalized citizens. There was no justification for an incompetent minority race to dominate the overwhelming majority Chinese.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In conclusion, he appealed to K'ang for surrender:

If K'ang should regret and courageously change his course, his nationwide reputation and many followers, some of whom have been leaning towards revolution, would hasten the downfall [of the Manchu regime] and he [K'ang] would become a genuinely "admirable philosopher-king" [*shu-wang hsuan-sheng*].⁽⁴⁷⁾

Chang and the Su-pao Case

Chang's letter to K'ang, which appeared in the *Su-pao* [*Kiangsu Daily*] on June 29, 1903, brought forth a sensational lawsuit, known as the "Su-pao

(46) See Chang Ping-lin, "Po K'ang Yu-wei lun ko-ming shu" 駁康有為論革命書 [To K'ang Yu-wei on Revolution: A Rebuttal], in T'ang, *Chang T'ai-yen cheng-lun hsuan-chi*, Vol. 1, pp. 194-209. A brief summary of this letter first appeared in *Su-pao* 蘇報, No. 2550, June 29, 1903, p. 1.

(47) Chang, "Po K'ang Yu-wei lun ko-ming shu," p. 208.

case" [*Su-pao an*]. The newspaper was first registered in Shanghai's foreign settlement in 1896 under the name of a Japanese merchant, who reportedly had clandestine ties with the Black Dragon Society, an ultra-nationalist organization in Japan. The paper was not politically influential at its inception. Not until 1900, when it was transferred into the hands of a Chinese publisher named Ch'en Fan, a follower of K'ang Yu-wei, the paper became a significant voice for political progress. Particularly, since 1902, the paper had been stepping up its criticism against the Manchu government and its policy amidst rising student nationalism. A result of its moving toward radicalism was the establishment of a close working relationship with Patriotism Academy; while the *Su-pao* published critical essays written by the teachers and the students of the academy, the academy received financial aid from the newspaper.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Even so, the *Su-pao* still could not be called a revolutionary paper for many of its key figures, including the publisher, remained sympathetic to K'ang Yu-wei's cause. K'ang and the revolutionaries, though ideologically so different, shared the immediate goal of toppling the existing Manchu government. In fact, the Manchu authorities made no distinctions between them. Both were put into the generally category of the so-called "New Party" [*hsin-tang*] or the "Traacherous Party" [*ni-tang*].⁽⁴⁹⁾

In early 1903, the *Su-pao's* publisher appointed the revolutionary Chang Shih-chao (1881-1973), who had earlier resigned from a military academy in Nanking in protest to the Russian aggression in Manchuria, to edit the paper. As a result, all-out attacks were made not only against the Manchu

(48) Cf. Fang Han-hsi 方漢溪, *Chung-kuo chin-tai pao-k'an shih* 中國近代報刊史 [A History of Modern Chinese Newspapers], (Shansi: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1981), Vol. 1, p. 332. See also Chang Huang-hsi 張篁溪, "Su-pao an shih-lu" 蘇報案實錄 [A Faithful Account of the Su-pao Case], in HHKM, 1:367.

(49) This can be seen in some government documents. See, for example, *ibid.*, 1:410. See also "Chin Ting chih Liang Ting-fen han" 金鼎致梁鼎芬函 [Chin Ting's Letter to Liang Ting-fen], in *Chin-hai-shih tsu-liao* 近代史資料 (1956), No. 3, p. 4. The letter was dated July 11, 1903.

regime but also against K'ang who defended the Manchus. Chang Ping-lin was a close friend of the new editor and became a major voice in this chorus of radicalism. Moreover, he established friendship with Tsou Jung, who had recently returned from Japan following a vigorous protest against the Russian occupation of Manchuria. The eighteen-year-old Tsou drafted a 20,000 word pamphlet entitled *The Revolutionary Army* [*Ko-ming chun*]; its uncompromising tone was highly appreciated by Chang, who volunteered a foreword in which he predicted that its easy-reading style would make a wide and profound impact.⁽⁵⁰⁾ On June 9, the *Su-pao* introduced *The Revolutionary Army* in its new books column by declaring that the principal theme of the book "is to overthrow the Manchu regime and to restore the Chinese state." In addition, Editor Chang Shih-chao endorsed Tsou's book in a separate essay by noting that "it can well be the foremost textbook for our national education."⁽⁵¹⁾ Then, the next morning's *Su-pao* carried Chang's foreword to Tsou's book, in which he acclaimed that the author had made a "thunderous sound" [*lei-t'ing chih-sheng*] for the oncoming revolution.⁽⁵²⁾ By now the *Su-pao* was no doubt the major paper that set off the revolutionary sparks. Chang's reply to K'ang appeared on June 20 issue of the paper, and in effect, poured oil on the fire.

To be sure, the Manchu officials were uninterested in the quarrel between Chang Ping-lin and K'ang Yu-wei. But Chang's abusive and insulting language against the Manchu race in general and the Manchu emperor in particular made it intolerable to them. Early during the anti-French and anti-Russian movements, the Manchu governor of Kiangsu En-ming had tried, in vain, to

(50) See Chang Ping-lin, "Ko-ming chun hsü" 革命軍序 [Foreword to the Revolutionary Army], in T'ang, *Chang T'ai-yen cheng-lun hsuan-chi*, Vol. 1, pp. 191-92. The *Ko-ming chun* was published in May 1903. Cf. HHKM, 1: 331-32.

(51) See "Tu Ko-ming chun" 讀革命軍 [A Review of *The Revolutionary Army*], in *Su-pao*, No. 2485, June 9, 1903, p. 1.

(52) Chang, "Ko-ming chun hsu," p. 193.

suppress the *Su-pao*.⁽⁵³⁾ And now the Manchu officials were determined to prosecute the hateful rebels and to ban the treacherous paper. The operation involved the Grand Council [Chun-chi ch'ü], the Governor-general of Liang-chiang Wei Kuang-t'ao, the Governor-general of Hu-kuang Tuan-fang, the Governor of Kiangsu En-ming, and the Magistrate of Shanghai, Yüan Shu-shün. Because the rebels and the paper were protected by the International Settlement, a special team under Yü Ming-chen was sent to Shanghai in coordination with the Shanghai Magistrate to negotiate with the foreign authorities. Thanks to the assistance of the American consul and an American publisher, the foreign authorities agreed to arrest the key *Su-pao* figures for trial.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Evidently, Yü, who was reluctant to see the execution of intellectuals and whose son, Ta-chao, had studied in Japan and had revolutionary friends, deliberately leaked the news and made the first arrest of the *Su-pao*'s accountant, a relatively unimportant person, as an alarm. Moreover, Yü had a prior private meeting with the revolutionary Wu Chih-hui before the arrest was made. These actions gave the time and the chance for those who were slated for arrest to flee; Ch'en Fan, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Wu Chih-hui, Lung Chi-chih, and Tsou Jung either escaped or hid. Having captured no one of significance Yü could then report the *fait accompli* and let the matter lay dormant.⁽⁵⁵⁾ But Chang Ping-lin refused to hide when the British police entered Patriotism Academy to make a search on June 30. His courage compelled Tsou Jung to surrender himself some days later. Other *Su-pao* persons taken into custody about the same time were Lung Chi-chih, still a K'ang follower, and Ch'en Chung-i, the son of the publisher Ch'en Fan. The trial

(53) The best source was Sung Su's 宋恕 unpublished letter dated June 12, 1903, quoted in Hu Chu-sheng, 胡殊生 "Chang T'ai-yen nien-p'u ch'ang-pieh ting-pu" 章太炎年譜長編訂補 [Amendments to the Draft Chronological Biography of Chang Ping-lin], *Chin-tai-shih yen-chiu* 近代史研究 [Studies in Modern History] (1982), Vol. 1, p. 260. Cf. Fang, *Chung-kuo chin-tai pao-k'an shih*, Vol. 1, p. 363.

(54) Cf. Chang, "Su-pao an shih-lu," p. 367.

(55) Note that the Manchu governor-general Tuan-fang was apparently suspicious of Yü's son, see IHKM, 1: 453.

of the *Su-pao*, then, became complex and sensational. ⁽⁵⁶⁾

The Manchu authorities fought hard to take custody of all "criminals" and then to transfer them to Nanking for a grand trial. According to the Ch'ing law, they were clearly guilty of treason and, therefore, subject to the capital punishment. From the Manchu perspective, the problem was not merely to punish these offenders but also to deter future offenders. But the foreign authorities in Shanghai, particularly the British consul and the local Chamber of Commerce, resisted the Manchu request of repatriation in order to uphold their "sovereignty" inside the settlement. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ The recent execution of Shen Ching, a participant in the T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang uprising of 1900, in Peking made it even more difficult for the foreign authorities to repatriate the political prisoners who would be, almost surely, put to death. Still, the Manchu authorities, from the Grand Council down to the regional governments, persistently instructed their negotiators to win the case. They wanted Chang Ping-lin and Tsou Jung most anxiously. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ One Ch'ing archive document states that Chang Ping-lin's "crime is most serious" [*ch'ing-chieh tsui-chung*] and Tsou Jung, though even more ridiculous in use of language, viz. "to slaughter all Manchus," merely "picks up Chang's ideas." ⁽⁵⁹⁾ The Manchu negotiators tried to argue with the foreigners that neither Chang nor Tsou was a so-called political prisoner; rather, they committed the crime of libel—*absentia* for *lèse majesté* and of threatening the general peace, so that they should be repatriated. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Chang Chih-tung, then a member of the Grand Council, was especially worried that the failure of repatriation would encourage more rebels to use the International Settlement as their base for physical assaults from within. Thus, he instructed his negotiators that in order to get the criminals the Manchu government could promise the foreigners they would not be executed

(56) *Ibid.*, p. 373.

(57) *Ibid.*, pp. 410, 469, 476.

(58) *Ibid.*, p. 409.

(59) See "Chin Ting chih Liang Ting-fen han," pp. 2-3.

(60) See HHKM, L; 446.

after repatriation. ⁽⁶¹⁾ Nonetheless, the foreign authorities insisted on a trial by a "mixed court," consisting of both Chinese and foreigners. This court eventually set free all but Chang Ping-lin and Tsou Jung because both men frankly admitted their intention of overthrowing the Manchu regime. ⁽⁶²⁾ On December 24, 1903, the revolutionary pair were sentenced to life imprisonment. ⁽⁶³⁾ However, in the face of public criticism and disagreements among the foreign consuls, the court reduced the sentence to three years for Chang and two years for Tsou. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ While Chang survived the imprisonment, Tsou died suddenly on April 3, 1905, about seventy days before completing his term. He was only twenty years old.

The Rise of Revolutionary Temper

Was the Manchu regime satisfied with the results: the death of Tsou Jung, the imprisonment of Chang Ping-lin, and the banning of the *Su-pao*? Not at all. The unsuccessful attempt to repatriate the prisoners, despite long and hard efforts, was decidedly frustrating. As Governor-general Tuan-fang told Chang Chih-tung, "if [we] fail to uphold [our] justice, we will not be able to run the country and nip [any future] rebellion in the bud."⁽⁶⁵⁾ Some desperate Manchu officials were reportedly tempted to seize Chang and Tsou by means of bribery and kidnapping. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ Obviously, from the Manchu point of view, the case was anything but a success. And the way the trial had proceeded, permitting Chang and Tsou's open defiance in court and letting the foreigners decide the verdict, was nothing but disgraceful. The trial inevitably exposed the humiliating character of the Manchu regime. The rumor that the Manchu regime was willing to exchange the Shanghai-Nanking railroad privilege for the prisoners

(61) *Ibid.*, p.432.

(62) *Ibid.*, p.382.

(63) *Ibid.*, p.384. Some other details about the *Su-pao* case can be found in Rankin, *Early Chinese Revolutionaries*, pp. 69-72.

(64) The British consul who had persistently rejected repatriation may have played a decisive role in reducing the prison terms. For the British position, see HHKM 472.

(65) *Ibid.*

(66) Quoted in *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:181.

further stained its reputation. (67) Last but not least, that a man who ridiculed the emperor was only penalized a three-year prison term unavoidably eroded the omnipotent image of the "son of heaven" [*t'ien-tzu*]. All in all, the Manchu regime's loss of prestige and power during the trial could hardly be compensated by the short prison terms imposed on its most wanted "criminals."

On the other hand, Chang and Tsou won wide admiration and immense respect for their unyielding courage, in spite of their sufferings in prison. Chang's statement, "Reply to the Press from the Cell," which appeared in the *Su-pao* on July 6, 1903 particularly enhanced his stature as a determined revolutionist. He stated:

Nationalism is a flourishing [ideology] in the twentieth century. The barbarous Manchus differ from our race. They should be overthrown whether or not they could reform [the country] and rescue our people. I wrote the foreword for *The Revolutionary Army* to indicate the differences between revolution [*ko-ming*] and restoration [*kuang-fu*]. In common usage we say revolution. But from my ideological point of view I prefer a restoration [of a Chinese nation].... That the Manchu barbarians have instigated this trial is not really surprising, for an usurper naturally hates the [real] master. People like myself are intellectuals, who have had not even an inch of weapon in hand to resist the enemies. Since we are in prison, we are prepared to shed blood. I am very calm, for I feel proud to face God in heaven and four hundred million of my people on the earth. (68)

The *Su-pao* was banned by the authorities in the foreign settlement on the day when this "reply" was published. But a new journal named *Kiangsu* was published to continue the *Su-pao*'s mission with added fighting spirit. In its

(67) *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, p. 10.

(68) Chang Ping-lin, "Yu-chung ta hsin-wen pao" 獄中答新聞報 [Reply to the Press from Cell], in *Su-pao*, No. 2512, July 6, 1903, p. 1.

sixth issue there was a poem in honor of Chang:

Your unfailing heroism,
Adds to [our] unmeasurable courage to fight the barbarians.
Leave your iron head,
To make a bronze statue.
There is still a place in prison,
Better than no home at all. ⁽⁶⁹⁾

Another poem to honor both Chang and Tsou reads:

How high-spirited these [two] sons of China are.
Their righteousness is as heavy as the mountain
And they consider death as light as a feather.
Now one hundred days in the barbarian prison,
Two brave heads fearlessly challenge the executioner's sword. ⁽⁷⁰⁾

Tsou's sudden death on April 3, 1905 caused suspicion and anger. The word spread from the prison inmates suggest that the young revolutionist was, in fact, murdered by a foreign physician who had accepted Manchu bribes. ⁽⁷¹⁾ While Tsou was made a martyr, Chang became a hero. Each was honored as the Mazzini of China. ⁽⁷²⁾ There is every reason to believe, as a contemporary paper noted, that no other revolutionist had yet exerted such a powerful influence on the Chinese revolutionary scene as Chang and Tsou. ⁽⁷³⁾

The significance of the *Su-pao* case, or more specifically the case of Chang and Tsou, to the revolutionary movement seems to have not yet been given full appreciation by recent historians. Rather than a hypostatized

(69) See Chung-yang 中央, "Chi T'ai-yen" 寄太炎 [To Chang Ping-lin], in *Chiang-su* 江蘇 in Lo, comp., *Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien*, Vol. 6, pp. 139-40. Note that Chung-yang was a pen name of Huang Tsung-yang 黃宗仰.

(70) *Ibid.*, p. 140.

(71) *Tzu-ting nien-p'u*, p. 11.

(72) Liu Ya-tzu, *Liu Ya-tzu shih-tz'u hsuan* 柳亞子詩詞選 [Selected Poems of Liu Ya-tzu] (Peking: Jen-min wen-hsueh she, 1981), p. 4.

(73) Quoted in *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1: 203.

episode, it was a major cause-effect factor in the temporal sequence of the revolutionary movement. It is hardly far-fetched, as a contemporary observer declared, that "despite the banning of the *Su-pao* and the imprisonment of the revolutionaries, I consider [the event] a great turning point for [the fate] of our people."⁽⁷⁴⁾ Similarly, as a recent historian has declared, "the sedition trial was a milestone in that city's [Shanghai] history. For the first time the dynasty was savagely attacked by the native press in China, and the image of a paternal, inviolated regime was destroyed."⁽⁷⁵⁾ This unprecedented event, in fact, turned the tide in favor of the revolutionary movement. First of all, the publicity of the trial made the revolutionary banner ever more clear. Although the revolutionaries had been seeking a political goal ultimately different from K'ang Yu-wei's reformist force, the latter had hitherto overshadowed the former---the revolutionaries were often regarded as associates of K'ang. Not only the Manchu authorities considered them as scoundrels of the same ilk, but also the foreign authorities in the settlements could hardly distinguish the one from the other, as the immediate goal of both was to undermine the existing regime. Hence, all of the anti-government people were often mistakenly being identified as followers of K'ang.⁽⁷⁶⁾ However, the Chang-Tsou pronouncement of revolution drew so much attention that the revolutionary movement that it became distinctly independent from K'ang's movement.⁽⁷⁷⁾ From then on, the revolutionaries became increasingly more powerful challengers to K'ang and his followers. More and more revolutionaries, including Sun Yat-sen, followed Chang's suit to assail K'ang and his Emperor-protection party. They finally became bitter rivals

(74) Quoted in *Tsou Jung* 鄒容 [A Biography of Tsou Jung], in *Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih ts'ung-shu* 中國近代史叢書 [Modern Chinese History Series] (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1974), p. 53.

(75) See Y. C. Wang, "The *Su-pao* Case: A Study of Foreign Pressure, Intellectual Fermentation, and Dynastic Decline," *Monumenta Serica, Journal of Oriental Studies* (1965), Vol. 24, p. 125.

(76) See "Chin Ting chih Liang Ting-fen han," p. 4.

(77) See HHKM, 1;466.

rather than uneasy allies.

Secondly, the *Su-pao* trial made the already popular book—*The Revolutionary Army*—infinitely more famous and influential. The book was bought at a high price in China in spite of the government's prohibition of its circulation.⁽⁷⁸⁾ And in overseas Chinese communities this inflammatory book was widely reprinted and read. Sun Yat-sen, for instance, reprinted 11,000 copies in San Francisco. One estimate gave a total of 1,100,000 copies being sold; no other Chinese revolutionary work at the time ever reached the million mark.⁽⁷⁹⁾ The huge circulation also meant immense influence. Thanks to its straightforward and plain language, the book easily inspired its readers. For instance, Wu Yueh, the assassin who made the attempt on the lives of five Manchu commissioners at the Peking Railway Station in 1905, had repeatedly read this book.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Ch'en T'ien-hua, another revolutionist who committed suicide as a protest in December 1905, had written the story of the *Su-pao* trial into his novel entitled *Shih-tzu huo* [*The Lion's Roar*].⁽⁸¹⁾ Given its wide circulation and profound influence, Tsou's book and Chang's foreword were almost made the Koran of the Chinese revolutionists at the time.

The Revolutionary Army aside, the personal courageous example set by Chang and Tsou also provided a timely stimulant to buttress the radical morale. Chang recalled that during the trial the people filled the streets to watch him proudly passing through.⁽⁸²⁾ "How wonderfully high-spirited chaps," as a paper's editorial acclaimed, "Chang and Tsou are!"⁽⁸³⁾ Across the sea in

(78) *Tsou Jung*, pp. 54-55.

(79) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

(80) Tu Ch'eng-hsiang 杜呈祥, *Tsou Jung chuan* 鄒容傳 [Biography of Tsou Jung], (Taipei: P'o-mi-erh shu-tien, 1952), pp. 36-37.

(81) Ch'en T'ien-hua 陳天華 "Shih-tzu hou" 獅子吼 [*The Lion's Roar*] in *Ch'en T'ien-hua chi* 陳天華集 [Works of Ch'en T'ien-hua] (Nanking: Chung-kuo wen-huan fu-wu she, 1946), ch. 7.

(82) See Chang Ping-lin, "Yü-chung yü Wu Chun-sui Chang Po-ch'un shu" 獄中與吳君遂張伯純書 [Letter to Wu Chun-sui and Chang Po-ch'un from Prison], quoted in *Nien-p'u ch'ang-pien*, 1:174.

(83) See "Su-pao an" 蘇報案 [The Su-pao Case], in *Huang-ti huan* 黃帝魂 [The Soul of Yellow Emperor], in Lo comp., *Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien*, (Taipei, 1968), p. 7. See also *Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'ien shih-nien shih-lun hsuan-chi* 辛亥革命前十年時論選集 [Collected Essays from Newspapers Published in Ten Years Prior to the 1911 Revolution] (Peking: San-lien shu-tien, 1977), Vol. 1, Book II, p. 778.

Japan, Sun Yat-sen, too, sang the praises to the pair for their admirable spirit in confrontation with the Manchu government during the trial which had greatly upgraded the revolutionary movement. ⁽⁸⁴⁾

Thus, the sentiments generated by the *Su-pao* trial became an important link in the sequence of events following the Boxer catastrophe that rapidly radicalized Chinese intellectuals. Chang's 1902 rally, though abortive, was followed by even more vigorous anti-French and anti-Russian movements, which united patriotic intellectuals into political organizations, mostly notably the Educational Society for Militarising People [Chun-kuo-min chiao-yü-hui]. The Society, radical as it was, inspired many intellectuals to form assassination squads against the Manchu officials. The *Su-pao* trial further fanned the flame of radicalism. In late 1903 Huang Hsing, a member of the Educational Society, founded his Hua-hsing hui [China Restoration Society] in Hunan to prepare an armed uprising on the occasion of Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi's seventieth birthday. ⁽⁸⁵⁾ The action, though unsuccessful, represented the growing trend towards political violence.

Not long after the founding of the Hua-hsing hui, the Chekiang intellectuals created the Kuang-fu hui [Restoration Society] in Shanghai. Chang's close relationship with this society is well known; however, his role in its founding is subject to controversy. Chang claimed that he and Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei first founded the society and T'ao Ch'eng-chang and Li Hsieh-ho followed suit. ⁽⁸⁶⁾ But Chang was still in prison when the society was founded. Evidence tends to suggest that the driving force behind organizing the society was such Chekiang members of the Educational Society as Wei Lan and Kung Pao-ch'üan. The last named revolutionist later became Chang's son-in-law.

(34) Sun made this remark in his "The Origins of the Revolution" [Ko-ming yuan-ch'i, 革命原起], quoted in *Tsou Jung*, p. 54.

(85) See HHKM, 1:505-11.

(86) Chang Ping-lin, "Kuang-fu chün chih hsu" 光復軍志序 [Preface to the Annal of the Restoration Army], *Chang T'ai-yen hsien-sheng so-chu shu* 章太炎先生所著書 [Works of Chang Ping-lin] (Shanghai: Ku-shu liu-t'ung ch'u, 1919), *chuan* 13, p. 15a. This preface can also be found in T'ang, *Chang T'ai-yen cheng-lun hsuan-chi*, Vol. 2, p. 681.

Kung and Wei gathered revolutionaries in Shanghai and made Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, who had recently returned from Tsingtao, president of the Kuang-fu hui; its other key members included T'ao Ch'eng-chang, Hsu Hsi-lin, Ch'iu Chin, and Li Hsieh-ho.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Chang's imprisonment, however, did not preclude him from being involved in the founding of this revolutionary society. The name of the society, Kuang-fu, was his idea, which had been elaborated in his foreword to Tsou's noted book. And Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei confirmed that he had frequent communications with Chang either by postal messages or through jail visits.⁽⁸⁸⁾ There is no doubt that Chang had known and endorsed the society before its inception in the winter of 1904.

Chang completed his jail term on June 19, 1906. He was in prison long enough to become a revolutionary hero, and yet short enough for his name remain popular. On the day of his release, a crowd of admirers lined up to greet him at the gate.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Sun Yat-sen, now leader of the newly launched Revolutionary Alliance [T'ung-meng hui] sent a four-man team as his personal representatives to Shanghai to greet him and to accompany him back to Japan.⁽⁹⁰⁾ In short, Chang Ping-lin became a great hero in the rising Chinese revolutionary movement.

(87) See, *Hsin-hai ko-ming hui-i lu* 辛亥革命回憶錄 [Memoirs of the 1911 Revolution] (Hupch: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1981), Vol. 4, pp. 131-42.

(88) Chou, *Hsin-hai ko-ming-ch'ien ti Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei*, pp. 68-69.

(89) T'ao, *Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei nien-p'u*, p. 156.

(90) See Chung-yang tang-shih hui 中央黨史會 ed., *Tsung-li nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao* 總理年譜長編初稿 [The First Draft of the Chronological Biography of Sun Yat-sen], Nanking: Chung-yang tang-shih hui, 1936, *chuan* 1, p. 141.

「章炳麟與革命風潮，1900—1905」

中文提要

汪榮祖

本文旨在探討章炳麟早期的革命思想與活動，尤注意二個方面：(一)章氏從變法立場轉變為革命立場的經過。(二)章氏在拳亂之後五年中對革命運動的貢獻。

章氏在自述中曾說幼年時仰慕明末志士而反滿，但在庚子拳亂發生前，他並不是革命黨。事實上，從甲午到戊戌之間，他可說是一變法維新派，庚子之後，他才加入革命陣營，本文將對此一轉變作一說明。

章氏加入革命之後，憑其學識與文筆，即頗受注目，先在日本組織亡國紀念會，雖未成功，但其開紀念會的宗旨因此而廣為流佈，影響頗大。章氏自日本回滬後，藉租界活動，而當時革命風潮因拒法、拒俄事件，日益高漲，行動日益激烈，革命勢力浸浸然，有超乎康有為的保皇黨之勢，章氏之駁康尤大快革命人心，卒演成蘇報一案，震動一時。蘇報案並非突發與孤立事件，而是革命風潮激盪之餘的一個高潮，其對日後革命運動發展影響至巨，自不待言；而所謂蘇報案，實即章鄒案。章炳麟與鄒容的革命精神藉審判而大顯，對人心的鼓舞，至有關係。本文將檢視章氏與蘇報案的關係，以及此一事件對整個革命運動的影響。

