

**PROBLEMS OF STARTING A REVOLUTIONARY BASE:
SUN YAT-SEN AND CANTON, 1923.**

By C. MARTIN WILBUR

SUN YAT-SEN'S RECOVERY FROM DEFEAT

Late in October 1923, Dr. Sun Yat-sen began the reorganization of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang which resulted in the First Congress of the Party in January 1924, and a revitalization of the revolutionary movement in China. What happened thereafter is a well-known story. With Canton and nearby counties as its initial base, the revitalized Kuomintang developed its revolutionary instruments and techniques until, even though Dr. Sun passed away in March 1925, the Party was able to fulfill his great dream. This was to launch a successful Northern Expedition, replace the corrupt Peking Government by a Nationalist Government based upon his ideals, and start the process of reunifying China, ending the unequal treaties, and modernizing the nation. What is not so well known is the situation before the reorganization began. The purpose of this article is to describe conditions in Kwangtung during the eight months from February to October 1923, to show the problems which Dr. Sun and his colleagues faced and how they tried to overcome them. The problems were serious and the accomplishments considerable, and without these initial successes the Kuomintang reorganization could not have taken place.

On February 21, 1923, Dr. Sun began his third administration at Canton. The second administration, when he held the title of President of the Chinese Republic, came effectively to an end on June 16, 1922,

when troops under General Yeh Chü, a subordinate of General Ch'en Chiung-ming, drove Dr. Sun out of the presidential residence and he took refuge on a gunboat in the Pearl River. After a fruitless two months waiting for deliverance by his troops that were off on a northern campaign, and deserted by part of the navy, Dr. Sun left Canton for Shanghai, where he arrived on August 14. He spent the next six months organizing a comeback. We shall not discuss this interim period in detail, but a few important points may be mentioned.⁽¹⁾

Dr. Sun appointed a committee of his colleagues in Shanghai to help him reorganize the Kuomintang, which had not been very active and had few members except in Kwangtung and among overseas Chinese. This reorganization was accomplished — at least on paper — with a revised constitution and new Party platform, as well as a revised structure for party headquarters, and Dr. Sun made a series of new appointments. He also permitted a few leaders of the new and tiny Chinese Communist Party to join the Kuomintang in order to work for the national revolution under his leadership. He negotiated with most of the important military leaders of China through delegates, his objective being either to get to Peking, apparently with the hope to bring about national reunification by political means, or to organize a coalition to overthrow the Peking Government, which was then dominated by the Chihli Clique, led by Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu. Dr. Sun also had indirect negotiations

(1) This article, especially written in honor of Professor Kuo Ting-ye, is drawn from the manuscript of a book which I hope to publish in the future. Here I have not attempted to document background information, but only to provide references for factual matters. The convenient source about Dr. Sun's public activities is *Kuo Fu Nien Pu*, enlarged and revised edition, 2 vols, Taipei, Chung-kuo Kuomintang Tang Shih Shih-liao Pien-ts'uan Wei-yuan-hui, November 1969. Hereafter, I refer to this as KFNPTtp, to distinguish this third edition from earlier ones. For the Shanghai interval see pp. 906-955.

and correspondence with Adolph Joffe, the Russian emissary who was attempting to open diplomatic relations with the government at Peking. The Chinese revolutionary leader had a lively interest in the Russian revolution and was eager to have Soviet backing, just as he was always hopeful of recognition and assistance from other powers. In January he had several meetings with Mr. Joffe in Shanghai. One outcome was the well-known Sun-Joffe Declaration of January 26, 1923, but the details of the discussions are still kept secret by both sides so it is not yet possible to say what understandings they may have reached.

Dr. Sun's main effort in Shanghai, however, was directed towards ousting Ch'en Chiung-ming from Canton so he could restore his own government there. This was not easy to do, for General Ch'en was a well-respected revolutionary leader in his own right and had a strong following in the Kwangtung Army, which he had helped to create. The military forces more loyal to Dr. Sun had been defeated in their effort to rescue him in July, and were mostly scattered east and west along the northern borders of Kwangtung. The strategy was to regroup these defeated forces and send those in the east to invade Fukien, and those in the west to invade Kwangsi. Then these and other forces which could be brought into the campaign were to descend on Canton by the East River and West River routes.⁽²⁾

(2) Previously it was difficult to piece together the story of this campaign, but now there is almost too much material. *Ko-ming Wen-hsien* compiled by Lo Chia-lun and others, Taipei, Chung-kuo Kuomintang Tang Shih Shih-liao Pien-ts'uan Wei-yuan-hui, 1953—with 67 volumes to date. (Hereafter KMWH). Volume 52, pp. 238-436 is devoted to the recapture of Canton. Teng Tse-ju's invaluable account in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Erh-shih Nien Shih Chi* is reprinted in pages 412-428, and there is also an account by Li Lieh-chün, pp. 482-486. Tsou Lu has an account of his participation in *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Shih Kao*, Taipei edition, second printing, May 1970, pp. 1065-1072. (Hereafter Tsou Lu, CKKMTSK). Also KFNPTtp, pp. 914-943.

To stage a comeback required a great deal of money to pay military commanders and purchase munitions. The Kuomintang in Shanghai raised more than a million Chinese dollars during 1922, and almost \$ 118,000 in December alone.⁽³⁾ Also several of Dr. Sun's followers organized an office in Hong Kong to raise funds, to negotiate with military commanders in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and to smuggle arms and carry out other necessary tasks. Under the leadership of Teng Tse-ju, Ku Ying-fen, Lin Chih-mien, Lin Shu-wei, Li Wei-fan and others, and joined by Tsou Lu as Dr. Sun's special deputy, this office raised more than \$ 400,000 (Hong Kong currency, equivalent to about US\$ 231,000). Most of this was used to finance Yunnan and Kwangsi troops in their descent upon Canton by the West River route and to encourage units of the Kwangtung Army in that region and ships of the river fleet to turn over. A good deal was also spent to mobilize scattered local forces in the Canton delta region.⁽⁴⁾ Dr. Sun corresponded with a number of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung commanders, some of whom had a revolutionary background, urging them to join in driving out Ch'en Chiung-ming.⁽⁵⁾ Wealthy Canton was a very attractive prize for mercenary forces in southern China.

(3) Tsou Lu, CKKMTSK, pp. 453-456, records the accounts for December showing sources of income and four categories of expenditures. The undifferentiated category of "special expenditures" consumed \$ 105,439.29 out of a total income for December of \$ 117,956.57. We may assume most of this was for military purposes.

(4) Teng Tse-ju's meticulous accounts are reprinted in KMWH, vol. 52, pp. 414-419.

(5) Dr. Sun's correspondence is found in *Kuo Fu Ch'uan Chi*, compiled by Chung-kuo Kuomintang Tang Shih Shih-liao Pien-ts'uan Wei-yuan-hui, 2nd edition, 6 vols, Taipei, October 1961, Vol. 5, pp. 456-516. Among the generals in Kwangsi to whom Dr. Sun wrote were Chu P'ei-tè, Chang K'ai-ju, Yang Hsi-min and Chiang Kuang-liang of the Yunnan Army, and Liu Ta-ch'ing and Liu Yü-shan of the Kwangsi Army, as well as to many other generals in Hunan and Fukien. Hereafter this work is referred to as KFCC.

The result of several months of complicated manouvers was that Generals Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Huang Ta-wei, and Li Fu-lin invaded Fukien with units of the Kwangtung Army and took the capital, but were unable to break through the south and participate in the capture of Canton. That city was captured on January 16, 1923, by a coalition of Yunnan and Kwangsi forces led by Generals Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, who had driven rapidly down the West River together with turned-over units of the Kwangtung Army, aided by the river fleet. Many local forces joined the fray when the city was about to be taken. Ch'en Chiung-ming withdrew to his stronghold at Huichow (Waichow) on the East River on the night of January 15, and Canton was left in great confusion with various military commanders rushing to get control of taxing offices, and various political factions beginning to compete for power in the new administration.

With his rival defeated, Dr. Sun had booked passage for January 27 to return, when the unhappy news reached him of a coup in Canton on the 26th, led by a famous Kwangsi commander, Shen Hung-ying and several other outside generals, against Dr. Sun's supporter, the Cantonese general, Wei Pang-p'ing and Dr. Sun's appointee as provincial governor, Hu Han-min. General Wei was taken into custody by Yang Hsi-min, while Hu Han-min fled to Hong Kong together with Tsou Lu, Teng Tse-ju and Lin Chih-mien.⁽⁶⁾ It took some weeks to straighten out the situation so that it would be safe for Dr. Sun to return. In short, an alliance of forces stronger than Shen Hung-ying's was created and then all sides, including General Shen, requested Dr. Sun to come. He left Shanghai

(6) Tsou Lu, CKKMTSK, pp. 1071-72; Teng Tse-ju, *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Erh-shih Nien Shih Chi* as condensed in KFNpttp, pp. 949-950

on February 15 and spent several days in Hong Kong where he was warmly received by the Governor of the Colony, Sir Reginald Stubbs, and by leaders of the Chinese business community and labor organizations. This was an effort to start good relations between the new Canton administration and Hong Kong, and if possible, to arrange for loans. Dr. Sun then returned to Canton only a little more than six months after he had left in complete defeat. It was a remarkable comeback!

A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF CANTON

When Sun Yat-sen arrived in Canton on the afternoon of February 21, he was welcomed by "popular ovation," in the words of the British Consul General. He proceeded to the Civil Governor's *Yamen* where he met delegations of officials, representatives of labor unions, members of the press, and leaders of "all circles."⁽⁷⁾ That night at a banquet tendered by generals of the Yunnan and Kwangsi armies and leading citizens of Canton, he spoke as President of the Republic, setting forth his plans to unify Kwangtung and make it a model province, then unite the southwest, and finally unify the country. He thanked the Yunnan and Kwangsi commanders for what they had done in driving out Ch'en Chiung-ming, but urged them to undertake the new responsibility. Rebel Ch'en's remnant armies must first be cleared out, then excess troops be disbanded and converted into workers, after which, with the support of public opinion and the power of a well trained army, national unification would surely succeed. Already the Fengtien, Anhui and Southwest parties were

(7) Great Britain, Foreign Office 371/9181/F1268 [F1268/12/10] (Hereafter FO). Despatch enclosing Canton, Jamieson, Feb. 22, 1923; *North China Herald*, Feb. 24, p. 500 (Hereafter NCH); and KFNPtpp, p. 956.

hand-in-hand, the President said, and now Hong Kong was ready to support his cause. This was the great opportunity!⁽⁸⁾

But what were the realities? What was the situation in Canton and what were the main problems Dr. Sun and his associates faced in trying to make Kwangtung the base of political power? Having twice headed regimes there, he surely understood the realities much better than we can ever know them. We can only attempt to reconstruct the potentialities and problems that confronted him.

Canton was one of the most populous and wealthy cities of China. It probably numbered a million people and was set in one of the most densely populated delta lands in the world. Canton was a great commercial center and also a seat of light industry. It had a splendid location, about forty miles from the ocean and near the convergence of three important rivers. The North River provided fairly easy communications with southern Kiangsi and Hunan, and thence with the Yangtze valley; the West River drained eastern Yunnan, Kwangsi and western Kwangtung; while the East River arose in the borders of Fukien and flowed through eastern Kwangtung. All the rivers passed near Canton, forming a network of waterways through the delta, one of which was the Pearl River. With a great hinterland which produced a variety of crops and minerals, and ringed by a fertile area with a thriving agriculture, much of it produced for commerce (e. g. silk, sugar, rice and fruits), Canton was a great trading center. It traded with other parts of China and with other parts of Asia, Europe and America.

As a commercial center with a long history, Canton had a variety of trading firms, shipping companies, banks and remittance houses, compan-

(8) KFCC, III, 248-252.

ies manufacturing for the Chinese and foreign markets, and a multitude of shops. Its narrow streets were incredibly crowded and busy. A *Guide to Canton*,⁽⁹⁾ prepared for Chinese visitors, provides a glimpse of this metropolis a few years earlier. Listed are 64 types of shops, each type clustering along certain streets, and selling everything Chinese would wish to buy. Many goods were made right on the premises, but Canton had larger industrial establishments also, such as 26 silk, cotton, and woolen mills, eight foundries, an arsenal, a mint, three boat-building yards, four ceramic works, eight oil-pressing plants, 15 printing establishments, etc. The city had many financial institutions: 12 western style and 96 native banks, 48 customs brokers, 53 underwriting firms, and 75 pawnshops, all duly listed. Any view of Canton would show the great fortress-like towers owned by the pawnshops to store entrusted property. This is only a partial list. The efficient police of Canton kept a register of all money-making enterprises in the city, classified into 233 types; for the year 1923, the register showed 31,802 such enterprises.⁽¹⁰⁾

The *Guide* also listed Chinese hotels, restaurants, tea houses, theatres, cinema houses, and thirteen types of brothels, including Canton's famous "flower boats." It also described the four types of gambling establishments, but if the visitor wanted a more quiet evening the *Guide* listed billiard parlors, including that of the Y. M. C. A. It also listed reputable doctors practicing Chinese or Western medicine, as well as the location of Canton's 12 hospitals. Canton was the cultural and intellectual center of the south. The *Guide* listed 32 newspapers being published in 1918;

(9) *Kwang-chow Chih-nan* [Guide to Canton], Shanghai, New China Book Co., November 1919. Illus.

(10) *Kwang-chow Shih Shih Cheng Pao-kao Hui-k'an, 1923* [Report of the Canton Municipal Government for 1923], Canton, Municipal Government, February 1924, pp. 222-245.

including one put out by the General Chamber of Commerce and another by the federation known as "The Seventy-two Guilds." Canton had four college-level institutions — for teachers, government workers, doctors, and agricultural specialists — and ten normal schools, 27 vocational training centers, more than a hundred higher and lower primary schools, several traditional academies (*shu yuan*) and 15 missionary educational institutions. For the devout there were 17 Buddhist and four Taoist temples, 29 Protestant and six Catholic churches, and five Mohammedan mosques.

The *Guide* gave the addresses of various clubs, guilds, and associations. Canton had 24 *hui kuan*, club-houses for natives of other provinces, prefectures, or important cities residing in the southern metropolis. Sixteen guildhalls were listed and 22 associations which owned buildings, such as the Canton Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial League, the Overseas Chinese Industrial Society, the Medical Association, the Red Cross, the Kwangtung Educational Association, the Society for the Study of Self-Government, the Confucian Society, the Buddhist Association, the Y. M. and the Y. W. C. A. Thirteen charitable institutions were run for provincial associations, and the *Guide* listed 28 other charitable institutions, including dispensaries, orphanages, and an old people's home. The Cantonese were notably progressive people.

Looking at the city from the Pearl River one could see many six and eight storied office buildings along the Bund. There were a few wide streets and boulevards, the result of a municipal modernization project. In the unreconstructed parts of the city, however — and that was most of it — the streets were more like alleys closely lined with shops and so narrow that only pedestrians could press their way through the throngs of shoppers.

The waterfront stretched for several miles between Tung-shan in the east and Saikwan, the "Western Suburb," which was the old commercial center outside the city wall. The river swarmed with freight junks, lighters, ferries, launches, shallow-draft steamers, and assorted small craft that were the homes of thousands of "boat people." Across the busy river was the island of Honam, its northern part an extension of Canton's metropolitan area. Since Canton's roadstead could only take shallow-draft vessels, most goods for external trade had to be transhipped at Hong Kong.

Canton and Hong Kong were linked in many ways. Not only was the British colony Canton's ocean port, but its population consisted largely of Chinese from Canton and the delta. Important Chinese business firms usually had branches in both cities, and Hong Kong currency was standard for larger contracts in Canton, where the banknotes of Hong Kong's British banks circulated freely. A railway connected the two cities and river steamers connected the two ports. Just off the shore of Canton's "Western Suburb" lay a small island, originally a sandbar which had been leased to Britain and France, and converted by them into a miniature foreign colony, with spacious lawns and shade trees. There stood several consulates, foreign banks and other business houses, and the homes of important foreigners. Shameen also provided a zone of security for wealthy Chinese who, in times of danger, could deposit valuables in the foreign banks or even flee there to take the steamer to Hong Kong.

Though Canton was the largest and richest city in south China, there were many other lesser cities nearby. Directly south of Canton was the county of Hsun-te (Shuntak), which specialized in silk production. A study done in 1924 estimated that about 1.4 million of its people

engaged in some phase of sericulture, and that the raw silk, almost all of it marketed through Canton, was worth \$ 72 million annually in Hong Kong currency.⁽¹¹⁾ This is only an example of delta prosperity.

Dr. Sun hoped once again to fashion Canton and the surrounding area into a political base. But Canton was a city bent on commerce; it looked seaward and turned its back on Peking. It may have been a cradle of revolutionaries, but Revolution had brought it mostly sorrow. The merchant community was not eager to finance revolution and military campaigns. One reason Ch'en Chiung-ming had been popular was that he opposed using the province's resources to finance a military campaign into central China. Kwangtung for the Kuangtungese: we tend to our problems and let the north take care of itself!

What might be Dr. Sun's bases of power? One base, could he gain some control over it, was the apparatus of provincial and local government. Yet it is not easy to say what the real condition of these institutions was in early 1923. Dr. Sun could get himself elected President by a rump parliament, or could appoint himself Generalissimo, but these titles had little meaning unless he could get the instruments of government under his own control.

The crux of the matter was "the purse and the sword." If Dr. Sun's appointees could collect the taxes — all taxes — and if the dispersal of governmental revenues was under his control, then he could be said to govern. If the military forces in the area were paid by him or his government, and if they obeyed his orders then, too, he governed. The real situation, it seems, was very different.

(11) Charles Walter Howard and K. P. Buswell, *A Survey of the Silk Industry of South China*. Ling Nan Agricultural College, Agricultural Bulletin No. 12, January 1925, pp. 15-21.

THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY CONTROL

For many years the Canton delta had attracted a variety of military adventurers bent upon milking it. The waterways were the lair of ineradicable pirates, while the hills held bandit gangs. The underworld of robbers, pirates, and secret societies was interlinked with local power structures. The split between Sun Yat-sen and Ch'en Chiung-ming had broken such unity in the Kwangtung Army as General Ch'en had been able to impose during the years 1920-1922.⁽¹²⁾ Dr. Sun's most loyal force, the provincial First Division, was quartered in the Chiang-men (Kong-moon) area. The ruler of Honam, Li Fu-lin, who supported and protected Dr. Sun, was a former bandit; his private troops and flotilla ran a protection business for merchants and shippers in the pirate-infested delta. However, some brigades of his troops had participated in the recent ill-fated northern campaign and were still in Fukien. Now several extra-provincial armies — some in Dr. Sun's pay and some on their own — had fought their way into the Canton region and had seized most of the revenue-producing tax agencies. The submission of these "guest armies" to Dr. Sun's authority was uncertain. They had fought against local troops for control of local revenues. Dr. Sun's ability to govern, perhaps even his ability to stay in Canton, depended upon the relationship which would develop between himself and the commanders of these forces. Could he satisfy their financial requirements? Could he get them into battle — or rather, under what conditions could he get them into battle?

(12) I have discussed the nature of Chinese militarism in the 1920s in "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1927," Ho Ping-ti and Tang Tsou, editors, *China in Crisis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, vol. I, pp. 203-263.

Much would depend upon his ability to find new sources of tax revenue, the cooperation he could get from the merchant community, the contributions he could get from overseas Chinese, and the loans he could arrange. Much would depend, also, on his ability to maintain and enhance his personal prestige. To do this he had to show results in bringing stability and evidences of civic progress back to the Canton area.

How many troops were there in Kwangtung? This question can scarcely be answered with any accuracy. Battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions in South China were largely autonomous units organized by professional officers, who chose their subordinates and recruited men from their home districts. The smaller units might simply be local corps (*min t'uan*), outside any formal structure. In the course of provincial wars there had been a constant process of combining units into aggregations for campaigns, or split-offs due to defeats or deals. Every unit of battalion size or larger needed some populated territory upon which to subsist: its garrison area. Hence, the components of a division or army were often spread in separate towns or even different counties. When campaigning, an army would often leave part of its force behind to protect its base areas and assure continuing finances. Fragmentation was inherent in the system.

Many military units were like business enterprises, allowing the commander and senior officers to enrich themselves through the taxes they collected, by protecting gambling and the opium traffic, or extorting from merchant associations. It was a common practice — though impossible to say how common — for officers down the chain of command to hold back some of the troops' pay. Therefore, it was advantageous to over-report the size of a unit and not to fill vacant positions except when

a campaign was imminent. This practice was known as "eating empty numbers" (*ch'ih k'ung o*). Sub-commanders tried to keep the real size of their units secret from their superiors, but all units were publicized as being larger than they were.

Hin Wong (Huang Hsien-chao), the well-informed journalist in Canton, estimated in March the strength of the various units connected with the Generalissimo's command or his potential allies.⁽¹³⁾ The sizes are not large and they are presented in thousands — in short, they are estimations. Hin Wong thought Shen Hung-ying's army along the North and West Rivers, numbered about 5,000 Kwangsi and 3,000 Kwangtung troops; Yang Hsi-min's mixed Yunnan-Kwangtung Army, principally in Canton, 6,000; the Kwangtung Army at Chiang-men under Ch'en Tse and Chou Chih-chen, 12,000; Chu P'ei-te's troops on the West River beyond Chao-ch'ing, 3,000 (these were mostly Yunnanese); Li Lieh-chün's force at Swatow, 3,000; and Lin Hu, who was "considering withdrawing his opposition to Sun Yat-sen," 10,000. Left out of the calculation is Liu Chen-huan's separate Kwangsi Army and whatever strength Li Fu-lin had reassembled on Honam Island and southward. There also had been the Third Kwangtung Division that participated in the capture of Canton, which had been brought under the leadership of Wei Pang-p'ing, and then been partly disarmed and partly absorbed into Yang Hsi-min's force after Shen Hung-ying's attempted coup.

The officers of the Kwangtung First Division had had a long relationship with Sun Yat-sen and the division was the nearest thing to being "Sun's own," except his bodyguard. Yet even the First Division — under-strength and some fifty miles from Canton — had been torn by the

(13) *China Weekly Review*, April 7, 1923, p. 218, datelined Canton, March 24. I have written the names in the Wade-Giles system. (Hereafter CWR).

split between Dr. Sun and Ch'en Chiung-ming; the commanders of its battalions and regiments were not entirely united behind Dr. Sun's cause. Probably the most loyal of the extra-provincial commanders was Chu P'ei-te, but his force was many miles from Canton. The same might be said of Li Lieh-chün in Swatow. He was an old revolutionary colleague of Dr. Sun and had served in previous administrations, but his troops were a pick-up lot, formerly in Ch'en Chiung-ming's coalition. The Yunnan Army in Kwantung was a grouping of under-strength units called divisions or regiments; they had independent commanders and Yang Hsi-min was merely the senior officer, who led his own division. Liu Chen-huan was a commander who had switched sides between the Kwangsi Clique and Kwangtung Army several times for a price — but this was not unusual. The two most dangerous armies, apart from Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces in the East River region, were those of Shen Hung-ying and Lin Hu, but there were many other small bands which might turn one way or the other.

During 1922 and the early part of 1923 there was strong drive among Chinese commercial and intellectual leaders for an end to civil war, a peace conference among the major military factions, and a disbandment of troops. This was the main condition under which Li Yuan-hung accepted the presidency at Peking on June 11, 1922. Dr. Sun also adopted this position: he issued strong declarations for a peace conference, the disbandment of armies, and converting soldiers into laborers on public works.⁽¹⁴⁾ Hence, although he claimed the title of President immediately

(14) KFNPTtp, pp. 874 (June 6, 1922), 906 (Aug. 15), 947 (Jan. 26, 1923), 957 (Feb. 24) with full texts in KFCC, IV, pp. 29-40. Dr. Sun also explained his plan for troop disbandment to Hong Kong business and labor leaders on February 20, and to Canton leaders the next day, see KFNPTtp, p. 955-56, KFCC, III, pp. 244-252.

after his return to Canton, he did not set up a presidential government. He merely resumed the powers of Grand Marshal, or Generalissimo. When he met with civil and military groups he talked of "peaceful reunification and converting soldiers into workers." The plan for disbandment in Kwangtung required that every army report to the Generalissimo's Headquarters within half a month — about March 20 — the number of battalions and a list of all officers and men in the ranks. These would be verified by deputies sent from the Generalissimo's Headquarters, and thereafter the old and weak soldiers and men without rifles would be demobilized first. They were to be set to useful work such as road building, for which they would be paid good wages.⁽¹⁵⁾ Of course, to carry this plan out would require special funds, which Dr. Sun hoped to raise through loans.

EFFORTS TO BUILD GOVERNMENTAL POWER

Dr. Sun began vigorously to set up a government and to assert his authority as Generalissimo. Hsü Chao-chen was his appointee as Governor of Kwangtung in place of the absent Hu Han-min. Sun Fo took up his duties as Mayor of Canton again on February 26. The Generalissimo also allotted garrison areas to the various armies. He ordered Shen Hung-ying to take his troops to the Chao-ch'ing region and garrison the north bank of the West River; Yang Hsi-min to transfer his Yunnan troops to the North River; Liu Chen-huan to occupy the eastern part of the delta nearby; and other troops not to move without his orders. The reason for trying to get Shen Hung-ying to the west was to separate him from the North River supply route from Hunan, and to remove him

(15) KFNPTtp, p. 961, based upon Tsou Lu, CKKMTSK.

as far as possible from Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces and Lin Hu. Generals Shen and Ch'en were both thought to be in league with Wu P'ei-fu. Assigning the North River region to Yang Hsi-min had been General Yang's own suggestion, for the reason just stated.⁽¹⁶⁾ The smaller Kwangsi force under Liu Chen-huan was to be a screen between Ch'en's forces and Canton.

On March 2nd, Dr. Sun formally established his Military Headquarters in the Agricultural Experiment Station on the northern edge of the city under the protection of General Yang. He appointed the following important persons to various ministries and bureaus: T'an Yen-k'ai, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Teng Tse-ju, Liao Chung-k'ai, Ku Ying-fen, Liu Chi-wen, Chu P'ei-te, Yang Shu-k'an and Lin Yun-kai.⁽¹⁷⁾ These were men with good political connections not only in Canton but with nearby provinces and among overseas Chinese. Yet the group could scarcely be more than a paper cabinet at first. Probably the most important office was that of Minister of Finance, assigned to Mr. Liao, who had not yet come from Japan. The Minister had the task of finding the funds whereby the Generalissimo could pay the armies. During the following year Dr. Sun appointed a succession of men to this post and other financial offices, because of his continuous need for cash.

There was a framework of a provincial government, with positions for commissioners, a provincial assembly and provincial courts; these and other agencies were staffed by officers and clerks. There were office buildings, archives, and administrative routine. But in reality, Kwang-

(16) KFNPTtp, pp. 957-58; on General Yang's plan, see Chiang Yung-ching, "Hu Han-min Hsien-sheng Nien P'u Kao," in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, compiler, *Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Shih Ts'ung K'an*, vol. III, August 1961, pp. 79-320, p. 194.

(17) KFNPTtp, p. 959.

tung was so divided politically that very little which the Assembly might vote or the Governor proclaim could be executed beyond a fringe of nearby counties. The Governor might appoint a county magistrate, but whether the magistrate could even take over the *yamen* would depend upon whether the local garrison commander considered himself allied to the current rulers in Canton or to one of their rivals.

Canton's city government was another matter. In 1918, Canton had launched a modernization program to remove the city wall and construct modern boulevards along its course. After General Ch'en Chiung-ming drove the Kwangsi military regime out of Canton in October 1920 and invited Dr. Sun to return, they had established Canton's first municipal government. Sun Fo, recently out of Columbia University, became Canton's first mayor at the age of 29. The municipal government began to operate in February 1921 in new offices on the Bund. There were six departments: Public Safety (i. e. police), Education, Health, Finance, Public Utilities, and Construction. Two independent supervisory agencies were set up also: an Accounting Office and a Municipal Advisory Council, partly appointed and one-third elected.⁽¹⁸⁾

Mayor Sun and his six Western-educated Commissioners did much in the following months to modernize Canton, widening streets and expanding public transportation, opening new schools and public parks. Previously a tax on house rents produced only \$ 600,000 a year; under Sun Fo's first administration new levies brought in \$ 3,000,000 for the

(18) *Kwang-chow Shih Shih Cheng Pao-kao Hui-k'an*, 1923, Appendix, p. 73; Paul P. Whitman, "Canton—Commercial Metropolis of South China," CWR, Jan. 26, 1924, pp. 315-322; Howard L. Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, III, pp. 162-63 on Sun Fo. KMWH, vol. 51, pp. 389-411 has a detailed discussion of Canton's Municipal Government taken from an article in the Shanghai *Min-kuo Jih-pao*, January 22, 1922.

fiscal year 1921, and the budget for 1922, before the coup d'etat of June, had been set for \$ 5,000,000. According to an account which praised Sun Fo's administration, merchants were willing to pay more taxes to the municipal government but not to the province, since more provincial revenues only meant more soldiers.⁽¹⁹⁾ The Municipal Government could be a source of strength for Sun Yat-sen; in fact, it proved to be the most important supplier of funds for the Generalissimo's Headquarters.

Furthermore, Canton had a particularly effective Police Department. There were several hundred officers and about 4,000 constables. The Department had been started in 1902, had its own training academy, and the police knew the city inside and out.⁽²⁰⁾ They collected the tax on house rents, which became a very important source of funds for the Generalissimo's Headquarters. Dr. Sun appointed Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to be Commissioner of Public Safety for Canton, that is, Chief of Police. He was an old associate and from Dr. Sun's home county, Hsiang-shan, where he had been elected magistrate in 1922. Chief of Police was a position of substance and added to Dr. Sun's real power.⁽²¹⁾ General Wu held this position most of the time until April 1926.

Dr. Sun also appointed his own District Salt Inspector for Kwangtung, replacing a man who had held the position for ten years, and starting a conflict with the central Inspectorate in Peking, and indirectly, with the

(19) S. Y. Wu, "Canton's Experiment with Commission Government," CWR, December 9, 1922, pp. 44-45.

(20) KMWH, vol. 51, p. 406; Hwei-shung Gao [Kao Wei-hsiung], "Police Administration in Canton," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 10, 1926, pp. 332-54, 669-98, 872-90.

(21) CWR, March 24, 1923, p. 140, datelined Canton, March 7; *Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Hsien-sheng Hui-i-lu*, no. place, no date [after 1957], pp. 60-65; Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, III, pp. 450-51.

British Government.⁽²²⁾ Salt, of course, was an important source of revenue. On March 5, Sun Yat-sen ordered the independence of the judiciary in Kwangtung — local administrations were not to interfere with the courts. Furthermore, all officers in courts were to be appointed by the Generalissimo. He then appointed Chao Shih-pei as head of the Supreme Court and a few days later ordered that all judicial administration be under Judge Chao's control.⁽²³⁾

DR. SUN'S HOPES FOR FOREIGN AID

While getting his government started, Dr. Sun tried to follow up on the good relations which he had begun with Hong Kong. On March 7, in company with his American legal adviser, Mr. Robert Norman, he called upon the British Consul General, Sir James Jamieson. They discussed such practical matters as improving Whampoa port, extending the Canton-Hankow Railway and linking it up with the Kowloon-Canton line, which British entrepreneurs had long desired. Dr. Sun also inquired about the possibility of British officials assisting the Canton Government in financial reorganization.⁽²⁴⁾ Mr. Liang Shih-i, the very influential Cantonese financier and former Peking official under Chang Tso-lin's patronage, had an interview in Hong Kong with Mr. S. F. Mayers of the British and Chinese Corporation, a few days after Mr. Mayers had talked railways with Dr. Sun. Mr. Liang proposed a Consortium loan to the new southern government, guaranteed by the salt revenue which Canton had retained and which brought in five to six million dollars annually.

(22) KFNPTtp, p. 944; NCH, May 12, p. 363 and May 19, p. 434.

(23) KFNPTtp, pp. 961, 964.

(24) FO 371/9181/F1426 [F1426/12/10], Despatch enclosing Jamieson, Canton, Mar. 7, 1923.

He thought a loan of \$100,000,000 was about right! Three-quarters of this would be for constructive purposes, specified and supervised by the Powers, but the rest must be "free money," which was absolutely essential for any Chinese government, Mr. Liang said.⁽²⁵⁾ Dr. Sun followed this proposal by a speech on March 18 in which he waved an olive branch toward Hong Kong, talking about opportunities for foreign capital in his domain. He let it be known that he was negotiating for a loan between Canton and the Government of Hong Kong, in which Peking was not to interfere.⁽²⁶⁾ On April 1, Eugene Chen, who often served as Dr. Sun's spokesman to the Western press, issued a "Declaration of Future Foreign Policy." This was a request for Western aid, outlining plans for fiscal reform and construction. All nations were to be welcomed in financing, but America and Great Britain were preferred.⁽²⁷⁾

While he was seeking foreign financial aid, Dr. Sun had not given up the idea of enlisting foreign governments, particularly the United States, to assist in China's unification. In an interview with Mr. Fletcher S. Brockman, an old Y. M. C. A. friend, sometime during March,⁽²⁸⁾ Dr. Sun made his complaint that China was not an independent country because of its domination by many Powers, and blamed them for support-

(25) FO 371/9181/F1520 [F1520/12/10], Records of a Conversation between S.F. Meyers and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, March 13, 1923; and same, Records of a Conversation...with Liang Shih-yi, Hong Kong, March 16, 1923. The incident is not recorded in Mr. Liang's chronological biography, *San-shui Liang Yen-sun Hsien-sheng (1869-1933) Nien P'u*. Taipei reprint edition, 1962.

(26) NCH, Mar. 24, p. 587.

(27) *New York Times*, April 2, 1923. (Hereafter NYT).

(28) NYT, July 22, 1923, VII, 5:6. The date of the interview is not stated but it was held at the heavily guarded "Agricultural College," which was Dr. Sun's headquarters from March 2 till April 3, 1923; thereafter he had his headquarters at the Cement Works in Honam. KFNPTtp, 959, 965.

ing the Peking regime and calling it a government. He particularly blamed America for drawing China into the war against Germany, which had led to the split between the North and the South. He asserted that the Peking Government could not stand for twenty-four hours without the backing of foreign governments, for its only revenues came from the maritime customs and the salt gabelle.

The foreign countries blindly and persistently declined to recognize the Southern Government, "which is really the *de jure* Government," Dr. Sun said, adding that six provinces were loyal to the South. Yet the revenues from the maritime customs and part of that from the salt gabelle were collected by the power of foreign countries and turned over to Peking, which used a considerable portion of it to fight against the southern government. "The foreign powers are helping the autocratic and bureaucratic Peking Government to crush the democratic Southern Government by taking these taxes out of South China and turning them over to Peking. . . . We do not ask these nations to collect the taxes from our people and turn them back to us. We ask that they shall collect the taxes, North and South, and hold them until we Chinese can straighten out our internal affairs and establish one government that will truly represent the Chinese people."

Dr. Sun defended his alliance with Chang Tso-lin because he and Chang had a common enemy, "and I will take him — or anybody else who will help me — into the combination to overthrow Peking."

"We have lost hope of help from America, England, France or any other of the great powers. The only country that shows any sign of helping us in the South is the Soviet Government of Russia." Asked if he considered the Soviets democratic, Dr. Sun replied without hesitation,

"I do not care what they are if they are willing to back me against Peking."

As we have seen, Dr. Sun actually had not abandoned hope of foreign financial help at this time, but it is interesting that he seemed to have hope for help from Soviet Russia against Peking. As we shall see, it was during this month, March 1923, that the Russian leadership made its decision to come to Dr. Sun's support, though he had not yet been informed of this.

Dr. Sun's bids for foreign financing seem to have gotten nowhere. His government was soon at war with Shen Hung-ying and then pitted against a revived coalition of generals under Ch'en Chiung-ming, situations most unpropitious for reconstruction loans. Furthermore, the collateral suggested by Liang Shih-i, the salt revenues, were contested. First claim on them had already been pledged for a Consortium loan to the Peking Government in 1913.

The idea of British officers assisting Dr. Sun in reorganizing his Government's finances was kept alive during May. The Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Reginald Stubbs, reported that Dr. Sun wished to enlist the services of British experts, and the Governor wondered if H. M. Government would approve "any of my officers being lent to him." Foreign Office officials were opposed, but wired to the British Minister in Peking for his opinion. Sir Ronald Macleay replied near the end of May that the Consul General in Canton was well disposed to the idea, should fighting cease and conditions return to normal, but Macleay argued that Britain should not assist Sun in that way as it would be regarded both in China and in the United States as intervention on Sun's side. "He has probably reached some understanding with Bolsheviks and has

coquetted with communism and Indian sedition. In spite of friendly remonstrances he has infringed reorganization loan agreement by tampering with British salt administration." The Foreign Office then informed the Colonial Office that they concurred: it was best to continue an attitude of friendly neutrality, but not to comply with Sun Yat-sen's request.⁽²⁹⁾

SOVIET LEADERS DECIDE TO AID THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE

While Britain was maintaining "friendly neutrality," Soviet Russia was moving towards active assistance to Sun Yat-sen. The steps are gradually being revealed by recent Russian scholarship, but without much exact detail. According to Miss Mirovitskaia, when Sun Yat-sen met Joffe in Shanghai in January he informed him of his plans to organize an expedition against Peking but revealed that his resources were insufficient and that he lacked specialists capable of organizing his army. Sun said he would like to receive financial and advisory aid from the USSR.⁽³⁰⁾ Miss Kartunova says that in March 1923, the "leading organs" of the Russian Communist Party/Bolshevik and the Soviet Government "found it possible to render assistance to Sun Yat-sen and to send our advisers to him." She makes an even more precise statement in a second article:

(29) FO 371/9181/F 1464 [F 1464/12/10]. A series of communications dating May 9-18; and FO 371/9181/F 1628 [F 1626/12/10], Telegram, Peking, Macleay, May 28, 1923, transmitted to CO, June 4.

(30) R. A. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade," in *Leninskaia Politika SSSR v Otnoshenii* [The Leninist Policy of the USSR with Regard to China], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, pp. 20-67, p. 26, based upon archives in the USSR Ministry of Defense. I am indebted to Mrs. Lydia Holubnychy for most translations from the Russian. I give titles of articles in translation.

In March 1923 the Soviet Government decided to render financial aid to the revolutionary government of Sun Yat-sen amounting to about two million Mexican dollars and to dispatch to China, in agreement with Sun Yat-sen, a group of advisers.⁽³¹⁾

These statements seem to imply a decision in March, without specifying when the policy of aid to Sun began to be implemented. Miss Mirovitskaia tells of a telegram sent on May 1, 1923 from Moscow to Joffe — still in Japan — informing him that the Soviet Government was ready to render its support to the revolutionary movement of the Chinese people. On the same date the government of the Soviet Union sent a telegram to Sun Yat-sen, expressing the “readiness to render necessary assistance to China.”⁽³²⁾ Both statements are vague, but if Dr. Sun received his telegram, it must have been encouraging. A Directive of the Executive Committee of the Comintern prepared in May for a forthcoming Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, has the following ambiguous statement, which may, of course, only be figurative: “7, As for the civil war between Sun Yat-sen and the northern militarists, we are supporting Sun Yat-sen, but we require the Kuomintang to create a broad political national movement by means of systematic propaganda

(31) A. I. Kartunova, “Sun Yat-sen and Russian Advisers; Based on the Documents from 1923-1924,” in *Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1966; Sbornik Statei, Vospominanii, Materialov* [Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1966; a Collection of Articles, Reminiscences, and Materials], Moscow, Glav. Red. Vost. Lit., 1966, pp. 170-189, p. 171. A. I. Kartunova, “Sun Yat-sen—a Friend of the Soviet People,” in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, IX, No. 10, October 1966, pp. 27-38, p. 34.

(32) Mirovitskaia, “The First Decade,” p. 26; and Mirovitskaia, “Mikhail Borodin (1884-1951),” in *Vidnye Sovetskie Kommunisty—Uchastiniki Kitaiskoi Revolutsii* [The Outstanding Soviet Communists—the Participants in the Chinese Revolution], Moscow, Akad. Nauk SSSR, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, “Nauka,” 1970, pp. 22-40, p. 24. Both articles are based upon Russian archives.

and agitation.”⁽³³⁾ Toward the end of May or early in June, A. I. Gekker, who had been with Joffe in Peking, was in Moscow selecting the first team of Soviet military men to go to China. Five of them arrived in Peking on June 21.⁽³⁴⁾ In the meantime, G. Maring (Sneevliet), as Comintern representative, had reached Canton and had discussions with Dr. Sun,⁽³⁵⁾ who was deeply engaged in defending Canton from forces aligned with Ch'en Chiung-ming.

THE FIRST MILITARY CHALLENGE SURMOUNTED

The Peking Government, under control of the Chihli Clique, issued a mandate on March 20 appointing Shen Hung-ying as Superintendent of Military Affairs (*Tu-li*) in Kwangtung and Yang Hsi-min as his Assistant, General Lin Hu as General Commander of the Kwangtung Army and Defense Commissioner of Ch'ao-Mei (eastern Kwangtung), Admiral Wen Shu-te as Commander of the Canton Navy, and Sun Ch'uan-fang as Superintendent of Military Affairs in Fukien. The appointments had been rammed through by Wu P'ei-fu and Ts'ao K'un, and the cabinet of Chang

(33) Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey*. Stanford University Press, 1957, p. 345, based upon G. S. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, compilers, *Strategiia i Taktika Komintern... na Primere Kitaa. Sbornik Dokumentov*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 114-116.

(34) A. I. Cherpanov, *Zapisiki Voennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Voyny, 1924-1927* [Notes of a Military Adviser in China; From the History of the First Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1924-1927], 2 vols., Moscow, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institut Norodov Azii, "Nauka," 1964, 1968. I, pp. 6-7, 11. There is a draft translation of volume I by Alexandra O. Smith, Edited by Harry H. Collier and Thomas M. Williamson, *Notes of a Military Adviser in China* by Alexander Ivanovich Cherepanov, Taipei, [U.S.] Office of Military History, 1970, where see pp. 3-11. Cherepanov was one of the five young officers selected to go to China.

(35) This is not mentioned in KFNP, which tends to conceal Dr. Sun's relations with Soviet Russia and the Comintern, but we know that the discussions took place.

Shao-tseng handed in its resignation rather than approve the mandate.⁽³⁶⁾ The appointments were, in effect, a declaration of war against the Canton Government at a time when the public mood favored peace negotiations. Generals Shen and Yang both declined Peking's appointments in circular telegrams and on March 28, Shen telegraphed that he would obey the Generalissimo's orders to move his troops to the West River and set up headquarters at Chao-ch'ing.⁽³⁷⁾ He was merely stalling. He kept his headquarters in the Shih-ching Arsenal, a few miles northwest of Canton. Arms and some men were coming to him by the North River route and additional troops were shipping down the West River from Kwangsi.⁽³⁸⁾

Sun Yat-sen now faced a major test: could he remain in Canton? This would depend upon what troops would fight the Kwangsi intruders and whether he could find the funds to keep them in battle. Shen Hung-ying's forces launched an attack on Yang Hsi-min's headquarters in the Agricultural Experiment Station north of the city at dawn on April 16. The main units which repulsed the attack and then drove Shen's troops out of the province were several divisions of the Yunnanese Army, part of the small Kwangsi force under Liu Chen-huan, units of the Kwangtung Army, including the First Division, and a few battalions of the Fu Army

(36) Kao Yin-tsu, *Chung-hua Min-kuo Ta Shih Chi*, Taipei, Shih-chieh She, 1957, pp. 117-118, (Hereafter, Kao, *Chronology*); NCH, March 24, 1923, item datelined Peking, March 21, which reported Dr. Sun's followers in Parliament as indignant.

(37) Kao, *Chronology*, p. 118 and KFNPTtp, p. 964.

(38) NCH, April 7, 1923, pp. 16-17 for details from Canton dating March 20 and 23. Shen was said to be leading 8,000 troops at that time. He had refused to meet Dr. Sun. NCH, April 21, p. 152, datelined Canton, April 7, for report that European travellers had seen large numbers of troops coming down the West River in junks, thought to be reinforcements sent by General Lu Yung-t'ing. Arms and munitions sent down the North River had markings of the Han-yang Arsenal, an indication they were supplied by Wu P'ei-fu.

of Li Fu-lin.⁽³⁹⁾

There were three main battlegrounds in this month-long campaign. The initial theatre was the hill region north and northwest of Canton. The counter-attacking Yunnanese drove the Kwangsi Army back upon the Canton-Hankow railway, capturing the Arsenal on April 19. Chu P'ei-te's independent Yunnanese force is said to have been the victor there. Dr. Sun immediately appointed his confidant and recent agent in Germany, Chu Ho-chung, Director of the Arsenal. The next area of battle was along the Canton-Hankow Railway up to railhead at Shao-kuan. This was much fought over, with some northern reinforcements aiding Shen Hung-ying. However, by May 9 the Yunnanese had cleared the railway, with help from the First Division of the Kwangtung Army. The third area of battle was the West River region around Chao-ch'ing (or Kao-yao) in which Kwangtung troops fought a small Kwangsi force, finally driving the remnants back into Kwangsi province by May 18. However, Shen Hung-ying was not finished until he had made two more tries to regain the railway, with northern reinforcements, which he attempted during most of June, and briefly in August.⁽⁴⁰⁾

There are several noteworthy points about this battle. One was Dr. Sun's personal participation in directing the fighting. During the first few days he was with General Yang Hsi-min, whose participation was crucial. Generalissimo Sun visited various battle fronts, comforted the wounded, and showed himself in Canton in his Grand Marshal's uniform.

(39) KFNPTtp, p. 968-970; Kao, *Chronology*, pp. 119-120. There is an extensive account in KMWH, vol. 52, pp. 486-502, with tables of organization, battle orders, records of casualties, etc.

(40) KFNPTtp, p. 968-976; Kao, *Chronology*, pp. 119-122; NCH, April 21, p. 150, April 28, pp. 218-19, May 5, p. 295, May 12, p. 363.

This was to be his characteristic behavior in the military campaigns of the next year and a half. During some of these trips Mme. Sun and Chiang Kai-shek accompanied him.⁽⁴¹⁾ Another point was the support the Generalissimo received from Cantonese troops and civilian groups. The Merchant Corps mobilized to maintain order in Canton. Students and labor unions paraded to show their support, and it may have been somewhat easier, momentarily, to raise defense funds. Apparently it was not a make-believe war, for the hospitals in Canton were reported full of wounded soldiers. One insoluble problem, however, was a shortage of arms and ammunition. At first the Kwangtung Arsenal was under Shen Hung-ying's control, and his troops damaged it when they left. In any case, it did not have the capacity to equip the thousands of troops that depended upon it.⁽⁴²⁾

Another noteworthy element was the role played by local defense forces (*min-t'uan*) in harassing the extra-provincial troops. Some of the Kwangtung units which joined the fight may, in fact, have been temporary coalitions of such local forces. A booklet issued in July by the Propaganda Committee of the Generalissimo's Headquarters and written by two Cantonese Communists on Sun Yat-sen's staff, T'an P'ing-shan and Feng Chü-p'o, praised the role of the Merchant Corps in maintaining order in Canton during the fighting. It noted the supporting role of the *min-t'uan* of the North and West River regions and in particular cited

(41) *Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih Hsien-sheng*, Compiled by Mao Szu-ch'eng, edited by Ch'en Pu-lei. 2 vols, no place, no date [1948?] pp. 211-213; KFNPTtp, pp. 970-972. General Chiang arrived in Canton on April 20 after repeated requests by Dr. Sun and others. Mme. Sun is said to have arrived on April 30, NCH, May 5, p. 295.

(42) The points made are supported by KFNPTtp and NCH, and by two admiring reports by the British Consul General dated April 21 and 28, 1923 in FO 405/240 *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, Part LXXXVIII, Jan-June, 1923, No. 81, Enclosures 3 and 4.

the *min-t'uan* of Kwang-ning, a county in the northwest that bordered Kwangsi, for their important contribution to the enemy's defeat.⁽⁴³⁾ During the subsequent year the good relationship between the Generalissimo and the Canton Merchant Corps gradually cooled and finally ended in complete hostility, while the *min-t'uan* were later to become the main foe of the farmers associations organized under Kuomintang auspices.

Before the battle against Shen Hung-ying was over, Dr. Sun and his supporters faced a more serious problem in the east: a new attack by Ch'en Chiung-ming's adherents, which began about the middle of May. This was part of Wu P'ei-fu's strategy to topple Sun's regime before tackling Chang Tao-lin. This war in the east was fought intermittently until November, and ended in a stand-off. How did the Generalissimo raise the money to finance these wars?

FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Chinese local finance in the 1920s seems an impenetrable jungle which defies explanation. There were scores of types of taxing organs in any locality, and the actual collection of many taxes was customarily farmed out to merchants. The numerous taxes collected in a county or a market town — such as assessments for schools or peace-keeping forces, levies on hog-butchering or the sale of cocoons — were consumed on the spot, though any county was supposed to pass some money up to the provincial administration. There were several revenue devices which

(43) T'an P'ing-shan and Feng Chü-p'o, *Ko-ming chung chih Min-t'uan Went-t'i*, [Canton], propaganda Committee of the Generalissimo's Headquarters, July 1923, pp. 2-3. The Kuomintang Archives 416/1. The booklet presents a scheme for organizing farmers' corps, workers' corps, and merchants' corps on a district wide and province wide basis as part of democracy in the national revolution. Though written by two Communists it is free of Marxist rhetoric.

produced larger incomes. One was the *likin*, a tax on commercial goods in transit. There were hundreds of such internal customs stations in China; essentially they produced income for the military-political authority which established them and enforced collection. Kwangtung, with its thriving commerce, had more than its share of *likin* stations.

Another important source of revenue was the government's monopoly on the manufacture and sale of salt. In theory this was a Peking Government monopoly but it was beginning to break down; we will discuss the situation in Kwangtung shortly. Most of China's railways were government-owned though initially financed through foreign and domestic loans. From these the Ministry of Communication in Peking derived income above that pledged to repay debt obligations. With the increasing independence of military regimes in China after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, railway revenues were sequestered by local regimes. The growing of opium, its transport and sale, all were heavily taxed under the guise of opium suppression. Another source of revenue was the minting of coins and issuing of paper currency. If debased in quality or lacking adequate reserves of specie but forced upon the public, these issues were a hidden tax. This is by no means a full inventory of revenue devices; it merely suggests where Dr. Sun's financial managers might turn in the emergency.

Early in 1923, Dr. Sun had several financial organs, the Ministry of Finance in the Generalissimo's Headquarters, the Kwangtung Provincial Finance Office, and the Canton Municipal Finance Bureau. The first apparently attempted to provide the money for military operations, the second to collect revenues in those counties under the Government at Canton, while the third performed the same function for the city. The

latter was certainly the most efficient and systematic. Dr. Sun's basic problem was to get the larger sources of revenue under the control of his own financial agents, since most tax-collecting organs had been seized by the Yunnan and Kwangsi commanders before his return to Canton. In the meantime he and his financial helpers resorted to crisis measures.

First, a few examples of the need for funds for military operations. The Kuomintang Archives preserve a telegram from General Li Lieh-chün to Sun Yat-sen, appealing for \$100,000 to be used to persuade commanders of some recently bought over units in the Ch'aochou — Swatow region to go into battle to open a route into Kwangtung for Hsü Ch'ung-chih's forces, which were then stuck in southern Fukien. Sun's marginal notation reads, "It is not easy to arrange for funds. Hong Kong merchants must be hesitating but we should make every effort to manage it. Perhaps there is hope from the Ch'aochou merchants in Shanghai. It is imperative that a telegram in the combined names of Ch'aochou and Swatow officials come to the Ch'aochou Club, requesting the merchants all to contribute."⁽⁴⁴⁾ In March, the Generalissimo reportedly gave \$150,000 to General Shen Hung-ying to leave Canton city, but Shen is reported to have used the money to buy over other units or to recruit new troops.⁽⁴⁵⁾ In May, when General Liu Chen-huan's forces were transferred back to Shihlung on the eastern front, Sun reportedly rewarded them with \$200,000 for fighting against Shen's troops. Dr. Sun wrote to his quasi-ally, Chang Tso-lin, on May 3, appealing for funds. Besides \$250,000 which he needed to pay for new equipment for the Arsenal, he

(44) KFNpttp, p. 959. No date is given but the circumstances suggest early February before Dr. Sun left Shanghai.

(45) NCH, March 24, p. 787 (The information may have come from the British Consulate in Canton); and May 19, p. 434, story datelined Canton, May 8.

asked if Chang could help to finance what would be, in effect, a revived northern campaign. He needed a minimum of \$ 500,000 to get Li Lieh-chün's army back into Kiangsi and \$ 200,000 to assist T'an Yen-k'ai to return to Hunan. Sun said he was so short of funds that he could not "rescue the dying and succor the wounded" from the recent battle, and he numerated his casualties.⁽⁴⁶⁾

From this brief account it seems evident that the mercenary forces in and around Canton were willing enough to cream off tax revenues or protect gambling or opium smuggling for a cut, but to get them into battle, except to defend their territory, required cash payments.

Dr. Sun and his helpers tried their best to raise loans. We have already mentioned the frustrated hopes for British funds for capital construction, with a certain proportion in "free money." They also tried to borrow \$ 6,000,000 in Hong Kong from Chinese merchants, among whom some of Sun's supporters had the best of connections. But what could be offered as security? A group met with him on March 31 and reportedly agreed in principle to make a loan to assist in troop disbandment, provided Dr. Sun was able to control all financial offices in the province and to direct military affairs. If this really was the proviso, there could be no hope of fulfillment. The negotiations continued until mid-April, with Governor, Hsü carrying the burden, but in the end the Hong Kong merchants apparently offered little cash. And then the Generalissimo was at war.⁽⁴⁷⁾

A natural source for funds was the Canton Chamber of Commerce.

(46) KFCC, vol. V, pp. 552-53. Dr. Sun claimed that his forces fighting Shen Hung-ying had lost a regimental commander killed, had 12 officers of battalion commander rank or higher wounded, and nearly a thousand lower rank officers and troops killed.

(47) Reports in NCH, April 7, p. 10; April 21, pp. 152, 162; and April 28, p. 221.

Chinese governments customarily turned to merchants when needing funds, and guilds and chambers of commerce were the merchants' bargaining agents. Dr. Sun tried to borrow \$1,000,000 from the Canton Chamber after his Hong Kong venture faltered, but without much success, apparently. Then, allegedly, he allotted proportions of the amount to each commander to collect for himself.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The Chamber had a form of protection, however — the Merchant Corps. We do not know the outcome of this effort, but there is no doubt that Dr. Sun's financial agents would have to go to merchants' organizations and bargain for the funds needed for the security of the city. The process would include appeals, threats, negotiations and some final agreement — in short, not a loan but a levy.

An example would be the agreement to permit an extra levy of the tax on house rent. Such a tax was levied in April and collected by the Canton police, who kept the register of properties for just this purpose. Naturally the tax was resisted by many individual owners.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The device was used several more times during the year. In June the government attempted to force a "loan" of some three million pounds of rice from Canton's rice dealers, with the promise to repay in July. The dealers retaliated by suspending imports. This was a standard form of merchant resistance to arbitrary authority. The government also reportedly "borrowed" the funds which insurance companies had deposited with it as security.⁽⁵⁰⁾ There were many similar levies during the coming months.

(48) NCH, June 9, p. 660.

(49) NCH, May 5, p. 295; May 12, p. 367. I am not sure whether this was a forced contribution equivalent to one month's rent or an extra levy of the usual monthly ten percent.

(50) NCH, June 16, p. 731; June 23, p. 801; July 21, p. 161.

The municipal government found a potential gold mine in the sale of public properties, such as the old Tartar General's *yamen*, the lands of the Agricultural Experiment Station, communally owned temples, and lands occupied by persons who could show no legal deed. Such sales naturally aroused great opposition, and there were charges of corruption which the Mayor, Sun Fo, met with demands for evidence and an order to his Finance Bureau to submit daily statements on land sales.⁽⁵¹⁾ Such sales, however, were merely part of a broader enterprise in which the municipal government was attempting to bring under its control various public or communal institutions, such as neighborhood temples with their markets, Buddhist and Taoist temples, old Manchu banner lands, and filled-in portions of the city moat or edges of roads which had been encroached upon. Such properties the government regarded as public, and it attempted to manage and gain income from them.⁽⁵²⁾

Sales of land and undeeded buildings went on throughout Sun Fo's administration and netted a great deal of money for the Generalissimo's war chest. Dr. Sun defended the sales in an interview with the Editor of the *North China Daily News*, Mr. O. M. Green; and Sun Fo reported, after his retirement in September 1924, that the municipality had collected \$7,660,000 by this means during some 17 months under his administration.⁽⁵³⁾ Canton city gradually became the main financial prop for

(51) NCH, April 21, p. 152; May 5, p. 295; May 12, p. 367; June 9, p. 660; June 30, p. 868; July 7, p. 12.

(52) See financial report of the municipal government for 1923 in *Kwang-chow Shih Shih Cheng Pao-kao Hui-k'an*, 1923, pp. 28-33.

(53) NCH, Dec. 15, 1923, pp. 769-70. According to KFNP the interview was on December 7, 1923. U. S. Department of State Decimal File 893.00/5716, Despatch, Shanghai, October 1, 1924 enclosing a clipping from *North China Daily News*. (Hereafter citations of the State Department Decimal File will be noted as USDS). Hin Wong reported that in 8½ months,*

Dr. Sun's southern regime. According to the official financial report, the city treasury provided from various sources more than \$6,000,000 during 1923 for military rations.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Taxes on salt became another important source of income for the southern government. Dr. Sun's appointment of his own Chinese Salt Inspector indicated his intention to have the revenues collected for his government and not permit them to go to Peking. The Salt Inspectorate was modeled after the Maritime Customs Service, centralized and under foreign control, though having a mixed Chinese and foreign staff. Funds collected were held in foreign banks to pay off the installments due on the 1913 Reorganization Loan, the remainder then going to the Government in Peking. The system had been breached, however, by various provinces since the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and Kwangtung had been the chief offender. Kwangtung had made a third of the "misappropriations" of the entire country, holding back some 19.7 million dollars from 1916 to June 1921 and 14 million more to the end of June 1923.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Therefore, Dr. Sun was doing nothing novel in claiming the local salt revenues. Yet his government was immediately in conflict with the foreign District Inspector, W. N. Fergusson, supported by the Chief Inspector, Sir E. C. C. Wilton and the Diplomatic Corps. To some foreign Powers the issue was the sanctity of treaties and the security for foreign loans. Dr. Sun's appointee went right on collecting despite the protests of the British,

*to December 1923, the Canton Municipality had contributed more than \$5,330,000 to the war chest from sale of public and confiscated lands. CWR, March 8, 1924, p. 58 and March 29, p. 176. This report probably was based upon official figures.

(54) *Kuang-chow Shih Shih Cheng Pao-kao Hui-k'an*, 1923, p. 109.

(55) FO 405/241 *Further Correspondence Respecting China*, Part LXXXIV, July-Dec., 1923, No. 43, Despatch, Peking, Macleay, Nov. 1, 1923, transmitting memorandum from E. C. C. Wilton, the foreign Chief Inspector of the Salt Administration.

French and Japanese Consuls. The receipts by June were said to be running \$8,000 per day. By early July the issue seems to have been settled by a face-saving formula worked out with Dr. Sun's new Foreign Minister, Dr. Wu Ch'ao-shu, and was a victory for the Cantonese. Dr. Sun's government is said to have garnered \$2,828,000 from May through December, 1923 from the salt gabelle.⁽⁵⁶⁾

It is not possible to give a financial balance sheet. Only for the municipal government are published records of income and expenditures in 1923 available. Municipal income is reported to have increased from about three million dollars in 1922 to nine million in 1923, but expenditures for 1923 show 6.2 millions in "loans out."⁽⁵⁷⁾ On the other hand, revenues of the provincial finance office were much reduced, from 19.2 million dollars in 1922 to 10.3 million during 1923, when only a small part of the province could be reached by the provincial treasury, and many *likin* stations had been seized by military commanders.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Various men struggled with the southern government's financial problems. From March to May it was Teng Tse-ju as Minister of Finance at the headquarters level (acting for Liao Chung-k'ai); Yang Hsi-yen as

(56) NCH, May 12, 1923, p. 363; May 19, p. 434; June 9, p. 650; June 16, p. 731; July 17, p. 12; and CWR, Feb. 2, 1924, p. 352. The amount collected was said to have been about half as much as that collected during the same period the year before.

(57) *Kwang-chow Shih Shih Cheng Pao-kao Hui-k'an, 1923*, chart following p. 102.

(58) Information from T. V. Soong to George Sokolsky in March 1926. For the years 1912-1922 the annual average Kwangtung provincial income had been 19 million dollars. George Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hongkong and Canton", reprinted from *North China Herald* of April 24, May 1 and May 6, 1926, and issued as a supplement to *The China Express and Telegraph*, London, n. d. The annual provincial figures may also be found in The Kuomintang Archives, 444/19 *Ts'ai-cheng Pao-kao*.

Since writing the above I have seen financial accounts of the Generalissimo's Headquarters from April to October 1923 in *Lu Hai Chün Ta-yüan-shuai Ta-pen-ying Kung-pao*, Reprint, Taipei, Chung-kuo Kuomintang Tang Shih Shih-liao Pien-ts'uan Wei-yuan-hui, 1969, vol. V, pp. 2291-2307 and 2495-2501.

provincial Finance Commissioner; and Wu Hsueh-kuang as Salt Commissioner. On May 7, Dr. Sun reorganized his governments. He appointed Liao Chung-k'ai provincial Governor; Yeh Kung-cho Minister of Finance, with Cheng Hung-nien as Vice Minister (Yeh was concurrently provincial Commissioner of Finance till someone else was found); and he put Teng Tse-ju in charge of salt. He then appointed Tsou Lu as provincial Finance Commissioner. Tsou postponed taking up the job until June 11 and apparently Yeh dallied even longer, perhaps till near the end of June.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Dr. Sun's appointment of Yeh Kung-cho and Cheng Hung-nien was part of his larger political plans, an alliance among opponents of the Chihli Clique. Liang Shih-i and Yeh Kung-cho were leaders of the Communications Clique and very experienced officials who had been forced out of office in Peking in 1922 as a result of the conflict between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin. Being Cantonese, Liang and Yeh had retired to Hong Kong. Mr. Liang recommended Yeh and Cheng Hung-nien to Sun, who appointed them to the top financial posts. Mr. Liang was probably a key man in the liaison network between Chang Tso-lin and Sun Yat-sen, which also included leaders of the An-fu Clique. Dr. Sun thus gained two experienced financial officials and presumably also strengthened his ties both with the Communications Clique and Chang Tso-lin. However, his financial problems went on and on, as later discussion will show.

A POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN PEKING

During the first two weeks in June 1923, a factional struggle within

(59) KFNPTtp list the appointments, but through newspaper reports from Canton it is clear that appointments did not necessarily mean the actual filling of positions.

the Chihli Clique and among members of Parliament in Peking came to a climax in the driving out of President Li Yuan-hung. The President had been restored to office the previous June by the efforts of Wu P'ei-fu after Wu's victory over Chang Tso-lin in the first Chihli-Fengtien war. Ts'ao K'un, the senior Chihli militarist and leader of the Pao-ting faction of the Clique, aspired to the presidency. He was supported by the Tienstsin faction, headed by his brother, Ts'ao Jui. Without detailing the complicated conflicts within Parliament and between the factions in the Chihli Clique, it is enough to say that by use of pressure from "citizens corps," a police strike, denunciatory telegrams, and failure of support by commanders of Peking garrisons, the President was made to flee to Tientsin, and even forced to give up his seals of office on pain of his life! Thus the way was opened for the election of a new president. It was an unusually odorous episode in Peking politics, damaging the prestige of the government as well as that of the main conspirators. Many members of Parliament left in protest.

While these events were happening in Peking, Sun Yat-sen was directing the fight against both Shen Hung-ying and forces supporting Ch'en Chiung-ming. His first recorded public reaction was a manifesto on June 29, issued in the Generalissimo's name together with that of his new Foreign Minister, Wu Ch'ao-shu. This excoriated the Peking regime and the militarists of the north, reminded the nation of Dr. Sun's proposal for a disbandment conference, and called upon the foreign powers no longer to recognize the Peking Government.⁽⁶⁰⁾

(60) KFCC, IV, pp. 40-42 and NCH, July 7, 1923, p. 10. Surprisingly, the *Herald* supported Dr. Sun's call for the Powers to withhold recognition. They did not, however.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS APPRAISED

How should we appraise the accomplishments and the frustrations of Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues during the first four months back in Canton? Apparently they had little influence on national politics except in a negative sense: they maintained an autonomous government in Canton that was outside the reach of the Chihli Clique. All talk of national unification by conference and of troop disbandment had come to nought. In Kwangtung, provincial forces and extra-provincial mercenary armies had fought off the bid of Wu P'ei-fu's protégé, Shen Hung-ying, to take Canton. Now military commanders professing loyalty to the constitutionalist cause controlled the principal towns along the North and West Rivers and in the delta. They protected Canton from Sun's rival, Ch'en Chiung-ming. The commanders seemed willing enough for Dr. Sun's government to administer routine civilian affairs, so long as they retained control over such lucrative sources of revenue as protection of gambling, *likin* stations, transport and sale of opium, and received regular "rations" from the government.

Canton had been stabilized after the disorders of January and February. Apparently the municipal government under Sun Fo operated efficiently. The city was paying more than previously in taxes and each trade was being pressured for special levies, but Canton was a wealthy city. What the merchants demanded was stability and geographical scope for trade; this Sun's government was beginning to provide. Hopes for economic development of the province with foreign loans and for reform of the fiscal system with British advisers showed no signs of fruition, however. The Kuomintang had reopened a headquarters in Canton, but the center was still in Shanghai, and the Party's main function there was to pro-

pagandize and maneuver for Dr. Sun on the national political stage.

Yet the resilient revolutionary leader had made a comeback from his humiliation of a year before. By June 1923 he had shown an ability to overcome a crushing defeat. He was now beginning to create a regional base of political power, modest and precarious though it still was. He was trying to give a modern and efficient administration and hoped to find the means to develop the economy of the Canton area.

PERSISTENT PROBLEMS NOT YET SOLVED

During the summer of 1923, Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues faced dangerous problems in Kwangtung. Generals allied to Ch'en Chiung-ming were attempting to capture Canton, while Dr. Sun's forces were trying to take Huichow, General Ch'en's bastion on the East River. A contest was on for control of the Swatow-Ch'aochow and Fukien borderland region, and T'an Yen-k'ai, with Dr. Sun's support, was trying to create a coalition of forces in southern Hunan to topple Governor Chao Heng-t'i. These military and political embroilments absorbed much of the Generalissimo's energy and cost the people of Canton dearly.

By July, Ch'en Chiung-ming must have gathered a great deal of money, some of it probably coming from the Chihli Clique, with which to persuade commanders to go into battle against his rival. General Huang Ta-wei, a member of the Kuomintang Military Committee, turned over to General Ch'en and joined Generals Lin Hu and Hung Chao-lin in an attack on south Fukien, were Dr. Sun's supporter, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, still had some troops in alliance with General Tsang Chih-p'ing. Two brigades of Li Lieh-chün's force in Swatow switched over to Lin Hu.⁽⁶¹⁾

(61) KFNPTtp, pp. 988-89.

To counter the danger on the east, the Generalissimo went on July 26 to Shihlung, where the Canton-Kowloon Railway crosses the East River, to supervise a drive against Huichow. On the eastern front there were some twenty different military units using designations such as "division" or "brigade," each under a separate commander. These forces were supposed to protect Canton on the northeast, invest and capture Huichow, and drive through southeastern Kwangtung and take Swatow.⁽⁶²⁾ It was a formidable task even to coordinate such heterogenous forces, let alone to command them.

During most of August and September, Dr. Sun was at the eastern front supervising the effort to take Huichow. The battle was complicated by a serious flood, which required that provisions be sent from Canton rather than being commandeered on the spot. The protracted military effort was unavailing, for the Huichow fortress was impregnable.⁽⁶³⁾ In its war-financing the Government seemed to move from crisis to crisis.

This sense of crisis is seen in a letter from Liao Chung-k'ai, then Governor of Kwangtung, to the Finance Minister, Yeh Kung-cho. He wrote that General Liu Chen-huan's headquarters needed money urgently. Yeh's office was supposed to have contributed \$50,000 but was \$14,000 short. Liao begged that the balance be sent before 4 p. m. so he could send it to the front.⁽⁶⁴⁾ A series of letters from Dr. Sun to Hu Han-min, Yang Shu-k'an and Minister Yeh in July and August, beg them by all means to find the money to pay for troops on the eastern front. On

(62) *Ibid.*, pp. 992-93.

(63) KMWH, vol. 52, pp. 510-18 (by Li Lieh-chün); *ibid.*, pp. 540-552 and Tsou Lu, CKKMTSK, pp. 1108-1117 (for Ku Ying-fen's account).

(64) *Liao Chung-k'ai Chi*. Peking, Chung-hua Shu Chü, 1963, p. 119. Written on stationery of the Governor, the letter is dated "31," which probably means July or August 31, 1923.

August 16 he wrote his Minister of Finance that during September his headquarters would need \$ 10,000 each day for urgent military expenses.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Since there is no systematic account of how the Canton Government raised its war chest, we can only give examples of methods used. The Cantonese were passionate gamblers. One source of revenue was to license gambling establishments and provide them protection in exchange for a cut. Military units garrisoning a city fought battles for control of gambling territories. The same was true for the licensing of opium smoking establishments. Both forms of taxation were reinstated in Canton and its environs.⁽⁶⁶⁾ It is very doubtful, however, that anyone could have prevented such taxation, nor is it known whether the Generalissimo's Headquarters received any of these funds. More likely, they were creamed off by the most powerful commander in each locality. Railways were a potential source of income; armies garrisoning towns along them might impose surcharges on tickets or freight rates to support themselves. In August, the Government threatened to take over the private Sunning Railway, but cancelled the order when the Directors offered to contribute \$ 100,000. Surcharges on regular taxes were a convenient emergency measure. In September, Canton's restaurant keepers, firecracker dealers, and mutton vendors refused to pay an increase for war purposes and the Generalissimo threatened them with a fine of \$ 100,000, at which they went on strike. Hotel keepers and building contractors also tried to evade increased license fees.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Land confiscations and sales aroused tremendous opposition and charges of corruption. On

(65) KFCC, V, pp. 555-56.

(66) NCH, August 4, p. 324; August 25, pp. 521, 525, 538.

(67) NCH, August 25, p. 525; Sept. 29, p. 903; October 6, p. 18; Oct. 13, p. 99. A Reuters correspondent had a bitter report in NCH, Sept. 22, p. 850.

September 22, assailants attempted to assassinate the Mayor as he was riding along the Bund. By October the Government was offering a reward of 20 per cent of the sale price to informers who disclosed public lands in private hands, with the result that large sections of the city and its suburbs were claimed by the government as unlawfully occupied lands.⁽⁶⁸⁾

FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO ENLIST FOREIGN AID

Being pressed by his rival, Ch'en Chiung-ming, and in dire need of funds, it seems natural that Dr. Sun's Government would try to acquire the most stable and constant revenue available to any Chinese government—moneys collected by the efficient, foreign controlled, Maritime Customs Service. On September 5, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Generalissimo's government, Wu Ch'ao-shu, sent two Memoranda to the Peking Diplomatic Corps through the British Consul General in Canton, stating the case why the Canton Government should receive a share of the "Customs surplus."

C. C. Wu, as he was known to Westerners, was the son of the late Wu T'ing-fang, an eminent western-educated diplomat and official under the Ch'ing and Republican Governments. He had been educated in the United States and England, served in the southern government from 1918 to 1922, part of the time as a delegate from the South at the Paris Peace Conference. In the spring of 1923, Dr. Sun invited him to become Foreign Minister. Mr. Wu was then 36 years old, and with his excellent command of English, his legal training, and his considerable experience in diplomatic affairs, he was an excellent choice for the post, one which he held for most of the next three years.

(68) NCH, Oct. 6, p. 19; Oct. 20, p. 159.

Minister Wu presented a lucid and persuasive case, argued on legal and moral grounds, why his Government was entitled to receive a share of the Customs revenues collected in the southern provinces.⁽⁶⁹⁾ During 1919 and 1920 part of the Customs revenue was turned over to the Government at Canton, the payments being stopped in March 1920, when the government had been disrupted by internal dissension among its Directors. For a number of months the sums designated for Canton were accumulated but nothing further was remitted despite the requests of the Canton Government as newly constituted toward the end of 1920. This had been so because the Diplomatic Corps in Peking adopted the view that it was trustee only for that portion of the Customs Revenue required to meet the obligations of the Chinese Government for Boxer Indemnity payments; whatever surplus remained should be turned over to the Peking Government, recognized by the Powers as the Government of China. Minister Wu argued that the government in Peking was not the Government of China but merely a faction which happened to possess the seat and the archives of government. It was completely unjust, Minister Wu contended, that revenues collected in the south be turned over to this northern faction, which thereby was able to use other funds to make war upon the South. Such a dispensation not only denied to the South its due share, but forced it to spend its revenues to defend itself from attack by the North. "This is against all notions of justice and fair play." Minister Wu requested the Diplomatic Corps to instruct the committee of bankers to transfer all surplus, after legal foreign obligations against Customs revenue had been met, to the Inspector-General of Customs. The Canton Government would then request him to divide this sum

(69). *China Year Book* 1924-1925. pp. 850-53.

proportionately between Canton and Peking as well as to refund to Canton the surplus due and accumulated since March 1920.

Anticipating the argument, and the fact, that the Peking Government had pledged the surplus for the repayment of other foreign and domestic debts and that the British Inspector-General had undertaken to administer the surplus in this way, Minister Wu argued that such a decision could in no way effect the share due to his Government; he also contended that there were other sources of revenue, such as the salt, and the wine and tobacco monopolies, adequate to cover Peking's obligations. "It is submitted therefore that from every conceivable angle a clear and convincing case has been presented" for the proposal to divide the surplus proportionately between Canton and Peking.

The previous proportion going to Canton had been 13.7 per cent of the whole. Apparently the Canton Government calculated that the amount due to it was 12.6 million dollars, for in his second Memorandum, Minister Wu stated the constructive purposes for which his Government contemplated using these funds. He mentioned, with specified amounts, Canton municipal improvements, construction of provincial roads, currency reform, river conservancy, agricultural improvements, upgrading of educational institutions, and the suppression of piracy. There the matter rested while the Diplomatic Corps in Peking considered the problem. Having received no definite reply to his Memoranda, Minister Wu addressed another on October 23, at a time when the war with Ch'en Chiung-ming was growing ever more critical. At the end of the year the issue became explosive and led to a military confrontation between a number of Powers and the Canton Government.

Besides looking toward the Diplomatic Corps in Peking, Dr. Sun and

his colleagues were throwing out feelers elsewhere. On August 18, just after sending Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow, Dr. Sun wrote to Teng Chia-yen in Germany, asking him to consult with the German Government and capitalists about a scheme for cooperation in the economic, administrative and military reconstruction of China.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Dr. Sun complained that financial stringency made it impossible to buy arms. He hoped that some major German enterprise and the German Government would work out a large-scale reconstruction program for the cooperative development of China. After China had become rich and powerful its entire strength would then be available to help Germany free itself from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty.

In Berlin, Teng Chia-yen called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, handing over a letter sent him by Dr. Sun. This inquired whether the German Government might still be interested in the proposal that Chu Ho-chung had raised in 1921.⁽⁷¹⁾ The Foreign Office was cautious but did not exclude the possibility of Mr. Teng carrying on private negotiations

(70) KFCC, V, p. 558.

(71) In the latter part of 1921, Chu Ho-chung in Berlin had negotiated with Admiral P. von Hintze, former German Minister to China, concerning a secret project which von Hintze would head up in Canton, with the purpose of training the military forces of the southern government. The plan also may have involved a "triplice" between Dr. Sun's Government, Germany and Soviet Russia. Correspondence between Chu Ho-chung, Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai about the project was found in Mr. Liao's safe after the *coup d'etat* of June 16, 1922 and published by the *Hong Kong Telegraph* on September 22. Dr. Sun issued a statement, published on September 30 (NCH, Oct. 7, 1922, p. 9), in which he did not repudiate the letters but complained of poor translation. The German end of the negotiations is discussed in Joseph Fass, "Sun Yat-sen and Germany in 1921-1924," *Archiv Orientální* (Journal of the Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, Prague) vol. 36, 1968, pp. 135-148, pp. 142-146. Also, Karl Mehner, "Weimar-Kanton. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutsch-Chinesischen Beziehungen in den Jahren 1921-1924", *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl Marx Universität Leipzig*, vol. 8, 1958-59, pp. 23-42. (Both these works are based upon German Foreign Office archives).

with German industrialists, so long as the German Government was not involved. The Ministry requested a more concrete proposal from Sun Yat-sen. While Mr. Teng was negotiating in Berlin, the German Consul General in Canton was negotiating with the Government there for expanded commercial relations, which raised a protest from the Foreign Minister in Peking to the German Legation.⁽⁷²⁾ It seems that nothing substantial resulted from these efforts of Dr. Sun to draw Germany into closer relations in the hopes of military and economic aid. Apparently it was just one more frustration.

In the summer of 1923 the Russian Government sent its Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lev Karakhan, to Peking to reopen negotiations for a treaty of mutual recognition with the Peking Government. Soon thereafter the Russian leaders sent Mikhail Markovich Borodin to China to work with Dr. Sun and the southern revolutionaries. Mr. Karakhan began an exchange with Dr. Sun shortly after arriving in Peking. In a telegram dated September 8 he thanked Dr. Sun for his "friendship with Russia at the difficult time of her struggle for independence and freedom," informed him of the purpose of his mission to Peking, and expressed the hope that the two governments would do their utmost "to fulfill the great task of achieving genuine friendship between the two peoples."⁽⁷³⁾ A few days later Dr. Sun replied in a telegram which must have been drafted by Eugene Chen, judging by the flamboyant style.

I am deeply moved by your generous appreciation of my

(72) Fass, "Sun Yat-sen and Germany."

(73) S. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yat-sen: On the Occasion of the Centenary of His Birth (1866-1966)*, [Moscow], Novosti Press Agency Publishing House n. d., p. 34.

friendship for New Russia; and I affirm that no criticism of the order of ideas for which you stand, can or will prevent me from holding with you that the real interests of our respective countries demand the formulation of a common policy which will enable us to live on terms of equality with other Powers and free from the political and economic servitudes imposed under an international system resting on force and working through methods of economic imperialism....My fellow countrymen, I am sincerely persuaded, wish for the success of your mission, particularly on the matter of formal recognition of the Soviet Government. But your most formidable difficulty lies in negotiating with a political group which, being wholly unrepresentative of the Chinese people, has ceased to bear even the simulacrum of a national government, and whose diplomacy is in reality guided more by the wishes and desires of certain foreign Powers than by the vital interests of China as an independent and sovereign state....

He then went on to praise Karakhan for a rebuff he had given to Wang Cheng-t'ing by saying that Russia would never follow the example of the United States in its policy toward China.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Dr. Sun followed the telegram by a confidential letter to Karakhan on September 17 in which he told him of Chiang Kai-shek's trip to Russia, and with another letter trying to entice him to Canton. He warned the envoy that Peking would make formal recognition of the Soviet Government dependent upon stipulations set by America and other capitalist powers. Then he made his offer:

If you see no prospect of successful negotiations with Peking

(74) USDS 761.93/376. Despatch, Tientsin, J.C. Huston, Sept. 15, 1923. The despatch must be predated because the quotation comes from a Rosta release, datelined Peking, October 5. The telegram probably was dated September 16. Professor Tikhvinsky quoted from this telegram, but evidently retranslating from a Russian version.

on terms which would give New Russia international equality with other foreign powers without infringing the sovereign rights of the Chinese people, you may have to consider the advisability of coming to Canton to negotiate with my new government now being formed, instead of returning to Moscow empty-handed. The capitalist powers will try, through Peking, and by Peking, to inflict another diplomatic defeat on Soviet Russia. But please bear it always in mind that I am prepared and am now in a position to crush any such attempt to humiliate you and your government.⁽⁷⁵⁾

By curious coincidence, just when Dr. Sun was making this bid to Karakhan, singling out the United States as the Russian envoy's main adversary, his American legal adviser, Robert S. Norman sent the first of at least two appeals to the United States for American sponsorship of Dr. Sun's plan for a national unity conference. Both letters reached the State Department, no doubt by design. Writing a friend in California on September 18, Mr. Norman professed that he probably could influence the Canton leaders to accept an American initiative in calling a conference to unify the country and abolish the system of military governors, though he asserted that his letter "is not inspired in any way by the Canton Government or anyone connected with it."⁽⁷⁶⁾ This stretches our credulity. Mr. Norman wrote a similar letter to a friend in Washington, D. C.,⁽⁷⁷⁾ asking if the U. S. Government would come forward with suggestions for disbanding the *Tuchün* system. If the United States would suggest

(75) Tikhvinsky, cited, pp. 35-36. The letter concerning General Chiang is quoted in Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 243, from a typed copy in possession of Louis Fischer, provided by Karakhan himself.

(76) USDS 893.00/5303. Mr. Norman's letter was sent on to Senator Samuel M. Shorridge, who sent it to the Secretary of State.

(77) USDS 893.00/5270, date uncertain because the recipient forwarded only part of the letter on November 12, without the date of writing.

a peace conference, and signify its willingness to participate, Mr. Norman said, "I can remove any objections the Southern leaders might have." He then advanced Dr. Sun's well-known idea that establishment of a stable government in China would benefit the world, since China's need for railways, highways, factories and goods could then be realized and be paid for by her coal, iron and other raw materials. However, it appears that in the State Department these letters were merely noted and filed.

It seems certain that Dr. Sun was behind these feelers because there is his letter of September 27 to Sir Robert Hotung, who was proposing a conference of China's military-political leaders and the Diplomatic Corps to try to bring about Chinese unity. Dr. Sun promised to attend the proposed conference "if other principal leaders will meet me" to devise means to settle the grave state of the nation. He feared the complete disintegration of the state as a governing institution. Without such a settlement, he foresaw "a degree of political anarchy which may cause China to relapse into barbaric rule under a brutal soldiery."⁽⁷⁸⁾ Probably he was referring to the effort of Ts'ao K'un to have himself elected President.

These bits of correspondence from Dr. Sun and his staff reveal a conception of the Canton Government as more than a local regime in precarious control of part of a province, but they do not pretend that it is the *de jure* Government of China, which had been the claim of Dr. Sun's previous administration. Still, the Canton group clearly was the rival of the government in Peking, and Dr. Sun was searching in all directions for foreign diplomatic and financial support. In all these bids he was disappointed, except for the case of Soviet Russia. Mr. Karakhan

(78) NCH, Oct. 6, 1923, p. 11, quotes the entire letter. It is not found in KFCC.

did not come south to negotiate with the Canton Government, which would not have been useful in achieving Russia's diplomatic objectives. But he did send Mikhail M. Borodin to Canton, where he arrived on October 6. Mr. Borodin soon became the main instrument through which Soviet Russia aided the southern revolutionary group.

On October 5, Marshal Ts'ao K'un arranged to be elected President through lavish bribery, further damaging the prestige of the Peking Government. The Kuomintang and Sun Yat-sen reacted sharply. On October 7, the Party issued a bitter proclamation denouncing the election. On the 9th, the Generalissimo issued orders for the punishment of Ts'ao K'un and the members of Parliament who had voted for him; he telegraphed to Tuan Ch'i-jui, Chang Tso-lin and Lu Yung-hsiang calling for united action against Peking. He told reporters in Canton that another northern expedition would be undertaken to overthrow Ts'ao K'un, and that he expected help from Hunan, Chekiang and Manchuria—that is, from T'an Yen-k'ai's forces, which had not yet been defeated in Hunan, and from the main holders of real power outside the Chihli Clique. The Generalissimo also issued a statement to the Powers requesting them not to recognize the new President.⁽⁷⁹⁾

All in vain! Ts'ao K'un was inaugurated on October 10 and five days later the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps congratulated him on behalf of his colleagues.

APPROACHES TOWARD PARTY REORGANIZATION

Just at this time, early in October, Sun Yat-sen was hoping to

(79) KFNpttp, pp. 1013-14; KFCC, IV, pp. 95 and 432; NCH, October 20, p. 155, dispatched from Canton, October 10.

revitalize the revolution and was considering ways to reform the Kuomintang. A week-long conference was called in Canton, beginning October 10, to discuss ways to strengthen the Party. About eighty veteran members attended this Fraternal Conference. Unfortunately, Dr. Sun was ill on the opening day and could not attend, but he appointed a committee of eleven to discuss revitalization and a real reconstruction of the Party.⁽⁸⁰⁾ The next day in a talk to the committee he analyzed the reasons for the Party's past defeats, called on the members to sacrifice individual liberty for the cause, and contrasted the successes of the Russian revolutionary party with the weaknesses and failures of the Kuomintang. (Probably by this time he had had preliminary talks with Borodin.)

In a speech to the entire Conference on October 15, Dr. Sun emphasized the importance of propaganda. The membership of the Party must be purified of its opportunists and the rest must devote themselves to the great work of winning the hearts of the people. If this were not done, the Party could not even hold the small base it now had in Kwangtung. A membership lofty in character and exemplary in conduct could win the people's hearts by returning to the sacrificial spirit of the early martyrs and by spreading the Party's principles everywhere. Dr. Sun advocated starting a school for propagandists, but his basic formula was for each member to convert ten others, these then to convert ten more, and so on until the entire population was won over. Although the Party had 300,000 members, said Dr. Sun, there were less than 30,000 in Kwangtung who really understood the Party's principles. Still, they far outnumbered the thousand students who had formed the *T'ung Meng*

(80) KFNPTtp, pp. 1014-16. There is a picture of Dr. Sun and 83 other conference members in Chia-luen Lo, *The Pictorial Biography of Dr. Sun Yat-sen*, Taipei, 1965, p. 101.

Hui in Tokyo, and then had spread propaganda so effectively throughout China that by 1911 the Revolution was widely welcomed. Revolution had two aspects, he reminded his listeners—military struggle to overthrow evil government and drive out warlords and bureaucrats, and propaganda to reform society and convert the masses. This was the great task he urged the Party members to undertake.⁽⁸¹⁾

This was not yet a concrete plan for revitalization of the Kuomintang, and furthermore, Dr. Sun's statement that there were 300,000 members of the Party, or even 30,000 in Kwangtung, was questionable indeed. What, then, were the circumstances of this old revolutionary organization by 1923?

If we search for the Kuomintang apparatus in China as it was when this Fraternal Conference met, we discover only two centers in which significant work could be carried out on a regular basis. These were Shanghai, where the Party had its Headquarters, and Canton where there was a branch office. There were, of course, groups of individuals in other cities who had historic party connections, and there were many lodges in Chinese communities overseas. The apparatus was especially useful for propaganda purposes, because the Party published several newspapers, and its manifestoes and circular telegrams were well publicized. The Party could also raise considerable sums of money to support military campaigns if the cause had strong appeal, as we have seen. Probably the Party had by no means regained the membership it supposedly had in 1922.

A report on Party Affairs made at the the First Party Congress in January 1924 said that by the end of 1922 membership "according to the

(81) Texts of the two speeches in KFCC, III, pp. 258-269.

system" had reached 238,000, "but there were many empty places." This seemingly meant that numerous roll books, each having space for one thousand names, were only partly filled.⁽⁸²⁾ Also, some of the 1922 membership was made up of entire labor unions, such as the Seamens' Union, and probably of military units as well.⁽⁸³⁾ Whatever the figures may have been in 1922, the registers for Canton and some fifty county branches had been lost as a result of Ch'en Chiung-ming's revolt in June. If we conceive of Party membership as those who personally joined as individuals it may have been quite small in October 1923. For example, by December, after an intensive recruitment drive, there were only 1,023 registered members in Shanghai. By the time of the First Party Congress in January, Hunan had 475 members, Canton had 8,218, and the rest of Kwangtung had 5,377. This was nearly a year after Dr. Sun's return to Canton, and after an enrollment campaign in November and December. The registration for the whole of China was reported to be "more than 23,360," while there were about 4,600 members overseas.⁽⁸⁴⁾

However, it was not so much numbers which counted as it was

(82) *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Chou-k'an*, No. 9, February 24, 1924, p. 9. Seen in the Kuomintang Archives.

(83) Teng Tse-ju reported that there were "about 40,000 new entrants" into the Kuomintang in 1921-22, the majority of whom were workers and most of those seamen, because of the help given the Party to their strike. *Ibid.*, p. 12. In May 1922, Dr. Sun told S. A. Dalin, the representative of the Communist International Youth, that he counted his army of 100,000 as members since they recognized all the principles of the Kuomintang. S. A. Dalin, "The Great Turn; Sun Yat-sen in 1922," in *Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1966; Sbornik Statei, Vospominanii, Materialov*, pp. 255-285, p. 274. Liao Chung-k'ai spoke against the utility of incorporating military units into the party. KMWH, vol. 8, p. 1085, minutes of a meeting, December 9, 1923.

(84) *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Chou-k'an*, No. 6, Dec. 30, 1923, p. 4 (a telegram from Liao Chung-k'ai in Shanghai); No. 10, March 2, 1924, p. 11 (for Hunan); No. 9, pp. 6, 9, and 12 (for all other figures).

leadership and tradition. The Party had a political influence and a potential ideological attraction with the Chinese public because of its consistent espousal of nationalism and social reform. Its influence came partly from the literary and forensic abilities of its leaders, who had crusaded against the Manchus, denounced Yuan Shih-k'ai, opposed foreign privilege, and advocated various radical formulas for China's reconstruction.

The leadership came from various strata of society. Many had had a good classical education and some of the elders had distinguished themselves under the old regime—T'an Yen-k'ai as a Hanlin academician, and Hsü Ch'ien, the holder of a *Chin-shih* degree, for example. Some had advanced degrees from universities in America and Europe, and many had studied in Japanese colleges and military schools. They had served in various governments, national and provincial. These leaders, now mostly of middle age, had formed student friendships abroad, conspired to overthrow governments, gathered and dispensed revolutionary funds, smuggled arms, propagandized troops, participated in parliamentary struggles, established literary and political journals, taught in universities, organized trade unions, and engaged in business ventures. They came from all regions of China and had their various local ties, though most of them were from Kwangtung and the Yangtse valley provinces. It was this network of relationships in both the traditional and the more modernized sectors of Chinese society that made the Party much more than a name.

Let us illustrate this point functionally. Among opinion makers there were the veteran journalist, Shao Li-tzu; the editorialist and exponent of Marxism, Tai Chi-t'ao; the political essayist, Hu Han-min; the long-time

advocate of socialism, Liao Chung-k'ai; and the contributor to many radical journals, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang. Eugene Ch'en had been the editor of two nationalistic English language newspapers, the Peking and the *Shanghai Gazette*. Such men were probably associated in the popular mind with the Kuomintang, and they were currently engaged in promoting its cause. There was also a group of prominent former parliament members who had supported Sun Yat-sen's several governments in Canton, such as Chang Chi, Chü Cheng, Ting Wei-fen, Hsieh Ch'ih, Lin Shen and Tsou Lu, and who now were working for the Party.

Other men, such as Teng Tse-ju, Ku Ying-fen, Ch'en Shu-jen and Feng Tzu-yu were effective solicitors of funds among overseas Chinese. Chang Ching-chiang, a shrewd Shanghai businessman, had helped Dr. Sun with a special brokerage business. Other men knew how to tap Cantonese merchant groups in Chinese cities. Some men with Kuomintang affiliation had connections with organized labor, as for example, Ma Ch'ao-chün, Ch'en Ping-sheng, Huang Huan-t'ing, and Hsieh Ying-pai. Others had old connections with secret societies, important for arms smuggling and other underground work. A few moved in Christian circles and in the field of education.

Another field in which some Kuomintang leaders working with Sun Yat-sen had gained renown was as revolutionary military commanders and provincial governors. T'an Yen-k'ai of Hunan and Li Lieh-chün of Kiangsi were such men. Less famous in 1923, but military men with revolutionary credentials serving the Generalissimo, were Chang K'ai-ju, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, Chu P'ei-te and Li Chi-shen; and there were many younger officers who had been educated in military academies during the last years of the Manchu dynasty, who had fought in "cons-

titution protection" wars, and who were now active or potential adherents of the Kuomintang.

Yet it would not be correct to think of the Kuomintang as having an army. More realistically, some Party leaders through their network of connections in south and central China had the potentiality—if money were available—to put together military coalitions that could take Kwangtung and from there campaign temporarily in neighboring provinces—though we have seen how difficult it was just to hold the vital delta area around Canton.

The Kuomintang was not a monolith. It contained many coteries. This is not surprising, given the diversity of localities from which the leaders came, the twenty-year history of splits within the revolutionary movement, the pressures exerted by periodic defeats interspersed by occasional opportunities for official preferment and, more fundamentally, considering the pervasiveness of factionalism in the highly competitive larger society. Many leaders had their own coteries of followers and job-seekers. Thus, besides the network of outward relationships which the Kuomintang leaders had, there was an inner network of patron-follower groups. Apparently Dr. Sun stood above these coteries with his own long-standing relationship to men such as Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei; to his own son, Sun Fo, who had a following; and to others such as Teng Tse-ju, Ku Ying-fen, Chang Chi, Hsieh Ch'ih, Lin Sen, Ma Ch'ao-chün and many more. But among this array of old comrades there was a wide variety of temperments and outlooks—the potentiality for great conflict within the Party, particularly when it launched in a new direction.

To summarize this inadequate description of the Nationalist Party as

it was in 1923, it seems fair to say that it had considerable potential to lead a nationalist movement but needed further reorganization to make it an effective instrument. Apparently after his return to Canton, Dr. Sun was too engrossed in financial and military problems to pay much attention to Party organization, though he called on the Shanghai office from time to time to execute diplomatic missions or propaganda campaigns. Fragmented and ineffective though the Party may have been, however, it was more prestigious and potentially a more powerful organization than the tiny Communist Party which hoped to enliven it. That was the reason the Comintern wished to link up with the Kuomintang and let it lead a national revolution against "imperialism and feudalism," which would be the first step toward a socialist revolution, as Lenin and the Second Comintern Congress had figured things out. That was why Borodin was sent to Canton to assist Dr. Sun—if possible to guide him—in the revitalization of the Party.

Dr. Sun was ready to devote himself to Party reorganization and he now had an adviser with a great deal of revolutionary experience and the confidence of Soviet Russia's leaders. These leaders were ready to make an investment of talent and money to help the Kuomintang become a new sharp instrument of revolution. Very soon after Borodin's arrival, he and Sun met and had periodic discussions, but this is a rather complicated topic about which very little in the way of primary documentation has been produced by either side.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Dr. Sun telegraphed to Chiang

(85) Perhaps there is more than I am aware of, but two historians who were staff members of the Kuomintang Archives were able to cite no *internal primary* documentation on Dr. Sun's meetings with Borodin: Chiang Yung-ching, *Bo-lo-t'ing yü Wu-Han Cheng-ch'uan*, Taipei, China Committee for Publication Aid and Prize Awards, 1963, pp. 5-6, and Li Yun-han, *T'sung Jung Kung tao Ch'ing Tang*, Taipei, China Committee for Publication.*

Kai-shek in Moscow, and General Chiang quoted some of the telegram, which he received October 25, in a letter to the Soviet Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chicherin the next day. Dr. Sun sent his thanks "to the friendly government and party which sent their representative, Borodin, to Canton to aid warm-heartedly and sincerely," and "we deliberate with various comrades on the best course."⁽⁸⁶⁾

Between October 19 and 25 Dr. Sun appointed various people to work on the reorganization, but the key group was a Temporary Central Executive Committee appointed on the 25th to draft a new constitution, manage the registration records of local offices, and prepare for the calling of a Congress. Its nine members were Hu Han-min, Teng Tse-ju Lin Sen, Liao Chung-k'ai, T'an P'ing-shan, Ch'en Shu-jen, Sun Fo, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng and Yang Shu-k'an, while five other leaders were in a reserve group, Wang Ching-wei, Li Ta-chao, Hsieh Ying-pai, Ku Ying-fen, and Hsü Ch'ung-ch'ing. Sun Yat-sen appointed Borodin to advise this Committee. It met 28 times up to January 19 and dealt with a large number of problems.⁽⁸⁷⁾

*Aid and Prize Awards, 1966, 169-174. Both scholars made extensive use of archival material elsewhere in their books. One deduces the archives relating to Dr. Sun's dealings with Borodin are still closed. Russian archives are being studied by a new generation of Russian scholars, but nothing like a full account of Borodin's relations with Dr. Sun has yet been published so far as I am aware. Quotations from Borodin's reports to Karakhan on his meetings with Dr. Sun and with Communists and other leftists in Canton are found in N. Mitarevsky, *World-wide Soviet Plots, as Disclosed by Hitherto Unpublished Documents Seized at the USSR Embassy in Peking*, Tientsin, Tientsin Press, Ltd., n. d. [1927?], pp. 130-138. Mitarevsky "was associated with the Commission appointed by the Chinese Government to examine and translate the documents seized at the Soviet, Embassy, Peking," according to overleaf of the title page of this work. Elsewhere I have tested the reliability of the quotations from Borodin's reports on his meetings with Dr. Sun and they seem plausible, while some can be confirmed.

(86) *Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih Hsien-sheng*, p. 229.

(87) KFNpttp, pp. 1016-1020.

SUMMARIZING THE SITUATION AND THE POTENTIAL

Let us assess the revolutionary potential generated by Dr. Sun Yet-sen and his associates during eight months since their return to Canton in February 1923. Armies acknowledging the Generalissimo's government controlled the delta counties south and southwest of Canton, the railway leading northward, and the West River towns as far as Wuchow just across the Kwangsi border. T'an Yen-k'ai's effort to win control of Hunan still appeared promising, though actually it was on the verge of collapse. No other province was even nominally part of the Generalissimo's administration.

In the core area of his base, Canton and the surrounding towns, Dr. Sun had consolidated his position. Canton's municipal government operated effectively and revenues derived from the city had increased greatly in comparison with 1922. The armies which protected Dr. Sun's government cost the people heavily: they controlled many taxing agencies and the Generalissimo had constantly to raise large extra amounts to get the troops into battle. Dreams of troop disbandment were unfulfilled and opposition was mounting among Canton merchants to extortionate taxation. Furthermore, the armies mobilized by General Ch'en Chiung-ming controlled eastern Kwangtung to within forty miles of Canton, making Dr. Sun's position insecure. In fact, the tide of battle had just turned against the Generalissimo and within a few weeks Canton would be in grave danger of capture.

The prestige of the nationalist regime had probably risen in China in proportion to the decline of respect for the Peking Government resulting from the arbitrary ousting of President Li Yuan-hung in June and the

scandalous election of Ts'ao K'un to the presidency in early October. Yet no foreign government recognized the Canton regime as the government of China; they dealt with it through their consuls as with any local authority. Canton and Hong Kong were on good relations; their trade prospered and there were no serious political issues between them as yet. However, Dr. Sun had been disappointed in his hopes for development loans from British capital. Eight months of effort to find foreign financial help or political support had brought no known results except in the case of Soviet Russia. To judge from what little is known of General Chiang Kai-shek's mission in Russia and Dr. Sun's first contacts with Mr. Karakhan and Mr. Borodin, the Nationalist leaders had little clear indication what real help Soviet Russia would give; relations were still in the exploratory stage.

The Kuomintang, which was soon to lead a new revolutionary movement, seemed rather quiescent in Canton except as a producer of intermittent propaganda. Its main center was in Shanghai and its organizational structure was rather loose, except on paper. Its goals were ill-defined and it presented no burning issues or slogans to arouse public support. Its potential lay in its many leaders, men richly experienced in past political campaigns. The Communist Party, whose leaders had recently agreed to cooperate with the Kuomintang for the national revolutionary cause, was a miniscule organization—between 300 and 400 members—in a period of discouragement. Its influence in the labor movement was minimal at the moment. The Communist Party in October 1923 might fairly be described as a small, propaganda-generating coterie of dedicated radicals scattered in half a dozen cities, but everywhere operating furtively except in Canton. This Party, too, had several prestigious elders and a

number of promising younger leaders who had emerged from the second wave of the Chinese student movement around 1918 to 1921.

In summary, the National Revolution had not yet been vitalized. The potential was there in the Canton base, the indomitable Sun Yat-sen and his able followers in the Kuomintang, and in the leadership of the Communist Party and Socialist Youth Corps. Revolutionary potential also existed in the social environment: China's fractured polity, deep and pervasive social and economic inequities, foreign dominance, and the frustrations of patriotic intellectuals. There were two evident targets for hostility—the privileges of foreigners and the harsh and arbitrary rule of militarists. What needed to be done was to sharpen the Party's goals, strengthen its organization, and create a number of new revolutionary instruments: a vitalized propaganda organization, devices for mobilizing various sectors in the population, new financial resources, and a loyal and reliable revolutionary army under Party control.

In reality, this was a large and difficult agenda, which took several years to accomplish. The first step was the planning for Party reorganization and confirmation by the First Kuomintang Congress, a task which Dr. Sun now undertook with the help of his closest colleagues and the shrewd advice of Mikhail Borodin. But such a task could not be carried through without searching debate and profound disagreement, for the goal was to reshape the very future of the Chinese nation.