Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研究所

Vol. 126

ISSN：1029-4740

Size： 16 K

Other Ordering Methods：WuNan ． SanMin ． Agent List

Abstract：

This issue contains three articles: “Preparative Constitutionalism, the Court, and the Opposition: Duanfang and Memorials on Constitutional Reform in the Late Qing Dynasty,” by Zhang Jianbin; “The Continuity and Transformation of Military Thought: The National Revolutionary Army’s Four Counteroffensives in 1939,” by Su Sheng-hsiung; “Ho Shai-lai during the Korean War: Lobbying MacArthur for Chiang Kai-shek’s Participation in the War and Winning the Hearts and Minds of Overseas Chinese in Japan,” by Lee Kan; Book Reviews: “Weiping Tsai, The Making of China’s Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation,” by Chen Ling-chieh.

Contents

Articles

Preparative Constitutionalism, the Court, and the Opposition: Duanfang and Memorials on Constitutional Reform in the Late Qing Dynasty

Zhang Jianbin

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In 1905 during the reign of the Guangxu Emperor, the Qing court sent five ministers abroad to investigate and prepare for the establishment of a constitution, memorials provided by the group after returning of which would influence the direction of political reforms in the last years of the Qing dynasty. Since the day of their submission, it has been rumored that the drafters had all been Liang Qichao (1873–1929), who fled overseas. However, there has been a lack of evidence to support the process by which Qing court officials operated through Liang. The Duanfang Archives held by the First Historical Archives of China contain correspondence between the five ministers before and after going abroad, shedding little-known light on the case. The preparatory constitutional memorials and related documents by the investigative group were closely related to the behind-the-scenes promotion of high-ranking official Duanfang (1861–1911) of the late Qing. Before setting off, Duanfang had arranged for Xiong Xiling (1870–1937), who had close contacts with Liang, to travel abroad together, enabling him to contact all parties to prepare a memorial in private. A discovered memorial related to finance in the Duanfang Archives now confirms the fact that Liang drafted the memorial for the group of minsters. Moreover, a compilation and translation bureau was established in Shanghai at that time, which utilized various networks to directly or indirectly solicit scholars with various political demands, such as Ji Yihui (1874–1908), Yang Yulin (1872–1911), and Song Jiaoren (1882–1913), to compile and translate constitutional texts, revealing a level of interaction between the court and the opposition. After the group’s return to China, Duanfang, out of consideration for his own political stance, allowed Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) to revise the memorials pertaining to constitutional texts and thus took the opportunity to establish deeper ties with the Beiyang government. This case further highlights that most of the actors involved in the preparatory constitutional memorials had been from or served in Hunan or Hubei provinces, as well as being officials who had experienced the Hundred Days’ Reform movement of 1898. The bureaucratic constitutionalists actually played a core role in the process of initiating the preparation for a constitution, a point which has been mostly overlooked in previous research.

Keyword：memorials, preparative constitutionalism, Duanfang, Liang Qichao, Xiong Xiling, bureaucratic constitutionalists

The Continuity and Transformation of Military Thought: The National Revolutionary Army’s Four Counteroffensives in 1939

Su Sheng-hsiung

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In the historical narrative of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA), the entire Second Sino-Japanese War was well planned, with the strategy of exchanging space for time and of a protracted war of resistance; and in the second phase after the Battle of Wuhan, the NRA shifted towards the offensive to achieve victory. Contrary to this account, some commentators, while acknowledging the contributions of the NRA, have criticized it for its passive strategy and lack of will to attack, arguing that Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) looked to the West for help while maintaining large numbers of troops to defend against Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) Communist forces. The present article revisits these divergent views by examining the four counteroffensives of the NRA in 1939, only mentioned in passing by previous studies, to consider their own understanding of said offensives. The relevant historical facts are first reconstructed. Secondly, this article examines why the offensives were launched from the perspective of political strategy, analyzes statements over the so-called “quick victory theory,” and explores the influence of the NRA’s intelligence on strategy. Finally, military theory is adopted to explain the fundamental reasons for the offensives. This article argues that the NRA initiated the four counteroffensives due to political strategy and optimism in the war, but the most crucial factor was military ideology; that is, even if there were no political-strategic considerations, the NRA would have continued with the campaign in 1939. Inconsistent with the received criticisms, the NRA had in fact adopted an offensive defense from the onset of the war, which reached its peak in 1939, but the gap between the Chinese and Japanese forces was too significant for it to be implemented. The counteroffensives of 1939 were not a new tactic but a continuation of previous strategies, with this period also being a critical period of change in the military ideology of the NRA.

Keyword：Second Sino-Japanese War, winter offensive, Chiang Kai-shek, On War, military thought

Ho Shai-lai during the Korean War: Lobbying MacArthur for Chiang Kai-shek’s Participation in the War and Winning the Hearts and Minds of Overseas Chinese in Japan

Lee Kan

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Book Reviews

Weiping Tsai, The Making of China’s Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation

Chen Ling-chieh

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