

CHINA'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE LOWER YANGTZE VALLEY, 1860-1864*

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Even prior to March 19, 1853, when the Taipings established their new dynasty in Nanking, certain Ch'ing imperial officials had proposed to utilize foreign troops to assist imperial forces in suppressing the rebels and restoring the lost territories in the lower Yangtze. Those to be used were foreign troops stationed in China. The terms used by the

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Ch'ing officials for this policy was "borrowing (alien) troops to help in fighting rebels" (*chieh-ping chu-chiao* 借兵助剿). Precedents of *chieh-ping chu-chiao* were not rare in Chinese history, especially in the Han and T'ang dynasties. The borrowing of foreign troops of the 1850's and 1860's, however, was different in nature from these early precedents.

In the earlier periods borrowed foreign troops were from the alien tribes along China's interior frontier. During the Ch'ing period, however, they were from European powers. The alien tribes who came to help, though famous for their fierceness and bravery in warfare, possessed a low level of civilization. On the other hand, the foreign troops who helped in the 1860's were from highly civilized countries that had been constantly progressing and expanding. They possessed modern weapons and warships, as well as a superior military structure and effective modern tactics. The alien tribes were China's dependencies; the rewards for their assistance usually took the form of the granting of intermarriage and the bestowal of gifts, titles and signets. But in the Ch'ing period these were not enough to satisfy the foreign powers, who demanded substantial new privileges and were not satisfied with symbolic rewards. Consequently, the terms of alien service were not cultural but political. Having helped the imperial forces to restore Shanghai by defeating the Small Sword Society rebels in 1854, the French were rewarded taels of silver and rolls of silk. Nevertheless their actual profits took the form of the expansion of their concession in Shanghai, which, immediately after the incident, was enlarged west to the North Gate and south to the Little East Gate. In addition a new North Gate was constructed in Shanghai City for their convenience. Such expansion tended to create precedents for further encroachments.

Chieh-ping chu-chiao was a term commonly used during the 1860's in government and private documents. To officials of the Lower Yangtze area, *chieh-ping chu-chiao* meant the borrowing of troops from the British and French authorities to fight the Taipings. Individuals employed by the imperial government or officials recommended to her by their consuls or colleagues, whether they were leaders or groups, were not considered as *chieh-ping chu-chiao*. This is the criterion upon which the limits of this article are set. For example, the Ever-Victorious Army led by Frederick Townsend Ward and Charles George Gordon, and the flotilla organized by Lay and Osborn are beyond our scope, since Ward and Gordon were both employed by the imperial government. They had their own unique origins as well as influence which should be treated separately.

I. *An Early Instance of Foreign Assistance - - the Small Sword Society Incident*

On March 19, 1853, the Taipings occupied Nanking. No sooner had they pushed down toward the Lower Yangtze, occupying Chinkiang, then they advanced toward the North. This disturbed the whole country, especially the Lower Yangtze provinces. In early April, Huang Wei (黃威 Huang Te-mei 黃德美), a Fukienese, leader of the Small Sword Society (*Hsiao-tao hui* 小刀會), led a revolt in Ch'eng-hai and occupied Amoy, An-hsi, T'ung-an and Chang-chou within three days. The uprising was, however, suppressed by the imperial troops in a very short time. ① This revolt, though not having direct influence on events in Shanghai,

① *T'ai-p'ing-t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi* (太平天國史料叢編簡輯) (A concise collection of the Tai-p'ing's materials), (Shanghai, 1962) Vol. 5, p. 130.

set a precedent for the revolt there.

The Small Sword Society incident in Shanghai was far more complicated than that of Chang-chou and Amoy. The society's members in Shanghai were mostly vagrants from Fukien and Kwangtung. Since Shanghai was a trading port, many poor workers from Fukien, Kwangtung and Chekiang came to work there, mostly as junkmen or coolies. Being in the poorest stratum and lacking job security, their disaffection caused them to stir up trouble easily. They did not have any permanent organization but were merely hangers-on of the local Fukien and Kwangtung landsmann associations. Their leaders were directors of these associations and many used their positions to plot for power. Among these, Li Hsien-ch'ih (李咸池) and Li Yun-hsieh (李雲仙) of the Fukien clique and Li Shao-hsi (李紹熙) of the Kwangtung clique were the most notable. Usually they organized themselves in the form of secret societies such as the Triads (三合會) and the Small Sword Society.

When the Taipings continued on to take over Chinkiang and Yang-chou soon after occupying Nanking, residents of Shanghai were greatly alarmed. The Shanghai taotai, Wu Chien-chang (吳健彰), therefore called up a body of vagrants from Fukien and Kwangtung and organized them into a local militia to strengthen Shanghai's defenses. But as soon as the situation in the upper Yangtze became more stabilized, Wu disbanded the group to cut down expenses. Once disbanded, the members of this group were unemployed and the seeds of unrest were sown. As greater numbers of vagrants gathered, disorder and violence became imminent. Li Hsien-ch'ih, leader of the Fukien clique, organized these disruptive elements into the Small Sword Society. Wu Chien-chang tried

to end the society's activities in August by issuing a proclamation against it and arresting more than ten persons, including Li. In order to handle the situation more effectively, and with the consent of leaders from the landsmann groups, he reorganized the militia not only as a force to suppress unrest but also as a place for the vagrants. Unfortunately this plan took effect too late to solve the problem. The Small Sword Society was already preparing to take action. ②

On the morning of September 7, 1853, the Small Sword Society rebels broke into the city through the East Gate. They attacked the district office, murdered the magistrate, Yüan Tsu-te (袁祖惠), seized the taotai, Wu Chien-chang, and successfully occupied Shanghai.

After the occupation, they had neither a unified organization nor a strong leader. They still remained divided into provincial cliques, among which the Fukien and Kwangtung groups were the strongest. These two cliques together made up the main force in the Shanghai revolt. They, however, held very different political views. The Fukien clique only desired the chance to pillage and to flee with whatever valuables they obtained. The Kwangtung clique, on the other hand, had a comparatively higher political ideal. They tried to contact the Taipings in Nanking while keeping order in the city. Due to this split, the efforts of the two groups often cancelled each other out.

On the second day of the occupation, after plundering the customs house, the Kwangtung clique leader, Liu Li-ch'uan (劉麗川), in order to manifest the Small Sword Society's sincere desire to remain on good terms with Westerners, visited all foreign consulates in person and

② *Shanghai Hsiao-tao-hui chi-i shih-liao hui-pien* (上海小刀會起義史料匯編) (Documents on the Hsiao-tao-hui Rebellion at Shanghai), (Shanghai, 1958) pp. 35-40.

assured Humphrey Marshall, the American Minister, that there would be no anti-foreign activity^③. Meanwhile, other members, who lacked a long-term plan, plundered the custom house. A serious dispute arose between the two cliques over the disposal of the 200,000 Mexican dollars found in the district treasury. The Fukien clique wanted to divide the loot, while the Kwangtung clique advocated storing it for future military use. The dispute was so great that internecine hostilities almost ensued. Actually, by this time, a large number of Fukien members had already pillaged and fled from Shanghai. Even Lin A-fu (林阿福), the important Fukien clique leader, left Shanghai six months before the defeat of the Small Sword Society. The two cliques' opposite viewpoints seriously hindered any coordinated action. ^④

Foreigners who lived in Shanghai reacted promptly to the situation. Since the Taipings occupation of Nanking they were greatly concerned

③ Montalto De Jesus provides a concise and clear description of the composition of the Small Sword Society:

C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Shanghai*, (Shanghai, 1909) pp. 60-61. "The insurgent herd consisted mainly of Canton and Fukien junkmen and a good sprinkling of Ningpo braves. There were several foreign mercenaries, deserters from ships; also several Straits-born Chinese speaking English fluently. For headquarters the chiefs chose the house formerly serving as the British consulate. Lew (Liu Li-chuan) the commanding chief, once a sugar-broker of Canton, was the the founder of the Triad Society at Shanghai, whose adherents formed the main part of the herd, the next in importance being the Small Sword Society. Another leader had been a tea broker. The most warlike of them was a former ma-foo (rider) of the British Consul and other local residents, Chin Alin (who had been a ma-foo in the stable of Mr. Skinner of Gibb, Livingstone & Co.)."

④ *North China Herald*, No. 163, p. 22 (Sept. 10, 1853); No. 202, p. 179 (June 10, 1854); *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, (上海通志館期刊) (Shanghai Gazetteer Quarterly), Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 125.

for the safety of Shanghai. On April 8, 1853, after two meetings, the American and British residents decided to organize a self-defense force to protect all foreign residents in Shanghai. The result was the formation of the Shanghai Local Volunteer Corps, a group which received weapons from the British warship, *Bombay*^⑤. The organization later expanded into the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (S. V. C.).

Since the Small Sword Society showed no anti-foreign proclivities after their occupation of Shanghai, foreigners chose to remain neutral in the struggle between the rebels and imperial forces. The three treaty powers (America, Britain and France) gave no hand to either side, but armed themselves for self-defense within the concessions. As the concessions were in the northern part of the city, however, fighting inside or outside the city was very liable to affect them. Consequently, they could not avoid involvement in the war. Although foreigners within the concessions had determined to remain neutral, some avaricious merchants still continued trading munitions with the rebels who commuted in and out of the concessions. This situation led to a direct disruption of peace within the concessions, "the Battle of Muddy Flat (泥城之戰)" in early April, 1854.

The battle began on the 3rd of April, when several imperial soldiers attempted to seize some lumber (being used in construction) from some British merchants. Following the initial clash, there were three more incidents in which foreigners within the concessions were attacked. The result was that British and American police launched a counter-attack upon the imperial forces, leading to exchanges of fire and reinforcement

⑤G. Lanning—S. Couling: *The History of Shanghai* (Shanghai, 1921) pp. 305-306; *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 274.

by the imperial troops. No sooner had this occurred than Rutherford Alcock, the British consul, decided to drive away the Chinese forces, who were then camping near the concessions, with assistance from the British and American navies and the S.V.C. On the same day, he sent a protest to Chi-erh hang-a (吉爾杭阿), leader of the imperial troops, but he received a very vague reply. Again on the 4th of April, he notified Chi-erh hang-a that if his troops did not retreat a mile south-west before 3 p.m. that day, the British would expel them by force.

At 3 p.m. on the 4th, Alcock assembled 380 British and American troops and the S.V.C. (250 British, 130 American). Headed by O'Callaghan (the British captain) and Kelly (the American captain), the troops charged toward the imperial camps. In a short exchange of fire they not only smashed eight imperial battalions but also burned their camps to the ground. Other important figures participating in this battle included Thomas Wade and Roderick Dew of Britain and Consul R. C. Murphy of the United States^⑥. Below is a sketch map of the Anglo-American


⑥ G. Lanning—S. Couling: *The History of Shanghai*, pp. 307-310; *Ssu-kuo hsin-tang* (四國新檔) (New Documents on the Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers), (Taipei, 1966), "Ying-kuo tang", p. 166.

In historic accounts of Shanghai, there has been an inaccurate interpretation of the name of "the Battle of Muddy Flat." Here I would like to correct this general misinterpretation. In G. Lanning's book he explained the origin of the battle's name by referring to the description by W. S. Wetmore, who was one of the participants in the fighting.

"One word may here be said regarding the name, muddy flat'. We have Mr. Wetmorr's word for it that on the 4th of April, the weather was fine and the ground dry. Falling bullets kicked up the dust. There was, therefore, no "muddy flat" to traverse. But there is a tradition that one of the sailors in crossing a ditch or creek did get dirty, and suggested that the fight should be called the 'Battle of Muddy Foot.' A misprint in the press would make the historic change, and we think

it probable that it was in this way the misnomer came to be perpetuated.".....*The History of Shanghai*, pp. 311-312.

Actually, one should be very skeptical about Wetmore's account since it was written 35 years after the battle. Muddy Flat should refer to the camps of the stationed Imperial forces. At that time the Imperial troops built their camps in the northern part of the city, the so-called North Camp. Chinese camps were usually very crudely built. A ten foot high, 7-8 foot thick wall was built with a mixture of mud and turf. Within the area encircled by the wall were tents. When several of these mud walls jointed together they formed a muddy flat. In G. Lanning's book, pp. 304-305, there is a map with illustrations of these camps. There is a note on the map saying, "Three Chinese encampments, made of turf and mud." Another account said that the object of the foreigners' attack was the "battlemented wall" (*North China Herald*, No. 194, p. 146, April 15, 1854). This also indicates that they attacked a muddy flat. Based on these clues it is more reasonable to believe that "the Battle of Muddy Flat" meant the fighting took place in these camps.



military movement. It may help to clarify the three cornered relationship between the "neutral" British, French and American allies, the Small Sword Society, and the imperial forces.

Along Shanghai's east side flowed the Whangpoo River which made any attack on the city from that particular direction impossible. Therefore, the imperial troops besieged the city on only three sides, south, west and north. They set up a line of blockade by building camps from the Little South Gate all the way to the North Gate. Although the East Gate was a favorable zone for outside contacts, it was subject to frequent attacks by the imperial water force that patrolled the Whangpoo River. The North Gate, therefore, was the safety zone where the Small Sword Society rebels made their outside contacts and received supplies. Imperial troops also moved about in the area and this inevitably disturbed the concessions and disrupted the peace. Under these circumstances the treaty powers were gradually dragged into the civil war.

After "the Battle of Muddy Flat" there was an improvement in Ch'ing foreign relations at Shanghai. The local officials became more aware of the influential power of foreigners after this battle. They also saw that by creating a friendly relationship with foreigners, they might secure assistance from them. At the same time, the three Western powers repeatedly announced their sincere desire to remain neutral. On the 24th of April they even issued a joint declaration prohibiting foreign merchants from trading arms, munitions or supplies with either side.^⑦

^⑦ *North China Herald* No. 196, p. 154, (April 29, 1854); No. 206, p. 194, (July 8, 1854).

In the following months, leaders of the three Western countries continued to negotiate with both the Small Sword Society and leaders of the imperial forces to ensure the safety of the foreign concessions. In early April, the Ch'ing government acceded to some of their demands, and forbade imperial troops from entering the concessions. At the same time, however, Chi-erh hang-a dug a deep trench directly in front of the concessions, along which a bamboo fence was built^⑧. Meanwhile, representatives of the three Western powers also reached an agreement with the Small Sword Society on July 13th. The rebel leaders agreed to prohibit trespassing on concession territory by their followers. They also agreed to make this prohibition known to the whole city by posting declarations to that effect, the drafts of which would first be approved by the British. After several revisions these declarations were released but this action was immediately followed by a protest from the French consul, Benait Edan. Edan protested that the declaration restricted the insurgents from entering only the north bank of the Yang-king-pang (洋涇濱), north of Shanghai, but did not include the south bank. This part was not only nearest to the city but also nearest to the French concessions. Edan considered this a failure to respect French neutrality and demanded a revision. His demand, however, was turned down. This incident aroused Edan's discontent with British officials and also caused him to adopt a negative attitude toward the Small Sword Society.^⑨

⑧ *Wu Hsü tang-an chung ti T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi* (吳煦檔案中的太平天國史料選輯) (Documents on the Taiping Rebellion Selected from Wu-hsü's Archives) (Peking, 1958) pp. 29-30.

⑨ *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 97, pp. 111-113; Vol. 1, NO. 2, pp. 284-285.

Meanwhile, Chi-erh hang-a planned to cut off intercourse between the city and the concessions. He maneuvered around the three powers' neutrality, securing their consent to carry out his plan which included the barricading of a bridge and the building of a wall between the two zones.^⑩ At the same time, however, the rebels were building a mud fort outside the northern part of the city to counteract pressure by the imperial forces. The fort was built near the southern part of the American residential area and parallel to the French concessions.

Due to their location, the French concession was always the first victim whenever the imperial troops exchanged fire with the rebels. The newly erected fort posed yet another threat and this greatly increased the French consul's discontent. Accordingly, after notifying the rebel leaders, he sent a body of men to demolish the fort. In the middle of the operation some rebels came out to stop them. Shooting started and both sides then, opened fire. The French ship-of-war, *Colbert*, joined battle, shelling the city and the Little East Gate. Both sides suffered casualties and on December 14, 1854, Laguerre, commander of the French fleet, declared war on the rebels.^⑪

On January 6, 1855, the French bombarded the North Gate with two cannons and battered it down with a joint force composed of 1,500 imperial troops and 250 French marines. For four hours the rebels resisted courageously. Eventually, the French ceased fighting and

⑩ *Ssu-kuo hsin-tang*, "Ying-kuo tang", pp. 240-243; *Wo Hsü-tang-an chung ti T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi*, pp. 30-31.

⑪ *North China Herald*, No. 224, p. 58 (Nov. 11, 1854); No. 229, p. 78, (Dec. 16, 1854); No. 230, p. 82, (Dec. 23, 1854); *Ssu-kuo hsin-tang*, "Ying-kuo tang," pp. 224-245.

withdrew with a loss of 13 soldiers and more than 30 wounded.^⑩ On February 16, 1855, the imperial forces launched another heavy attack under cover of French cannon fire. The city, although not falling on that day, was already in a very vulnerable position. Meanwhile, the rebels failed to solidify their own camp within the city and there were many desertions. Finally, on the night of February 17, Shanghai was overrun. The insurgents' leader Liu Li-ch'uan was killed and the Small Sword Society incident came to an end.

The significant result of the incident was the transferring of Chinese Customs jurisdiction into the hands of a foreign inspectorate and the autonomy gained by foreign concessions in Shanghai. Within the next several decades those privileges extended to coastal ports all over the country. Militarily, the incident marked the beginning of foreign intervention in the civil war. The incident also pointed out that Shanghai was no longer purely a Chinese problem but one similar to any international metropolitan center where interests of different powers clashed.

II. *Early Efforts to Secure Western Military Assistance Against the Taipings*

Borrowing foreign troops was originally an emergency strategy employed by lower Yangtze officials. Their decision to appeal for military assistance from French and British officials stationed in Shanghai

^⑩ In this battle, the French officers killed in action consisted of Ensigns Discry, Durun and Petit. The ten soldiers who were killed were: Lejantel, Consolin, Troallic, Buffet, Dominici, Biharre, Evin, Massie, Jego, Legaffe. Officers who were wounded were: Massot, Guys, de Barbarin, Macaire, Forestier and Senel.

to fight the civil war fully illustrates the complexity of the contemporary local officials' motives. It was advocated as early as 1853, after the loss of Kiukiang, when the Taipings were still not yet in Nanking. A number of considerations prompted local officials to embark on such a course. For one, they understood quite well the lower Yangtze district's inability to provide for its own defense. With the loss of Kiukiang their confidence ebbed further. Moreover, there was a handy reference for them to estimate the military strength of foreign powers—the incident in 1842 (over ten years before) when British warships entered the Yangtze and smashed every line of defense in the lower river with ease. Further, in view of the defeat of Green Standard forces in the area and their own inability to organize local forces quickly, these officials saw that the use of foreign troops might offer them an easy way out of their dilemma, at the same time safeguarding their official ranks and pay.

The idea of borrowing foreign troops was first developed by the Shanghai taotai, Wu Chien-chang and the governor of Kiangsu, Yang Wen-ting (楊文定). In February, 1853, there was a rumor that the Shanghai taotai had borrowed five British steamships to help restore Kiukiang^⑩, but in fact the scheme was delayed for a while because of the lack of consent by the governor-general of Liangkiang, Lu Chien-ying (陸建瀛).

In March, 1853, when Nanking was in jeopardy, Wu began to carry out his plan. On March 15, hearing that the French warship *le Cassini* was due in Shanghai, he immediately entered into negotiations with the

^⑩ Chao Lieh-wen: *Lo-hua ch'un-yü-ch'ao jih-chi* (落花春雨巢日記) (Chao's diary). From *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao tsung pien chien-chi*. Vol. 3, p. 26.

French consul, de Montigny, requesting *le Cassini* be sent to Nanking to help in the civil war. His request, however, was turned down. The next day Wu again made the request, this time to the captain of the *le Cassini*, M. de Plas. Once more his request was denied. On March 19, Nanking fell to the rebels and the governor-general of Liangkiang was killed inside the city.

Wu then turned for help to Samuel George Bonham, the British consul who had just arrived in Shanghai. Again, his request was rejected. Wu, therefore, changed his plans and attempted to hire several foreign vessels to assist the imperial troops. Three vessels, the *Dewan*, *Antelope* and *Science* then entered the proximity of Chinkiang to render assistance. Wu thus became a pioneer in the borrowing or hiring of foreign troops in Kiangnan, a course which later developed in several directions^⑭.

After the loss of Nanking and the death of Lu Chien-ying, the Imperial Commissioner, Hsiang Jung(向榮), became head of the military operations in Kiangnan. Yang Wen-ting, meanwhile, took over the position of governor-general of Liangkiang. Wishing for a rapid restoration of Nanking and suppression of the rebels, they hoped to borrow British warships to attack the rebels' Yangtze water force. Soon after the fall of Nanking, Yang despatched Wu Chien-chang and another representative to negotiate with Rutherford Alcock at Shanghai for the borrowing of foreign troops. Alcock, however, turned down the request. Wu then returned the dispatch to Yang. Not long thereafter, Yang

⑭ B. Maybon—Jean Fredet: *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai* (Paris, 1929), pp. 46-47; p. 54; *Ch'ou-p'an-i-wu-shih-mo pu-i* (籌辦夷務始末補遺) (Taipei, 1966), p. 308; *Ssu-kuo hsin tang*, "Ying-kuo tang," p. 150.

was dismissed¹⁵.

In 1854, Wu persuaded the American minister, Robert M. Mc Lane, to offer assistance by promising to open up Hankow for trade as a reward. This time Wu's efforts were favored by the great influence exerted by local American merchants, particularly Edward Cunningham. Wu reported the negotiations to Governor Hsü Nai-chao (許乃釗) and Provincial Treasurer Chi-erh hang-a. Hsü, in turn, forwarded the details to the governor-general of Liangkiang, I-liang (怡良), who was then in Soochow. The plan failed, however, since I-liang would not consent to the arrangement¹⁶.

These unsuccessful attempts to procure foreign military assistance all took place before the French joined the attack on the Small Sword rebels at Shanghai. The French interference, though not creating great confidence among the local officials, gave a strong feeling of security for Shanghai and its environs. Moreover, the impression on the lower Yangtze officials and gentry was so deep and broad that it once more elicited interest in the use of foreign military power.

In 1856, the rebel Taiping leaders tried to shatter the Kiangnan Headquarters, (chiang-nan-ta-ying 江南大營) employing all their forces to counteract the siege of Hsiang Jung's troops. Once again alarm spread along both banks of the Yangtze. Predictably the appeal for borrowing foreign troops arose once more. Horatio Nelson Lay, an Englishman in Shanghai, suggested the purchase of new British steamships to fight on the Yangtze, while several imperial officials expressed a similar opinion.

¹⁵ *Ssu-kuo hsin-tang* "Ying-kuo tang", p. 151, Yang Wen-ting's dispatch to the British Consul; p. 153, Hsiang Jung's memorial.

¹⁶ *Wu-hsü tang-an chung ti T'ai-p'ing-t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi*, pp. 34-36; 39-42.

The Hsien-feng emperor agreed to the scheme of hiring foreign vessels but was still not receptive to the idea of borrowing foreign troops^{①7}.

During 1856, the Kiangnan Headquarters was at the end of its resources. Had it not been for the rebels' internal power struggle in that year which destroyed their kingdom's foundation, the Kiangnan area would have been unable to enjoy even a brief respite. In any case, the headquarters' strength remained the same. Hsiang Jung worried himself sick and soon died. His successor as Imperial Commissioner, Ho-ch'un (和春), gradually rebuilt the headquarters' strength and besieged Nanking a second time. But he failed to recapture the city, in spite of the several attacks he launched between 1856-1860. Instead, he and his troops were confronted by a heavy rebel second counterattack which damaged the headquarters so seriously that it brought about its total destruction. The fighting continued from April 27 to May 5, 1860 and was decided by "the Battle of Tan-yang" on May 19. From there on, with most of its troops destroyed, the Kiangnan Headquarters never had another chance to re-establish its former strength or status.

This second collapse of the Kiangnan Headquarters resulted in serious consequences for the lower Yangtze region. On one hand, the defeated troops that dispersed over various areas proceeded to pillage and massacre. On the other, within two months the rebels captured all the important cities along Lake T'ai, a district containing much of the country's wealth. Meanwhile, Ho-ch'un and Chang Kuo-liang (張國樑),

①7 *I-wu-shih-mo pu-i*, p. 384, Hsiang Jung's memorial; p. 387, Ho Kuei-ch'ing's memorial *Ssu-kuo Hsin-tang* "Ying-kuo-tang", p. 260, I-liang's memorial; *Chiao-p'ing yueh-fei fang-lueh*, (剿平粵匪方略) (Documents on the Taiping Rebellion), (1872), Vol. 156, pp. 11-12.

military leaders of lower Yangtze, both had been killed in action. Local officials such as the governor-general of Liangkiang, Ho Kuei-ch'ing (何桂清), the Kiangsu governor, Hsü Yu-jen (徐有壬), and the Chekiang governor, Wang Yu-ling (王有齡), had, of course, the responsibility of protecting their districts. They would otherwise have had no chance of survival once the capital was lost. Again, efforts to cope with the crisis included attempts to secure foreign assistance.

Neither gentry nor commoners of the lower Yangtze disapproved of the idea of borrowing foreign troops. On the contrary, they put high hopes on foreign assistance in resisting the Taipings' eastward advance. Some minor officials even spread rumors of Western military operations so as to maintain local order. For example, the officials and gentry of Ch'ang-shu, in order to calm their subjects, deliberately fabricated the rumor that the Shanghai taotai was leading a thousand foreign troops to help them¹⁹.

High officials in the lower Yangtze area were mainly interested in maintaining their positions, while gentry and commoners primarily were concerned with their lives and property. Since imperial troops in the area were too weak to suppress the rebels, officials and gentry were obliged to consider the utilization of foreign troops in order to deal with the critical situation. The collapse of the Kiangnan Headquarters in 1860 made the scheme all the more acceptable in Kiangnan. The responsibility for the planning and negotiations for the scheme fell to the lower officials under the direction of the three top provincial

¹⁹ T'ang: *Ch'iu wen jih-chi* (鯀聞日記) (T'ang's diary) in *Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao* (近代史資料) (New Materials on Modern History) No. 30, (1963, No. 1) (Peking, 1963), pp. 72-73.

officials—Ho Kuei-ch'ing, Wang Yu-ling and Hsü Yu-jen.

Wang Yu-ling, the governor of Chekiang, was most sensitive to changes in the situation and most enthusiastic about carrying out the plan of using foreign troops. As early as May 5, on hearing that the Kiangnan Headquarters was on the verge of disintegration, Wang immediately sent written reports to the governor-general of Liangkiang, Ho Kuei-ch'ing, and the Shanghai taotai, Wu Hsü(吳煦). In these reports he alerted them to prepare for the borrowing of foreign military forces. Within the same month he sent over ten letters to Wu and Ho, urging them to negotiate with the British and French authorities in Shanghai. Wang also gave Wu official instructions to be used as the basis for negotiations and sent a memorial to Peking reporting to the Emperor the plan of borrowing foreign troops^①. During the Soochow crisis the governor of Kiangsu, Hsu Yü-jen, also sent instructions to Wu Hsü, requesting immediate negotiations with the British or French authorities for the protection of Soochow. A few days later, however, Soochow fell and Hsü committed suicide^②.

Ho Kuei-ch'ing, governor-general of Liangkiang, was the highest local official, but after the collapse of the Headquarters he exposed his cowardice and irresponsibility. He was stationed with a large number of troops in Ch'ang-chou, the critical area for the Headquarters' supplies, but no sooner had he learned about the fall of Tan-yang than he prepared to flee. He made no attempt to resist with local forces nor did

① *Wu Hsü tang-an chung ti T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi* p.90, Wang's memorial; pp.44-45, Wang's instruction to Wu; pp. 81, 87, 91-99, Wang's nine letters to Wu.

② *Wu Hsü tang-an chung ti T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi*, p.45, Hsü's instruction to Wu.

he wait until the populace lost confidence and panicked. In spite of sincere appeals from the local gentry, he fled Ch'ang-chou with a unit of bodyguards before dawn on May 20th. On May 25th he arrived in Ch'ang-shu and from there he fled to Fu-shan. Finally on June 6th he arrived in Shanghai. According to Ch'ing dynasty political traditions and regulations, high officials were required to report their movements to the central government and give appropriate reasons for their actions. Therefore, when Ho arrived in Ch'ang-shu he reported that he was there to take care of rations. On reaching Fu-shan (which was adjacent to the Yangtze) he used pretext of taking care of the Water Force's rations. When he fled to Shanghai, he tried to explain that he was there to negotiate for the matter of borrowing foreign troops at the request of the British and French consulates. When his memorials reached Peking, however, they were seriously criticized by the Emperor who then dismissed him and appointed Tseng Kuo-fan his successor. In addition, the emperor issued orders to local officers to arrest Ho, and transport him to Peking for trial^②.

Meanwhile, at Shanghai, Ho met with serious problems in attempting to secure foreign assistance. At the time, China's relations with the British and French were already strained to the point of war. The British minister, Frederick W. A. Bruce, and the French minister, Alphonse de Bourbonlon, having arrived in Shanghai with their ships-of-war, were preparing to launch an attack against Peking in order to

② *Chiao-p'ing yueh-fei fang-lueh*, Vol. 238, pp. 16-17, Hsü Yu-jen's memorial; Vol. 239, pp. 7-8, Ho Kuei-ch'ing's memorial; Vol. 238, p. 8, 23, Emperor's Edicts; T'ang's diary, in *Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao* 1963, No. 1, (Peking, 1963) p. 70; *I-wu-shih-mo pu-i* p. 505; *Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo*, (Hsien-feng) Vol. 52, p. 1.

enforce the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). The mood of the Ch'ing government was still anti-British and anti-French. An additional complicating factor was that Ho had no knowledge of his dismissal, which accordingly denied him the authority to represent the local government.

On June 8, 1860, Ho had an interview with the British and French consuls to appeal for help. Naturally, his efforts were futile. On his seventh day in Shanghai, he again appealed for the Emperor's support regarding peace-negotiations and the issue of borrowing foreign troops. But in so doing, he only succeeded in receiving more serious rebuffs. Since Ho had been dismissed and been designated a criminal, the Emperor prohibited his interference in affairs at Shanghai^②.

During this critical period, the overall military situation had deteriorated. While the rebels continued to expand throughout the whole productive area of the lower Yangtze, imperial forces could do nothing but helplessly await their own destruction. As the three head officials saw it, the only remedy was to borrow foreign troops; but their endeavors to secure this support met with repeated failures. Nevertheless, their efforts marked a turning point in the whole situation. Whereas in 1853-54 officials requesting foreign assistance had given the impression that Westerners had reverently offered their assistance, now the attitude was one of unmasked urgency.

In the autumn of 1860, there was a drastic change in the north: British and French troops occupied Peking and the Emperor fled to Jehol. Peace talks then began in Peking under the direction of Prince

② B. Mybon, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 192-195; *T'ai-p'ing ti'en-kno shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi* Vol. 6, pp.157-161.

Kung. In November, Nicholas Ignatieff, the Russian minister proposed to send 300-400 Russian soldiers to help imperial troops in fighting along the Yangtze. The court in turn consulted Tseng Kuo-fan, Hsüeh Huan (薛煥) and Wang Yu-ling, who were at the time governor-general of Liangkiang, governor of Kiangsu and governor of Chekiang respectively. Soon these officials replied. Tseng submitted only to a conditional borrowing of Western techniques. His strategy was to delay actual foreign intervention in the war and instead learn their methods of building warships and cannons. Hsüeh and Wang, on the other hand, not only strongly expressed the need for foreign assistance but also stressed the extreme urgency of the situation. Hsüeh even drafted a plan to reward the foreigners. When their memorials arrived in Peking, they were reviewed by Prince Kung, who in January 1861 decided to adopt Tseng's policy of emphasis on the manufacturing of warships and weapons in Shanghai. This marked the birth of armories and shipyards in the city²³.

III. *The Establishment of the United Defence Bureau and the Assistance of the Foreign Troops*

Although the lower Yangtze officials never stopped negotiating with consuls of the three powers for the borrowing of foreign troops, it was obvious that satisfactory results would be difficult to attain. Moreover, it was clear that these results would be inextricably related

²³ *Tseng-wen-cheng-kung tsou-kao* (曾文正公奏稿) (A Collection of Tseng's Memorials) (Taipei, 1952), pp. 368-370; *Wu Hsü tang-an chung ti Tai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi*, pp. 47-48, Hsüeh's memorial; p. 49, Wang's memorial; *Hai-fang tang* (海防檔) (Documents on Maritime Defense) (Taipei, 1957) Part I, p. 3, Prince Kung's memorial and edict.

to the interests and attitudes of foreigners in Shanghai. Like Chinese officials of the lower Yangtze, Western authorities and merchants had various viewpoints and complicated motives; consequently, their attitudes sometimes were contradictory. At the highest level, however, official attitudes of the three powers were very simple. As a whole Britain, France and America chose to remain neutral. But their condition for neutrality was the key to later developments: They would remain neutral only as long as the safety of the trading ports was preserved.

After 1860, the lower Yangtze crisis was more serious than that caused by the Small Sword Society. Consequently, foreign officials in Shanghai all the more reinforced their "armed neutrality." Increasingly, foreign sentiment favored protecting not only the concession but also Shanghai proper and its environs. This posture made it basically impossible for the three powers to avoid being drawn into the civil war by future developments. Foreign merchants who resided in Shanghai valued most the safety of the coastal trading areas and, because of this concern with trade, they also desired peace and prosperity for the entire lower Yangtze area. Therefore, they too were willing to support plans to borrow foreign troops. Taking advantage of their position, the Shanghai taotai relied on them as mediators in negotiations with the British and French consuls.

After the collapse of the Kiangnan Headquarters in 1860, Wu Hsü spoke with B. Edan, the French consul, on the 23rd of May and appealed for help from French troops. In turn, Shanghai's gentry requested that Edan station French troops in the city for its protection. Meanwhile, a merchant from Ningpo, Yang Fang (楊坊), known by foreigners as Taki, informed the French consul that he would be

responsible for expenditures of the stationed troops. On June 3rd, after advising the French commander, Cousin Montauban, of the fall of Soochow and the rebels' march toward Shanghai, Wu obtained a pledge from him to form a joint force with the British to suppress the rebels. When Bourboulon and Bruce arrived in Shanghai, Wu and the local gentry again appealed for their help. The foreign officials agreed to their requests and joined in the defense of Shanghai.

On May 26, they released a joint declaration in which it was announced that Shanghai was an international port where Chinese and foreign interests were highly interrelated. They said that allowing a war to take place there would cause extensive losses to foreigners, and hence their sole objective was to maintain order and prosperity within the city. With the consent of the allied army and naval authorities, the local foreign officials unanimously agreed to prevent any acts of violence or pillage in Shanghai. Copies of the declaration were immediately posted at all city gates and in the French and British concessions. Their policy at this time was confined to defensive measures and was opposed to aggressive actions against the rebels. Naturally, they did not agree to attack Soochow^②.

Having occupied Soochow, the rebels continued to push toward the lower Yangtze. On August 17, 1860, the rebel chief (Chung Wang or Faithful Prince), Li Hsiu-ch'eng (李秀成), succeeded in seizing Hsü-chia-hui (Siccawei), to the west of Shanghai and turning it into his headquarters. On the 19th, he launched an attack on the city (Shanghai)

② B. Maybon, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp.193-200; Frank Hawks Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai*, p. 48; *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, Vol. 1, No. 1, P. 104; pp.138-139; Vol.1, No, 2, p.308; Vol. 2, No. 4, p.1481.

only to find to his surprise that it was manned by Allied troops. The Taipings first advanced toward the south gate but were driven away by Captain Budd and his Royal Marines. They then moved toward the south-west corner of the wall but encounter withering fire and were forced to retire. During the night, the rebel forces launched another attack on the western and southern suburbs, but they were again repulsed by the French.

On the morning of the 20th, the Taipings attacked the west gate and then turned toward the northern district, which was adjacent to the British and French concessions. There they were pushed back by Colonel March. Meanwhile the British warships *Nimrod* and *Pioneer* bombarded the rebels from Soochow Creek (Woosung River). After submitting to a two hour cannonade the rebels retreated toward Hsü-chia-hui. Within the concessions, the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (which had practically ceased to exist) was reorganized under Colonel Neale. The new Corps then guarded the western part of the concessions.

After the Taipings' retreat, Robert James Forrest, the British interpreter, and Philips rode out to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's camp. There they delivered a letter which stated that the city of Shanghai was under the protection of the British and French, and that they would not be permitted to enter. The two men were received cordially and departed as soon as the despatches were delivered. In view of this intelligence, Li Hsiu-ch'eng decided to withdraw during the night. The next day when Forrest returned to Hsü-chia-hui, he found that the rebels had evacuated^②.

② Hawks Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai*, pp. 48-50.

This incident like the Small Sword Society affair some seven years before gave the Chinese officials at Shanghai a strong feeling of security and all the more heightened their confidence in the utility of borrowing foreign troops. At the same time, however, the Anglo-French troops were fighting against imperial forces in Taku. On August 21 they occupied Taku and prepared for an expedition against the government in Peking. To the Chinese this inconsistency in their behavior was attributable to their concern for profit, which indeed it was. Nonetheless, the fall of Peking and the subsequent peace negotiations increased the probability of Allied intervention in the war on the side of the imperial forces.

By the end of 1861, most of Chekiang province had already fallen into rebel hands. With the loss of Hangchow and Ningpo, Shanghai encountered yet another serious crisis. The Taipings were again advancing toward Shanghai and pressuring the city by occupying all major points to the east of it. During this period, many officials and rich merchants of Kiangsu and Chekiang fled to Shanghai. Being extremely alarmed by the course of developments, they were obliged to appeal for foreign assistance in a more energetic way. Borrowing foreign troops became an unanimous hope of the populace at large.

Since this was not their first attempt to carry out the plan of borrowing foreign troops, experience accumulated from previous negotiations improved the maneuvering of these concerned individuals. This time they tried to achieve their goal by various means. One method was to secure consent from high authorities so that negotiations with the British and French consuls could be carried out officially. This policy had been supported and used by the government

in the past few years, and presented no problem. Negotiations were directed by the Kiangsu governor, who in turn appointed the Shanghai taotai to participate in actual discussions. The second method was somewhat more complicated and difficult, since there was a problem of responsibility once the plan was carried out. This official diplomatic activity had to be reported to the court in Peking, the Emperor was to be informed of the particular person who appealed for the borrowing of foreign troops. In 1860, the memorials of Hsü Yu-jen, Wang Yu-ling and Ho Kuei-ch'ing pointed out that they were merely relaying to the Emperor a petition of the local gentry to which they added a list of names. In this way, they could easily secure the Emperor's approval and avoid possible punishment. At that time, as the governor of Kiangsu, Hsüeh Huan was the highest official in Shanghai. He was quite willing to take up the task since he did not have confidence in any other means of protecting Shanghai. The third method was even more complicated than the second. Precedents showed that appeals for borrowing foreign troops had always been refused at the central government level. Thus, in order to effect their goals, the local gentry had to secure more consideration from the central government.

The new tactic they employed was to send a representative north by ship to persuade the high court officials. Meanwhile, local officials would try to convince the British and French consuls of the need to assist imperial forces in battle in the same way Cantonese hong merchants were used to influence foreign merchants. The hope was that the Western merchants would then seek active protection from their governments. The main figures engaged in this movement were the gentry of Kiangsu and Chekiang, who were either doing business in

Shanghai or serving as officials in the lower Yangtze.

Negotiations began while Shanghai was at the apparent height of its crisis. The key figures involved were Wu Hsü, Ying Pao-shih(應寶時) and Wu Yün (吳雲). The former prefect of Soochow, Wu Yün, had been in Shanghai since 1860 when he first arrived seeking assistance from foreign troops. P'an Tseng-wei (潘曾瑋) and Ku Wen-pin (顧文彬) also had been cooperating with him. The foreigner they interviewed was Harry Parkes, with Kung Ch'eng (龔橙) acting as their chief mediator. Wu Hsü was still in charge of the negotiations while Hsüeh Huan was the ultimate leader of the whole activity. He was responsible for reporting to the Court the results of the negotiations in order to secure the Emperor's sympathy and approval.

The talks were initiated by Parkes who, having just arrived in Shanghai from the north, assembled the local gentry to discuss defense problems. Wu Hsü seeing this as a chance to secure cooperation from British troops, appointed Wu Yün and Ying Pao-shih to negotiate with Parkes for British assistance in the defense of Shanghai as well as for the restoration of Soochow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking. During the talks, Wu Yün and Ying disclosed Shanghai's willingness to support the military movement financially. After two interviews with Wu and Ying, then P'an and Ku, Parkes finally agreed to their request, but his motives were unclear. At this time, the British tried to persuade the Taipings not to advance to within a 30 mile radius of Shanghai. In February, 1861, Vice-Admiral James Hope, had gone all the way to Nanking to notify the rebel head, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (洪秀全) of this policy, which was agreed to (for a year's duration) by the Taipings. Whether it was Parkes' own ambition to extend the territory under British protection

or his complete support of the official's requests, is hard to tell.

In any case the Shanghai gentry sent a joint petition to Hsüeh Huan requesting that he report to the throne this Anglo-Chinese agreement, emphasizing Parkes' consent to provide military support. The petitioners included most of the influential gentry in Shanghai, and even the three whose names were not on the list had no objection²⁰.

The reasons why the British were interested enough to initiate the discussions were three-fold. First, they and the French, through the treaty of Peking, had obtained trading privileges along the Yangtze. Second, since Shanghai had been under siege, foreign merchants, while strengthening their new defense organization, naturally desired more active assistance from the military units of their respective governments. Finally, a particularly crucial factor was the occupation of Ningpo by the rebels. This directly interfered with the foreign merchants' interests.

The rebel chief Li Hsiu-ch'eng, realized the importance of these interests all too well from his experience in 1860. Therefore, when he was ready to advance toward Shanghai on January 2, 1862, he sent a special letter to the western merchants saying that they would not be disturbed if the foreign troops remained neutral. The letter was delivered to Walter Medhurst, the British consul, who on January 12, 1862, summoned all the important Allied officials for a meeting from which he hoped would come an appropriate policy. The participants

²⁰ Wu Yün, *Liang-lei-hsüan ch'ih-tu* (兩齋軒尺牘) (A Collection of Wu Yün's letters), Vol. 12, pp. 31-32; Feng Kuei-fen, *Hsien-chih-t'ang chi* (顯志堂集) Vol. 4, pp. 19-21; *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi*, Vol. 6, pp. 166-167; Hawks Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai*, p. 51.

finally decided to announce that British and French troops had assumed the responsibility for protecting Shanghai. Any rebel military movement, whether against the city itself or its surrounding areas would automatically be considered a declaration of war on the Allied troops. The importance of the announcement was that, henceforth, the Anglo-French troops were more aggressive in expanding around Shanghai. Consequently, the British and French became involved in the civil war in Chekiang and Kiangsu²⁷.

In view of the impending danger, the local officials and gentry who fell back on Anglo-French assistance were willing to maintain close relationships with the Allied troops and to supply their basic necessities. Furthermore, they optimistically expected to restore Soochow, Hangchow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking with the help of their newly-acquired military allies. Accordingly, they decided to form an organization which would take over the new tasks arising from dealing with the Allied troops. This organization was the Sino-foreign United Defense Office (*Chung-wai hui-fang kung-so* 中外會防公所), later known as the United Defence Bureau (*Hui-fang chü* 會防局). Wu Hsü and Ying Pao-shih were its designers. They first drafted up "terms," and sent them to Wu Yün; Wu, in turn, made some revisions in the text and sent it to the Kiangsu governor as an appendix to the "report" from Shanghai (the official statement sent by the Kiangsu and Chekiang gentry members regarding the borrowing of foreign troops). Hsüeh Huan then enclosed the appendix in his memorial and sent it to Peking.

The formation of the Bureau (or office) was mentioned neither in the official statement nor the memorial. It was only included in the

²⁷ B. Maybon, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 206-207.

appendix among the eight items delineating the "terms" for borrowing foreign troops. There it was explained that an office had been formed in the Yang-king-pang and that gentry and officials had been designated to deal with foreigners, to supply material necessities and to exchange information with the British and French consulates.

Hsüeh's memorial was first disapproved by the Court in an edict dated February 2, 1862. The Kiangsu governor then immediately sent in another memorial which not only stressed Shanghai's perilous situation but also emphasized the joint Sino-foreign effort to protect the city. On February 8, the throne issued an edict approving Shanghai's plan to borrow foreign troops and consenting to the formation of the United Defence Bureau. This edict later became legal evidence of the organization²⁸.

The success on the part of lower Yangtze officials and gentry to secure the throne's approval was a significant development. Similarly, the willingness of the central government to support their plan was an innovation worthy of attention. As a whole, the success of the plan was due to three factors: 1) Between November 1861-January 1862, a short period of a few months, the rebels occupied not only most of Chekiang but also the major cities in areas east of Shanghai. Moreover, the rebels occupation of Ningpo made the British increasingly aggressive in their anti-Taiping attitude, and eventually, on May 10, they recaptured Ningpo by force, an action which subsequently erased much of the Court's skepticism. 2) By occupying Ningpo, the rebels secured the

²⁸ Wu Yün, *Liang-lei-hsüan ch'ih-tu*, Vol. 12, p. 8; *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-ka'n*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 143-144; *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi*, Vol. 2, p. 209; *Chiao-p'ing yueh-fei fang-lüeh*, Vol. 287, pp. 3-5.

conveniences of a port and, for a while there was a rumor that they were going to buy American ships to attack Tientsin. This naturally panicked the high officials. 3) The Shanghai crisis in early 1862 affected all the wealthy refugees from Chekiang and Kiangsu. Therefore, they were more active in advocating implementation of a plan to utilize foreign troops.

In order to secure sympathy and approval from the central government, they decided to send two influential members of the gentry to Peking by ship. They were to go there to explain the situation more clearly. The two persons chosen each had a particular mission. P'an Tseng-wei, a former official in the Board of Punishment, had relatives serving as officials in the capital. His mission was to explain to Prince Kung the expectations of the gentry and the seriousness of the situation at Shanghai. With his official background, he also succeeded in convincing Chao Kuang (趙光), a Minister of the Board of Punishment, to speak in favor of the proposed plan. Chao, in his memorial to the throne, appealed for approval of the plan so that Soochow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking could be restored. Kung Ch'eng, the other representative, was neither an official nor had he any connection with high authorities. He, however, knew Thomas Wade very well. Besides, he had had extensive social contacts with foreign merchants. His mission was to maneuver between the British and the Tsungli Yamen in order to obtain an agreement on borrowing troops. The maneuvering was almost perfect²⁰.

²⁰ *Tai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi*, Vol. 1, p. 320, Vol. 2, p. 209; *Shanghai yen-chiu tzu-liao hsü-chi* (上海研究資料續集) (Supplement to the Materials on Shanghai Problems), pp. 652-653, Li Hung-chang's letter; *Hai-fang tang*, Part I, pp. 38-39, Chao Kuang's memorial; *Chung-ho Monthly Magazine*, (中和月刊) Vol. 6, No. 3-4, Kung Ch'eng's letters.

In actuality, the United Defence Bureau was formed before the memorial was sent to the Court, in order to coincide with the foreign troops' mobilization to counteract the rebel attack on Shanghai. It came into existence on January 13, 1862, outside the north gate in Yang-king-pang. An office was set up inside the Yuan-t'ung Official Bank (源通官銀號) and P'an Tseng-wei, Ku Wen-pin, Wu Yün and Ying Pao-shih were appointed directors by the Kiangsu governor^⑩.

According to the established "terms," the United Defence Bureau was responsible for supplying salaries, uniforms and munitions for 10,000 foreign soldiers. Each individual was allowed 20 taels for average monthly expenses; hence, the total expenditure per month was to be about 200,000 taels. The United Defence Bureau extracted half of this sum from money collected through maritime customs; for the other half they depended on forced donations collected at three stations in and around the British and French concessions. Both Chinese and foreign merchants were subject to these forced donations. Of course, the number of troops actually participating in the war never reached 10,000, so the expenditure was not as high as estimated. However, other expenses such as hiring ships or transporting troops and weapons added up to a considerable amount. The organization was criticized for corruption as well as extravagance and after the suppression of the rebels, Li Hung-chang reported to Peking and had it disbanded^⑪.

⑩ Feng Kuei-fen, *Hsien-chih-t'ang Chi*, Vol. 4, pp.19-21; Wang T'ao, *Ying-juan tsa-chih* (瀛壖雜志) (Short Essays on Shanghai), Vol. 6, p. 10; *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, Vol. 2, No.4, p. 1494.

⑪ *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi*, Vol. 2, pp. 210-211; Vol.6, pp.169-170.

IV. *The Policy of the Hsiang-Huai Leaders Toward the Action of the Borrowing Foreign Troops*

For ten years, the appeal for foreign interference on behalf of the imperial forces was a significant provincial activity. Participants included both high officials and influential gentry-merchants. Nevertheless, there were exceptions among some provincial officials, particularly the developing Hsiang army group. With the collapse of the Kiangnan Headquarters, the leaders of the Hsiang and Huai Armies, Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang took over the positions of governor-general of Liangkiang, governor of Chekiang and governor of Kiangsu, respectively. Tseng's brother, Kuo-ch'uan (國荃) was appointed to besiege Nanking. Their opinions were quite different from those of certain other provincial officials and their views carried considerable weight.

The Hsiang army was founded in 1853, but in spite of its contributions against the Taipings, it never had a real chance to develop prior to 1860. Its numerous sacrifices did not gain it sufficient confidence by the Court, which during the 1850's entrusted the mission of suppressing the rebels to the Kiangnan Headquarters. This policy did not change for eight or nine years, since leaders in the Headquarters, (as well as their local supporters) were the most influential and most trusted figures in the empire, while Tseng Kuo-fan was not yet even a provincial official. His Hsiang army always numbered around 10,000 and his financial resources were limited. For many years his army had been surviving at a subsistence level.

Following the collapse of the Kiangnan Headquarters, however, only the Hsiang army was near enough to take up the task in its

place. Despite its popularity among the people of Kiangnan and the long-time rumor of its expected arrival, the cavalry of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in (僧格林沁) was very unlikely to travel south to the lower Yangtze, leaving Peking and Tientsin unguarded.....particularly since news of the Allied troops' intended attack on various coastal ports in the north became more prevalent each day. The Mongol prince was unable even to leave Tientsin.

Under such circumstances the Hsiang army was given a chance to develop. Tseng was appointed Imperial Commissioner and also governor-general of Liangkiang. These two positions not only gave him military power, but also entrusted him with the highest provincial authority. Since he had gained considerable experience fighting the Taipings during the past few years, he welcomed the opportunity to prove the Hsiang army's strength and planned for its expansion.

The fighting in the lower Yangtze, which was Tseng's responsibility, provided an excellent chance for further development, and the Hsiang army leaders were extremely reluctant to share it with any other group. The Kiangsu and Chekiang gentry, however, had neither the strength nor the spirit to fight and could not endure the hardships of fleeing from one place to another. They hoped for the recapture of the lower Yangtze territory as quickly as possible and the Hsiang army's slow advance made them impatient. They, therefore, proposed the plan of borrowing foreign troops. In addition, they also wished to benefit politically and to maintain their status by making use of the powerful foreign troops. But, to the Hsiang army leaders, the plan they advocated threatened to deprive them of their chances for glory and to work against their political interests. Consequently the Hsiang army leaders

were strongly against the proposal of borrowing foreign troops, which contradicted their fundamental strategy.

Among the Hsiang army leaders, Tseng Kuo-fan, as the commander-in-chief, became the core of such opposition. He was confronted with the problem in December, 1860, following his June appointment as governor-general of Liangkiang. After the Peking conventions the Russian Consul, Nicholas Ignatieff, offered Prince Kung three to four hundred Russian soldiers to help in the fighting along the Yangtze. As mentioned previously, the central government referred the proposal to the three head provincial officials and asked for their opinions. The Kiangsu governor, Hsüeh, and the Chekiang governor, Wang, not only accepted the proposal with open arms but also thought it an essential move. Only Tseng was reluctant to agree. However, instead of directly rejecting the proposal in his reply, he listed three main reasons for his disapproval. They were: (1) The rebels strength lay in their infantry, not in their water forces. (2) Every section of the Yangtze was patrolled by sufficient Chinese water forces (This included the Hsiang Army's Water Force), and there was thus no need for the Russian Navy to aid these units. (3) Foreign troops who provided help might make unexpected demands, which, if not dealt with properly, would cause various disputes. His main suggestion was to reward the foreigners for their good will, but delay their actual participation. Since he himself was facing the problem of being too weak to recapture Kiangsu and Chekiang he dared not oppose the proposal openly. Nevertheless, he did not want to see foreign intervention and he tried to detain it for the above reasons^②. Tseng's expressed opinions also represented those

^② *Tseng wen-cheng-kung tsou-kao*, pp. 368-370.

of Tso Tsung-t'ang, who was then working in Tseng's headquarters. Tso, in fact, wrote the memorial for Tseng³³.

From the end of 1861 to early 1862, when most of Chekiang had fallen, Shanghai's safety was again threatened. Meanwhile the Hsiang army was in Anking, too far away to save Shanghai. Therefore, the appeal for foreign assistance became the last resort for local gentry and provincial officials. Realizing the necessity of obtaining Tseng's support, they tried to convince him of the desirability of borrowing foreign troops.

P'an Tseng-wei was the most important and active representative of the gentry. On January 3, 1862, he wrote Tseng a private letter asking for his support as the highest provincial official. Ten days after the letter was sent, the United Defence Bureau was formed, showing that the gentry were determined to carry out the plan even if Tseng's objected. They not only had a systematic procedure but also possessed a good deal of independence in their activities. Chou T'eng-hu (周騰虎) was another member of the gentry who had close relations with Tseng. When he arrived in Shanghai to investigate the overall situation, Chou, like P'an, advised Tseng to support the plan³⁴.

Tseng, meanwhile, was in no position to reject the plan abruptly since he could not protect Shanghai in any effective way. His policy, which he stated clearly to P'an in his letter of reply, went only so far as to accept the suggestion of borrowing foreign troops to join in the defense of Shanghai. He still strongly disapproved the idea of using

³³ Wang Erh-min, *Huai-chün chih* (A History of the Huai Army), p. 51.

³⁴ *Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an-hsin-kaò*, (曾國藩未刊信稿) pp. 7-8; 21-22; to P'an Tseng-wei; *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao tsung-pien chien-chi*, p. 218, Chou wrote to Tseng.

foreign troops to restore Soochow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking.

Still, Tseng agreed to take ultimate responsibility for the activities of borrowed troops, provided that they participated in fighting only at Shanghai and Ningpo. His main reason was that foreign interests were mainly in coastal treaty ports, not in interior regions like Soochow, Ch'ang-chou or Nanking; therefore, their assistance should be confined to coastal areas.

Wu Hsü, representing the Shanghai officials, also wrote to Tseng explaining the plan and requesting the latter's support. Tseng, in return, wrote back several times, repeatedly explaining his attitude. He agreed to the borrowing of foreign troops to defend Shanghai and recapturing Ningpo and was willing to be responsible for its consequences. But as before, he obliquely declined their proposed joint attack on Soochow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking with foreign troops. Not long after his correspondence with Wu, Tseng also wrote to Hsüeh Huan, again stressing his basic strategy. Besides these Shanghai officials, he also replied to Chou T'eng-hu^⑤.

Since he was the highest provincial official, Tseng's consent to take responsibility for the borrowing of foreign troops meant that he had to report his basic strategy and approach to the court. In early 1862, therefore he sent three memorials stating his policy and explaining his difficult situation. Besides these memorials, he also wrote Prince Kung privately. By this time the Hsiang army had already gained great

⑤ *Wu-Hsü tang-an chung-ti Ta'i-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi*, pp.79-81, Tseng's two letters to Wu; *Tseng wen-cheng-kung shu-chu* (曾文正公書札) (Tseng's letters), Vol. 17, pp. 29-30; *Tseng kuo-fan wei-k'an hsün-kao*, pp. 27-28, p. 35, pp. 56-57, to Hsüeh Huan.

prestige and was on the road to further advancement. Therefore, Tseng's policy and approach were supported by the court⁸⁶. Another Hsiang army leader, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, also strongly opposed the plan of borrowing foreign troops—primarily because he intended to recapture Nanking by himself so as to increase his own reputation. And, in fact, from the siege of Nanking to its recapture (1862–1864), he received no help from foreign troops.

Li Hung-chang, the Huai army leader, originally came from the Hsiang army. Therefore, his transfer to Shanghai was but an expansion of the Hsiang army's influence. When he arrived in Shanghai on April 8, 1862, the appeal for foreign intervention had already been met. British and French troops were fighting in the vicinity of Shanghai on behalf of the imperial government. Li's mission was to prevent the foreign troops from entering the interior and to confine them to the defense of Shanghai, according to Tseng's strategy. However, after he had been in Shanghai a scant two weeks, the British Admiral, James Hope, came to him, attempting to arrange a joint attack on the T'ai-pings. Li then asked Tseng for instructions. Tseng advised him to follow the original strategy, noting that the Huai army's mission was to cooperate with the foreign troops in the defense of Shanghai but not in the recapture of the interior. Furthermore, he indicated that areas in the vicinity of Shanghai such as Nan-hsiang and Chia-ting were classified as the interior⁸⁷.

⁸⁶ *Tseng wen-cheng-kung tsou-kao*, p. 451, pp. 469-471, 492-494; *Tseng wen-cheng-kung shu-cha*; Vol. 18, pp.25-26.

⁸⁷ *Tseng wen-cheng-kung shu-cha*, Vol. 18, pp.20-21.

In general Li was able to carry out Tseng's strategy. Before his arrival and for several months while Li was in residence there, Shanghai was defended by British and French troops and the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün, 常勝軍) This situation remained unchanged until May 17, 1862, when the French Admiral, Protet, was killed in action. After this, the British and French gradually withdrew their assistance. From then on, the defense of Shanghai was largely dependent on the Huai army and F. T. Ward's Ever-Victorious Army.

Naturally, the British and French still defended their concessions in Shanghai, and this indirectly freed the Huai army from worry about its rear. Consequently, Li could send all his best troops to the front and demonstrate their best fighting ability. Meanwhile the United Defence Bureau used most of its resources for the support of Ward's army and for the purchase of ships. Therefore, Li benefited both directly and indirectly from the situation. In spite of the fact that the plan to use foreign troops was carried out against the will of the Hsiang-Huai army leaders, they and their forces received substantial gain from it. Moreover, the plan was satisfactory to Tseng since foreign troops did not compete with the Hsiang-Huai armies in the recapture of interior cities and thus did not deprive them of the chance to increase their prestige. In addition, Li personally benefited. Due to the lower Yangtze gentry's active appeal for borrowing foreign troops to recapture Soochow, Ch'ang-chou and Nanking, Tseng was obliged to despatch troops to Shanghai. For this, he had to rely on Li's troops to be stationed there to represent the Hsiang army's strength. Consequently, the Huai army's chance for further development was more secure.

Actually, the greatest impact foreign intervention had on the

Hsiang-Huai army was in Chekiang where Tso Tsung-t'ang benefited most. As was the case at Shanghai, foreign intervention in Chekiang was of two levels: (1) foreign troops employed by China; and (2) local Chinese troops directed by French or British officers. But unlike those in Shanghai, these two different groups were mixed in one unit without any sharp distinctions such as existed between, say, the Ever-Victorious Army and regular British and French troops. In the 1860's, there were two units of foreign troops active in Chekiang. One represented Britain, the other France. Their formation, similar to that in Shanghai, followed the loss of Ningpo on December 9, 1861, where the rebel occupation not only interfered with foreign interests but also gradually caused misunderstandings between the Taipings and residents of the foreign concessions.

On May 5, 1862, the Ningpo taotai, Chang Ching-ch'ü (張景渠), officially requested the British consul, Federick Harvey, to unite with the French and assist the imperial forces in recapturing Ningpo. On May 8, 1862, Captain Roderick Dew and Lieutenant Kenney jointly notified the rebel leaders to withdraw from Ningpo peacefully, but their offer was rejected by the Taipings. The British and French flotilla then assisted the imperial troops in attacking Ningpo. On May 10, 1862, Ningpo was recaptured by the combined forces. However, Kenney was seriously wounded in the action and he died not long after.

After the recapture of Ningpo, the British and French participated in Chekiang operations as two mixed units. One of these units consisted of Chinese soldiers and British officers organized by Roderick Dew and modeled after the Ever-Victorious Army. They were called the Ever-Pacifying Army (*Ch'ang-an chün* 常安軍). The other was a Sino-French

unit headed by Lieutenant A. E. le Brethron de Caligny who assigned French officers to direct western-trained Chinese troops. This unit accomplished more than the Ever-pacifying Army and was more influential. After le Brethron died in action, Tardif de Moidrey was appointed by the French government to fill the position. Later, Paul d' Aiquebelle succeeded Tardif, who fell in battle. D'Aiquebelle remained until the fighting in Chekiang ended. His unit was known as the Ever-Conquering Army (*Ch'ang-chieh chün* 常捷軍)⁸⁵.

After the rebels captured Hangchow on December 29, 1861, the Chekiang governor, Wang Yu-ling, committed suicide. Tso Tsung-t'ang succeeded him on January 23, 1862 and took over the responsibility of resisting the rebels. Since the coastal cities were too far away to be properly defended, Tso first advanced toward western Chekiang, while foreign troops in east Chekiang were fighting separately. With western forces and imperial troops attacking from both east and the west, the rebels were trapped in the middle. This situation benefited Tso and favored the advance of foreign troops in east Chekiang. Important cities in east Chekiang, along the coast or on the southern bank of the Ch'ien-t'ang River (such as Ningpo, Ts'u-hsi, Feng-hua, Yü-yao, Shang-yü, Hsiao-shan, and Shao-hsing) were recaptured by British and French troops. Later, joined by Tso's forces, they played an important part in restoring Fu-yang, Hangchow, Wu-kang, and Hu-chou. Meanwhile, the recovery of Ningpo not only cut off the rebels' supplies from the sea but also gave Tso a new economic resource. Foreign intervention in the Chekiang fighting generally favored the expansion of the Hsiang

⁸⁵ Kuo Ting Yee, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih* (太平天國史事日誌), Appendix, pp. 164-167.

army in that theatre and contributed to Tso's personal profit as well.

V. Conclusion

Foreign commercial activities in China had continually expanded since the opening of Shanghai in 1843. Following the move north of commercial centers from Canton, China's diplomatic relations with foreign countries made a shift. During times of peace, commercial developments were rapid, while political contacts were limited. Sino-foreign relations continued to be confined to circles of trade without any immediate change in Shanghai's political situation.

In the ten years from the opening of the port to the Small Sword Society incident, Shanghai retained the simple parochial political system it had for the previous 100 years. After the Small Sword Society incident, however, there were actually two foreign governments in Shanghai, one in the French concession, and one in the so-called international settlement. In the beginning, this situation did not deprive Chinese officials of their right to administer the concessions, but after the suppression of the Taipings in 1864, Chinese administration was no longer able to reach into the concessions. Such circumstances were already adequate to transform Shanghai into a complex international city. The expansion of foreign interests and the formation of special rights were direct results of the civil war. They were also the greatest benefits the foreigners gained by direct intervention in the war.

Other facts closely related with foreign interests were the rapid increase in population and the subsequent rapid increase in real estate prices within the concessions during the Taiping period. In the ten

years following the opening of Shanghai in 1843, there had been only about 500 Chinese within the concessions. In 1853, due to the occupation of Shanghai, the population in the concessions rose to 20,000. By 1860, it reached 300,000 and, by 1862, 500,000. In other words, within the ten years from 1853 to 1862, the number of Chinese residents within the concessions increased 1,000 times. In terms of urban population changes these numbers made Shanghai a city deserving of attention^③.

The jump in real estate prices was the result of two related phenomena: the rapid increase in population and the civil war in Kiangnan. When Shanghai was first opened, the British Consulate bought land at roughly 30 taels per mou. (30 taels was about 45 Mexican dollars; a mou is almost one-sixth of an English acre.) This price was already higher than that in the existing market. Outside the north gate, a mou cost only 15-35 Mexican dollars. (In 1844, one Mexican dollar equalled $4\frac{3}{4}$ shillings.)

In the early period following the opening of Shanghai, the maximum price of an acre within the concessions was only 46-74 Pounds, but by 1862, the price was as high as 8,000-12,000 Pounds per acre. This jump in price within such a short period demonstrates the drastic and rapid change occurring in the concessions^④. Foreign merchants were the only ones to profit from this rise in prices. Since they could make the most money in the shortest time in the real estate business, their interests in this particular endeavor increased so much that they often surpassed their

^③ *Shanghai t'ung-chih-kuan ch'i-k'an*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 298-300; Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 1052.

^④ Hawks Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai*, p. 12, 51; G. Lannings and S. Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, p. 281, 395.

original trade purposes^④.

From 1853 to 1864 both the imperial forces and the Taipings realized that the Western powers represented a third force whose cooperation might be of great importance in the struggle. The key to securing their assistance was appropriate diplomatic maneuvering, especially the ability to understand the intricacies of Sino-foreign relations; such an ability would enable them to grasp the best opportunities at the right time. In other words, the understanding of Shanghai's new situation and of its foreign residents' key interests was imperative.

In the Taiping period, foreigners who came to China were mostly merchants, especially British and Americans. There was also a minority

④ Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, pp.59-60. Here I quote his conversation with a merchant in Shanghai. The conversation itself is a valuable reference:

"No doubt your anticipations of future evil have a certain foundation, and, indeed, may be correct enough, though something may be urged on the other side as to the advantages of having the Chinese mingled with us, and departing from the old Canton system of isolation; but, upon the whole, I agree with you. The day *will* probably come when those who then may be here will see abundant cause to regret what is now being done, in letting and subletting to Chinese. But in what way am I and my brother landholders and speculators concerned in this? You, as H. M.'s Consul, are bound to look to national and permanent interests, that is your business; but it is my business to make a fortune with the least possible loss of time, by letting my land to Chinese, and building for them at thirty or forty per cent interest, if that is the best thing I can do with my money. In two or three years at farthest, I hope to realize a fortune and get away; and what can it matter to me if all Shanghai disappear afterward in fire or flood? You must not expect men in my situation to condemn themselves to years of prolonged exile in an unhealthy climate for the benefit of posterity. We are money-making, practical men. Our business is to make money, as much and as fast as we can; and for this end, all modes and means are good which the law permits."

who were missionaries from France, America, or England. Areas along the coast and major rivers were their primary regions of activity. Their main interest was in trade and the maintenance of local order. They sincerely intended to remain neutral but when the war expanded to the vicinity of Shanghai it forced them to adopt the policy of "armed-neutrality." Then, because commercial interests were related to the region as a whole, the Western authorities gradually took the position that merely defending one city was not sufficient; they needed peace in a larger circle. Accordingly, their neutrality proved flexible and inevitably, as they tried to carry out their policy of "armed-neutrality," they became involved in the war.

Ch'ing officials, lower Yangtze gentry, and Chinese compradores had a better understanding of Sino-foreign relations than did the Taipings. Some of them had been provincial diplomats and others had been working in foreign trading houses. With such backgrounds, they were in a better position to design ways to go about borrowing Western troops. They understood the foreigners' trade interests, which they continued to use as bait. Although they were not completely successful in their maneuvering, their approach was more likely to secure foreign support than that of the rebels which increasingly brought forth foreign hostility and resistance.

The civil war in the lower Yangtze and foreign intervention in the conflict had a deep impact on Chinese history for the next 100 years. The internationalism of Shanghai and the benefits gained by the Hsiang-Huai army leaders had far reaching influence. Another important consequence was the fundamental change in the composition of the society in Shanghai. Prosperity shifted around with the commercial

centers, which were then concentrated within the concessions. Due to the civil war in the lower Yangtze, much of the population of Shanghai moved into these areas. The majority of the populace moving to the concessions consisted of wealthy gentry members and officials from the lower Yangtze. Their intercourse with foreign merchants and Chinese compradores led to a transformation in the social composition of Shanghai. The uppermost stratum, which consisted of the area's most powerful and most influential figures, was formed by a clique of foreign officials, merchants, Chinese compradores, wealthy gentry, and officials.

There were also revisions in the power structure according to regions. The wealthy gentry of Chekiang, after the Small Sword Society incident, gradually began to extend their influence. During the following decades, they were able to retain their importance. On the other hand, while the influence of the Kwangtung merchants was never totally wiped out, the superiority they had enjoyed for twenty years after the opening of Shanghai gradually fell to the wealthy Chekiang merchants. In any case, the real masters of Shanghai were the foreign merchants who respected neither Chinese laws nor Chinese officials.

The change of Shanghai's status was also a clear illustration of the expansion of imperialism. In spite of the fact that neither the British nor the French governments had any real imperialistic intentions in China, the attitudes of their consuls, lower officials or merchants, were very aggressive. Presuming upon their countries' strong military forces, they often acted beyond their authority or responsibilities. Afterwards, they used the benefits gained to excuse illegal actions. From the Small Sword Society incident, there was an expansionistic movement among the officials and merchants of both Britain and France. The merchants'

trade interests generated this push which, when reaching the consuls, became both a political and a military movement. Foreign consuls were an important factor in the period's imperialistic expansion.

The internationalization of Shanghai after the Small Sword Society incident attracted many wealthy officials and rich merchants seeking refuge in its concessions and for the following 100 years, the concessions were sanctuaries for peaceful enterprise. Coastal concessions became havens for corrupt Chinese officials or unsuccessful warlords who came to enjoy the wealth they had accumulated from bribery or graft.

The cooperation between foreign authorities and Chinese authorities in the lower Yangtze region, especially in the defense of Shanghai, was still remembered some 40 years later when both sides tried to negotiate for another agreement to retain local order collectively. This was the course adopted by the southern provinces during the Boxer Riots of 1900, when foreign troops occupied Taku, attacked Tientsin, and then advanced toward Peking. The situation was similar to that in 1860 when the Anglo-French troops attacked the same cities. The southern areas along the Yangtze were within the realm of British interests and naturally the British did not desire to have riots in the area. Foreign merchants within the Shanghai concessions were alarmed and asked for protection, and therefore, the British consul (Pelham Warren) was obliged to take measures for the safety of the lower Yangtze. In order to protect the Shanghai concessions, he united all foreign consuls and negotiated with the Shanghai taotai. The result was an agreement to maintain peace despite the hostilities in North China. At the same time, the lower Yangtze gentry and officials also succeeded in convincing Liu K'un-i, the governor-general of Liangkiang, and Chang Chih-tung,

the governor-general of Hukwang to extend the terms of the convention over the whole area south of the Yangtze. Later, it extended so far that even Chekiang, Fukien, Szechwan and Kwangtung were under its influence. The whole procedure was then reported to the throne by governor-generals and governors of the respective provinces. Therefore, while the north was extremely disturbed, the south enjoyed general peace. This contrast between north and south, as well as the attitudes adopted by the Chinese and the foreign authorities bore certain similarities to the situation in 1860. In both cases, the commercial interests of foreigners provided the key to the situation.

本篇中文提要

本文討論近代上海發展初期之若干歷史背景，特別就長江下游中國官方借助洋兵防衛上海地區之史實，分析江南地方官紳之願望與活動，英、美、法三國官員與商人在上海租界之因應與企圖，以及外人逐漸捲入戰爭之經過。用以了解上海自1843年對外開關貿易以後二十餘年間，因中國內部戰爭之影響，而發生之急遽變化。此後洋人勢力伸入地方事務，列強在上海逐漸獲取各項特殊權利，而使上海形成一個特殊國際都市。凡此等上海地區之重大改變，均自1853年小刀會事件之發生為起始，且為外人捲入上海地方軍事防務之濫觴。繼後又因1860年代太平軍之數度進攻上海，以致外國軍隊與除役軍人之以各種身分形式參與戰爭，遂益加深列強在上海地方之影響力，而並導致租界內洋人行動之獨立，以開租界脫離中國行政管轄之漸。嗣後不久，終使上海租界完全達於獨立自主之特殊狀態。同時由於列強之造成租界主權之獨立，上海地方政治、經濟、人口重心，也偏移於租界，以使中國固有縣治之上海城廂，殆完全喪失其統治、防務、經濟、商業、外交之主導地位，一反而變為租界之附屬。而後百年來之所謂上海者，無論中外人士，皆莫不以外國租界為主體。此一中國領土內之國際都市，實在中國近代史上扮演極重要角色。本文僅在探討其初始轉變之若干重大關鍵，以備研究上海歷史之參考。