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The position of the so-called New-Guangxi Faction was very important in Guangxi province in the 30’s and 40’s of the 20th century. By following along the history of relevant academic study of the four major areas of concern in the province, i.e., politics, economy, the military and cultures, the author of this article still regards it as insufficient, because it has neglected the study of the relationship between national basic education and the construction in these four major areas. Holding that such neglect does not fit the original overall and interrelated characteristics of the construction, nor helps to deepen and broaden the available research achievements. In this article the author, by means of the method of historical reseach as well as the rich original resources, tries to restore the historical relationship between national basic education and the basic social construction in Guangxi in the 30’s and 40’s of the 20th century. First it makes an inquiry into the theoretical and legislative evidences on national basic education and construction as well as an examination of the overall and interrelated characteristics of construction of the province. Secondly it makes a detailed discussion of the inner relations between national basic education and the construction in the above-mentioned areas, both as a whole and separately. And finally an inquiry is made to analyze their merits and demerits. The purpose of the article is to reveal the importance of national basic education playing the role of both a medium and promotier in the social construction of Guangxi.
Due to the influence of the hindsight and politics, historians in the West, the Mainland China and Taiwan have had polar opinions of Jiang Jieshi: often either completely negative or completely positive. Yet, there is a “consensus” among historians on both sides of Taiwan Strait. They all believe that after Jiang Jieshi's visit of the Soviet Union in 1923, he was worried about the future of Sino-Soviet relations. Many even agree that he actively opposed the policy of alliance with the Soviet Union. Having tested these assertions against available new materials on this subject, we find that past research has over-simplified this part of history, which, in reality, exists a gray area. Jiang Jieshi was not an anti-communist prophet, nor a double-faced anti-communist intriguer. Rather, he was a loyal member of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) who identified with certain aspects of the Soviet revolution but who also had some serious reservations about that revolution. In fact, in the early period of the Northern Expedition, he consistently supported Sun Yat-sen's policy of allying with the Soviet Union.
We must study Jiang Jieshi as a human being, not as a saint nor a demon, in order to understand his true place in China’s history. This perspective in combination with newly available materials, should provide an opportunity to gain a better understanding of Jiang Jieshi and of the early Sino-Soviet relations.
Hunting is an excellent subject for anlyzing the relationship between people and nature. Much research has been done from the gender, racial and imperial perspectives. John M. MacKenzie, for example, argues plausibly in his works on the British Empire and the hunting cult that during the nineteenth century hunting had become a central part of the imperial culture. Not only did this cult fascinate the people at home but it pervaded the overseas British communities. Its influence was most strongly reflected in the mentality of British people living in colonies in Africa and India.
This paper continues this line of observation but shifts the focus to an arguable periphery of the British informal empire, i.e. Shanghai. It argues that the conflict between recreational hunting and commercial hunting existed not only between the colonisty and the colonized, but also among the colonizers themselves. Moreover, shooting in Shanghai was more than a mere sport or recreation. It was used as a means to help binding the colonial society together. In a tiny settlement of Shanghai surrounded by millions of Chinese, shooting wild pheasants and other game birds was a British self-expression and a norm of behavior. The transgressor could not be tolerated. Thus it led to serious conflicts between the Shanghai “sportsmen” and the International Export Company (IEC), one of the British companies exporting game birds from China to Britain.
This paper will first introduce the structure of the British community in Shanghai between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then discuss their shooting practices in the Yangtze region, and finally focus on the bird preservation campaigns led by the Shanghai sportsmen in 1899, 1914 and 1917. During these campaigns, IEC was targeted and labelled the “bird slaughterers” while the hypocrisy of the Shanghai “sportsman” community was exposed by IEC’s rebuttal. In the conclusion, we will discuss the meanings of these conflicts in the light of the colonial culture as well as how our relationship with nature today is related to such culture and values.
Scholars are used to calling urban people’s protests in Ming and Qing cities “urban riots,” while the existing researches often tend to ignore the links between popular religions and festivals with such protests. This paper attempts to use the City God cult as a case study in exploring the complex links between festival rituals, group protests, and popular religion.
What is now regarded as “traditional” temple activities became popular only since the late Ming and early Qing times, and as expected, local gazetteers dated from the period recorded a great variety of temple fairs and festivals occurring with greater frequency and more popularity. These activities were not simply an extension of traditional agricultural celebrations for the changing of the seasons, nor were they containable within official indoctrination. On the contrary the government notably failed in turning these temple festivals into regulated ceremonies to maintain social order. In fact, the festivals contained topsy-turvy, violent elements as found in European Carnivals. Moreover, such festivals might also become venues for expressing collective protests against the authority of the government and the social order.
There were many such cases of collective protests in Ming and Qing cities under the chosen period of study. In the study it is witnessed that the crowds actively chose to turn festivals into collective protests, and the City God cult was the one used most frequently in such protests. The frequency of its use was connected to the transformation of the City God cult during the late Ming period.
This paper shows that the rituals, character and temple functions of the City God changed greatly during this time. The City God temple became a meeting-place for the gentry and officials to discuss public issues. In addition, as the City God temple was usually the biggest, most accessible public temple in the city, so it naturally became an ideal meeting place for gatherings and collective action.
Having gone through a figurative metamorphosis of sort, the City God’s image gradually became more personalized and transformed into the Underworld Judge who had the right to punish local officials in this world. In the meantime, official rituals were secularized by these urban people who moreover initiated rituals such as filing indictments, lifting the God’s image and mock ghost trials. The personalization and secularization of the City God caused urban people to consider the City God as a powerful symbol of resistance against the authority of the local officials and gentry.
Thus, when protestors gathered in the City God Temple and employed these secularized rituals such as filing indictments, lifting the God’s image and mock trials of the ghost, they were trying both to strengthen the fight against perceived social injustice on the one hand, and to legitimize their collective actions on the other.
This paper is primarily based on information obtained from the Diary (Diary of the Master of Shuichu Residence) of Chang Li-chun, a Pao-cheng (a head of pao), with the scope of the study confined to the Hulutun District (around what is now Fengyuan). It is a regional case study on the implementation of the Paochia system in the early period of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. The social status of a Pao-cheng in this period will also be studied, including his role in the history of the Japanese occupation.
With the goal of building an efficient colonial system in the early stages of the administration of Taiwan, Japan introduced reforms in the Paochia system, which consisted of community self-government and self-protection measures. This system as a consequence became an auxiliary institution for grassroots administration. Through the Paochia system, the Japanese colonial government controlled and influenced grassroots Taiwanese society.
Shortly after obtaining control of Taiwan, the Japanese colonial authorities abolished both the existing grand rent household and the civil service examination system. Small rent household, Pao-cheng, and other Paochia members thus became the new leaders in Taiwanese society. They served as an influential social core. More so because the Pao-cheng was the link between the colonizers and the general populace. The intermediating role played by Pao-cheng helped prevent or buttress many direct conflicts between the officialdom and the population. Owing to their broad understanding of people, things, and events in the local community, Pao-chengs were looked upon by both the common people and the colonial authorities, notably in solving conflicts through decision-making and arbitration. From the Diary (Diary of the Master of Shuichu Residence), we realize that the Japanese colonial authorities also took advantage of the Paochia system to carry out and promote their colonial administration policies.
In terms of historical continuity, the Sino-French Controversy or the Sino-French War of 1883-85 in Vietnam can be said to have been evolved out of a series of diplomatic relations between the Qing and Nguyen dynasties and the French imperial power during the nineteenth century. As seen from the angle of political culture, it could also be said to be an outcome of the conflict between the Chinese World Order and the emergent International Law system. The definition of sovereignty in the modern International Law and the concept of the traditional Chinese World Order has been an irresolvable paradox; each has its own premises, and this led not only to the conflict of ideals, but also to war. The Chinese World Order observes a normative order instead of the legal norm, which, as a kind of passive imperialism, might be called “Imperialism des pauvres” (Imperialism of Pauper) as it were. Under it, and through the rituals, international or inter-state peace had once been obtainable at very low cost, and naturally enough, the constituent states were not totally independent, but interdependent in this hierarchical world.
Though the Nguyen dynasty accepted the Qing imperial decree as necessary to confer upon it the Kingship of Vietnam, but this did not mean a diminution of its de facto sovereignty or even suzerainty. Vietnam was able to form its own smaller Chinese World Order vis-a-vis that of Great China. The encounter of the West and China, especially after the Opium War, which exposed fully to Vietnam the weaknesses of Qing, had the effect of alienating the two states further. However, the Nguyen dynasty did not succeed in formulating an appropriate policy to manage the incoming occidental forces that overwhelmed the country and caused it to become one of the French colonies.
Having witnessed the Chinese World Order being destroyed by Western imperial forces, Vietnam quit the orbit of Chinese Empire and became bound to that of France and the new International Law. For itself, China accepted finally, however reluctantly, the realism of Western International Law, part of which at least means that the legal norm has now taken the place of the old rites.