

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT FROM U. S. A. *

By SAMUEL C. CHU

In this year of observing the 90th anniversary of the conclusion of the first Sino-Japanese War, historians and specialists outside China, agreeing with those in China, acknowledge its importance in the history of China and Japan. Speaking primarily for those working in the United States of America, I would say that they might not completely agree with their Chinese counterparts in seeing the exact contours of modern Chinese history, from the Opium War to the present, in quite the same way, but they certainly do regard the war as marking a sharp turning point in the course of that history.

First, it marked the end of the period of the Self-strengthening Movement. While reform efforts continued and even intensified after the war, their nature changed substantially. Thereafter reforms took on a more political tinge, broadened its base considerably among the emerging public sector, and had as its primary purpose the upgrading of the nation rather than the preservation of the dynasty. The key figures of the Self-strengthening Movement, such as Li Hung-chang, having been disgraced by their failure in the war, were also replaced by another type, such as K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

Secondly, the war was a turning point because it ushered in an even more intensive period of imperialist aggression. The last vestiges of China's strength and respectability were stripped away. In an era when might makes right, China's inability to perform credibly against an enemy so seemingly limited as the Japanese removed the last element of constraint from the voracious appetites

* This article, and my longer study of the Sino-Japanese War and its antecedent Self-strengthening Movement, owes a great deal to the works, and the direct help, of many, to whom grateful acknowledgement has been long overdue. For this article I would like to single out especially the following: Kuan Chieh, Ch'i Ch'i-chang, Sun Ke-fu, Thomas Kennedy, Richard Smith, John Rawlinson, Wang Erh-min, Bonnie Oh, Peter Cornwall, Kwang-ching Liu, Ichiko Chuzo, Silas Wu, Hankyo Kim, Mathew Gardner, Thomas Robinson, Chang K'ai-yuan, Hsia Tung-yuan, T'ang Chih-chun, Li Tsung-i, and many others, to whom specific mention will be made in later works. For assistance with Japanese materials I am indebted to James Morita and James Bartholomew.

among the Powers toward China. Led by Germany, but quickly followed by England, France, Russia and the United States, China was so nearly parcelled out in 1897-98 that her mere survival as a nation-state was called into question⁽¹⁾. The Boxer Uprising failed to eradicate the foreign menace in China. In fact, by the failure of the Boxers, China came perilously close to losing her sovereignty altogether. It was only the mutual greed and jealousy of the Powers which kept China from being completely partitioned. Japan took an active role among the Powers despoiling China. Therefore the War also marked the start of Japan's course of expansion, which in the subsequent half century saw her rise inexorably to be the leading aggressor in China⁽²⁾.

Finally, scholars abroad recognized the critical importance of the War of 1894 because it initiated the era of revolution, which culminated in the Revolution of 1911. Sun Yat-sen and his fellow revolutionaries had little respectability and less support before the war. The Ch'ing dynasty still had enough vestige of legitimacy and residue strength to command general allegiance. Even Sun himself, as demonstrated by his long letter to Li Hung-chang, conceivably might have been coopted by the reformers (and the revolutionary movement, which arguably would have arisen eventually, would have been delayed thereby)⁽³⁾. More fundamentally, the trauma of the unexpected loss to Japan decidedly changed the minds of a significant number of the scholar-gentry class, one of the traditional pillars of support for the dynasty. The maverick scholar-gentry Chang Chien is the most obvious example, but others of his type were also motivated by a new sense of patriotism to work for fundamental change. When the dynasty failed to satisfy them, they threw

(1) The classic study of the diplomatic aspects of the war, using only western language sources, is William L. Langer's *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, 2nd ed. (1956), Chapter 6, pp. 167-194. Still useful is an even earlier work, Hosea B. Morse's *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1918), vol. 3, chapter 1. For the Japanese side of the complex moves leading to war, nothing is more revealing than Mutsu Munemitsu's remarkable memoir, *Kenkenroku*, written in 1896, immediately after the war. In 1982 Gordon Berger brought out a fine annotated English translation of this work (Princeton University Press/Japan Foundation).

(2) See Shumpei Okamoto's "Historiography of the Sino-Japanese War: the Japanese View," in *International History Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1979), pp. 205-214. Most Japanese writings on the war in recent decades are of the neo-Marxist persuasion.

(3) Sun's long communication to Li Hung-chang, containing a comprehensive program of reforms, can be found in *Wan-kuo Kung-pao* 萬國公報 (edited by Young J. Allen), October and November 1894 issues.

their weight against the survival of the Ch'ing⁽⁴⁾.

For these and other reasons, there is no question that scholars abroad, even before the recent upsurge of interest among scholars in China, have long acknowledged the importance of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Yet, there has been little solid work done on the War itself. It seems almost ludicrous to acknowledge that the single best western language account of the war remains that of Vladimir (the pseudonym of Zenon Volpicelli, himself obscure), *THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR*, published in London in 1896. The naval aspects of the war, long the best known part from western sources because of the professional interest of naval academies in other countries, and the fortuitous presence of a number of foreign participant-observers, have been treated in John Rawlinson's *CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR NAVAL SUPREMACY* (1967). There is nothing comparable on the war on land, although Stanley Spector's *LI HUNG-CHANG AND THE HUAI ARMY* (1964) is of some use for the period prior to the war. In fact, there is now increasing attention placed upon China's efforts to build up her military capabilities. Thomas Kennedy's *THE ARMS OF KIANGNAN* (1978) and his several articles are an important body of work on China's armament industry. Similarly Richard Smith, the author of *MERCENARIES AND MANDARINS*, a study of the Ever Victorious Army, has gone on to write a series of articles on the modernization of the Chinese army in the 1870's and 1880's⁽⁵⁾. On the war itself, however, we have only a slim volume by Jeffrey Dorwart with the curious title *THE PIGTAIL WAR* (1975). The title is not inappropriate, for clearly Dorwart's main interest is in the American reaction to the war, rather than on the war itself. It conveys accurately the relatively low degree

(4) On Chang Chien, see Samuel C. Chu, *Reformer in Modern China, 1853-1926* (Columbia University Press, 1965).

(5) Vladimir (Volpicelli, Zenone), *The China-Japan War: Compiled from Japanese, Chinese and Foreign Sources* (London, 1896); Rawlinson, John L., *China's Struggle for Naval Development: 1839-1895* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Spector, Stanley, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century Chinese Regionalism* (Seattle, 1964); Kennedy, Thomas L., *The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860-1895* (Boulder, Colo., 1978). Among Richard J. Smith's works, the most relevant is "Foreign Training and China's Self-strengthening: the Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873," *Modern Asian Studies* (October 1976), pp. 83-111. Smith also has an unpublished paper on military education in the 1880's, some of which findings have been incorporated in Chapter 4 (jointly authored by Smith and Kwang-ching Liu) of *Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, 1980), vol. 11. Another of Smith's unpublished papers also incorporated in part in *CHC* chapter is "The Military Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95" (1978).

of official U.S. interest in the war, a few active individuals notwithstanding, and the general degree of ignorance and disinterest toward the war on the part of the American public⁽⁶⁾.

What is the reason for this clear neglect of such a key historical event? The first and most obvious reason is the lack of adequate sources. Today the few scholars who have looked into the foreign sources on the war in archives overseas are forced to recognize that the war simply did not generate the kind of detailed coverage in western countries as in Japan⁽⁷⁾. That is why the new work being done in China today is so important. Until more Chinese documents are made available, such as those found in CHUNG-JIH CHAN-CHENG (CJCC)⁽⁸⁾, and more monographs and articles published, scholars abroad will always be handicapped by their lack of sources⁽⁹⁾.

An equally important reason for the neglect of the war is the fact that other topics both before and after the war have drawn scholars' attention away from it. One of the main topics preceding the war is the entire late 19th century Ch'ing effort to recover from the near-fatal blow of the Taiping challenge. The importance of this so-called "China's response to the West," in both diplomatic and intellectual sense, has been challenged by scholars abroad of late, but it still remains an important and attractive subject for study⁽¹⁰⁾. Even more work has been done on key events following the war. The 1898 Reform, the Boxer Uprising, the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, and the intertwining and then sharply competing histories of the rise of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),

(6) Dorwart, Jeffrey M., *The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Amherst, Mass., 1975).

(7) On the matter of lack of sources, see Samuel C. Chu, "Historiography of the Sino-Japanese War: the Chinese View," in *International History Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1979), pp. 194-204.

(8) The full citation of CJCC is *Chung-Jih Chan-cheng*, 中日戰爭 edited by Shau Hsün-cheng, 邵循正 7 vols. (Shanghai, 1956).

(9) Some basic Japanese source collections and studies of the war are: Fujimura Michio 藤村道生, *Nisshin sensō* 日清戦争 (Tokyo, 1973); Nakatsuka Akira 中塚明, *Nisshin sensō no kenkyū* 日清戦争の研究 (Tokyo, 1968); Nippon Kaigun Gunreibu 日本海軍軍令部, *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen kaisen shi* 明治二十七/八年海戦史 (12 vols.) (Tokyo, 1905; Nippon Rikugun Sambo Hombu 日本陸軍參謀本部, *Meiji nijūshichihachinen Nisshin senshi* 明治二十七/八年日清戦史 (8 vols.) (Tokyo, 1904-1907). See Okamoto article in *International History Review*, cited above, for comments on some of these and other works.

(10) On challenges to "China's response to the West," see Paul Cohen's *Discovering History in China* (N. Y., 1984), especially pp. 9-55.

especially the success of the latter draws much attention. By contrast the War of 1894 seems merely a beginning, important only because it led to these other fundamental events, and thereby neglected for itself⁽¹¹⁾.

We might add one additional reason, even if it is less important than the above two. All historians work with some internal viewpoints and personal predilections. Scholars of Chinese history in the U. S. tend to study those events which relate to Western relations to China, or something fundamentally important to China herself such as the rise of the KMT and CCP (which of course also had implications of western connection, through Sun Yat-sen and Marxism respectively). Therefore a war between China and Japan tended to be less highly regarded. Obviously they do not see it as one which the West, and the U. S. in particular, is primarily involved.

If the scholars abroad wish to contribute to the understanding of the Sino-Japanese War, in what way can they do so? I believe there are several ways, which up to now have not been taken up, for reasons I have already cited. I myself am trying to approach it through the following ways, mostly having to do with military preparedness and battle performance. In this way, the war is linked logically with those aspects of the Self-strengthening Movement preceding it which have to do with the search for national security through military upgrading. It also has less to do with certain other aspects of the war which are currently preoccupying most of the scholars in China.

Specifically, the topics I am interested in are: Chinese perception of Japan and intelligence gathering, the improvement of weaponry, training and recruitment of the officers, command structure and the lack thereof, and finally, broad strategies and specific tactics. Underlying all this is the implicit, sometimes explicit, comparisons with China's adversary, Japan, in all these specific aspects.

First, perception and intelligence. It has long been known that on the eve of the war the Chinese leadership took Japan lightly. The question remains, however, why this was so, and whether the Chinese leadership had adequate sources of information. In a chapter entitled "China's Attitudes

(11) In contrast to the relative neglect of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 has been treated much more fully in western languages. See the bibliography in Shumpei Okamoto's *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (N. Y., 1970), pp. 307-318.

toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War," in the book *THE CHINESE AND THE JAPANESE*, I have argued that there were deepseated reasons why the Chinese regarded the Japanese so lightly, and that reliable information on Japan was not totally lacking but that it was not used⁽¹²⁾. Here it remains only to summarize my points.

The Chinese had traditionally regarded Japan with either indifference or contempt. The overwhelming bulk of the Ch'ing leadership was far more concerned with the traditional domestic aspects of government (peace preservation, tax collection, adjudication of serious judicial disputes, regular administration, and the like) than dealing with foreigners. Of the handful that were concerned, the so-called Self-strengthening faction, their preoccupation was primarily toward the western powers, England, Russia, France, even to some extent toward the United States, and little toward Japan. The outstanding exception to this generalization was Li Hung-chang, who, in spite of his personal weaknesses and public mistakes, was generally more farseeing than his peers. In short, the Chinese leadership as a whole neglected Japan, regarding her as a lower order of tributary states (although technically Japan never paid tribute to China) and of no great danger to the Chinese. As the year 1894 approached, the major bureaucratic preoccupation of Ching officialdom was the forthcoming celebration of Empress Dowager Ts'u-hsi's sixtieth birthday⁽¹³⁾. One must admit that, given the order of priorities in political affairs at the time, not to mention Ts'u-hsi's well-known personal vanity and greed, it was only to be expected that most of the officialdom naturally regarded the proper celebration of her birthday as of the greatest political importance.

A corollary question has to do with China's source of information on Japan. The conventional interpretation is that China had little information

(12) See Samuel C. Chu, "China's Attitudes toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War," *The Chinese and the Japanese*, edited by Akira Iriye (Princeton, 1980). The standard work on Chinese in Japan remains Saneto Keishu 實藤惠秀, *Meiji Nisshi bunka Kōshō* 明治日支文化交流 See also Wu Wei-ming 吳偉明 "Yao Wen-tung: i-ke pei i-wang-liao te Ch'ing-mo 'Jih-pen t'ung'" 姚文棟：一個被遺忘了的清末 '日本通' (Unpublished paper, Ta-lien Conference, September 16-20, 1984).

(13) There are many entries on Tz'u-hsi's birthday preparations in the *Shih-lu* 實錄. The Palace Archives collection in both Taipei and Peking contains other items not published in the *Shih-lu*. See also *Wan-Ch'ing Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao* 晚清中日交涉史料, 15 #1777.

about Japan. I submit that this is not quite accurate. China did have information on Meiji Japan's development in general, and her growing armed strength in particular, but that did not make much difference. The basic problem was the failure of the Chinese leaders to make use of what information they had. Granted that a number of Chinese reports evaluated the Japanese army and navy rather cavalierly. The newly-formed army was largely made up of peasant recruits, and even the most informed of Chinese officials had low opinions of peasants as soldiers. Apparently there was little awareness of the upgrading of Japan's officer corp. As to Chinese estimation of the Japanese navy, it was reported to be made up of "primarily small, wooden ships, solely for defense." Admittedly these reports were filed in the decade of the 1870's, before the critical years of rapid naval buildup following 1885. Still, the Chinese persisted in such estimation of Japanese strengths, right up to the outbreak of the war⁽¹⁴⁾.

But to return to my main contention here, even if the information were accurate and up-to-date, the Chinese in all probability would have benefited little from it. For outside Li Hung-chang there seemed to be no one at Court who was paying any attention to reports filed from the Chinese mission in Tokyo, the source of most of the intelligence. In the documents debating the pros and cons of going to war with Japan, there is not a shred of evidence that the decision-makers were basing their arguments on anything other than preconceptions of Japan.

Wartime intelligence is of a quite different order than pre-war information gathering, but here too the Chinese were deficient. No systematic network of communications were set up in the war zones, and between the front and the rear. Li's command post remained in Tientsin, and reports from the front and order thereto routinely took several days to transmit, largely because telegraph lines did not reach the key points. One example was the debate which went on in establishing a temporary telegraphic terminal at Ching-chou,

(14) On China's knowledge of Japan, see Chu article in *The Chinese and the Japanese*, pp. 82-88. See also the longer study of the Chinese mission in Tokyo, Jen-hwa Chow, *China and Japan: the History of Chinese Diplomatic Missions in Japan, 1877-1911* (Singapore, 1975). In contrast to the general ignorance of the Chinese toward things Japanese, the latter gathered increasingly accurate data on China's military capabilities as war approached. In the National Diet Library today can be found a number of these specialised works, starting in 1880 with *Rimpō heibi ryaku* 隣邦兵備略 issued by the War Ministry, and compared that with *Shinkoku gumbi soran* 清國軍備總覽 published in 1894.

the Liao River, but no effective use of this one exception was made before the need for it was rapidly overrun by events⁽¹⁵⁾. One surmises that when the command power was stripped from Li and placed on successive others, Prince Kung and later Liu Kun-i, communications between Peking and the fronts were possibly even worse, since Li at least had the experienced Sheng Hsuan-huai, the long-time director of the Chinese Telegraphic Service, acting as the de-facto quartermaster general and communications chief.

One persistent historical question relating to information and communications has been answered. During the war, and for years afterwards, there was a belief that the Japanese had access to Chinese information, so uncanny was their response to the Chinese diplomatic and military initiatives⁽¹⁶⁾. The suspicion arose widely that Japanese spies had infiltrated into the Tientsin headquarters⁽¹⁷⁾. That is still a possibility, but I am convinced that the Japanese had already broken the Chinese telegraphic code even before the war began. Thus in China's diplomatic efforts, especially during the crucial negotiations for a peace treaty at Shimonoseki, the Japanese had an enormous advantage. This fact alone is insufficient to explain China's dismal performance on the battlefield, since the relatively primitive communications system used by the Chinese, mostly messengers and occasionally telegraphic reports to the rear, did not always employ the elaborate code used in overseas communications. Nevertheless, the Japanese breaking of the Chinese code was the most obvious example of the generally superior communications advantage the Japanese had, as contrasted with the Chinese.

Turning from intelligence to weaponry, I rely heavily on the solid monographic work done by Thomas Kennedy. His book, THE ARMS OF

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- (15) On telegraphic operations at Chin-chou, see *Chia-wu Chung-Jih chan-cheng* (*Sheng Hsuan-huai tang-an tzu-liao hsüen-jichih san*) 甲午中日戰爭 (盛宣懷檔案資料選輯之三 (上) (Shanghai, 1982), p. 140.
- (16) On the Japanese breaking of the Chinese secret code, see Lü Wan-ho 呂萬和 "Chia-wu chan-cheng chung Ch'ing cheng-fu ti mi tien-ma shih chen-yang pei p'o-i ti," 甲午戰爭中清政府的密電碼是怎樣被破譯的 *Li-shih chiao-hsueh* 歷史教學 (1979 no. 6), p. 68. This short piece makes the most convincing case on what has been debated by scholars for years. See also Yamabe Kentarō 山部健太郎, "Gaiko bunsho to angō" 外交文書と暗號, *Misuzu*, no. 39 (June, 1972), pp. 25-30.
- (17) On Japanese spies in China before and during the war, see Sun K'e-fu 孫克復 "Chia-wu chan-cheng yu Jih-pen₁ chien-tieh," 甲午戰爭與日本間諜 *Li-shih chih-shih* 歷史知識 (1984, no. 4), pp. 10-11, and Chi'i Ch'i-chang 戚其章 "Jih-pen tieh-pao huo-tung yu Chia-wu chan-cheng" 日本諜報活動與甲午戰爭 (Unpublished paper, Ta-lien Conference, 1984).

KIANGNAN, is the best single monograph in any language in analyzing the growth and problems of China's premier ordinance unit. If China were to bring herself up to comparable levels of preparedness in military hardware as her enemies (and in the minds of Manchu Court these potential enemies included both domestic rebels and western powers, not just Japan alone), then the course of Kiangnan's development is all important. We must clarify one other point. By the latter 1880's the establishment of the Tientsin Arsenal meant that weapons of the Huai Army units stationed in the north were henceforth to come primarily from the Tientsin Arsenal and not from Kiangnan⁽¹⁸⁾. Still, all other arsenals, Tientsin included, were modeled upon Kiangnan, and had similar vicissitudes in their history.

Kennedy shows conclusively that problems persisted throughout the decades of Kiangnan's growth and development. On top of the basic problems, lack of capital, inadequate technical knowledge, and general bureaucratic inertia, Kiangnan had problems not of its own making. The basic problems above could be solved, and to some extent were solved, by the use of foreign technicians, and drawing regional capital from the sources of revenue controlled by the powerful governor-generals such as Li Hung-chang. The more intractable problem was the ever changing improvement of weapons through the application of the latest inventions. No sooner did China master one level of technical and practical competence, than the need arose to make further changes, often necessitating scrapping much of the previous level of accomplishments, due to newer designs or materials in weapons technology. There was never the adequate inclusion of the mechanism for self-and constant improvement in the Chinese arsenals. Thus, similar to the problem of whether to build or buy warships, China might have been better off in the short run buying the needed weapons from abroad. Ultimately, of course, China would be perpetually beholden to foreign arms suppliers if the policy had been adopted, but the fact remains that her commendable efforts to be self-sufficient in arms fell short, and the primary reason was the backwardness of her total industrial sector⁽¹⁹⁾.

Even with these shortcomings, on the eve of war, China had produced

(18) On the Tientsin Arsenal being the main domestic weapons supplier to the Huai Army in north China, see Thomas Kennedy, pp. 142-146.

(19) On Kiangnan's troubles, see Kennedy, especially pp. 99-112 and 123-139.

an improved version of the renowned Mauser rifle which compared favorably with the standard rifle issued to the Japanese infantry, the Murata rifle. So the point seems to be clear that China was not deficient in the capability for producing firearms for her semi-modern army. Rather, it was the system of management that proved deficient. First, the Chinese-improved Mauser was hardly more than prototypes, showing the potentialities of what China could do, but not produced in sufficient quantities to make it the basic weapon for the Chinese army. Second, China never did adopt the practice of phasing out older models of weapons once a newer and improved model became available. The latest models were simply added onto the older ones, creating a bewildering combination of different types of weapons for each unit. When one considers the fact of the need to supply these different models with their individual types of bullets and shells, the Chinese capability of producing one superior rifle becomes quite meaningless in a larger sense. In practical terms the Chinese were inferior in weaponry, despite the potentialities of matching or overcoming Japan's lead in weapon technology⁽²⁰⁾.

If the point above is accepted, then clearly China's main handicap was not the disparity in armament production per se. In fact, one could hardly ignore the fact that the quality of military leadership was at least as important as inferiority in weapons in explaining China's eventual defeat, and that brings us to the matter of officer training.

Here the picture is a mixed one, and one must separate the naval officers from the officers of the Huai Army units. On the navy, mainland Chinese scholars led by Kuan Chie, Sun K'e-fu, and Ch'i Ch'i-chang, have greatly enlightened us on the capabilities of the naval officers engaged in the war⁽²¹⁾.

(20) On the lack of standardization and professionalism, see Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe* (N.Y., 1878), Chapters 20 and 21. Twenty years later, even after the Sino-Japanese War, China was not much better prepared militarily in these respects. See a condescending but nevertheless useful article by another foreign professional observer, A.E.J. Cavendish, "Armed Strengths of China," in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, vol. 11, no. 42 (June 1898), pp. 705-723.

(21) Among the many recent publications of Kuan, Sun and Ch'i are the following main ones: Sun K'e-fu 孫克復 and Kuan Chieh 關捷 *Chia-Wu Chung-Jih hai-chan shih* 甲午中日海戰史 (Ha-er-pin, 1981), and their *Chia-wu Chung-Jih lu-chan shih* 甲午中日陸戰史 (Ha-er-pin, 1984). Another of their collaborative effort is *Chia-wu chan-cheng jen-wu chuan* 甲午戰爭人物傳 (Ha-er-pin, 1984). Ch'i Ch'i-chang 戚其章, earliest publication was *Chung-Jih Chia-wu Wei-hai chih chan* 中日甲午威海之戰 (reprinted, Chi-nan, 1978, from the 1962 edition). In 1983, after numerous articles he came out with *Chung-Jih Chia-wu chan-cheng shih lun-ch'ung* 中日甲午戰爭史論叢 (Chi-nan, 1983), which collects them from various publications into one convenient volume.

Their work can be usefully supplemented by John Rawlinson's book on Chinese naval development⁽²²⁾. Working with limited sources, Rawlinson nevertheless showed clearly that naval development, including officer training, went quite far toward professionalization and in building up a strong esprit-de-corp among officers⁽²³⁾. Men like Teng Shih-ch'ang, Lin Yung-sheng, Fang Po-ch'ien, and especially Liu Po-ch'an, had their solid Mawei Academy training polished by their subsequent advanced studies in England and Germany⁽²⁴⁾. Certain problems remained. The fact that so many of the Chinese naval officers were southerners, mostly Fukienese but with a sizable representation of Cantonese, meant that there was always some friction between them and the northerners (meaning anyone north of Fukien and Kwangtung), such as Ting Ju-ch'ang, placed over or under them. Moreover, sufficient evidence can be cited to show that many, including certainly Liu and Fang, acquired some of the undesirable characteristics of the capital officialdom during their lengthy service in the north⁽²⁵⁾. Still, the top captains were a competent group. Below the top officers were younger officers trained at the newer Tientsin Naval Academy, who were equally good if not better than the more senior naval officers.

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- (22) The basic source on the history of the Chinese navy remains Pao Tsun-p'eng's 包遵彭 *Chung-kuo hai-chün shih* 中國海軍史, 2 vols. edition (Taipei, 1970). An earlier 1951 one-volume edition is not comparable to the fuller edition. See also John Rawlinson's *China Struggle for Naval Development* cited earlier. A short memoir with relevant materials from a foreign professional is Edward R. Fremantle, *The Navy as I Knew It* (N. P., 1904). Of less reliability is Lee McGiffin's *Yankee of the Yalu: Philo Norton McGiffin, American Captain in the Chinese Navy (1885-1895)*. See also Wang Chia-chien 王家儉, "Ching-mo hai-chün liu-hsüeh-sheng ti pai chien chi ch'i ying-hsiang" 清末海軍留學生的派遣及其影響, *Li-shih hsüeh-pao* 歷史學報, no. 2 (1974).
- (23) See *Pei-yang kai-chün Chang-ch'en* 北洋海軍章程 (1888), unpaginated edition kept at Shanghai Library. Admittedly these impressive regulations may have been carried out more in theory than in practice completely. Still, the existence of these regulations suggest that the navy was far ahead of the army. See also Rawlinson, pp. 157-163. One other evidence of the relative level of competence attained by some Chinese naval officers can be seen in the *Hang-hai su-chi* 航海瑣記 (also known as *Lou-ch'uan jih-chi* 樓船日記) by Yü Shih-i 余思詒, a detailed account of Chinese officers sailing the newly purchased *Chih-yuan* 致遠 and *Ching-yuan* 靖遠 from England to China in 1887. (Excerpts in *CJCC*.)
- (24) For details of the naval academies, see Pao Tsun-p'eng, *Ch'ing-chi hai-chün chiao-yu shih* 清季海軍教育史 (Yangminshan, Taiwan, 1969).
- (25) Interesting enough, the Japanese navy had similar problems as the early Peiyang Fleet. See Peter G. Cornwall, "The Meiji Navy" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970). Another useful work for comparing the two navies is David C. Evans, "The Satsuma Faction and Professionalism in the Japanese Naval Officer Corps of the Meiji Period, 1868-1912" (Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1979).

The conventional accounts of the naval side of the war, both in China and abroad, had always cited incompetent leadership as one of the main causes of China's defeats with the corollary that the rank and file performed better. Typically the former cavalry background of Admiral Ting is cited as proof. I believe we can now take a much more balanced view toward the performance of the naval officers. Not only did the Peiyang navy fight much better than hitherto realized, but the credit for this redounded to both the officers and the men, certain obvious exceptions as Fang notwithstanding. Had there not been a disastrous national policy to freeze naval development as of 1888, which is Tz'u-hsi's real crime against national defense (far more significant than, though not altogether unrelated to, the notorious building of the marble barge in the Summer Palace) and had there not been Li Hung-chang's cautious strategy, discussed later in this paper, one can surmise a much more even naval contest between China and Japan⁽²⁶⁾. Whatever China's naval shortcomings, the quality of her naval officers, I believe, was not a major one.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the army officers. Here we are mostly talking about the reformed Huai Army units, with a mixture of Northeast (Manchurian) troops, such as those under I-k'e-t'ang-a, thrown in⁽²⁷⁾. The leading American scholar on this question is Richard Smith. Because of lack of sources for later periods, Smith has been concentrating on the period before 1880's, when some significant upgrading of officer training were undertaken⁽²⁸⁾. Unfortunately Smith and others could not examine the critical decade of the 1880's, but I suspect that, unlike the navy, the army ceased to keep up the pace of improvements in officer training from the modest efforts preceding. Even in the 1860's and 1870's the efforts brought limited results. Most of the Huai Army veteran officers, quite understandably, tended to be wedded to their experience in the Taiping campaigns, when a limited use of modern firearms was only supplementary to the main components of the

(26) On Tz'u-hsi's disastrous fiscal policies affecting the navy, see *Ch'ing-mo hai-chün shih-liao* 清末海軍史料, pp. 682ff. See also Pao Tsun-p'eng, *Hai-chün shih*, pp. 622-661.; Rawlinson, pp. 140-143.

(27) See Wang Chia-chien 王家儉 "Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang ti ch'uang-she chi ch'i ying-hsiang" 北洋武備學堂的創設及其影響 *Li-shih hsüeh-pao* 歷史學報, no. 4 (1976).

(28) On the shortcomings of the Huai Army officers, see Richard J. Smith, "The Reform of Military Education in Late Ch'ing China, 1842-1895," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XVIII (1978), pp. 15-40.

regional armies' success: strong cohesion among officers and men, and a clear purpose, leading to high morale. With few exceptions, the vast majority of the Huai Army officers remained convinced that these tried and true verities were what made the Huai Army strong. They remained contemptuous of the newly-introduced weaponry and drilling techniques. Scattered units did employ foreign drillmasters for improved training, but the effort never went very far, and tended to lapse back to the earlier system⁽²⁹⁾. Such deficiencies were not apparent before the war broke out in 1894, and the grand maneuvers in the spring just before the war tended more to build up a false sense of confidence rather than to reveal intrinsic weaknesses⁽³⁰⁾. But there is no denying the evidence once actual fighting began.

A few more comments might be added at this point. First, the slowness of reform, and the resistance of the army officers against it, is a historical phenomenon not unique to China⁽³¹⁾. In fact, virtually every army, when confronted with radical innovations in organization or training, tends to resist them. This has been true of such long-standing and well-known western military powers as France and Russia. Even the vaunted German army, when Scharnhorst and Gneissau first introduced their major reforms in the period following the Napoleonic wars, had to overcome strong opposition among their fellow officers. So the saying that "generals are always fighting the previous

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- (29) Smith shows clearly that even the best of the more forward-looking officers had certain limitations. See also Yang Li-chiang 楊立強 "Chung-Jih Chia-wu chan-cheng yu Ch'ing-mo chün-chih pien-ke" 中日甲午戰爭與清末軍制變革 (Unpublished paper, Weihai Conference, September 21-25, 1984). In comparison with the relative backwardness of the Chinese armed forces, even the Peiyang Fleet, the Japanese armed forces had undergone rapid modernization in the decade prior to the outbreak of the war in 1894. One example is Japan's naval medical corp. See *Nisshin san'eki kaigun eiseishi* 日清戰役海軍衛生史, issued by Kaigunsho Imukyoku 海軍省醫務局, 4 vols. (Tokyo, 1898). A summary translation of this work in English appeared as *The Surgical and Medical History of the Naval War between China and Japan during 1894-95* (Tokyo, 1901).
- (30) On the spring 1894 Grand Maneuvers of the combined Peiyang Navy and Huai Army, see *Hai-chün ta-yue chang-ch'eng* 海軍大閱章程 (1894), a copy of which is deposited at Peking Library. Contrast this, essentially a grand parade, with the Japanese combined maneuvers of 1890, with both the army and navy divided into attacking and defending forces. Sambō hombu 參謀本部, *Riku-kai gun rengō dai enshū kiji* 陸海軍聯合大演習記事 (1891), kept at National Diet Library in Tokyo.
- (31) China's relative slow pace in introducing military reforms was by no means unusual. For a useful comparative perspective, see the Russian case, as shown in Forrest A. Miller's *Dimitri Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia* (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). See also John S. Curtiss, *Russian Army under Nicholas I 1825-1855* (Durham, N.C., 1965), chapter 18.

war" has much validity. China's slowness in changing its officer training system is a normal situation, not an unusual one.

Second comment, the relative success of the naval officers as compared with the army officers should not surprise us either. The navy is a technical service. Even in the days of sailing ships, it required competent captains just to move and manuever the ships, much less fight. With the introduction of steampower the need for greater technical competence became even more pronounced⁽³²⁾. Moreover, the Peiyang navy was a brand new creation. While China did have the traditional water forces, and some carryover from this precedent can be discerned in the new deepwater fleet, the techniques of the old, slow, and mostly reverine water forces were inapplicable to the new ocean-going fleet. Accordingly China's navy did not have nearly so heavy a burden of tradition to overcome than did the army. China being a traditionally land-minded nation, the Huai Army also had a stronger and prouder tradition than the infant modern navy, which made reforms much harder to effect in the army.

Turning to command structure, one can be briefer. For all intents and purposes China did not have a unified command either on land or sea. Nor was there a tradition of theater hierarchy of leadership. The failure to unify the three modern fleets into one is well known. The Court also did not see fit to create a unified command of its land forces until late in the war, in effect relying upon Li Hung-chang to provide whatever de facto coordination there was. Aside from the fact that Li had his own personal shortcomings, institutionally speaking Li could only command his own Huai Army units directly, the other forces such as the Northeast armies under I-ke-t'ang-a were only cooperating forces, not subject to Li's direct command.

The lack of national military coordination can be seen in microcosm at the front as well. The defense of Pyongyong provides a classic illustration. Each of the commanders (Tso, Ma, Ye and Wei) commanded his own troops under no real superior in that theater. Even when the Court designated Ye Tzu-ch'ao as the superior commander on the scene, there was no tradition of welding a unified front command under him. (Ye's personal weaknesses,

(32) For the connection between technological advances and the expansion of European imperialism, see Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the 19th Century* (N. Y., 1981)

and the rivalries among the other commanders, also contributed to the lack of coordination.) Accordingly the several commanders could only agree in conference to parcel out the defense into sectors, which were essentially static, no matter where and how the Japanese attacked. In operation this resembles the deployment of allied forces under independent officers, not a unified field command⁽³³⁾.

Contrast the above with the Japanese command, with general headquarter at Hiroshima, where the Meiji Emperor himself resided for the duration. From that central post clear lines of authority ran to the several field armies, acting in support of one another, with the navy also acting in concert with the armies⁽³⁴⁾. The advantage of Japan and the disadvantage of China seem readily apparent.

What is often forgotten, however, is that even if China had a unified army and navy command, there was no guarantee that such organizational changes alone would have made a significant difference. Li Hung-chang has been criticized for opposing a unified naval command even before the war began. No doubt Li was aware of his personal losses of power in any such proposed reorganization, but the alternative of introducing a number of inexperienced and incompetent Manchu high court officials into the naval command would not have improved matters. And when Li was in effect removed, and his successor Liu Kun-i given more centralized control, there was no noticable improvement in China's conduct of the war. In short, without the tradition of a national armed forces, and the willingness of the various unit commanders to work as a team, mere restructuring of commands would not have guaranteed coordination and efficiency.

Another point. Certain scholars have argued, some explicitly but many more implicitly, that had China mobilized all of her fleets and numerous armies to fight the Japanese, the war could have been won. Aside from the enormous task of organization that would have entailed, I believe the outcome would have been little affected. The Southern and Fukian fleets were

(33) On the Pyongyong campaigns, see Sun and Kuan, *Chia-wu Chung-Jih lu-chan shih*, pp. 119-157. See also Vladimir, pp. 120-163.

(34) On the development of the Japanese high command, see Matsushita Yoshio 松下芳男 *Meiji gunsei shiron* 明治軍制史論 2vols. (Tokyo, 1956 edition). See also the fictionalized account, *Hiroshima daihon'ei no Meiji tenno* 廣島大本營の明治天皇 (Tokyo 1932, reprinted 1966).

in considerable disarray. Adding them to the Peiyang Fleet, by far the largest and best of the fleets, would have merely slowed down movement, and further complicated fleet coordination. The situation was similar with the army. The Huai Army units stationed in the Chihli and Fengtien provinces were also China's most modernized units. The southern forces were impressive only in numbers. Their wide disparity in fighting capability would have rendered them more like a horde than a disciplined army in battle. China was a long way from having an effective unified armed forces⁽³⁵⁾.

Finally, let us turn to strategy and tactics.

In overall strategy the Chinese never had any grand plans. There was some planning, but done rather haphazardly⁽³⁶⁾. This lack cannot be more striking than by comparing China with Japan. Long before the war officially began (August 1, 1894), the Japanese high command had already worked out a series of contingency plans. Japan expected to win, first by driving the Chinese out of Korea, then one army would drive directly westward across southern Manchuria, while the main force would separately attack Lu-ta, the taking of which would also dislodge the Peiyang Fleet from its most heavily fortified base. Another army would launch a separate attack on Weihaiwei, landing nearby and taking it by siege in a combined army-navy operation. The ultimate goal, formulated at the very beginning of the war, would be a giant pincer movement, closing in and taking Peking from both north and south. Japan even conceived of a final climatic battle on the North China Plain. But that was not all. The Japanese also planned for less successful contingencies. Should the Manchurian or Shantung campaigns prove indecisive

(35) On the lingering argument that China could have won, had she been unified, see such general works on Sino-Japanese relations as Li Tse-fen 李則芬 *Chung Jih kuan-hsi shih* 中日關係史 (Taipei, 1970), pp. 320-324. Other more specialized accounts of the war published recently also harbors this attitude, albeit more implicitly.

(36) The most useful discussions of China's strategy and tactics are found in Ch'an-mou Peng-pu 參謀本部 *Chia-wu Chung-Jih chan-cheng chi-yao* 甲午中日戰爭記要 (N.P., 1935), but internal evidence indicates that this work drew heavily from Japanese sources and accounts, without citations. See also Chuang Wei-min 莊維民 "Lun Chia-wu chan-cheng chung ti Ch'ing-chün chan-lueh" 論甲午戰爭中的清軍戰略 *Tung-yüeh Lun-ch'ung* 東岳論叢 (1984, no. 4). pp. 109-112 An interesting earlier discussion of China's coastal defenses, *Yang-fang Yüeh-lüeh* 洋防說略 by Yü Yün-ch'iu 俞雲秋 was published actually before the war in 1887. It discusses in considerable detail the defense of the entire China coast, including Chihli and Fengtien, but there is no evidence that this, or any other works of this kind, influenced the strategic thinking of Li Hung-chang, much less the Ch'ing Court.

or adverse, the Japanese were prepared to deny Korea from the Chinese counterattack. Even the worst contingency was taken into account: the loss of the control of the sea. In such case the Japanese would fight a delaying action in Korea, slowing down China's advance as much as possible, in preparation for settlement through negotiation⁽³⁷⁾.

The Chinese Court, while not taking the Japanese seriously before the war, did work out some general plans once fighting began⁽³⁸⁾. The first line of defense would be Pyongyang, where the Chinese expected to stop the Japanese advance. Should that fail, then the Chinese would fall back to the Yalu River line. Little further planning was done at that time, since the Court did not expect the Japanese to penetrate onto Chinese soil. When it happened, and swiftly, the Chinese fell into a pattern of reacting to Japanese initiative. The plan was to hold Lu-ta, while engaging the enemy on the South Manchurian plain. When Lushun fell, a belated attempt was made to go on the offensive in the Hai-chen sector. The ultimate line of defense was to be at Shanhaikuan, the defense of which was so sensitive to the Court that it tended to preoccupy them at the expense of other critical areas. At no time did the Chinese appear to recognize the Japanese war plans in its totality. Together with the Court's special concern with the defense of Shenyang, preoccupation with Shanhaikuan symbolized the piecemeal nature of Chinese strategy⁽³⁹⁾.

Compared to overall strategy, the actual operational tactics of the Chinese were better⁽⁴⁰⁾. The sending of troops to Asan even before the hostilities began was not unwarranted, and the Asan contingent's retreat to Pyongyang in good order was an excellent tactical maneuver. The choice of Pyongyang as the first defensive strong point was sound. Had the Chinese utilized fully their advantages there (ample time, men, and materials) and conducted a spirited defense, the entire course of the war might have been different, even

(37) Japan's strategy is discussed in *Chi-yao* 記要, pp. 14-15.

(38) On China's contingency planning, see *Chi-yao* 記要, p. 15.

(39) On Chinese post-Pyongyang planning, *Chi-yao* 記要, pp. 50-55. On Li's restraining order to Ting, see Sun and Kuan's *Hai-chen shih* 海戰史, pp. 79-83. Also Rawlinson, Chapter 7.

(40) Military historians distinguish *operations* as a third component of planning, between *strategy* and *tactics*, especially when writing about wars in the 20th century. I am not certain this distinction can be applied before the present century, so I use tactics to include the operational aspects of a given campaign.

if the Chinese had to pull back to the Yalu front eventually. Even when Pyongyong fell quickly, the concept of defense along the Yalu was not ill-advised. And when the Japanese did break through into Chinese territory, Chinese success in holding the Mout'ienling-to-Hai-chen line not only effectively denied the Japanese Shenyang, but acted as a constant threat to Japanese action in the Liaotung Peninsula. Had the Chinese been able to hold out at Lu-ta for some time, a spirited counteroffensive at Hai-ch'en and at Mout'ienling would have rendered Japan's control of south Manchuria tenuous. Without securing south Manchuria, Japan would not have dared to attack Weihaiwei, and no pincer movement toward Peking could have developed.

The tactics for war at sea requires separate treatment. The recent scholarship of Professors Kuan, Sun, and Ch'i have shown conclusively that the Peiyang Fleet fought much better than they have generally been credited. The main point of discussion, therefore, revolves around the following: Li Hung-chang's order to Ting Ju-ch'ang, the Battle of the Yellow Sea, and the defense of Weihaiwei.

Li has been castigated by virtually all historians for having hobbled Ting by his order confining the fleet to primarily convoy duties for Chinese troop transports, and forbidding it to sortie east of the Yalu-Weihaiwei line. Such a criticism is valid, for these interdictions completely removed the threat of the Peiyang Fleet to Japan's vital sea links between the home islands and the continent. Even the possibility of the Chinese venturing to the Inchon area and eastward would have forced the Japanese fleet to cover a much wider area of the sea, and thereby render her offensive operations that much more difficult. But one must concede the realities of the time. The Japanese adopted wholeheartedly Alfred Thayer Mahan's dictum of regarding the primary goal of the navy to be seeking out and destroying the main units of the enemy. Most other major naval powers then still were mired in the conventional thinking of regarding the main functions of the navy to be that of protecting the sea lanes and covering vulnerable areas of the coast. In that light, China was not unusually backward in her naval theories.

Li Hung-chang knew more than anyone how seriously deficient the Peiyang Fleet was, because of the Empress Dowager's diversion of naval funds. His desire to keep the Fleet intact as a striking force, therefore, can be defended. Unfortunately Li's credibility is suspect, since he had other reasons for adopting

a generally passive policy. We shall discuss Li's leadership elsewhere. Here we need only point out that, had Ting been able to elude the Japanese, and then sink some of Japan's troop and supply ships, especially prior to the Luta or Weihaiwei campaigns, that would have forced the Japanese to adopt a slower and more cautious timetable of attacks. We must admit that such precise naval operations require both timely intelligence and brilliant maneuvering capabilities, both of which were problematical with the Chinese. Still, the sixteenth century Korean example of Admiral Yi effectively undercutting Hideyoshi's supply line to his invading army in Korea demonstrates Japan's vulnerability in any continental wars.

On the Battle of Yellow Sea, we can be briefer. Enough work has been done for us to say that the Peiyang Fleet, even with her obvious deficiencies, fought reasonably well⁽⁴¹⁾. I shall simply summarize my own conclusions. I believe that the line abreast formation adopted by Ting was the most appropriate for the Chinese fleet; it would have been even worse had Ting opted for the line ahead formation, used by the Japanese. When the Japanese managed to turn the flank and isolate the Chinese fleet, the heavier and more strongly fortified CHEN-YUAN and TING-YUAN still could have served as a nucleus of effective battle, had the other ships supported them vigorously.⁽⁴²⁾ And with all the Japanese advantage of faster overall speed and superiority in rapid-firing guns, the battle still lasted five hours, with the Chinese fleet succeeding in disengaging at the end, with its minimal fighting capability intact. The Japanese clearly won the day, inflicting much heavier punishment upon the Chinese and driving the Chinese from the sea, but the battle would not have been so decisive in the long run if Lushun and Weihaiwei could have been held for some time, to allow the fleet be repaired and to regroup. So my conclusions echo those of Professors Kuan, Sun, Chi, and others, that the Peiyang Fleet, under difficult conditions, fought the Japanese more than

(41) On the Battle of Yellow Sea (also called Battle of Yalu in western works), see Sun and Kuan, *Hai-chan shih*, pp. 105. Also Rawlinson, pp. 174-185, and Cheng T'ien-chieh 鄭天杰 and Chao Mei-ch'ing 趙梅卿 *Chung-jih Chia-wu hai-chan yu Li Hung-chang 中日甲午海戰與李鴻章* (Taipei, 1979), pp. 27. There are also numerous contemporary journalistic accounts, and subsequent analytic articles by naval professionals in technical periodicals. For some years the Yellow Sea battle, like the Battle of Jutland later, was one of the case studies in all leading naval academies in the West.

(42) On the Line-abreast versus the Line-ahead controversy, see Ch'i Ch'i-chang, *Chung-jih Chia-wu chan-cheng shih lun-ch'ung*, pp. 106-133.

credibly.

Where I depart from some of the Chinese historians, not necessarily those I have mentioned, is my belief that credit for Chinese effectiveness and gallantry should be shared by both the officers and sailors. Teng Shih-ch'ang deserves all the credit he has gotten, but I believe it should be more for his years of effort to improve the fleet prior to the war, than for his gallant death at Yellow Sea. At the risk of tarnishing the reputation of a fine officer, one must raise the question whether Teng might not have been wiser to save his crippled ship (and himself) to fight another day. Teng aside, other officers, Lin Yung-sheng in particular, should be given full credit also. Even Ting Ju-ch'ang and Liu Po-ch'an, generally criticized for their command performance at Yellow Sea, did better than their reputations afterwards.⁽⁴³⁾ But citing individual captains is not the main point (there was ample evidence of individual cowardice and incompetence also) of my argument. Rather it is that praise and blame should also be assessed collectively. Evidence shows, I believe, that most officers and men acquitted themselves well on that tragic day, when the Peiyang Fleet had to fight the Japanese High Sea Fleet against tremendous odds.

Finally, the siege of Weihaiwei. This was perhaps the most tragic campaign of the war. On the one hand, it seems that if China had really rallied a sufficient force in Shantung, she could have counterattacked against the Japanese invaders successfully and thereby saved Weihaiwei. On the other hand, the assessment is probably unrealistic, given the fact that China had been on the defensive throughout the war, and its one offensive series, in the Hai-ch'en sector, proved utterly unavailing.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Therefore, one can sense a feeling of inevitability in the fall of Weihaiwei. Even in the face of incredible odds, the Fleet, under Ting's direction, managed to hold out effectively and courageously as long as possible. Unfortunately the supporting army's performance, with a few exceptions, was deplorable. The naval defence of

(43) On Teng Shih-ch'ang 鄧世昌, see Sun and Kuan's *Jen-wu chuan* 人物傳 pp. 7-12. This indispensable book has short but useful biographies of all key persons involved in the Sino-Japanese War. Teng has been written about in numerous published and unpublished articles also. He and Tso Pao-kuei 左寶貴 are usually cited as archetypes of the patriotic officers. Only recently has there been more balanced works on them and others, notably in works reassessing the careers of senior officers, such as Ting Ju-ch'ang 丁汝昌.

(44) On Hai-ch'en campaigns, see Sun K'e-fu "Chia-wu Ch'ing-chün wu-fu Hai-ch'en shu-lueh" 甲午清軍五復海城述略, pp. 11-37. in 甲午戰爭史學會論 See also Sun and Kuan, *Lu-chan shih*, pp. 244-277.

Weihaiwei will always stand as a monument to Chinese bravery and determination, but victory at Weihaiwei alone, even if possible, would not have changed the course of the war. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

In summary then, China did not lose the war by failures in either strategy or tactics alone. Her overall failure must be sought elsewhere.

In conclusion, let me say that as of now there is little sustained scholarship in the United States on the Sino-Japanese War. It is my profound hope that my work will stimulate others to turn their scholarly energies to this important historical event. In doing so they will quickly come to realize, as I have for some time, that the Chinese specialists on this event have made our work possible. I further believe that the Sino-Japanese War cannot be fully understood, without taking into account the search for national security carried on previously under the rubric of the Self-strengthening Movement. By studying such topics as arsenals, the navy, communications, we can better understand China's capabilities and limitations in her ability to wage modern war.

Conversely, the war was a testing time for the Self-strengthening Movement. Failure to pass that test exposed once and for all the failure of that Movement, and turned China finally to the path of revolution and reform, out of which came the China of today. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ The lesson to be learned seems plain to me. Modern warfare cannot be successfully prosecuted by a semi-modern nation. China in this war had the misfortune of coming up against Japan, one of the few successful nations in transforming herself within two

(45) A useful account of the Weihai battle still: Ch'i Ch'i-chang's *Chung-jih Chia-wu Wei-hai chih chan* 中日甲午威海之戰. See also Sun and Kuan, *Lu-chan shih* 陸戰史 pp. 278-320, and Vladimir, pp. 269-304. See also Wang K'e-chü 王可舉 "Chia-wu chih chan Jih-chün chai Jung-ch'en-wan teng-lu kung-yen Wei-hai chün-kang shih-lueh" 甲午之戰日軍在榮成灣登陸攻陷威海軍港事略, *Shan-tung sheng-chih tzu-liao* 山東省志資料 (1958).

(46) On the linkage between the Sino-Japanese War and the Self-strengthening Movement 自強運動, also known as Foreign Affairs Movement 洋務運動 see my unpublished paper, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Potentialities and Limitations of Reforms under the *Yangwu* Movement" (draft version, 1975, revised version, 1980). Since my open presentations of my ideas in China in 1981, several articles have appeared. See Ch'i Ch'i-chang's "Ts'ung Chia-wu chan-cheng kan Yangwu yün-tung ti hsing-chih chi ch'i shih-pai" 從甲午戰爭看洋務運動的性質及其失敗 in *Chung-jih Chia-wu chan-cheng shih lun-ts'ung* 中日甲午戰爭史論叢 (Chi-nan, 1983), pp. 249-269. Other scholars, such as Mao Chia-ch'i 茅家琦 have also agreed in general with my assessment. For an earlier assessment of the Self-strengthening Movement, without specific reference to the Sino-Japanese War, see Thomas Kennedy's "Self-strengthening: an Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* vol. 3, no. 1 (November 1974), pp. 3-35.

generations from a truly feudal state into a modern nation. China's failure, therefore, should be seen in the global perspective. She did not lose primarily because of Japan's aggression or the imperialistic nature of the western powers alone. China's own institutional weaknesses, at a time when the Chinese people were not able to control their own destiny, were major factors to the national tragedy.