The modern history of Taiwan began with Dutch colonization, and the construction of Tayouan Harbor was their first step in taking control. Because of its key role, this offshore sandbar is mentioned in many historical studies. Yet most of these studies focus on the events and people of this early stage of Taiwan’s history, only treating Tayouan as part of the background; very few offer a detailed exploration of the port as an actual space. The goal of this paper is to examine Tayouan in terms of its place and what it contained as a space.

     In the 17th century Tayouan was an international harbor that the Dutch used to promote trade with China and Japan. We thus begin with a general overview of the economy of the Taiwan Straits at that time, and then move to a spatial interpretation of Tayouan itself. This essay discusses the historical potentiality of this port based on Dutch overseas sailing transportation and their traditional harbor planning on the Rhine Delta. Through an analysis of conventional town planning from the Middle Ages to the 17th century in the Low Countries, we can explain how the technology was used to construct a harbor system around Tayouan on Taiwan’s southwest coast as well as the Penghu Islands. We also hope to throw some light on the meaning and influence of Dutch colonization on spatial development in Taiwan generally, as well as the origins of the settlement formation of Taiwan.

     Based on a documentary observation of Jiangnan village life in 18th and 19th centuries, this paper argues that Confucianism penetrated villager’s everyday life mainly through private schools, folk discourses, and popular religion. In this ways, Confucian ideas, in a sense, began to influence their everyday life in the village. Accordingly, rather than scholars who focused on official propaganda and education, low-stratum intellectuals, who led lives similar to those of the villagers, played a central role in communicating Confucianism to commoners. Similarly, in this process power was simultaneously being reinforced and restricted in ways not only visible in the controls of the official ideology and gentry’s cultural hegemony over the people that previous scholars have emphasized. As well, from a broader view of social life, related developments included adjustments in different kinds of village social cultures and social relations that ameliorate class conflict between poor and rich. Therefore, the effects of the penetration of Confucian norms into village life corresponded to historical changes. In this sense, the “ harmonization of ritual propriety and popular custom” of traditional historical discourse in the China might serve as a native historical category that could correct or supplement current conceptions that are principally derived from the Western historical experience and encourage the exploration of local knowledge.

     In order to facilitate his revolutionary activities, Sun Yat-sen needed a baseand financial support, as well as experience of the modernization process from the advanced countries. These were all incentives for him to accept Japanese aid. Due to the support of Japan, Sun was able to merge the various secret societies in South China and became their leader. Japan thus helped the Chinese revolution in its early stage. From the Japanese point of view, China’s conventional image as a huge empire had survived the Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, Japan was anxious at the rumored possibility of a Sino-Russian military coalition. In order to prevent revenge from the Qing, Japan chose to support Sun’s revolutionary activities as a containment policy.

     Since the foundation of the cooperation between Sun and Japan was based on mutual benefit, changes in circumstances could challenge it. Two key events brought about such a change. One was the Boxer Uprising in 1900, and the other was the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The Boxer Uprising convinced Japan that the Qing was no longer a threat. Finding that China had become a kind of colony, Japanese policy shifted to the protection of China from dismemberment by Western powers. Japan’s new China policy switched to support the Qing Imperial House to maintain order, so as to be strong enough to maintain a buffer state between Japan and Western powers. Accordingly, in this period Japan terminated its support to Sun.

     After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan further aggrandized her influence into China. The expansion of its special interests in Manchuria became Japan’s essential goal. Therefore Japan abandoned its traditional policy of supporting the unity of China, while, on the other hand, firmly supporting the Qing government. This is because after its victory over Russia, Japan believed in its capability of competing with Western powers in the dismemberment of China. To meet this purpose, the existence of a corrupt Qing government was to its advantage. As a result, Japan adopted a policy of suppressing the revolutionaries.

     As for the period of the 1911 Revolution, Japan’s China policy can be further divided into two stages. At first, Japan, following her post Russo-Japanese War policy, backed the Qing Imperial House. Later, Japan proposed a loan to the revolutionary government in exchange for commercial privileges in the lower Yangtzu Valley region. Failing to acquire substantial aid from Japanwas a key factor in forcing Sun Yat-sen to compromise with Yuan Shikai. On the other hand, Japan as well missed its best chance to establish cooperative relationship with Sun’s revolutionary forces. Their relationship thenceforce remained mistrustful.

     This paper uses the case of grain trade networks to re-assess the role of the foreign sector in China’s economy in the interwar years (1918-1936). Previous studies have debated over the issue and mainly dichotomize the Sino-foreign business relationship in terms of competition. This paper attempts to explore the complex relationship between the two by reconstructing both the domestic and foreign trade networks in the China grain market (mainly rice and paddy, wheat and flour). It also examines the relationship between foreign and domestic grains at the trading port level. To further explore the factors affecting the movements of both domestic and foreign grain imports into Chinese ports, this paper also examines the relationship between the movements of rice and flour during the period under review.

     Our analysis demonstrates that China’s economy in the interwar years was full of complex relationships between different sectors. The case of principal food grains has illustrated that the performance of one kind of grains was not simply determined by its foreign rivals. It was also affected by other sectors of the domestic market and depended remarkably on the scale of that market. Larger markets, by virtue of their size, seem to attract competition more easily than smaller ones. Yet, competition might come not just from foreign rivals; domestic ones, including those of different kinds but substitutable, should be of no lesser importance. Besides, the “competition analysis” fails to recognize the very nature of the China grain trade networks. As this paper has shown, overseas Chinese imported rice and paddy into the country, showing an extension of Chinese business networks, while Chinese flour-mill owners used foreign wheat imports to compete with foreign flour. In short, the dichotomy between “China and the world” simply fails to provide a satisfactory analytical framework. Further research would benefit from leaving this framework for other fundamental changes in modern Chinese economy and society.