

「新帝國主義」中的逆流： 莎士保理與英國的遠東政策

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摘要

本文討論十九世紀後期西方「新帝國主義」運動下，英國首相兼外交部長莎士保理所持的對華政策。藉此作者欲說明英國對華政策的特殊性（相對於其它強權而言），及其決策形成的背景。文分八節：首節介紹莎氏對中國國家與人民的看法與態度；第二節討論英國在華的商業利益與傳統政策；第三節說明一九八〇年代後期，列強加速對中國權利侵奪時，英國政府內部因不同的對華主張所致的對立；第四節探討莎氏對德俄強索膠州、旅大所持的看法與對策（此即威海衛的租借與香港租界的擴張）；第五節根據莎氏的帝國主義觀念，分析列強瓜分在華「勢力範圍」與「門戶開放政策」的意義；第六節探討拳亂期間英國的對華政策；第七節藉英國對中國藩屬的政策，進一步驗證莎氏對華態度的特點；末節結論，概述莎氏的東方政策之本質。大致言之，莎氏堅持一與眾不同的帝國政策，此即強調和平漸進手段，與間接控制的「非正式帝國」主張。正由於此種近乎獨排眾議的保守自持之外交立場，終使莎氏在殖民競爭的狂潮中，漸失其人民與同僚之支持，而被迫讓出其外交主掌權(1900)，乃至其主政的地位(1902)。此後英國改採積極參與列強權勢擴張的行動，而其霸權的性質乃日益高張。

SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA: LORD SALISBURY AND BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

Wang Shih-tsung

Summary

Three times Prime Minister as well as Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury (1830-1903) was the most important director of British foreign policy during the age of the New Imperialism (1870-1914). His stance in the scramble for the Eastern possessions has often been misunderstood. Focusing on his China policy, this study is intended to analyse and explain how Salisbury viewed the problem of cultural conflict, and how he treated the nationalities issues involved in British imperial expansion in the East. Points of particular emphasis in this article are, 1. Salisbury's understanding of the character of the Chinese nation; 2. Salisbury's views on Britain's trade-centred policy in China; 3. dissension in the Salisbury government about China policy in the late 1890s; 4. Salisbury's response to the German and Russian encroachments upon China after 1897; 5. China's partition into spheres of influence and the formation of the Open Door Policy; 6. Salisbury's position in the Powers' joint adventure in China following the Boxer uprising; 7. British expansion in South-East Asia at the expense of Chinese suzerainty. The author shows that Salisbury's influence had a marked effect on the character of British empire and British ascendancy in regions outside the formal empire; and that British imperialism developed further under Salisbury while keeping in balance the measures necessary to assert British interests and a modified approach to imperial enterprise that took into account alien nationality and native rights.

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Three times Prime Minister of Great Britain (1885-86, 1886-92, 1895-92) as well as Foreign Secretary (1885-86, 1887-92, 1895-1900), Lord Salisbury (1830-1903) was the leading politician responsible for British foreign policy during the age of so-called New Imperialism (1870-1914). His stance in the scramble for the Eastern possessions has, naturally enough, often been misunderstood by the

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victims of Western colonization of the day and their descendants. To take his policy towards China as an example, this study aims to explain, in a broad sense, how Salisbury viewed the cultural conflict between East and West, how he treated Oriental nationality and nationalist aspirations in the areas under British control or influence, and how he directed British policy in the Eastern world at a time when the Western powers and his own colleagues were fervently playing an imperial game unprecedented in world politics. While it is a truism that British imperialism was somewhat liberal in spirit - particularly when compared with French policy, it has not yet been appreciated how far Salisbury succeeded in reconciling the moral and practical demands of Western civilization upon itself with the requirements of power.

The basic tenets of Salisbury's political thinking were generally displayed in his essays and speeches in the 1860s, then to be modified as he came to terms with the marriage of liberalism and democracy in later Victorian Britain. Salisbury was not typical of either party in English politics, being neither conservative in terms of standard Toryism nor conventionally liberal. As a leading Conservative, his opinions clashed with those of other Tories from time to time: in political circles he displayed unusual self-reliance and freedom. Directing British foreign policy, Salisbury achieved what could be expected of an able leader for the protection and advancement of British interests overseas. But it was done in such a way as to make it hard to define him as 'imperialistic' in the sense the term is usually understood.

At the height of popular enthusiasm for imperial enterprises Salisbury stood calm and firm, always assuming a sceptical and restrained attitude towards colonial expansion. It was perplexing, to many, that so reluctant an imperialist as Salisbury should have been engaged himself actively in the international power struggle. His sense of both continuing crisis and of responsibility were the answer. It was this awareness of a long crisis and of his responsibility for the English worldwide privileges that rendered Salisbury second to none in his determination

to defend and further British imperial existence. Again, it was the same sense that inspired his reluctance to accept new commitments, and his preference for indirect control as the principle of imperial domination. Salisbury had as little confidence in the prospects for an empire erected to acquire military glory as he was loath to enlarge the British Empire merely for the sake of doing so. Nonetheless, Salisbury merits the name of imperialist, as it was the abuse of, rather than imperialism itself that he disapproved of.

The Chinese question was put to a severe test under Salisbury's approach towards imperialism, which ended in his fall and a significant change in British foreign policy.

I. THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE AND ITS PEOPLE: SALISBURY'S VIEWPOINTS

It seemed to Salisbury that, for lack of religious fanaticism and bias, the Chinese people were not as hostile to Western culture as the Moslems. Yet in view of the strength of mind bred by an ancient civilization at the farther end of the world, he did not assume that the nationality of the Chinese was more adaptable to Western values than that of the Moslems. He thought that reforms founded upon European ideas were as repugnant to the Chinese as they were to the Mohammedans. In his opinion, an already strong sense of self-assertion in Chinese national character was sharpened by a singular system of civil appointments by way of competitive examinations, which resulted in a selfish officialdom, as opposed to the philanthropy of Christian civilization.¹ Anyway, Salisbury excluded China from his category of civilized nations despite her long history and unique culture, and made no distinction between her and other Oriental countries in his treatment of Eastern nationalities. He thought, as many

¹ Viscount Cranborne (later Lord Salisbury), 'Competitive Examinations', *Quarterly Review* 108 (October 1860), pp. 575-576 and 581; also cf. the same author, 'The New Religious Movements', *Saturday Review* 17 (2 April 1864), p. 406.

did, that the Chinese were a people not easily dealt with, who, like other Oriental nations, would nevertheless submit themselves resignedly to power in its material as well as moral sense. But China was an unusual case in Salisbury's diplomacy. As he told Lord Northbrook, the Indian Governor-General (1872-76), 'China is a very awkward position for us to deal with. She is not sufficiently outside the pale of civilization to be chastised as you chastised the Nagas, and not sufficiently within to pay much regard to the usage of international law.'² The somewhat elusive and intractable attitude of the Chinese towards diplomatic intercourse and their extraordinarily strong anti-foreign feeling led to their being thought occasionally as barbarous by Salisbury. 'Possibly to deal successfully with Chinamen a somewhat Chinese isolation of mind is necessary', he suggested,³ holding that in order to bargain with China, one had to grasp the psychology of the Chinese. Salisbury correctly judged in 1889 that there should be no damaging effect on British consular jurisdiction in China if Britain, yielding to Japanese remonstrations, were to renounce such privilege in Japan. The Chinese authorities, he asserted, were anxious enough to avoid any extended contact with foreigners because, unlike the Japanese, they did by no means crave an equal footing with Western nations, being as self-complacent as considering such a development a decline, rather than an elevation, of their own status.⁴ This, definitely, was a sound understanding of the world view of Chinese traditional politicians. With this understanding of the value of moral authority in the Chinese mind, Salisbury paid much attention to the way in which diplomatic questions were presented to the Chinese Government.

Salisbury had a profound distaste for the belligerence of British officials and

² IOLR, Salisbury Collection: letter books, IOR Neg 11677/3/p.336, Salisbury to Northbrook, 22 October 1875.

³ Ibid., IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 332, Salisbury to Northbrook, 15 October 1875.

⁴ K. Bourne and D. C. Watt eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs* (Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1987), Part I, Series E, vol. 3, 5861/1, 'Provisions for Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction (in Japan)': a memorandum by Salisbury, 19 June 1889.

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merchants in Asia who tended to abuse the prerogatives of Western power and arouse unprovoked conflicts with the natives. Furthermore, in such cases they, by their one-sided allegations, sought to make Cabinets their puppets by taking action in the Far East. Believing the power of the Empire behind them, the British mercantile community in the Far East '[took] pleasure in displaying an insolence which they would not dare to exhibit at home.' 'If these men were left to win their way to wealth by their aptitude for conciliating native feeling, their demeanour would be very different', Salisbury believed.⁵ In his view, a normal and peaceful development of Anglo-Chinese relationship was impossible unless some restraint was imposed upon British officials and traders in China. Salisbury was also a severe critic of British gunboat policy in the Far East. In as early as 1857 he said that Britain had already employed brute force overseas to an extent injurious to her commercial interests, warning that an aggressive character was the most dangerous one Britain could assume.⁶ 'We extort commercial treaties at the sword's point, which are certain to be broken the moment the fleet is out of sight', he wrote in an essay entitled 'The Japanese Difficulty' in 1863.⁷ He argued that in Persia, Burma, and China, the first advances of Britain had been repelled with horror and indignation, because it was felt that Britain had always taken 'the first opportunity of picking a quarrel and encroaching on the rights of the native government.' 'Were the English looked upon by foreign nations as honest traders? No.... Many of those nations looked upon the trade of England as the mere precursor to her dominion', Salisbury remarked.⁸ On the approach to the question of opening Chinese markets for British merchandise, Salisbury concluded that a reputation for honour, justice, and truth would do more to induce the jealous Chinese to open their ports to Englishmen than any demonstration of force and

5 Viscount Cranborne, 'The Japanese Difficulty,' *Saturday Review* 16 (18 July 1863), p. 77.

6 *Hansard*, 3S, vol. 144, 'War in China', 27 February 1857, p. 1541.

7 Viscount Cranborne, 'The Japanese Difficulty,' *Saturday Review* 16 (18 July 1863), p. 77.

8 *Hansard*, 3S, vol. 144, 'War in China', 27 February 1857, p. 1541.

violence Britain might employ against them.⁹

Salisbury maintained that Anglo-Chinese relations should be built upon a friendly footing with all proper regard for the feelings of the Chinese nation. In dealing with the questions between Britain and China he always tried to avoid forcible action which would debase the Chinese Government, as the maintenance of Chinese status in the international community constituted a vital element of his China policy.¹⁰ In 1857 Salisbury as a young backbencher launched a violent attack in Parliament on the piracy of the English merchants who had precipitated the *Arrow* affair in China, which led to the Second Opium War (1857-60). He claimed that the Chinese authorities were justified in considering the British troops buccaneers who, without declaring war, had bombarded Canton and sacked the town. 'In forming our judgement on [Governor Yeh's] conduct we must look at things from his point of view', Salisbury said.¹¹ In July 1860 when the British troops were about to claim victory in the China War, he called the Government's attention to preventing further Anglo-Chinese clashes by strictly controlling combative British officials in the Far East. Commenting on the case of Augustus R. Margary's (a British vice-consul) murder during a British exploration of a Burma-Yunnan route in 1875, Salisbury blamed the jealousy and suspicion of the natives to have been caused by Englishmen's unscrupulous expeditions into Asian countries long before. In a letter to the Viceroy of India, Salisbury cited the observation of the Moslems encountered by an English explorer to Sind in 1834 on the bank of the Indus, 'Ah! now the English have seen our river, conquest will soon follow.' 'That seems a prevalent native idea, not wholly unjustified by experience', Salisbury said.¹² Though he held that Margary's murder should be

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Cf. PRO, F.O. 228/859/p. 28, Salisbury to Walsham, 22 June 1888; and F.O. 228/1303, Salisbury to Bax-Ironside, 15 September 1899.

¹¹ *Hansard*, 3S, vol. 144, 'War in China', 27 February 1857, p. 1540.

¹² IOLR, Salisbury Collection: letter books, IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 226, Salisbury to Northbrook, 9 April 1875.

avenged 'as far as the Peking Government [could] do it',¹³ and that Britain should launch a new expedition if only for prestige's sake, he was very anxious about the violent and overbearing manner of Sir Thomas F. Wade, the British minister to Peking from 1871 to 1883, in negotiating with Chinese officials. In the Indo-Chinese frontier disputes arising from British annexation of the tributary states of China, and in the negotiations on trade in southwestern China, Salisbury always conceded on matters of form, e.g., nominal sovereignty, which, because of their significance for the maintenance of prestige and dignity, the Chinese authorities were especially concerned about. It was Salisbury who sought to dilute the abrupt and uncompromising attitude of the Indian Government towards Chinese claims and urged it to proceed with talks on Tibet and Burma in the late 1880s and 1890s.¹⁴

Salisbury's remarks on Christian missionary enterprise in China featured his sympathetic understanding of Eastern nationality. Addressing a British missionary society in June 1900, when anti-foreign riots were raging across China, Salisbury said, 'You observe that all the people who are slaughtered are Christians. Do you imagine that they are slaughtered simply because the Chinese dislike their religion? There is no nation in the world so indifferent on the subject of religion as the Chinese - it is because they and other nations have got the idea that missionary work is a mere instrument of the secular Government in order to achieve the objects it has in view.'¹⁵ He acknowledged that it was not wholly prejudice on the part of the Eastern peoples if they held that missionaries were but an instrument of

¹³ Ibid., IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 308, Salisbury to Northbrook, 1 September 1875. Also cf. HHL, 3M, D/20/83, Salisbury to Disraeli, 30 June 1875.

¹⁴ Cf. PRO, F.O. 17/1109/p. 112, Foreign Office to India Office, 26 April 1889; F.O. 17/1109/p. 153, FO to IO, 19 July 1889; F.O.539/56/no. 116, FO to IO, 5 March 1892; F.O.17/1150/p. 227, FO to IO, 7 March 1892; F.O.17/1402/p. 92, FO to IO, 15 May 1899. See also Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767-1905* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 193-194.

¹⁵ *The Times*, 20 June 1900, a speech at a celebration of the bi-centenary of the Society for Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, London, p. 10.

imperial invasion, as it was true, and, as he said, it could hardly be avoided that the Powers who were most active in missionary work in the East were also constantly noted for territorial expansion. 'They have a proverb in the East - first the missionary, then the consul, then the general. That, as a matter of fact, has too often been the case', he said.¹⁶ Seeing that the political circumstances in the Far East had changed so tremendously in the nineteenth century that any dispute arising from missionary work was liable to incur political friction, Salisbury urged upon British clergymen the importance of prudence, thoughtfulness and a modest manner in their missions in the Far East. In practice a Foreign Office circular with a memorandum was distributed under Salisbury's instructions in early 1892 enumerating the risks in connection with missionary work in China.¹⁷

Salisbury's policy in China was moderate and conservative, free from aggressiveness and territorial aims. In 1898 he defined his China policy as 'to maintain the Chinese Empire, to prevent it [from] falling into ruins, to invite it into the paths of reform, and to give it every assistance ... to perfect its defects and increase its commercial prosperity.'¹⁸ It was a policy, he believed, of mutual benefit, which, therefore, could be more effectively pursued by persuasion than by coercion. In contrast to the optimism of the British merchants in China, Salisbury

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See PRO, F.O.17/1143/p. 74, Circular with a Memorandum, 2 February 1892. In this memorandum several suggestions are given, such as 'Chinese prejudices and superstitions should be more carefully considered in the form of heights of buildings erected'; 'Any endeavours to combat heathen prejudices and superstitions should be conducted with moderation and judgment'. In a letter to the Queen, Salisbury said, 'The missionaries are often to be condemned, as they do not sufficiently consider how much bloodshed their imprudence may cause.' See HHL,3M,D/87/830, Salisbury to the Queen, 31 December 1891. Clearly Salisbury was aware that conflict between government's policy and Christian missions overseas was all too frequent and hardly avoidable. See A. N. Porter, 'Religion and Empire: British Expansion in the Long Nineteenth Century, 1780-1914', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 20:3 (1992), p. 385. For academic discussion on British missionary work in China, see E. S. Wehrle, *Britain, China, and the Anti-Missionary Riots, 1891-1900* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966).

¹⁸ *The Times*, 30 June 1898, a speech at the United Union, London, p. 10.

considered it impossible and unprofitable for the British to rule the Yangtze Valley directly, or to take the whole of China under their control. The formidable expense needed for defending an extensive frontier on land was, he said, the only real security the Government possessed that Britain would not be driven by her merchants into annexing China.¹⁹ Yet Salisbury realized the enormous potential resistance of the Chinese nationalities. He was of the opinion that China could not but prostrate herself before the Powers as she was militarily weak, but the enormous population, united at all events by a keen sentiment against foreign domination, made the country morally unconquerable. 'If you take a wider view, and look into the future and ask what are the powers of which...China might dispose... you will conclude that... you never could pronounce that 400 million of men who...are the bravest of the brave could ever be absolutely prostrate', Salisbury emphasized in a Parliamentary speech on British occupation of Wei-hai-wei in May 1898.²⁰ The Chinese Government had not the power, if it had the will, to prevent the feeling against foreigners that culminated in outrage; and for the Powers the only way to ward off such outrage was, he asserted, 'by inspiring fear in the very place where it occurred'.²¹ What a laborious task this would be considering the vastness of China.

To the Han people, the predominant ethnic group in China, the Manchu government was an alien rule and, certainly, an undesirable regime whose political title should not survive its physical power. Revolts on a large scale had occurred ever since the defeat of China by British forces in the Opium War. On the question of Chinese revolution Salisbury took a neutral stand. During the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), he was strongly opposed to British intervention for the sake of political gains, saying, 'The most hopeless enterprise of all will be a crusade in the cause of

¹⁹ Viscount Cranborne, 'The Revolution in Japan,' *Saturday Review*, 15 (3 January 1863), p. 9.

²⁰ *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 57, 'Occupation of Wei-hai-wei', 7 May 1898, p. 1516.

²¹ *Hansard*, 3S, vol. 205, 'China - The Tien-Tsin Massacre', 24 May 1871, p. 560.

legitimacy, as represented by the heir of [Emperor] Hsien-Fung,²² China, he believed, was in the agony of a vast revolution, and should be left to her own fate. In the late 1890s when, increasingly, political refugees from China were taking shelter in Hong Kong, Salisbury maintained an attitude of non-intervention regardless of the remonstrations of the Chinese Government. His Indian experience had taught him the impolicy of meddling in civil wars in which Britain had no stake. And, he affirmed, this lesson was to be heeded even more scrupulously farther East.

II. BRITISH COMMERCE AND TRADITIONAL POLICY IN CHINA

The importance of the market of China to industrialized nations in the period of the New Imperialism needs no emphasis.²³ This was especially true of Britain, who enjoyed a great preponderance of trade with China over that of all other powers put together even on the eve of the twentieth century.²⁴ Salisbury held to the belief that British interests in China were thoroughly commercial, not territorial; the postulate upon which Britain had based her policy since the Opium War of preserving Chinese independence and integrity. This policy was essential to the maintenance of British superiority in the Chinese market. And so it was Russia again, who would benefit most from the disruption of the Chinese Empire, that posed the greatest enemy to Britain in China. However incapable and corrupt it appeared, the Chinese Government was, in Salisbury's eyes, worth British support, because it still permitted immense commercial activities. And whenever

²² Viscount Cranborne, 'The Fourth Chinese War,' *Saturday Review*, 14 (26 July 1862), p. 98.

²³ In 1885 when Sir William White expressed his reluctance to take the ambassadorship in Peking, Salisbury wrote to him to call for further reflection. Salisbury reminded him of the vital importance which that mission was assuming, saying, 'The Power that can establish the best footing in China will be master of the great part of the trade of the world.' See HHL, 3M, A/44/31, Salisbury to White, 30 September 1885.

²⁴ See PRO, F.O.17/1357/p. 115, Salisbury to MacDonald, 23 December 1897.

the issue of indemnity demands from the Chinese Government or the question of resorting to a policy of coercion against China arose, Salisbury was careful not to press the country to a point where the stability of the Manchu Dynasty was at stake. Throughout his career Salisbury tried, though unsuccessfully, to keep the Chinese question within the bounds of international commerce, on the basis of a regular diplomatic relationship, and to avoid its complication by the Powers using political means to further their mercantile enterprises in the Far East.²⁵ The commercially oriented character of British policy in China, however, did not necessarily make the objects of British activity in that country more clear-cut, easier to reach, or even less imperialistic; and its means was naturally not more pacific. As Salisbury wrote in 1862, 'We are not fighting to gain territory or to keep it; but we are fighting for that much more impalpable possession which we describe as the Chinese trade. It is the indefiniteness of the task we have undertaken that makes each new Chinese war open so terrible a vista of prospective expense. There is no limit to the obligations which the protection of a trade may not impose upon us.'²⁶ Thus he emphasized that the art of moderation and self-restraint was ever more called for in British China policy.

Railway competition among the Powers became an important feature of the scramble for China after the huge indemnity entailed on China after her defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 had crippled her finances. In 1896 the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Britain called for a governmental guarantee of a Burma-Yunnan railway; Salisbury, always reluctant to build a formal link between official policy and commercial pursuits in China,²⁷ rejected such an

²⁵ Cf. L. K. Young, *British Policy in China, 1895-1902* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 7.

²⁶ Viscount Cranborne, 'The Fourth Chinese War,' *Saturday Review*, 14 (26 July 1862), p. 97.

²⁷ For further discussion, see D.C.M. Platt, *Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.304-5; David McLean, 'Commerce, Finance and British Diplomatic Support in China, 1885-86', *Economic History Review*, 2nd S., vol. 26 (1973), pp.468 & 476; and 'The Foreign Office and the First Chinese Indemnity Loan, 1895', *Historical Journal*, 16:2 (1973), p.321; and A.N. Porter, *Victorian*

application. When urged again by British merchants to render governmental assistance in securing railway concessions from the Chinese authorities in 1898, Salisbury declined once more, and replied that the duty of the British Government in foreign countries was to give protection to British subjects and to see that they were not treated with injustice or illegality, and no more. 'It is not our duty to make railways until we are masters of a country, which could only happen after a successful war. We cannot force the Chinese Government to give concessions', he maintained,²⁸ knowing that the Chinese did not particularly wish for railways. The definition in such negative tones of British policy towards international competition in the Far East undoubtedly disappointed British capitalists grievously. The utmost Salisbury was willing to do was to support China's resistance against attempts by other powers to secure her rejection of British applications for railway construction. In order to avoid further international conflicts over the right to contract to build railways in China, an Anglo-German agreement was signed in September 1898, followed by another one between Britain and Russia half a year later, all in the light of the principle of the spheres of influence. However, Salisbury still stressed, 'The best way of obtaining the construction of railways in China is for independent English companies to produce the capital and ask for a concession'.²⁹ The contrast between Salisbury's passive and sceptical attitude towards the 'policy of conquest by bank and railway'³⁰ and other Governments' active interposition in this enterprise disquieted Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister to Peking (1896-1900), as well as many politicians at home.

In Chinese eyes, the opium trade was the key issue that led to the first

Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1986), p. 281.

²⁸ *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 63, 'Railway Concessions in China', 1 August 1898, p. 655.

²⁹ Quoted in N. A. Pelcovits, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office* (New York: King's Crown, 1948), p. 235.

³⁰ Cf. *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 63, 'Railways Concessions in China', 1 August 1898, p. 657.

Anglo-Chinese War of 1840-42, which resulted in the Treaty of Nanking and subsequent agreements securing for Britain the position of superiority in the China trade. The profit from the export of opium to China constituted a keystone of the revenue of India in the nineteenth century. As this traffic involved the question of morality, opium policy became a test of a politician's sense of righteousness. In dealing with this question Salisbury was governed more by his sense of responsibility as a trustee for imperial interests than by a humane consideration for Chinese welfare. Speaking in the Parliamentary debate on India revenue accounts in July 1866, Salisbury, the then newly appointed Indian Secretary, drew his parliamentary colleagues' attention only to the danger of the opium trade in financial terms, warning that if the Chinese could get their opium elsewhere, the Indian revenue would be ruined.³¹ Aware that the growing of opium had increased largely in China since its cultivation had been permitted by the Chinese Government in 1859, Salisbury particularly concerned himself with the additional provisions to the Chefoo Convention of 1876 which would enable the Chinese authorities to exclude the Indian product by raising the *likin* (a transit tax) on opium to an extent where a protectionist policy could be effected. Indeed Salisbury had hoped that, out of the surplus revenue engendered by the opium trade, the Indian Government would be able to lighten the cotton duties in the country.³² But he did not think that it was practical or possible to tackle the opium trade 'as a philosophical and sanitary question'. 'We must treat it purely as a commercial question', Salisbury argued in his interview with Kuo Sung-tao, the Chinese Minister to London, in 1878.³³ He claimed that prohibition of the drug's

31 *Hansard*, 3S, vol. 184, 'East India Revenue Accounts', 19 July 1866, pp. 1086-1087.

32 IOLR, Salisbury Collection : letter books, IOR Neg 11678/5, Salisbury to Sir J. Strachey, 15 March 1878.

33 PRO, F.O.405/24/no. 19, Memorandum by Salisbury of Interview with Kuo Ta-jen, 2 August 1878; also cf. F.O.405/24/no. 23, Salisbury to Fraser, 17 August 1878. In a private letter, Salisbury said, 'As far as I can form a judgment, the case of opium does not appear to me to differ from that of alcohol in this country, and I am not prepared to prohibit the manufacture or the (sale?) of [it].' See HHL, 3M C/7/447, Salisbury to C. W. Cutis, 13 Feb. 1892. Also cf.

consumption was a responsibility of the native government, not its foreign suppliers, and that the object would not be attained by imposing a prohibitory duty on imported opium.

As to the persistent agitation of the anti-opium organizations in England in the latter part of the nineteenth century, they were not Salisbury's worry. 'I do not think they have any real strength, but like Chinese artillery, they look formidable in the distance', he told Lord Lytton (the Indian Governor-General, 1876-80) in 1878.³⁴ Salisbury's attitude towards the question remained the same in the 1885 Anglo-Chinese negotiations on the opium duty. Yet a feeling of uneasiness, or even a sense of guilt, could easily be detected in his remarks related to the opium trade in China. Therefore, in the trade regulations concluded between Britain and other countries in the Far East, such as Korea and Japan, where Britain did not make a great profit on opium, Salisbury made moves to keep opium on the list of prohibited goods in the tariff, only making an exception in favour of its medical use.³⁵

III. DIVIDED OPINIONS OF BRITISH POLITICIANS ON CHINA POLICY IN THE LATE 1890s

The enormous gains of Japan and the intervention of three Great Powers (Russia, Germany and France) in the cession of Liao-tung Peninsula following the defeat of China in the 1894-95 war sparked an intense scramble for China and a series of Far Eastern crises, which diverted the diplomatic interest of Western Powers from Africa and the Near East to China. This was the inception of a new era of imperial competition in the Far East, to which Salisbury, owing to his feelings against colonialism in China, failed to respond to good purpose by taking

ibid.,C/7/421, R.T. Gunton to Ms. Mehl, 19 March 1891.

34 IOLR, Salisbury Collection : letter books, IOR Neg 11678/5, Salisbury to Lytton, 8 March 1878.

35 Cf. PRO, F.O.262/433/p. 162, Salisbury to Plunkett, 12 November 1885.

steps in time. Although a new and separate department was added to the Foreign Office in Salisbury's last ministry to meet the growing importance of Far Eastern affairs, he adhered to Britain's traditional stand over the Chinese question in its new phase. When he again took over office as both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in June 1895, Salisbury considered the most important task in the government's China policy to improve Anglo-Chinese relations, which he saw were poisoned by Britain's pro-Japanese attitude at the close of the 1894-95 war.³⁶ Regardless of the agitation of those in favour of a forward policy in the Far East, Salisbury maintained that China should not be treated on a level with other nations in the East because of her special political circumstances and cultural existence. 'We cannot possibly have over the internal government and military administration of China the same influence which we have over India, that we conquered by the sword, or over Egypt, of which the government by the sword has been placed at our command', Salisbury declared in 1898.³⁷ He exhorted his countrymen to be content with what Britain had achieved in China, and warned them of the danger of overtaxing the resources of the nation by endlessly expanding their Empire in the Far East. Salisbury indeed was against the tide of imperialism in the Chinese arena at the turn of the century and, consequently, against the current of British public opinion regarding China policy.

Salisbury's cautious reaction to Russia's moves of expansion in north China, which culminated in the occupation of Port Arthur and Talienwan in March 1898, was viewed as a policy of concession by some imperially minded politicians, for whom Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary (1895-1903), was a spokesman. A heated debate in Parliament on Salisbury's foreign policy took place on 10 June 1898, in which his proceedings in China were severely criticized by both the opposition and some jingoist members of his own Party. On the other hand,

³⁶ Memorandum by Salisbury, no date, quoted in Lady G. Cecil, 'Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury', unpublished vol. V, pp. 258-259.

³⁷ *The Times*, 30 June 1898, a speech at the United Union, London, p. 10.

Chamberlain's views on the Chinese question, which had been boldly presented in his Birmingham speech a few weeks before, also became the target of several MPs' attacks in the debate.³⁸ Assuredly, strong overtones of racism in the disposition of Chamberlain made him an opponent of Salisbury's China policy. Along with the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury (1895-1902), who took charge of foreign policy in Salisbury's absence for reasons of health, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1885-86; 1895-1902), Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for War (1895-1900), Lord George Hamilton, the Indian Secretary (1895-1903), the Admiralty, and a number of government officials also felt inclined to support a vigorous and positive policy in the Far East.³⁹

Besides Parliament the pressure groups, e.g., The China Association (formed in 1889) and the Manchester mercantile bodies, as well as the press, such as *The Times*, swayed British public opinion towards Far Eastern policy during the late 1890s. Salisbury simply could not ignore their demands. 'I agree with you', he wrote to Chamberlain after the Germans had occupied Kiaochow and Russia had demanded the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan in late 1897, 'that "the public" will require some territorial or cartographic consolation in China. It will not be useful and it will be expensive; but as a matter of pure sentiment, we shall have to do it.'⁴⁰ The heavy pressure on Salisbury adopting measures in respect to China was reflected by an MP's observation in 1898, 'I think that Lord Salisbury...has allowed himself to be influenced too much by newspapers and by his

38 See *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 58, 'Supply - Debate on Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy', 10 June 1898. Also cf. HHL, 3M, A/106/25, Salisbury to MacDonald, 19 May 1898. In this private letter Salisbury said, 'The version of Mr. Chamberlain's speech is plausible but malignant and unfair.'

39 For further discussion see J. D. Hargreaves, 'Lord Salisbury, British Isolation and the Yangtze Valley, June-September 1900', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 30 (1957), pp. 70-71.

40 Quoted in R. Taylor, *Lord Salisbury* (London: Penguin, 1975), p. 190.

colleagues',⁴¹ a judgement that is not likely to be the conclusion of any well-informed study of Salisbury's political thought. Public criticism of the Government's inactivity in the Chinese question aggravated the split in the Cabinet and strengthened the desire for aggressive action. An impression of two policies in China grew in British minds.

It was the controversy over the Government's policy in China that led to the decline of Salisbury's political influence and the disunity of British foreign policy in the Far East during the late 1890s and early 1900s, and helped to end Britain's comparative isolation in a troubled world. As far as Salisbury had control of the Cabinet, or, in plain terms, whenever his failing health would not force him to hand over his office for recuperation in France, a forward policy in China stood no chance of being implemented. Yet it was because of this stand that the Conservatives' confidence in, and British public esteem for the Prime Minister were gradually diminishing. The defining features of Salisbury's imperial thinking were more clearly displayed against this background.

IV. THE SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA: SALISBURY'S RESPONSE

The indemnity loans to China after her defeat in the Sino- Japanese war interested all the Powers vying for financial influence in the country. At first Salisbury refused to take any anticipatory steps for the bid. It was MacDonald who propelled Britain into the struggle. Yet after 1897 the competition for the loans intensified and became increasingly politicized, since it appeared identical with the scramble for spheres of influence. Therefore, during negotiation over the third indemnity loan, Salisbury was forced to demand a number of concessions from the Chinese Government as compensation for the 'affront' that would be caused by a

⁴¹ Comment by Mr. Labouchere. See *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 58, 'Supply - Debate on Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy', 10 June 1898, p. 1368.

rejection of the British loan offer, or as the price for British help.⁴² These included free inland navigation, cession of territory required for a railway from Burma to the Yangtze Valley, first refusal by the Chinese Government to any other Power's demand concerning that valley, and occupation of Chusan - all for the sole purpose of a formal recognition of Britain's privileged status in the Yangtze Valley. 'These things China must grant if she accepts the loan from Russia, and, if she refuses, we shall take them', he wrote to MacDonald in January 1898.⁴³ His insistence on the assignation to British banks of an adequate share of the loan was surprisingly rigid, which was an exception indeed in Salisbury's policy towards the Chinese. This was partly caused by his anxiety to avoid any appearance of Britain's exclusion from the transaction: that would affect the existing balance of influence in China. Therefore Salisbury was not decidedly averse to the idea of sharing the loan with Russia.

Salisbury refrained from any radical reaction to the Kaiser's occupation of Kiaochow in November 1897, as he saw no harm done to British interests in China. And, knowing that the Germans would not give way because of British intervention, he did not want to kindle the struggle for Chinese territory by demanding a corresponding compensation for Britain.⁴⁴ Of course, Salisbury was aware of the aggravated imperial competition for territorial acquisitions in China since the Sino-Japanese war. That was inevitable, as he recognized, but more distasteful to him was the savage means for achieving it which would leave an unpleasant impression on the Chinese mind even more harmful than the material loss they would suffer. He said in January 1898, 'The mode in which the purpose

⁴² PRO, Cab. 37/46/29/no.1, Salisbury to MacDonald, 28 December 1897; and F.O. 17/1338, same to same, 1 February 1898. For detailed discussion, cf. L. K. Young, *British Policy in China 1895-1902* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 62-64.

⁴³ PRO, F.O.17/1338, Salisbury to MacDonald, 28 January 1898.

⁴⁴ Salisbury wrote in a minute, 'If they (the Germans) stay where they are, they will act as an irritant to Russia but would not hurt us: but...if they go to Foochow we ought to obtain compensation at Chusan.' See PRO, F.O.17/1330, Minute by Salisbury, 18 November 1897.

of Germany had been attained impressed me more unfavourably than the purpose itself. The Russians had acted up to this point with perfect correctness. I was wholly unable to pay the same compliment to Germany.⁴⁵ It had been suggested that Britain should take Chusan or ask for additional territory for the Hong Kong colony to defend English interests in southern China. To this view Salisbury was opposed; still devoted to the principle of Chinese integrity, he preferred a promise of non-alienation by the Chinese Government as the safeguard for British commercial supremacy. Despite the pressure of British public opinion, he determined that no counteraction should be adopted by Britain on the ground of the most-favoured-nation clauses in the Treaty of Tien-tsin (26 June 1858) unless other Powers should take further steps towards annexing Chinese soil.

It was Russia who took the next step forward by squeezing from China the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan in March 1898. To Salisbury, Russia's move involved great political consequences of international importance: it indicated the commencement of 'the division of the cake'. This certainly really disgusted him. He said, 'Of course the Russians have behaved abominably and if it would be any satisfaction to my colleagues I should have no objection to fighting them.'⁴⁶ Yet Salisbury had no objections to Russia's plan of obtaining an ice-free harbour on the Chinese coast provided it rested on bilateral agreements with China rather than on force. As to insistence on stipulations for that port to remain open to international trade, he was irresolute.⁴⁷ But the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan meant over-stepping the mark. Russia's control of Port Arthur, commercially insignificant but as a military port conspicuously close to the Chinese capital, posed questions of a different order. 'The occupation of Port Arthur... would

⁴⁵ PRO, F.O.405/76/no. 36, Salisbury to Lascelles, 12 January 1898.

⁴⁶ Lady G. Cecil, *Biographical Studies of the Life and Political Character of Robert Third Marquis of Salisbury* (privately published, no date), p. 58.

⁴⁷ In a letter to MacDonald dated 17 January 1898 Salisbury said, 'You are not bound to insist on making Talienwan a Treaty port if you think it impracticable, though we should give it up with regret.' See Cab.37/46/29/no. 33.

inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and a commencement of the partition of China', Salisbury pointed out, worrying that the Russians' example would be followed by other Powers.⁴⁸ And he warned the Chinese Government that if the port was ceded to Russia, Britain would be compelled to acknowledge China's acquiescence in the dismemberment of her empire, and that it would be useless henceforth for Britain to shape her own policy or to influence that of other Powers towards preserving Chinese integrity.⁴⁹ Russia's immediate response to the Kiaochow incident in the form of a corresponding occupation had made the demand for a compensatory acquisition for Britain too forceful for Salisbury to neglect. Salisbury opposed a war with Russia over the lease of Port Arthur because Britain could not afford to quarrel with Russia at a time when an Anglo-French conflict in the Upper Nile was in sight, which resulted in the Fashoda Crisis half a year later, exactly as he had predicted.⁵⁰ With the British Government's grave protests being ignored and its proposals rejected by St. Petersburg, Russia's triumph at Port Arthur had become a humiliation of British pride. Therefore, if only for the sake of Britain's prestige or moral influence in the East, Salisbury had to make a move. As he pointed out to the House of Commons, 'It was most important that, not only in Chinese opinion but in Korean and Japanese opinion also, we should not be thought to have been throwing up the game in the neighbourhood of those territories which lie near Port Arthur.'⁵¹

Without alternatives open to him, Salisbury resorted to the occupation of Wei-hai-wei as a counterweight against Russia's control of Port Arthur, and as a lookout post for the Germans in Shantung. Much like Salisbury's acquisition of Cyprus, Wei-hai-wei was held by Britain on the understanding that it would be

⁴⁸ PRO, F.O. 405/76/no.364, Salisbury to O'Connor, 22 March 1898. Also cf. F.O. 405/76/no. 398, same to same, 24 March 1898; and F.O.405/76/no. 435, same to same, 28 March 1898.

⁴⁹ HHL, 3M, A/106/23, Salisbury to MacDonald, ? March 1898.

⁵⁰ Lady G. Cecil, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵¹ *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 57, 'Occupation of Wei-hai-wei', 7 May 1898, p. 1518.

returned to China, despite the twenty-five year lease, as soon as Russia gave up Port Arthur. He told MacDonald in March 1898, 'If we obtain satisfactory assurances as to...our Treaty rights by Russia, we have no wish, under existing circumstances, for special rights at Wei-hai-wei ourselves, since the obligation of occupying it would be a costly one. We should prefer...an engagement...by China of the type of the Agreement [of non-alienation] respecting Chusan.'⁵² The request for the lease of Wei-hai-wei, on the same terms as those granted to Russia for Port Arthur, was made mainly out of political and military rather than commercial considerations, as Wei-hai-wei was unlikely to be an important inlet to the Shantung market. To all intents and purposes, the occupation of Wei-hai-wei clearly contravened the avowed policy of Britain in China. Moreover, in the British people's eyes, Wei-hai-wei was of little value to their country, and Salisbury's countermeasure fell short of redressing the balance. Salisbury stretched his laboured argument for the importance of Wei-hai-wei and the significance of the British occupation in China's favour, but failed to move even his confidants, among whom MacDonald, for example, was in favour of a punitive policy in view of China's bad faith on the question of foreign loans because of Russia's threats, while Chamberlain pressed for the possession of some great city in the interior on the Yangtze River.⁵³

In Parliamentary debates on the occupation of Wei-hai-wei Salisbury claimed that the Government's policy had been pursued in full consideration of its effect upon the mind of Eastern peoples, and that the act was in the interests of all nations concerned for the independence and integrity of China. He argued,

'What China wants is courage, and one of the defences of the occupation

⁵² PRO, F.O.405/76/no.280, Salisbury to MacDonald, 12 March 1898. In another letter to MacDonald dated 7 March 1898 Salisbury said, 'The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese, to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to Germany.' See F.O.17/1362/no. 55. Also cf. F.O.17/1338, Minute by Salisbury, 22 March 1898.

⁵³ HHL, 3M, A/92/35, Memorandum by Chamberlain, 16 August 1898.

of Wei-hai-wei is that it had a tendency to strengthen China against despair, and to give her courage...to stand up against her enemies. The danger of allowing the occupation of Port Arthur to take place without any corresponding movement on our own side was that China, or, at all events, large classes of Chinamen, would give themselves up to despair, and believe that the domination of one foreign Power was a destiny from which it was impossible for them to escape.’⁵⁴

This remark reminds one of his arguments for the British occupation of Cyprus some twenty years earlier. Much as then, Salisbury had now acted in a bid to frustrate the attempt of any power to obtain complete predominance, this time at Peking. According to his point of view, China herself was also a beneficiary, if not immediately, under the British scheme. This, however, was by no means shared by the Chinese people, who saw the British as their major enemy. Yet in his assessment of the impact of the British policy Salisbury did pay attention to the moral aspect of its repercussions on the native people. Intentionally, he left the administration of the inhabitants in Wei-hai-wei to the Chinese authorities. Salisbury maintained that, as regarded the manner in which the leased territory was to be treated, the precedent of Cyprus should be followed: it should not be dealt with as part of the British dominions like Hong Kong. When the instructions for drafting the Wei-hai-wei Order in Council were under consideration, Salisbury cautioned that to incorporate the territory in the British dominions would set a bad example to other Powers who held leased territories in China. During the period of the Boxer uprising he warned the Colonial Office not to attempt any administrative change at Wei-hai-wei; he ruled out the suggestion of abolishing, forcibly, Chinese jurisdiction in the city of Wei-hai-wei, and the proposal for extending the leased territory.⁵⁵

Salisbury explained the necessity of the acquisition of the New Territories

⁵⁴ *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 57, ‘Occupation of Wei-hai-wei’, 7 May 1898, p. 1517.

⁵⁵ PRO, F.O.228/1340, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 22 October 1900.

only in terms of strategic safety for Hong Kong, which had come into question after the French had occupied Kwangchow Bay to the South. In fact the extension of the Hong Kong colony had long been requested by British China merchants and diplomats. In his original instruction to MacDonald on the extension of the colony, Salisbury referred only to the territory south of the line from Deep Bay to Mirs Bay. But the Admiralty successfully revised the demand to include the area north of the line. To avoid disturbing the domestic and civil organization in the New Territories, Salisbury himself had merely taken the precautions necessitated by the defence of the position of Hong Kong. Moreover, according to the Convention of 9 June 1898, the Chinese officials now stationed in the city of Kowloon were permitted continued jurisdiction.⁵⁶ However, the Colonial Office did not share Salisbury's view that the administration of the inhabitants in Kowloon had better remain in Chinese hands as long as it corresponded with the military requirements for Hong Kong's safety. After a series of clashes between natives and British settlers in the colony following the demarcation of the newly leased territory in 1899, the Chinese officials were finally expelled from the Kowloon government.

V. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

The chain reaction sparked by the German lease of Kiaochow of squeezing concessions from China had by mid-1898 resulted in a new political map of China, drawn up by spheres of influence of the Powers. A phrase invented after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, aimed to facilitate future occupation and, actually, partition of the African continent, 'sphere of influence' as an imperial approach was applied in China more thoroughly than in Africa, Turkey or elsewhere. Salisbury's distaste for the partition of China was demonstrated by his emphasis

⁵⁶ PRO, F.O.17/1450/p. 312, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 10 December 1989.

upon the distinction between a 'sphere of influence' and a 'sphere of interest'.⁵⁷ It was the latter that Salisbury advocated as the solution to the confrontations between the Powers in China since he understood that a division into spheres of influence involved a possible partition of territory. Arising out of sundry new ideas of modified and limited possession in what might philosophically be called the diplomatic evolution during the late nineteenth century, the term 'sphere of influence' had come into general use in the 1890s, particularly when the Chinese question was concerned. 'We talk now not only of "protectorates", but also of "spheres of influence". It is a very odd metaphor. I do not know exactly how you get into the sphere of influence.... It is a right over countries which does not involve for the present the duty of undertaking the regular government, but which establishes that the quasi-independence of those countries must, at all events, be recognized by other civilized Powers', Salisbury commented in 1894.⁵⁸ To Salisbury, a sphere of influence was a quasi-protectorate. 'Influence, if it be excessive and constant, is veiled conquest', he pointed out.⁵⁹ When the scramble for China was at its height, he instructed MacDonald, 'You should not recognize that any nation has, as of right, a sphere of influence in China, as Her Majesty's Government have never done so.'⁶⁰ However, Salisbury's perception of 'spheres of interest', which was first openly proposed in 1898, was open to censure in Parliament because it was liable to invite the creation of a number of spheres of exclusive interest in China to the detriment of British treaty rights.⁶¹ Reluctantly

⁵⁷ Cf. C. J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1879-1902*, vol. I (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 229.

⁵⁸ *Hansard*, 4S., vol. 25, 'Uganda', 1 January 1894, pp. 148-149.

⁵⁹ Viscount Cranborne, 'Poland,' *Quarterly Review* 113 (April 1863), p. 470. It has been pointed out that Salisbury treated spheres of influence and protectorates as the same. See W.R. Johnston, *Sovereignty and Protection: A Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1973), p. 320.

⁶⁰ PRO, F.O.405/76/no. 104, Salisbury to MacDonald, 29 January 1898.

⁶¹ Cf. *Hansard*, 4S, vol. 58, 'Supply - Debate on Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy', 10 June 1898, pp. 1390-1395.

Salisbury gave in and adopted the notion of sphere of influence when most of the Powers had already claimed their special and exclusive rights in China. But soon afterwards the 'Open Door' policy was formally proposed by the United States at the instigation of Britain as a remedy to international tension caused by the creation of the spheres of influence.

In Salisbury's view, China was the only battleground where Britain could 'attack Russia with effect'.⁶² Yet in the late 1890s Salisbury had been mindfully cultivating the friendship of Russia, Britain's most formidable foe in the Far East, with an eye to preserving the independence of China. For this reason he had embraced a restrained attitude towards Russia's aggressive activities in Manchuria during the Boxer uprising. In June of that year he wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote (MP for Exeter, son of Lord Iddesleigh), 'When [Russia's] Siberian railway is ready, she will want to be mistress of the greater part of China: and if Afghanistan is unprotected she can force us to give way in China by advancing upon India.'⁶³ As the expansion of Russian influence in China grew with the progress of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Salisbury could do no more in the interests of Britain in China but to curb Russian encroachments by means of an understanding based upon the principle of 'spheres of interest'. From this standpoint, the Anglo-Russian (railway) agreement of April 1899 was a victory for Salisbury as it confined Russia's influence to the region north of the Great Wall. But his attempt in early 1898 at the establishment of a general understanding on China failed to inspire Russia's sympathy. This was partly because Salisbury would not go far enough to make it worthwhile to the Russians by raising the question of territorial partition. In fact he even avoided using the term 'spheres of influence' in his proposition: what he actually referred to was the probability of 'a partition of preponderance', while he insisted on the maintenance of existing

⁶² HHL, 3M, A/44/31, Salisbury to White, 30 September 1885.

⁶³ Salisbury to Northcote, 8 June 1900. Quoted in J. A. S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy* (London: Athlone, 1964), p. 296.

treaties and Chinese integrity.⁶⁴ The fact that Salisbury was much more worried by Russia's territorial ambition regarding Manchuria than jealous of her commercial gains in the north made an Anglo-Russian understanding on China appear highly possible but considerably limited as well.

In the late 1890s Salisbury, in view of the Powers' encroachments upon Chinese territory, was set to support a 'liberalizing' movement even at the sacrifice of some British preferential rights there. 'Now a free port is much better than a Treaty port', he said in February 1898.⁶⁵ Reacting to Russia's lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, Salisbury instructed the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote (ambassadorship 1893-1902), to call for the United States' cooperation in opposing any action by the Powers which would threaten to restrict the opening of China to the commerce of all nations.⁶⁶ To him the significance of the Open Door policy lay in its effect of changing the Powers' spheres of influence into spheres of interest. As the whole policy was explained to mean equal rights and opportunities for all nations in China, including Britain of course, regarding matters of industrial or commercial enterprise, this would not be attained if certain spheres of influence were agreed upon.⁶⁷ Under the scheme each of the Powers were to declare their sphere of interest respectively, reserving free trade and China's right to taxation, thereby weakening their claims to a strict sphere of influence, although their privileges and advantages were intact under the new system of spheres of preponderance. Since Britain controlled a sphere of influence in China larger than any other Power, it appeared to some politicians in London that the Open Door policy was to Britain's disadvantage. Chamberlain, for example, argued for a policy of 'open door for concession' instead of 'the open door for trade', pointing out, 'If all nations have equal opportunities of gaining

⁶⁴ PRO, F.O.405/76/no. 88, Salisbury to O'Connor, 25 January 1898.

⁶⁵ *Hansard*, 4S., vol. 53, 'Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech', 8 February 1898, p. 41.

⁶⁶ Cf. PRO, Cab.37/46/29/no. 149, Salisbury to Pauncefote, 7 March 1898.

⁶⁷ HHL, 3M, A/92/35, Memorandum by Chamberlain, 16 August 1898.

concessions all over China it is probable that this country would have for many years to come four fifths at least of such concessions.... In fact we are "exchanging" our present situation in which we have nine tenths of the trade of the whole of China for one in which we are not likely to have more than nine tenths of the trade of Central China.'⁶⁸ Although the Open Door policy assumed the appearance of a commercial understanding, it was, for Salisbury, directed at a political agreement as to the maintenance of the independence of China. In effect, the equality of commercial opportunity, which rested on the ground of treaty rights, could not be realized without an independent China. Judged by results, the declaration of the Open Door principle was another success of Salisbury's diplomacy in the Far East, and a victory for the cause for indirect imperialism.

VI. THE BOXER UPRISING: BRITAIN'S STAND

The Russian ambition to occupy Peking worried Salisbury more than any other danger during the Boxer uprising in 1900. Russia, not China, seemed to him the greatest menace of the time. The Boxers' grisly anti-foreign rampage did not modify Salisbury's stand over the Chinese question or even alter his attitude towards the Chinese nation.⁶⁹ In Salisbury's eyes they were a mere mob - not representative of the whole population and easy to handle. He tended to take a stand similar to that of the United States and refrained from regarding the situation as that of a war with China.⁷⁰ In contrast to the impetuous and violent action of the Powers, notably Germany and Russia, Salisbury's cautious posture was described as a 'hands-off' policy by the Chairman of the China Association, who urged the necessity for a special mission to China, such as Lord Elgin's (the British negotiator for trade agreements with China and Japan, 1857-60) in the Second

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Cf. HHL, 3M, A/86/27, Memorandum by Salisbury, 2 August 1900.

⁷⁰ HHL, 3M, A/84/116, Salisbury to the Queen, 5 July 1900.

China War.⁷¹ The measures he took during the Boxer upheaval were actually more in response to the Russians than to the Chinese. He was of the opinion that if Russia showed signs of an intention to occupy the Chinese capital, Britain should take some important part of the country simultaneously as a counter-balance to any force subversive of Chinese independence.⁷² Under such circumstances Salisbury only reluctantly agreed to participate in the joint military operation of the Powers, which he called a 'Concert of Europe in China'.⁷³ Not only did he want to keep a free hand for dealing with the said crisis, but he endeavoured to prevent Britain from aggravating the chaos by taking strong measures, which was the policy of the allied forces. Thus, Britain's action, he told MacDonald, could not but be affected by the action of the Chinese Government and in some degree the other Powers.⁷⁴

Contemplating the settlement of the Boxer disturbance, Salisbury said Li Hung-chang, the Chinese omniscient negotiator, 'must be the best judge of the risk, as he knew his own countrymen better than I did'.⁷⁵ He hoped that the Boxers could be pacified by Li's influence rather than suppressed by the Powers' forces. It disgusted him when the Powers threatened to destroy the tombs of the Manchu monarchy as a tactic for bringing the Chinese court to terms. He also objected to launching a long expedition in pursuit of the Chinese troops and fugitive Emperor. His response to MacDonald's recommendation for British troops in addition to those now under orders being sent to China was an abrupt rejection in a somewhat reprimanding tone.⁷⁶ The British Minister's proposal to occupy Shan-hai-kwan, the main passage to Manchuria, was again ruled out by the

71 BL, Bertie Papers, Add MSS 63014, Chairman of the China Association to F. Bertie, 22 July 1900.

72 PRO, F.O.405/92/no. 179, Salisbury to MacDonald, 7 June 1900.

73 PRO, F.O.17/1417/no.58, Salisbury to MacDonald, 22 May 1900; and F.O.17/1418, Minute by Salisbury, 21 May 1900.

74 PRO, F.O.228/1339, Salisbury to MacDonald, 22 June 1900.

75 Ibid.

76 See PRO, F.O.405/94/no. 302, Salisbury to MacDonald, 26 August 1900.

Prime Minister. Salisbury was also strongly opposed to the suggestion that, for the purpose of maintaining order, the Powers should jointly establish a central government in China without regard for the condition or the intentions of the Peking authorities. These negative responses by Salisbury to the proposals for a forward policy in China did not spring from a cynical attitude towards imperialism, but from his consistent respect for Eastern nationality, although, needless to say, he would not sacrifice British interests into the bargain.

Salisbury had tried to settle the problem ensuing from the Boxer storm in a way that would involve thorough consultation of Chinese opinion prior to punitive demands that were inevitably made upon the Chinese. Before those responsible for the turbulence were identified, the Germans drew up a plan for punishing the trouble-makers as a prerequisite for the opening of negotiations. Salisbury denounced this policy which would delay the restoration of order in China. He went on to comment, 'We have no proof whatever that it will be in the power of the allies to inflict the punishment which these offenders deserve.'⁷⁷ Although there was little doubt that the Dowager-Empress, who was the actual ruler of China at the time, was the principal author of the calamities, Salisbury hesitated to prescribe an adequate punishment for her, apprehending such a move to result in the destruction of all government in the country. He did not desire to change the Chinese system of government forcibly, nor the people's customs along with it. In a Parliamentary statement of the Government's policy in China on 2 August, 1900, Salisbury declared that the future government of China, whether directed from Peking or decentralized, had to be Chinese, and should never be a European administration; nor should Chinese troops be reorganized under foreign officers.⁷⁸

In October 1900 Salisbury and Count Paul von Hatzfeldt (1831-1901), the German Ambassador, came to an arrangement upholding the principle of commercial freedom in China and the territorial integrity of the country. The

⁷⁷ PRO, F.O.405/95/no. 212, Salisbury to Lascelles, 25 September 1900.

⁷⁸ PRO, F.O.405/94/no. 39, Salisbury to Pauncefote, 4 August 1900.

agreement, which, like the John Hay Note, was being communicated to the other Powers involved to invite their support, renounced all attempts on the part of any of them to take advantage of the present crisis in China for the purposes of further territorial acquisitions.⁷⁹ The Anglo-German Agreement of 1900, or the Yangtze Treaty as it is commonly known, was, however, not an indication of Salisbury's abandonment of the spirit of an Anglo-Russian understanding on China, but symbolic of the ground gained by the pro-German party in the Cabinet.⁸⁰ The circumstances created by the Boxer uprising put to a severe test the Powers' adherence to the Open Door policy. It constituted an even more severe test of the self-discipline of contemporary leaders of imperial powers on the matter of territorial expansion, as literally the Open Door declaration simply spoke of commercial equality. Taking a step further, the Anglo-German initiative was, in Salisbury's conception at least, to be established as a bulwark against territorial imperialism in China. As the principles recorded in the agreement were identical with the policy so far pursued by Britain in the Far East, Salisbury meant to bring the policies of the Powers into line with that of Whitehall. With this in mind, he firmly objected to the German proposition of limiting the Open Door principle to the basin of the Yangtze; he insisted on a declaration in reference to all Chinese dominions so that Shantung and Manchuria, the spheres of influence claimed by Germany and Russia respectively, should also be subject to the rule. However, the wording of the agreement did not fully meet Salisbury's expectation because of the German intention to make it agreeable to the Russians. It had become in his eyes a vague declaration, open to interpretation. Though dissatisfied, Salisbury

⁷⁹ For details of the agreement as finally settled see PRO, F.O. 405/96/no. 138, Salisbury to Count Hatzfeldt, 16 October 1900; for content of the draft agreement see F.O.405/95/no. 211, Salisbury to Lascelles, 25 September 1900.

⁸⁰ For details see George Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963), pp. 14-20. In the view of the German Government, Salisbury was an obstacle to an Anglo-German understanding over China. See BL, Bertie Papers, Add MSS 63014, Minute by Bertie, 5 September 1900.

came to terms with the Germans in the hope that he might thus effectively avoid a joint move towards partitioning north China between Germany and Russia.

VII. BRITISH EXPANSION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA: THE EFFECTIVE END OF CHINA'S SUZERAINTY OVER HER TRIBUTARIES

The nineteenth century had seen three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824-26; 1852; 1885) which culminated in the annexation of all of Burma on 1 January, 1886, twenty-three years after Lower Burma had formally been ceded to Britain. Salisbury came under pressure of English public opinion in favour of a forward policy towards the eastern neighbour of India when he first assumed office as the Indian Secretary in 1866. Yet in an effort to ease or, to some degree, divert the strong course of the westward advance policy, he was disposed in favour of a more vigorous India policy regarding its eastern boundary. He wrote to Sir John Lawrence, the Indian Viceroy (1864-69), in 1866, 'I have no anxiety for Afghan acquisitions. When the hour strikes for extension in the opposite direction - for absorbing Burma - I shall hear of it without regret. But to the westward we have gone quite far enough - perhaps too far.'⁸¹ Salisbury did not think an extension of British influence on Burmese frontier undesirable if it could be obtained peacefully. He was far from wishing for another Burmese war for diplomatic ends despite the bellicose sentiments of Anglo-Indians, though for reasons of prestige he strongly felt that Britain could not afford to tone down before the Burmese, however slightly, on Indo-Burmese affairs.⁸² He told Northbrook after Margary's murder in 1875, 'Our policy [in Burma] is [to] avoid war if you can: but if you are

⁸¹ IOLR, John Lawrence Collection, MSS Eur F.90/27/no. 42, Salisbury to Lawrence, 19 November 1866.

⁸² IOLR, Salisbury Collection: letter books, IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 290, Salisbury to Northbrook, 6 August 1875.

forced into it, let it be the last Burmese war.’⁸³ Burma policy was a part of Britain’s India policy, but in a way it was an extension of British policy in China, which was also influenced by British views of India. Salisbury said in 1885, ‘Our interest in Burma is entirely Indian, and our interest in China nearly so: the India Office view should therefore prevail.’⁸⁴ Burma, exclusive of her value as a new market for British goods, was of no great importance in Salisbury’s view. Still, with the object of preventing any power from obstructing the communication between British Burma and China, he maintained that the British, without taking the responsibility of ruling the Burmese, should manage to wield a paramount influence on the Mandalay Government which controlled the upper part of former Burma. Skilful diplomacy, he believed, would do all that was necessary for this purpose without involving Britain in any embarrassment or causing large expenditure. This should include control of the succession to the Burmese throne, as well as the procurement of a stipulation such as was found in several of the earlier Indian treaties, viz., that the king of Burma ought not to employ Europeans, especially for military purposes, without British approval.⁸⁵

When Salisbury took charge of the India Office in 1866, the principal task he faced in implementing Britain’s Burma policy was to open a route connecting British Burma and south-western China, and, if possible, to build a Burma-Yunnan railway. On the issue he held that it should be done with the full assent of the native governments interested, and that the most effective form in which their assent might be given was the deputation of accredited agents to accompany the expedition.⁸⁶ Emotionally, Salisbury was against the making of the road; nor did

⁸³ *Ibid.*, IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 281, Salisbury to Northbrook, 22 July 1875. In 1879 he wrote to Cranbrook: ‘I think you will have to take Burma. As a matter of political convenience I should prefer to postpone it till after the general election: but I doubt whether you will have the choice.’ See HHL, 3M, D/29-30/123, 3 September 1879.

⁸⁴ HHL, 3M, D/15-19/134, Salisbury to Churchill, 24 November 1885.

⁸⁵ IOLR, Salisbury Collection: letter books, IOR Neg 11677/3/p. 296, Salisbury to Northbrook, 18 August 1875.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, IOR Neg 11671/2, Salisbury to Lawrence, 2 October 1866.

SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA: LORD SALISBURY AND BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

he wish to commit the Indian revenue to its construction. But in order to answer the importunities of the mercantile bodies at home with ascertained facts lest they should force upon the Indian Government much more active steps in this matter by way of a Parliamentary resolution, he did by no means want the exploratory work to be carried out in a perfunctory manner.

Apart from the apprehension of an undesirable development of Burma's internal condition that was brewing, King Thibaw's (the last king of Burma, 1878-85) introduction of the French powers into his country as a countercheck to English influence in early 1885 had actuated Britain to take a peremptory measure in respect of Burma.⁸⁷ On the eve of the Third Burmese War Salisbury compared the relationship of Britain to Burma to that existing between France and Tunisia,⁸⁸ which was conquered in 1881 and made a protectorate by the French. Negotiations began between Britain and China, the suzerain of Burma, soon after the British Minister informed the Tsungli Yamen of Burma's absorption, as the British Government had promised before the war. Concerned for the rights of China as well as the commercial relations between Britain and that country, Salisbury was willing to preserve the tributary system in Sino-Burmese relations; he was willing, even, to enthrone a new king of Burma on that basis, although he saw that to do so would contradict British Indian practice.⁸⁹ In his opinion, the points in dispute in the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over Burma were mere matters of form on which Britain could make concessions without any ill effects. The initial agreement, however, was overturned following the fall of the Salisbury ministry in early 1886. The Liberal Government only consented to the payment of tribute by Burma to China in exchange for Peking's recognition of British sovereignty over the Burmese conquest.

Salisbury's policy in Siam was, again, that of indirect imperialism while

⁸⁷ Cf. HHL, 3M, A/44/7, Salisbury to Walsham, 8 September 1885.

⁸⁸ PRO, F.O.17/1059/p. 252, Salisbury to Lyons, 19 October 1885.

⁸⁹ PRO, F.O.17/1060/no. 9, Salisbury to O'Connor, 12 January 1886.

commercially oriented. It was moderate, not extremely expansionist. In contrast to the wishes of Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and Balfour, he set himself against the idea of assuming protectorates or sovereignty over Siam and the Malay states. The ultimate object of Salisbury's policy in South-East Asia was to establish 'independent protected states' in place of the despotic monarchies there. Under the arrangement, absolute rights of internal government were to remain with native rulers while their foreign policy would be carried out through the medium of Britain. But in his opinion this was feasible only if such a step excited no anti-English feelings among the Siamese people, nor consequently precipitated an embarrassing Franco-Siamese agreement. The object of a limited protectorate was but to strengthen and consolidate Britain's vested rights over these countries, and to secure international recognition of those rights.⁹⁰ As in China, economic interests were all Salisbury wanted to safeguard in South-East Asian states, whose political independence, he stressed, was to be supported to Britain's advantage. On this understanding, when the question of the payment of tribute by Siam to China was revived by Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs (1863-85; Director, 1885-1908), in 1885 after three decades of interruption, he shared Hart's opinion that Siam should be encouraged to resume the homage. After Britain and France had come to terms on the question of Siam in 1896, Salisbury held that, in the interest of the country's tranquillity and administrative efficiency during the period of transition, the Siamese Government should not be urged to recruit too large a proportion of its officials from any one European nation, especially not from the two dominating Powers in Siam. Apart from the question of temporary precaution, however, this was, he insisted, a matter which ought to be left to the native authorities' discretion in accordance with their own ideas of reform. As to the question of the Siamese boundary, Salisbury envisaged that a solution by means of a general statement on the part of

⁹⁰ PRO, F.O.572/21, Minute by Salisbury - 'Borneo Protectorates', 6 March 1888; and F.O.69/136, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 29 March 1889.

the Powers concerned, viz., Britain and France, would be quite unjustifiable and should not lead to any good: he maintained that it could only be determined in communication with the Siamese Government itself. The somewhat domineering manner in which the Indian Government treated the settlement of the frontier between Burma and China and that of Siamese boundary gravely worried Salisbury.

Salisbury was favourably inclined to the arrangement for the neutralization of the Valley of the Menam, by which he hoped an independent Kingdom of Siam, with well-defined frontiers, would be established. For this purpose he was keen to reach a reciprocal arrangement with France ensuring the maintenance of Siam within her existing limits. The idea entertained by many contemporaries that the Anglo-French Convention of 15 January 1896 was merely a veiled partition was absurd as far as Salisbury was concerned. He definitely had hoped that this agreement, which provided additional security for the heartland of the Kingdom, would 'give the Siamese the strength and confidence required for... the development of Siam to the full scope of her position and her rights.'⁹¹ The Convention defined the spheres of influence of Britain and France in Siam, but it also pledged their support for the Kingdom's independence by way of mutual restraint from further territorial expansion and the acquisition of exclusive interests. Furthermore, following the example of engagements into which Britain had entered with other South-Eastern Asian countries, Salisbury concluded a secret agreement with the Siamese Government the following year, in which Britain recognized Siamese suzerainty over south Malaya in return for the promise that Siam would not cede territory or privileges in these states to other nations without British consent.⁹² As a result, even though Siam lost territorial influence

⁹¹ PRO, F.O.17/1293/p. 185, Salisbury to Mr. de Bunsen, 22 January 1896. Also cf. F.O.17/1270/p. 1, same to same, 13 August 1895; and HHL, 3M, A/119/55, Salisbury to M. de Courcel, 29 November 1895.

⁹² For detailed discussion see I. Klein, 'Salisbury, Rosebery, and the Survival of Siam', *Journal of British Studies* 8:1 (1968), p. 138; and J. Chandran, 'Britain and the Siamese Malay States,

to the British in Burma and Malaya and the French in Laos and Cambodia in the nineteenth century, she still kept her independent status in the Second World War.

In extending British imperial rule to South-East Asia, 'the Mysore policy' (the policy of indirect rule), as Hicks Beach called it, was one to which Salisbury adhered with remarkable consistency. Native states, similar to those in India, were preserved under British dominion there for the same reasons: if the advance of Western domination was inevitable, as it plainly was, the East should be left with as much autonomy and dignity as possible. The destruction of self-government in the Orient would benefit nobody, leaving instead a demoralized population which, because of its vast size, the West would never be able to assimilate successfully. As Salisbury advised Viscount Cranbrook, the Indian Secretary (1878-80), on Burma in 1879, 'It certainly ought to be in our hands: though of course we ought to commit no act of aggression.'⁹³ Pacific invasion in an Eastern country was the policy: dominating it while preserving its distinct identity was the philosophy.

VIII. CONCLUSION: SALISBURY AND THE EASTERN MIND

In pursuit of British imperial interests, Salisbury was outwardly determined but acutely aware of the inherent moral conflicts. It is intelligible that the sense of cultural superiority was not absent from the mind of Salisbury, who, up to a point, was a believer in Darwinism, in both its scientific and social definitions. He was not doubtful about the value of British imperial expansion for the general progress of human civilization. Salisbury was, of course, an imperialist, but a reluctant and evidently a troubled one. He understood that the expansion of Europe was

1892-1904', *Historical Review* 15:3 (1972), p. 475. For further discussion on the Siamese question, see V. G. Kiernan, 'Britain, Siam, and Malaya, 1875-80', *Journal of Modern History* 28 (1956); and his 'The Kra Canal Projects of 1882-85: Anglo-French Rivalry in Siam and Malaya', *History* 41 (1956).

⁹³ HHL, 3M, D/29-30/123, Salisbury to Cranbrook, 3 September 1879.

inevitable, but, taking into account the rights and feelings of Eastern nations, he endeavoured to reduce his country's impact on the peoples subjected to British control and influence. Hence his preference for the generally peaceful invasion affected by informal empire; hence, too, his promotion of reform programmes based on European values in Oriental countries. This was the nature of 'Salisburian imperialism'. So far as British domination in the East was concerned, Salisbury favoured native rule and indirect control, in contrast to many who were in sympathy with imperial enterprise. A humane and disciplined spirit distinguished him from most imperialists in the nineteenth century. However, it was not necessarily apparent or appreciable to the parties involved or to his contemporaries, at all events, because, as he well knew, while it is possible, in argument, to distinguish between sympathy with objects (end) and sympathy with policy (means), the two tend to be confused, not to mention the fact that the colonial victims were certainly inclined - and sometimes justified - to think of all the imperialists as of the same ilk.

Reform based on the values of modern (if Western) civilization was the thing that Salisbury wanted the rulers of all Eastern countries to act upon for the good of political progress and human welfare. It was not a purely selfish policy with only the benefits to the great powers in view: it would also be helpful to the future independence of Oriental states from European influence, as was to be exemplified by the cases of Egypt, India and Japan. For the purpose of advancing such an undertaking, however, European employees in superior places were, he asserted, indispensable, a factor which Salisbury thought was accountable for the improvement of the Egyptian situation and the failure of the reforms in China.⁹⁴ The 'civilizing mission', however, should never be so forcible or imperative as to destroy the national character of the ruled. And, moreover, he was not always optimistic about a victory of Western civilization over Oriental minds, in the short

⁹⁴ HHL, 3M, A/32/9, Salisbury to Layard, 25 June, 1878.

term or in the long run. He wrote in 1882, 'It is very curious how entirely Eastern minds subjugate a Western mind when they establish any hold over it. I know more than one case of Indian Resident who has become the mere creature and instrument of the prince he is sent to control.'⁹⁵ Believing that institutions were the embodiment of nationality, Salisbury maintained a cautious attitude towards the transplantation of civilization, or the Westernization of Eastern communities; and he envisaged that attention would 'be far more usefully directed to persons than to paper institutions' in any scheme of Asiatic reform.⁹⁶ Denationalization or conversion by force was particularly to his abhorrence.

Japan is an example of the balance of realism and right in Salisbury's treatment of Eastern nationality. After a successful programme of Westernization under the Meiji Emperor (1867-1912), which brought about a spectacular victory over China that won Japan her recognition as a world power in 1895, Japan entered Salisbury's category of civilized nations in world politics. Japan had hence become the first effective force of resistance to European imperialism in the East, and later a competitor with Western powers.⁹⁷ As such, the rise of Japan was a good case for examining Salisbury's treatment of Eastern nationality in the light of the consistency of policy. Salisbury was an unsparing critic of Britain's policy of forcing trade on the Japanese ever since their isolation policy had first been broken by the United States in 1854. British policy in Japan was, in his view, overbearing, exacting and devoid of consideration of the Japanese people's feelings. In 1863, when Japan was suffering from revolutionary agitation, Salisbury warned against the thought of taking the opportunity to make further acquisitions. He cautioned that it would be dangerous for Britain to invite more European competition. If that country was made a British dependency, he said, it

⁹⁵ HHL, 3M, D/46-49/181, Salisbury to Lady John Manners, 26 December 1882.

⁹⁶ HHL, 3M, A/32/9, Salisbury to Layard, 25 June 1878.

⁹⁷ For discussions on Salisbury's Japan policy in terms of global politics, see Nigel Brailey, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: the Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', *Historical Journal* 35 (1992), p. 115 ff.

would become the most burdensome and turbulent dominion of the British Empire because of the extreme difficulty of subduing the stubborn natives.⁹⁸ Thus he hoped for a self-sustaining Japan that would be strong and stable enough to frustrate her enemies' designs. This was exactly what he expected of China as well. In principle Salisbury dealt with the Japanese nation in the same way as he treated other Eastern peoples throughout his political career. His respect for the Japanese achievement undoubtedly helped to weaken his resistance to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, the beginning of the end of Britain's semi-detached position in international politics which he had striven to maintain. It was nevertheless clear that Salisbury's regard for Oriental nationality transcended a feeling of pity for the weak or a sentiment of admiration for the strong.⁹⁹

When the world was marching towards a new era of international integration, between Western powers as well as between East and West, force could no longer be resorted to as freely as before for imperial ends. Reflecting on British imperialism in the East and anticipating its future at the beginning of the twentieth century, Salisbury warned, 'In the last generation, we did much what we liked in the East by force or by threats; by squadrons or tall talk. But we now have "allies" - French, German, Russian: and the day of free, individual, coercive action is almost passed by. For some years to come Eastern advance must largely depend on payment: and I fear that in that race England will seldom win.'¹⁰⁰ Moreover, in his

⁹⁸ Viscount Cranborne, 'The Revolution in Japan,' *Saturday Review* 15 (3 January 1863), p. 9. That Japan, once conquered, could be easily held against foreign invasion by a maritime power was, he stressed, rather a danger than an advantage to Britain tempted by further imperial acquisition.

⁹⁹ The rise of Japan in the 1890s did not result in a supposedly preferential treatment of the Japanese people by the Salisbury Government in its policy towards Eastern nationalities; neither did Japan become a more favoured nation than other Asian countries in the foreign relations of the British Empire. For instance, in the Colonial Acts of 1897, which regulated the immigration of foreigners into Australia and New Zealand, the Japanese were classed on the same level with the Chinese and other Eastern nations. See PRO, F.O.46/548/p.62, Salisbury to Mr. Lowther, 1 September 1897.

¹⁰⁰ Curzon Papers, F112/223-225, Salisbury to Curzon, 23 September 1901. Quoted in Premen

view, imperialism could seldom be justified by a simple appeal to force.

Although Salisbury was usually well-informed about the state of affairs in the East, it must be said that his observation of Eastern minds was, generally speaking, not particularly acute. Natural as it seemed, he often tended to regard the whole Eastern world, as opposed to the West, as a homogeneous society, failing at times to discern the delicate distinctions of culture between the several independently developed civilizations, and the differing extent of their development. In his eyes, as in others', there existed not a single truly civilized nation in the East, where revolution was needed for modernization (or, so to speak, Westernization) in the fullest sense. Eastern nationality often appeared strange to him, too. He considered the character of Asians to be elusive, capricious, and full of dissimulation; to him they were jealous, suspicious and revengeful. Nevertheless, his respect for Eastern nationality was rooted in reason and Christian morality; it did not fluctuate with international politics or his personal experience, nor was it compromised by his depreciation of the values of Orientals. This spelt out the statesmanship in Salisbury in an age of violence in the history of European expansion.

Abbreviations

BL British Library (the Department of Manuscripts)

HHL Hatfield House Library (private library of the Marquis of Salisbury, Hatfield)

3M = the Papers of the Third Marquis of Salisbury

IOLR India Office Library and Records

PRO Public Record Office, Kew, London

F.O. = Foreign Office

Hansard Hansard's Parliamentary Debates

Addy, *Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard: the Making of British Policy towards Lhasa 1899-1925* (Calcutta: Academic Publishers, 1984), p. 140.

撫順煤礦的發展，1907-1931

陳 慈 玉

摘 要

撫順煤礦的發展與日本對華的侵略史息息相關，也可以說是典型的日本對華直接經濟性投資，並且是由具「國策」性質的南滿洲鐵道株式會社所經營。在九一八事變以前，其發展過程除了內在的因素外，和當時東北的經濟演變情況有關，更與日本經濟及其政策相關，當時世界情勢的變化亦對此礦業發生影響。在 1907-1916 年的草創期中，撫順煤礦當局致力於設備的改善和技術的革新，並逐步使生產作業電氣化，亦從事新市街、宿舍和醫院等的建設，以期奠定永續經營的基礎。1917-1920 年的成長則主要歸因於蓬勃的東北內銷市場，這是由於第一次世界大戰對東北工業帶來的劃時代變革，亦即俄國資本工業的沒落，和日本資本以及華商資本工廠的勃興，於是當地鐵路、油坊、煉瓦、燒鍋、紡織、柞蠶絲、火柴和製糖等工業對煤炭的需求增加。撫順煤礦當局因而開鑿新坑，以求滿足消費市場。到 1920 年代，隨著日本工業發展和煤炭需求增加，成長中的撫順煤礦成爲日本進口煤的主要來源，但日本爲了保護本國業者，只得限制撫順煤的進口量。於是撫順煤轉而開拓中國本部和東南亞市場，以事彌補。而滿鐵所經營的鞍山鐵礦，由撫順供給燃料和原料焦炭，其所產生鐵和鐵礦石是當時日本鋼鐵業不可或缺之物。總之，二十世紀初期，原本只是日本糧食和肥料供給地的東北，隨著時間的流轉，逐漸扮演日本本土資源（煤）和重工業原料（生鐵）的補給站的角色。爲了達成此任務，滿鐵當局曾花費心血，引進新技術和設備，使此中國傳統的礦業，能在不斷的嘗試錯誤中蛻變。